‘Remember me’: *Hamlet, Memory and Bloom’s Poiesis*

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Although memory is not explicitly named in “Hades”, it nonetheless features centrally. Intertextuality is an example of memory, and in “Hades” Shakespeare’s *Hamlet* is remembered – specifically the Ghost’s relation to Hamlet, whom he bids to ‘Remember’ and ‘revenge’. Derrida calls this relation ‘hauntological’: it is characterised by an uncertain gaze, the father telling his son what to do, and the son mourning for his father. In Bloom’s mourning for his father, Virag, hauntology might be expected. However, it is Bloom’s late son, Rudy, who hauntologizes Bloom, thereby revitalising the latter; this adjusts Shakespeare’s original hauntology. While considering repeatable ways of maintaining this hauntology, Bloom jocularly reverts to new technology: the phonograph and photograph. His plan reveals his relish for liminality and *poiesis*: being and non-being at the same time. Bloom is thus remembered into the future, all the while *Ulysses* is haunted by *Hamlet*.

Keywords: William Shakespeare, James Joyce, *Hamlet*, *Ulysses*, “Hades”, memory, hauntology

Though “Hades”, the sixth episode of *Ulysses*, treats the dead most directly of all the chapters in the novel, that does not necessarily mean that it engages with memory explicitly. As Table 1 demonstrates, whilst in *Ulysses* there is a high preponderance of words in the lexical field of ‘memory’, few of them appear in “Hades”. In fact, the word ‘remember’, which occurs in every chapter, appears nine times in each of “Sirens”, “Circe” and “Penelope”. Fourth on the list is “Lestrygonians”, with “Hades” joint with “Nausicaa” in equal fifth (see Table 2). If only Bloom’s chapters are considered, then “Hades” languishes in fourth, still far below where it might be expected to rank. [insert Table 1]

These results should not be correlated with *Ulysses’* intertextuality. The episode ‘Scylla and Charybdis’ is well known as the ‘Shakespeare’ chapter, with Stephen talking about and frequently remembering Shakespeare’s texts. And yet, it only uses the word ‘remember’ twice, showing how intertextual ‘memory’ should not only be thought of as explicit, but discernible in the implicit and subtle. The texts ‘remembered’ also contribute to
Ulysses’ ‘structure of feeling’ – the ‘practical consciousness of a present kind, in a living and interrelating continuity’. The same goes for memory more generally: a text such as Ulysses that experiments with a range of narrative techniques, including stream of consciousness and interior monologue, somewhat forgoes other conventions of memory such as prefacing flashbacks or indicating indirect or reported speech. In short, memory in Ulysses should not be considered restricted to these common signs that indicate that ‘remembering is taking place’. [insert Table 2]

Instead, it is as Nicholas Royle describes:

It is a question, then, of phantom texts – textual phantoms which do not necessarily have the solidity or objectivity of a quotation, an intertext or explicit, acknowledged presence and which do not in fact come to rest anywhere. Phantom texts are fleeting, continually moving on, leading us away, like Hamlet’s Ghost, to some other scene.[4] The notion of phantom texts allows me to say that, in fact, remembering is taking place in “Hades”, and I will show below how “Hades” models the way that ‘remembering’ takes place across Ulysses entirely. As in Royle’s analysis – but in fact, even more so – in “Hades” memory is just like the Ghost of Hamlet. I will show that memory in “Hades” comes modelled directly by Hamlet’s Ghost.

“Hades” charts Bloom’s journey from the centre of Dublin to Prospect Cemetery in the city’s northwest quadrant. He attends the funeral of Paddy Dignam, and the journey, the service and the burial all prompt memories, both voluntary and involuntary, of people and events to flood Bloom’s consciousness.

One idea that “Hades” remembers is similar stories in classical epics. Bloom travels in a carriage with three other Dubliners – Martin Cunningham, Jack Power and Simon Dedalus – from Sandymount to Glasnevin. In the process the carriage crosses the four waterways in Dublin – the River Dodder, the Grand Canal, the River Liffey and the Royal
Canal – thereby mimicking the epic trope of the ἡ νέκυια, the nekuya or descent into hell. Odysseus’ descent into hell in The Odyssey, as with Aeneas in The Aeneid, requires him to cross the four waterways of Hades, the underworld. Maurice Halbwachs argues that ‘The “Nekuya,” […] provides a background against which we can more clearly discern both Olympus with its misty lights and a society of men who are above all lovers of life’. As with Odysseus, Bloom’s journey to the cemetery exposes him as a ‘lover[] of life’, though ‘no external wisdom guides him’. By placing “Hades” as direct descendent of these previous nekuyas, the text remembers The Odyssey and The Aeneid even as Bloom’s narrative departs from theirs. The text invites its readers to compare Bloom with Odysseus – as does the novel as a whole – and Aeneas, the founder of a new civilisation. Aeneas is an outsider who carries relics of the old gods – remembrances, that is – from Troy into Italy in order to lay the foundations for the next great civilisation of men. The implication is that Bloom is their descendant, carrying their legacy in Dublin.

The text obviously invites these connections; however, other memories and ghosts that irrupt into the text – including Bloom’s father, Rudolph Virag’s, death and inquest, to Bloom’s son’s imagined eleven-year-old existence – should also be considered. In this article, I take Bloom’s relationship to memory as a signal representation of how memories of the dead underpin a character’s continued living. I will show how it is not merely a structural force of death energising life. More than this, memories of death transform Bloom into a figure who pursues more vestiges of the dead – Bloom considers saving the dead from death in a quasi-life residing in technology. These memories become characterised by ποίησις, poiesis. Bloom’s lust for life, therefore, is no ordinary energy, but tends towards transformation, creation and liminality. It has a forebear in one of Ulysses’ chief intertexts: Shakespeare’s Hamlet. I will show how in “Hades”, Bloom and not Stephen is the descendant of Hamlet and the latter’s ontological interests, particularly as they are driven by memory –
the Ghost’s injunction to ‘remember me’ – and find a voice of poetic sensibility in technology (the record and the photograph). I will show that to ‘remember’ successfully is to relish being haunted by liminal beings, and to adopt an attitude to life that values perpetual regeneration, poiesis. Achieving this, Bloom thereby remembers Hamlet – the play par excellence that proves the importance of memory in literature.

I will first explain Hamlet as a play of memory, before describing Jacques Derrida’s reading of hauntology in the play. I then examine hauntology in relation to Bloom in “Hades”, before establishing that Bloom, like Hamlet, is vitally enhanced by the ghost of a dead loved one. In place of Hamlet’s father’s spirit, Bloom is compelled to life by the future-memorial ghost of his late son, Rudy. I finally show that Bloom begins to appreciate the presence of the dead in his life, imagining scenarios in which they can be brought back to quasi-life through the use of technology. My conclusion is that Bloom’s more positive outlook on life, following his encounters with the dead, endows him with a mind that ‘remembers poetically’ – though not writing poetry, Bloom is conditioned by poiesis, a sensibility that privileges liminality and potentiality.

**Hamlet’s Memories**

*Hamlet* is a play of memory. Even prior to meeting the Ghost, Hamlet is proud to wear the mourning weeds to signal his bereavement for his father. By Act One Scene Five, this memory play is spurred on by the Ghost’s explicit injunction to Hamlet: ‘Adieu, adieu, adieu, remember me.’ (I. V. 91) This compels Hamlet to erase his commonplace book, ‘My tables! Meet it is I set it down’ (I. V. 107), perhaps through a Ramist strategy for learning that has memory at its heart. As the play unfolds, Hamlet’s bid to ‘Revenge his [father’s] foul and unnatural murder’ (I. V. 25) is inextricably tied to Hamlet’s memory of the Ghost. When Hamlet speaks with Gertrude in her closet, the Ghost returns to make sure that Hamlet is on
the right path to vengeance: ‘Do not forget! This visitation / Is but to whet thy almost blunted purpose’ (III.iv.107–8; my emphasis). Evidently, remembering and revenging amount to the same thing for Hamlet. There is no Hamlet without memory.

In Specters of Marx, Derrida offers another reading of the Ghost’s relationship to Hamlet. Under the category ‘hauntology’ (which plays with ‘ontology’ in its French pronunciation), Derrida likewise considers the connection between Hamlet and the Ghost as integral to the drama. The absolute singularity of the coming of the Ghost – the inexplicability of the Ghost’s presence suggests it is a singular event, therefore happening both for the first and last time\(^\text{10}\) – leads Derrida to label it ‘Staging for the end of history’:

> Let us call it a hauntology. This logic of haunting would not be merely larger and more powerful than an ontology or a thinking of Being (of the ‘to be,’ assuming that it is a matter of Being in the ‘to be or not to be,’ but nothing is less certain). It would harbor within itself, but like circumscribed places or particular effects, eschatology and teleology themselves. It would comprehend them, but incomprehensibly. How to comprehend in fact the discourse of the end or the discourse about the end? Can the extremity of the extreme ever be comprehended? And the opposition between ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’? Hamlet already began with the expected return of the dead King. After the end of history, the spirit comes by coming back [revenant]. It figures both a dead man who comes back and a ghost whose expected return repeats itself, again and again.\(^\text{11}\)

Hauntology is greater than ontology, and refers to the singularity of the encounter with the spectral Ghost, despite the Ghost’s prior appearance: the paradoxical repetition of the singularity. Hauntology also refers to the question ‘To be, or not to be?’ (III.i.55), and therefore also the Ghost’s being or non-being.

Moreover, for my purposes hauntology is constituted by three ideas emerging from the actual encounters with the Ghost. These are (1) the ‘visor effect’, which includes a ‘spectral asymmetry’; (2) the ‘anachrony’ which ‘makes the law’; and, (3) the work of mourning which would seem to act as counter to the first two, though actually reinforces the
work that the Ghost can achieve. I will take each of these in turn to show their importance to my argument about memory in *Hamlet*. After, I will show how they are crucial to Bloom’s trip to Glasnevin Cemetery.

**Hamlet’s hauntology**

The ‘visor effect’ derives from a simple concept: the observer(s) of the spectre – Marcellus, Barnardo, Horatio or Hamlet – cannot see the spectre looking back at them. This is owing to the armed Ghost, whose visor is semi-permeable to sight:

The armor lets one see nothing of the spectral body, but at the level of the head and beneath the visor, it permits the so-called father to see and to speak. Some slits are cut into it and adjusted so as to permit him to see without being seen, but to speak in order to be heard. The *helmet*, like the visor, did not merely offer protection: it topped off the coat of arms and indicated the chief’s authority, like the blazon of his nobility.

Authority is visible onstage, so the Ghost’s clothing denotes someone of a high, if not the highest, rank. Furthermore, the authority is what allows the Ghost to restrict this visibility or ocularity: the visor does not let the observers see that the Ghost is looking at the observers.

Here is the spectral asymmetry of which Derrida writes.

The ability to identify the Ghost is central to Hamlet. He asks Horatio with successive, stichomythic questions: ‘Armed, say you? […] From top to toe? […] What looked he, frowningly? […] Pale, or red? […] And fixed his eyes upon you? (I.ii.225–33)

The energetic questions climax with Hamlet’s final inquiry in this sequence asking whether the Ghost looked at Horatio. The question of identity is resolved on the premise that the Ghost did look at Horatio, and that look confirmed the Ghost’s appearance. Hamlet’s next comment that ‘I would I had been there’ (I.ii.34), reveals that he is satisfied as to the Ghost’s identity.
It can be argued, however, that whilst ocularity is important to Hamlet, Derrida places too great an emphasis on the visor. This is especially true since, between the second and third of these questions, Hamlet makes an assertion that Horatio rebuffs:

HAMLET Then you saw not his face.
HORATIO O yes, my lord, he wore his beaver up. (I.ii.227–8)

Despite this obvious proof that the Ghost was able to avoid the semi-permeable problem of the visor and its slits, Derrida persists in focusing on the ‘visor effect’. To counter this complaint, he adds that

Even when [the visor] is raised, *in fact*, its possibility continues to signify that someone, beneath the armor, can safely see without being seen or without being identified. Even when it is raised, the visor remains, an available resource and structure, solid and stable as armor […] The helmet effect is not suspended when the visor is raised. Its power, namely its possibility, is in that case recalled merely in a more intensely dramatic fashion.14

The visor effect and its subsequent spectral asymmetry – of ocularity and of power – is all the more effective because of its *potentiality*: even when it is not in play, it threatens to reassert itself. This threat renders the spectral chief, the authoritative Ghost, always ready to ‘see and to speak’, and therefore the Ghost’s interlocutor must always be ready to listen to it without interruption. In effect, the visor effect turns the spectre into a living authority possessing a living voice able to bend others to its will. The envoy of the dead can control the stage.

This is also visible in the second hauntological idea, that of anachrony giving the law. When the Ghost speaks and gives his authority some vocal force, then he gives the law. The law, coming from a spectre, ‘thy father’s spirit’ (I.v.9), is given by a representative of *time before the play*. The play’s time, which I have already shown is confused owing to the repeated singularity of the Ghost’s visit, is again shown to be riven with anachronisms. Or, as Hamlet says to Horatio and the others, ‘The time is out of joint’ (I.v.86). The idea of
anachrony is compounded by another element of the Ghost’s giving the law: the fact it is the
Ghost of Hamlet’s father. Not only is the law-giver’s spirit dead, but there is a generational
separation between the law-giver and the legal prosecutor: the father instructs the son what to
do. The twin injunctions to ‘Revenge’ and ‘remember me’ become inherited laws that must
be executed by someone who was not victim of their initiating act – King Hamlet’s murder.
In this, then, Hamlet is actually the Ghost’s play, and not the prince’s.

The element of Hamlet that appears to counter hauntology is the central idea of
mourning. Hamlet, of all characters, mourns most obviously in the play, evident from the
moment he is seen onstage in his mourning weeds, though it is also clear, argues Derrida, in
Act Five Scene One when Hamlet is taking account of and addressing the skulls of dead
people. Derrida asserts that mourning ‘consists always in attempting to ontologize remains, to
make them present, in the first place by identifying the bodily remains and by localizing the
dead’. In the graveyard, Hamlet

demands to know to whom the grave belongs […]. Nothing could be worse, for the work
of mourning, than confusion or doubt: one has to know who is buried where – and it is
necessary (to know – to make certain) that, in what remains of him, he remain there. Let
him stay there and move no more!

This work of mourning is characterised by giving name to, or ‘ontologizing’ the remains of
the dead, and also of locating them geo-temporally – in their grave and in their right
temporality of death, and not life. The former leads to the latter, inasmuch as knowing of the
dead allows Hamlet to detach his living self from their dead remains.

However, it is clear that the work of mourning is interrupted by the arrival of the
spectre. Through the visor effect the spectre seeks to destabilise the ability of the observer to
localize or ontologize the dead – to mourn. The Ghost instead ‘freez[es] the young blood’
(I.V.16) of Hamlet. After the Ghost’s threat through spectral asymmetry, Hamlet learns that
the living cannot control the dead, but in fact that the dead control the living. Moreover, Hamlet’s legal framework, which had previously been prescribed by ‘the Everlasting’ and his ‘canon’ (I.ii.131–2), is now upset by the Ghost’s injunctions to revenge and remember.

Hauntology gives to mourning a hiatus, and denies it its full course. Conversely, mourning contests hauntology: the power of those living to establish their distance and difference from the dead denies hauntology its full force. Hamlet’s mourning, in this vein, acts to exemplify the power of suffering

the whips and scorns of time,
Th’oppressor’s wrong, the proud man’s contumely,
The pangs of despised love, the law’s delay,
The insolence of office and the spurns
That patient merit of th’unworthy takes[.] (III.i.69–73)

However, it must be borne in mind that hauntology casts a shadow over mourning that reveals the full living force of grief: mourning contests hauntology, and its power is redoubled through that contest. Without the shadow of death, and the threat of the returning dead to command the living, the force of mourning is weakened. Thus, hauntology is a necessary part of a successful and powerful process of mourning. And since revenging and remembering constitute a cornerstone of hauntology in Hamlet, then mourning must also be considered both ante and post hoc to those twin acts. Mourning remembers just at the moment when it seeks to detach the living from the dead.17

Hauntology, therefore, is a powerful force for the living – though it comes at a cost. It removes Hamlet’s agency from the stage – the law is not his own and he was not victim of the murder that instigated the laws to revenge and remember. And it relies on an asymmetry that manifests itself in ocularity: Hamlet must learn to trust in not seeing, in not always being able to identify the originator of the law. And yet, conversely, hauntology reinforces the importance and power of mourning, of ontologizing remains and localizing them in the grave.
Hauntology both interrupts and expedites mourning. I will now explain the relevance of these ideas to Bloom in “Hades”.

**Bloom’s Mourning**

Not unsurprisingly “Hades”, situated in a quasi-mythological underworld and site of afterlife, is a chapter coloured by death. R. M. Adams describes how Bloom is ‘haunted throughout the chapter by an amazing assortment of ghosts, spooks, and hobgoblin doppelgängers’, fearing even stories of ghosts returning after death: ‘I will appear to you after death. You will see my ghost after death. My ghost will haunt you after death.’ Memory in the order of spectrality, as in *Hamlet*, is conditioned by the encounter of the living with ghosts: the anachronistic return of those who do not belong with the living. As Bloom’s journey to and through Glasnevin Cemetery progresses, Bloom encounters more ghostly memories of his dead loved ones. This leads to Shari Benstock’s comment that ‘Bloom is haunted by the ghost of his dead loved ones, is obsessed with his own dead past, is discovering on this day that the “spirit” world is very much a part of his everyday life’. As I will show, Bloom learns to appreciate the community of the dead.

One of the first ‘ghosts’ to visit Bloom takes the form of an involuntary memory while they are still *en route* to the cemetery. It is the memory of his father, Virag’s, death.

That afternoon of the inquest. The redlabelled bottle on the table. The room in the hotel with hunting pictures. Stuffy it was. Sunlight through the slats of the Venetian blind. The coroner’s sunlit ears, big and hairy. Boots giving evidence. Thought he was asleep first. Then saw like yellow streaks on his face. Had slipped down to the foot of the bed. Verdict: overdose. Death by misadventure. The letter. For my son Leopold.

No more pain. Wake no more. Nobody owns. (6.359–65)

It would seem that this is hauntology in the mode of *Hamlet*: the father appearing to the son. For example, as in Derrida’s description of mourning in *Hamlet*, Bloom also uses the
memory as an archaeological dig for ascertaining knowledge. Bloom first locates the memory geo-temporally, not only the deictic ‘that’ indicating elsewhere from the carriage, but also in the ‘afternoon’. The text then describes the coroner’s room through the vignetteed ‘redlabelled bottle’, the ‘hunting pictures’ and the ‘Sunlight’ illuminating the coroner’s ‘ears, big and hairy’. Then the porter, ‘Boots’ is brokenly recalled ‘giving evidence’ of finding Virag dead. Aside from the ‘Stuffy’ coroner’s room, all descriptions are images irrupting into Bloom’s mind. Like a zoetrope, Bloom’s memory of the inquest consists of a series of disparate images strung together consecutively in a disruptive fashion that never fully erases the joins between the images. The static sequence, with only an imperfect hint towards dynamic movement, offers a version of the asymmetrical ocularity originating in *Hamlet*.

However, this father-son encounter circumvents hauntology and fails to hauntologize Bloom, despite the similarities. As such, the element of authoritative control evident in *Hamlet* does not continue in *Ulysses*: here, Bloom alone is able to see the revenant memory, and any authoritative speech is markedly missing. Even Boots’ evidence is related indirectly, without any kind of speech marker. In light of this reading, Bloom’s mourning for his father is incomplete because, paradoxically, the memory is not strong enough to act as catalyst to hasten the end of mourning. Without Virag’s hauntology, Bloom will never have full control over his mourning for his father.

There is the potential vessel for Virag’s authoritative instruction to the son here, in the form of the letter. Earlier in “Hades”, Bloom alludes to the letter, noting its most significant feature: ‘Be good to [my dog] Athos, Leopold, is my last wish.’ (6.125–6) Though this is an odd injunction to pass from father to son, it nonetheless qualifies as inheritance. However, its bathetic nature undermines the authority that Virag attempts to impart, thereby undermining Virag’s ability to control his son. As if to correct this failure, in ‘Circe’, *Ulysses’* fifteenth episode, Virag talks to his son while dressed in his own, traditional outfit (much as the Ghost
did): ‘the long caftan of an elder in Zion and a smokingcap with magenta tassels’ (6.248–9).

In this exchange between Bloom and the ghost of his father, Virag condemns the past behaviour of Bloom. Virag complains that ‘One night they bring you home drunk as dog after spend your good money’. Bloom’s reply that it happened ‘Only that once’ fails to console Virag, who continues: ‘Once! Mud head to foot. Cut your hand open. Lockjaw. They make you kaput, Leopoldleben.’ Virag finally finishes ‘(with contempt) Goim nachez!’ (15.266–79)

In her edition of the novel, Jeri Johnson translates this Yiddish phrase as a contemptible ‘The proud pleasure of the gentiles!’ The whole effect of the exchange is to show that the ghost of Bloom’s father is not so concerned with Bloom’s future actions – there are neither injunctions nor commandments – but purely with Bloom’s past acts. In this sense, Virag does not act authoritatively and he does not deny his son the ability to see him speaking and watching him; in spite of the homological similarities between Ghost-Hamlet and Virag-Bloom, Virag does not hauntologize Bloom in the way that the Ghost hauntologizes Hamlet.

Bloom also mourns the death of his son, Rudy. The chief element of his mourning centres on the idea that a son provides someone to whom Bloom can pass on his inheritance. The memory starts with, ‘If little Rudy had lived’. This phrase implies a conditional future tense in which a whole counterfactual world becomes possible. However, this future is denied both to Bloom and Rudy; as such, so is the power of Bloom as memory eikon: he will not become a memory for his son to draw on. Memory fails with the failure of the son to survive the father.

However, it becomes clear that this counterfactual, ghostly Rudy is able to hauntologize Bloom: ‘See him grow up. Hear his voice in the house. Walking beside Molly in an Eton suit. My son. Me in his eyes.’ (6.74–6)

It would be easy to draw analogies between Hamlet’s Ghost and Bloom: both figures seek anachronic futurity in their sons; both are connected to the ocular or spectral blindness, as Bloom here sees not Rudy’s eyes, but his
own eyes in Rudy’s (which also connects to anachrony). Both figures are also, in their connections with their sons, in a relationship with death or non-being: the Ghost is the return of a dead figure, whilst Bloom imagines the restoration of his own dead son. In this last idea, the homological connection between the Ghost, Bloom and Hamlet breaks down, however, for Bloom is never able to give the law to his son: Rudy is dead while Bloom lives. However, if the anachrony is reversed, then hauntology reappears: Rudy hauntologizes Bloom according to the three features of hauntology enumerated above.

As with Virag, Rudy also appears to Bloom in ‘Circe’. Unlike his grandfather, this younger ‘Rudolph Bloom’ does not speak. Instead, Bloom watches him. The ghost’s/memory’s clothes are again important, but so are his eyes:

RUDY

([…]) Against the dark wall a figure appears slowly, a fairy boy of eleven, a changeling, kidnapped, dressed in an Eton suit with glass shoes and little bronze helmet, holding a book in his hand. He reads from right to left inaudibly, smiling, kissing the page.)

BLOOM

(wonderstruck, calls inaudibly) Rudy!

RUDY

(gazes, unseeing, into Bloom’s eyes and goes on reading, kissing, smiling. He has a delicate mauve face. On his suit he has diamond and ruby buttons. In his free left hand he holds a slim ivory cane with a violet bowknot. A white lambkin peeps out of his waistcoat pocket.) (15.4956–67)

Two things merit focus in this passage. The first is Rudy’s reading backwards, it appears, from right to left. The second is Rudy’s unseeing gaze that continues while he carries on reading. Both draw attention to the importance of ocularity and the notion of inheritance.

The idea of ocularity is easily comparable with the Ghost’s relation to Hamlet. The unseeing gaze is as it is seen by Bloom, and therefore it is unclear whether the ghost of Rudy
sees Bloom or not. And yet, Rudy is also using his eyes to read; he is in ocular control. What he reads, I argue, is an authoritative Jewish text, for which reason he reads the Hebraic text from right to left. Rudy’s kissing the page is a Joycean interpolation which does not quite reflect Judaic practice.\textsuperscript{25} Nevertheless, the implication is clear: Rudy’s practice indicates the reinstitution of the authoritative Judaic word which Bloom has been ignoring.

The hauntological process appears to be complete: Rudy is anachronically haunting Bloom from the position of a younger generation that is now past; he is also denying Bloom the satisfaction of knowing whether or not he is looking at Bloom. And it appears that Rudy is giving the Jewish law back to Bloom. Indeed, Neil Davison sees in moments such as this an opportunity for Bloom to reinvigorate his role as ‘Jewish father’\textsuperscript{26} – something he performs in looking after Stephen Dedalus, ironically in ‘orthodox Samaritan fashion’ (16.3). Whilst Catherine Hezser contests Davison’s idea that Bloom re-commits to Judaism, particularly given that in ‘the following chapters, […] Bloom] repeatedly renounces his Jewishness’,\textsuperscript{27} Hezser’s position ignores the nuance of Davison’s argument that to identify as Jewish, for Bloom, was to identify positively as an outsider, rather than passively accept the objectification from characters such as the Citizen in ‘Cyclops’. Rudy’s hauntological appearance at the end of the ‘Circe’ episode precedes Bloom’s charitable fatherliness towards Stephen, narrated in ‘Eumaeus’ which follows. Rudy, in this sense, brings Bloom back to life when reminding him of his mortality.

And so, on two separate occasions, ghosts appear to Bloom in ‘Circe’ who originally spring to mind in “Hades”. Moreover, there are clear connections between their appearances in these scenes: Virag’s yellow streaked face; Rudy’s dressing in an Eton suit. I stress this to show the specific connections that these moments have, rather than the myriad other references in \textit{Ulysses} to Virag and Rudy. However, as I have shown, Virag’s appearance, although homologically closer to the Ghost-Hamlet relationship than Rudy-Bloom, is less
hauntological than the latter. This reveals one of the transformations that Joyce’s text makes to Shakespeare’s tragedy: a generational movement that enacts an anachronic shift from the power of the dead father to the power of the dead son.

**Bloom’s Revival**

Neither of the memories of Bloom’s relatives emerge from a moment of mournfulness, even if they are themselves sad. For example, Bloom’s memory of Rudy is inspired not by thoughts of death or childhood mortality, but rather by a moment of respect for Simon Dedalus in the latter’s concern for his son:

– I won’t have her bastard of a nephew ruin my son. A counterjumper’s son. Selling tapes in my cousin, Peter Paul M’Swiney’s. Not likely.

  He ceased. Mr Bloom glanced from his angry moustache to Mr Power’s mild face and Martin Cunningham’s eyes and beard, gravely shaking. Noisy selfwilled man. Full of his son. He is right. Something to hand on. (6.70–4)

This grudging respect for Simon and his demanding behaviour for his son compels Bloom to think about the future that might have been for Rudy. Inheritance is central in this interaction.

Bloom’s memories about his father in “Hades” are also triggered by one of the Dubliners in the carriage with him. Rather than Simon Dedalus, the focus is now on Martin Cunningham: ‘Mr Bloom, about to speak, closed his lips again. Martin Cunningham’s large eyes. Looking away now. Sympathetic human man he is. Intelligent. Like Shakespeare’s face. Always a good word to say’ (6.343–5). Martin Cunningham is subtly alluded to as a friend of Bloom’s who knows more than the others in the carriage about Bloom’s personal history (a point stressed at 6.526 ff.).

Moreover, whilst both memories are triggered by a moment of inspiration inside the carriage, the future-memory of Rudy inspires a yet more positive outlook from Bloom, since he starts thinking about how Rudy was conceived:
Behind the ghost of the dead Rudy stands the memory of Rudy’s beginning. This shows that Bloom’s journey through Hades may be contaminated by a host of ghosts and goblins, but can always return to life and living given the right circumstances. That the memory of his father does not return Bloom to thoughts of life shows the greater potency of Rudy’s memory over Virag’s: Rudy is the hauntologizing ghost from whom Bloom inherits.

Bloom’s revival should not just be thought of as a personal action, despite Kerri Haggart’s rightful claim that ‘Throughout [Hades] it is clear that Bloom’s concerns lie within the domestic realm’ and that ‘These thoughts are individual to’ Bloom.29 By taking into account Halbwach’s ideas of communal memory, Bloom’s role as a Dublin citizen, even in “Hades”, becomes clearer. When Halbwachs argues that the idea of absolute individual memory is a fallacy, he urges that ‘We appeal to witnesses to corroborate or invalidate as well as supplement what we somehow know already about an event’. Moreover, referencing an analogical transfer between the self and the other, he writes that when remembering collectively, ‘It is as if we were comparing the testimony of several witnesses’.30 Halbwachs explains his rationale in greater detail: ‘Our memories remain collective […] and are recalled to us through others even though only we were participants in the events or saw the things concerned. In reality, we are never alone.’ For example, ‘Many impressions of my first visit to London […] reminded me of Dickens’ novels read in childhood, so I took my walk with Dickens. In each of these moments I cannot say that I was alone, that I reflected alone’.31 Even when physically alone, therefore, Halbwachs’ individual is never sociologically isolated. Luke Gibbons’ argument bears this out in Joyce more generally:
Joyce maintains the openness to external promptings found in Proust’s involuntary memory, but there is also a sense in which they come from *within*: not from within the self, as in Freud, but from the unrequited pasts of a culture. Hidden pasts may lie outside the realm of the self, but this is only to say they lie in other selves, in the intersubjectivity of shared pasts and cultural memory.\(^{32}\)

These ideas are applicable to Bloom. Not only are his memories conditioned by others’ presence – Boots, coroner, Rudy and Molly – but the memories are summoned to presence by collective, social triggers. The first of these communities is that of the ‘spirit world’, as Benstock noted above. On his journey, Bloom encounters his own memories, but also comes across a series of others’ memories of loved ones and late friends. Additionally, even those in the carriage, let alone those at the graveyard, make mention of memories, or trigger Bloom’s memories of Rudy and Virag.

A case in point is Martin Cunningham, whose amiable, Shakespearean face twice prompts Bloom to open up to his emotions of mourning. On the first occasion, as I have quoted, Bloom can only examine Simon Dedalus’ moustache and Jack Power’s ‘mild face’; however, when he turns to Martin, he is able to connect with his eyes. On the second occasion, Bloom pinpoints Martin Cunningham’s ‘large eyes’ before they look away. These ocular moments remind the reader of the importance of the visual connection, and show what it is that Bloom is after: to look someone in the eyes. This is a motif throughout *Ulysses*, with Gibbons arguing that there is a special intimacy accorded to those who can converse through looking in one another’s eyes.\(^{33}\) However, in neither of the memories does Bloom achieve this, though he comes close with Rudy: ‘Me in his eyes.’ In this, notwithstanding Bloom’s desire to imagine how Rudy would look, Bloom fails to hauntologize Rudy. He gets further in Rudy’s ghostly appearance in ‘Circe’ when Rudy ‘gazes unseeing’ – on this occasion, however, the subjective ocularity is Rudy’s obligation as he hauntologizes Bloom.
These ideas confirm that, though mourning for his son and father, Bloom chases the living gaze to help him return to life. They additionally show that, although Bloom is made to feel unwelcome at certain points in “Hades” – such as when John Henry Menton curtly thanks Bloom for pointing out the dint in his hat (6.1026) – his fellow Dubliners do see him as a member of their community, albeit on the fringe. Just as they collectively trigger his memories, he becomes constitutive of theirs, merely by being a part of the social ritual that constitutes the funeral. Bloom equally becomes part of the community of dead in whose presence he now stands. Walking round the cemetery causes Bloom to pause and wonder: ‘How many! […] Besides how could you remember everybody?’ (6.960–2) In response, as he heads through the cemetery, Bloom seeks ever-more outlandish strategies for remembering. These strategies recreate the hauntological effect that has energised Bloom, and restore his agency that hauntology would remove.

**Technological Strategies**

Derrida labels *Hamlet*’s Ghost’s armour a ‘technical prosthesis, a body foreign to the spectral body that it dresses, dissimulates, and protects, masking even its identity’. The supplementary aspect of the armour adds a layer to the spirit – which might not even be there – and adds to the Ghost’s general dissimulation. But the armour also gives the Ghost material form. In this way, it is both suspicious, but a necessary factor in the Ghost’s hauntology. It also signals to Hamlet that the Ghost is *between* the spiritual and profane worlds. As I will show, Bloom himself considers technical prostheses to help maintain the living with the dead, whilst never fully restoring them to life. He does this in order to reproduce artificially the process of hauntology that so energises him.

It is first important to note the subtle suspicion of old technology in “Hades”. Commenting on the pointsmen who work the tramlines, Bloom wonders: ‘Couldn’t they
invent something automatic so that the wheel itself much handier?’ He answers his own enquiry: ‘Well, but that fellow would lose his job then? Well but then another fellow would get a job making the new invention?’ (6.175–9) Later in the chapter, Bloom additionally complains about hearts and their fallibility: ‘A pump after all, pumping thousands of gallons of blood every day. One fine day it gets bunged up: and there you are. Lots of them lying around here: lungs hearts, livers. Old rusty pumps: damn the thing else.’ (6.674–6) In the former passage, Bloom is an economic industrialist, seeing in new technology the possibility of new economies and therefore new employment; hence his veneration. In the latter passage, by contrast, older technology is considered second rate and frail, and its failing leads directly to death.

If Bloom is to be considered a latter-day Hamlet, then the technical prostheses he seeks in Glasnevin to counter the ‘rusty pumps’ must maintain the liminality of being; or, in Gibbons’ terms, they must ‘play with the persistence of the ghost under modernity’. Bloom’s first idea focuses on the voice – that medium of authority that the Ghost uses to command Hamlet.

Well, the voice, yes: gramophone. Have a gramophone in every grave or keep it in the house. After dinner on a Sunday. Put on poor old greatgrandfather. Krahraark! Hellohellohello amawfullyglad kraark awfullygladseeagain hellohello amawf krpthsth. (6.962–6)

This comical moment considers a technology that would allow the dead to appear after their death via their voice. Confusingly, Bloom imagines that the speaking voice would illogically say that it is ‘awfullygladseeagain’ (my emphasis): it would imply that it can see those to whom it is talking, despite that obvious impossibility. Once more, the ocular is joined with the spectral voice, thereby intensifying its hauntological power.
Moreover, Bloom’s suggested use of the gramophone record is identical to some of the earliest analogies of memorial storage. Plato’s Socrates instructs in *Theaetetus* to envisage the mind as ‘wax’ on which memory is imprinted ‘as we might stamp the impression of a seal ring’. 38 This imprint is the *tupos* of memory. 39 Just as the wax tablet is a representation of the space for memory, so the waxen record is a technological storage space; the difference lies in the personal accessibility of the former and the communal accessibility of the latter, and perfectly analogises Halbwach’s ideas about the impossibility of individual memory – all memory is collective. Though Fritz Senn criticises Bloom’s choice of gramophone, 40 the deficiencies Senn highlights are central to the hauntological experience that Bloom recreates. Technically, the voice presents an absence to the collective, rendering the dead person indeterminate between life and death, ‘ontologiz[ing] remains, to make them present’. 41

Bloom proceeds to think carefully about the visibility of those brought back to life by technical prostheses. He continues: ‘Remind you of the voice like the photograph reminds you of the face. Otherwise you couldn’t remember the face after fifteen years, say.’ 42 (6.966–8) At the heart of Bloom’s strategy is the bid to avoid forgetting other people – to avoid oblivion. It is as if he, as well as Hamlet, has received the injunction from the Ghost. As with the record the photograph is a mediated form of memory which is both distinct from that which or whom it memorialises – it is only a ‘remind[er]’ of the dead person’s face – and yet its mediated nature renders it immemorial because it relies on no living being in order to exist. Highlighting the deathly aspect of the photograph, Maud Ellmann writes that ‘Through the photographic image we survive the grave but also die before our death, disenfleshed before our hearts have ceased to beat’. 43 Roland Barthes’ (1980) meditation on photography corroborates this idea of the photograph’s intimate relation to death. Not only in the photograph ‘taken of me’ does Barthes reveal that ‘Death is the *eidos*’ but also any
photograph that acts as replacement for the monument has as its punctum – ‘A photograph’s punctum is that accident which pricks me (but also bruises me, is poignant to me).’\textsuperscript{44} – the idea that

\begin{quote}
he is going to die. I read at the same time: This will be and this has been; I observe with horror an anterior future of which death is the stake. […] Whether or not the subject is already dead, every photograph is this catastrophe.\textsuperscript{45}
\end{quote}

With this indeterminate temporality and liminal occupation between life and death, Bloom’s ideas approach a man-inspired hauntology.\textsuperscript{46} Gibbons writes that in revolutionary Ireland, ‘Holding on to the now and then in one frame, the capacity of the photograph to suspend the flow of time opens up the present to unrequited pasts, re-connecting with other narratives’ – i.e. with other futures.\textsuperscript{47} Ellen Carol Jones corroborates this idea when she argues that ‘Joyce’s texts examine how public “memory” is created by projecting a future not yet realized – a projection that is, paradoxically, also a ‘retrospective arrangement’’.\textsuperscript{48} The spectres raised in the record and photograph are both temporally and spatially liminal, and it is at this juncture that the individual memory transfers into a collectively accessible consciousness.\textsuperscript{49} This archive, as it were, would enable the dead to hauntologize everyone in Dublin. It also validates my theory of the memorial intertext – \textit{Hamlet} in this case – hauntologizing \textit{Ulysses}. Ellmann’s conclusion to all of this is salient here for a number of reasons: ‘To be or not to be is no longer the question.’\textsuperscript{50}

\textbf{Conclusion: Being and Non-Being}

I argue that the question has transformed in Bloom’s mind into a definitive statement: ‘To be, \textit{and} not to be.’ The shift from ‘or’ to ‘and’ mirrors Bloom’s fascination with the technological prostheses that render the memorial ghosts both dead \textit{and} living at once. This eases his mourning, apparently, and though Bloom leaves the cemetery still separate from his
fellow Dubliners (6.1027–8), he does so with renewed vitality: ‘The gates glimmered in front: still open. Back to the world again. […] How grand we are this morning! (6.995–1033)

Whereas Hamlet’s relationship with the Ghost led to his reduced agency, Bloom’s consideration of technological prostheses restores his agency in spite of the imbalanced hauntology. The opportunity to access more readily and create collective memory puts a spring in Bloom’s step.

This shift from questionable ‘or’ to liminal ‘and’ is theorized in Søren Kierkegaard’s 1843 ‘Either/Or’ essay. Kierkegaard’s ‘A’ analogises it through agricultural cultivation, claiming that when the land’s potential for growth and harvest is considered, ‘every particular change still falls under the universal rule of the relation between recollecting and forgetting.’

It is important to ask whether it is possible to choose both recollecting and forgetting: whether in forgetting the liveliness of people, they can still be re-membered back into the world. In answer to this question, Kierkegaard writes:

But what is it, then, that I choose – is it this or that? No, for I choose absolutely, and I choose absolutely precisely by having chosen not to choose this or that. I choose the absolute, and what is the absolute? It is myself in my eternal validity.

In Bloom’s choice to have the dead nearly living, and therefore both dead and alive at the same time, he maintains his own potential for being in his ‘eternal validity’. Bloom’s predilection for liminality in “Hades” maintains his own potentiality, his own liminality, though with the stress on his inability to die absolutely, rather than the ability to be brought back to life. He, like the ghosts he revives, becomes liminal in his remembering: he partially joins the community of the dead, just as they are summoned to meet him.

Kierkegaard describes a position such as Bloom’s as ‘remember[ing] poetically’, a process which prevents nostalgia – the painful return of memories. Since mourning is a process in which painful memories return, it is possible to equate ‘remembering poetically’
with completing the work of mourning. Here hauntology is seen to expedite mourning. Critically, remembering poetically is *not* the same as writing poetry. Rather, it needs to be considered as closer to an ethic of *poiesis*. In Plato’s *Symposium* Diotima schools Socrates in *Eros* and the love of absolute beauty. An analogy for erotic love is *poiesis*, through which Diotima explains how “‘There is poetry, which, as you know, is complex and manifold. All creation or passage of non-being into being is poetry or making, and the processes of all art are creative; and the masters of arts are all poets or makers’”\(^5\). A commitment to *poiesis* is a commitment to perpetual becoming, to thriving in liminality between being and non-being, life and death, the past servicing the future – a commitment to ‘eternal validity’. *Poiesis*, though similar to the classical idea of *tekhnè* – an art or skill more concerned with end product than process\(^5\) – differs in the idea of mediation. John Frow sees in *tekhnè* and technological forms of memory a mediation that implies ‘institutional conditions of existence’\(^5\). To suggest that the photograph and record are ‘Monuments of unageing intellect’, to quote Yeats’ ‘Sailing to Byzantium’,\(^5\) renders them static, ignoring their potential for maintaining potential (just as with the Ghost’s visor): their *poiesis*.

And so, to suggest that Bloom is remembering poetically changes the common perception of him. Bloom is nominally considered the Everyman in *Ulysses*, to Stephen’s poet-hero; Stephen is often compared to Hamlet. However, in this article, I have shown that Bloom is Hamletic through his *poietic* mourning which in “Hades” is overcome by more, not less death; but death that, in being brought back to life, hauntologizes Bloom. The technological prostheses of the record and the photograph represent versions of remembering poetically that allow the representation of those long dead to those who still live. This hauntology is exemplified in “Hades”, but is valid throughout the novel, and is even cemented by the appearance of the ghosts of Bloom’s father and son in ‘Circe’.
Finally, Bloom’s comical (though nevertheless important) memorial methods which allow for the production of a communal archive⁵⁹ reassert his importance to the Dublin community. He is the ‘passive and caring person’ who ‘achieves a sort of semi-divine status, at once victim and god, by a sort of anonymous celebrity’. And so, Bloom avoids ‘massification, […] i.e. being lost in the crowd’ and becomes the poietic Everyman.⁶⁰ Memory is at the heart of that role. Bloom remembers his father and son; the night terrors of ‘Circe’ remember the daytime desires of “Hades”; Glasnevin remembers the dead; and Bloom remembers Hamlet. Hamlet, of course, remembers the Ghost, who is the emblematic figure for the life-giving force of hauntology. In and through these memories, Bloom becomes eternally valid to his fellow Dubliners, and to Ulysses’ readers.

Memory, understood in this way both as intertext and impetus for personal life, is present in “Hades”, in spite of its explicit absences. In fact, “Hades” gives the model of memory for Ulysses as a whole and shows that the dead – be they dead texts or dead characters – still constitute an irrepresible and necessary part of Ulysses.

One final thought. As I have shown, anachrony and ‘time [being] out of joint’ is characteristic of all of the above analyses: a dead past is giving the law to the living present. It is important also to pay attention to the role of the anachronic future in hauntology. Importantly, through the poietic technology, Bloom would create an ‘eternal validity’ – the revenant dead would survive ad infinitum. Just as Rudy and Virag appear again in ‘Circe’, as if thrown forward in the text from “Hades”, so too would Bloom’s communally accessible archive of memory be available in the future. Rudy’s hauntology of Bloom allows the latter to consider a method of surviving into the future without the more natural opportunities that patrilineal inheritance affords. In this final sense, memory in “Hades” is not just about reviving the past or summoning up ghosts of the dead, but also about remembering faultlessly into the future – via a liminal, eternal existence.
Table 1. Frequency of lexical field of memory in *Ulysses* and “Hades”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Frequency in <em>Ulysses</em></th>
<th>Frequency in “Hades”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remember</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remembers</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remembered</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remembering</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memory</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memories</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recall</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recalled</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Rank order of episodes in *Ulysses* according to frequency of ‘remember’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>‘Sirens’</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Circe’</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Penelope’</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>‘Lestrygonians’</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>‘Hades’</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Nausicaa’</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>‘Telemachus’</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Oxen of the Sun’</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Eumaeus’</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>‘Proteus’</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Calypso’</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Lotus Eaters’</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Cyclops’</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>‘Aeolus’</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Seylla and Charybdis’</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>‘Nestor’</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Wandering Rocks’</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Ithaca’</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes


2. As Renate Lachmann argues, “‘Intertextuality’ is the term conceived in literary scholarship to capture this interchange and contact, formal and semantic, between texts – literary and non-literary. Intertextuality demonstrates the process by which a culture, where “culture” is a book culture, continually rewrites and retranscribes itself, constantly redefining itself through its signs. Every concrete text, as a sketched-out memory space, connotes the macrospace of memory that either represents a culture or appears as that culture’ (Lachmann, “Mnemonic and Intertextual Aspects of Literature,” 301).

3. Williams, Marxism and Literature, 132.


5. The term καταβασις, katabasis, more exactly describes the visit to the underworld, but nekuya is used as a generic term for summoning and conversing with the dead.


8. Shakespeare, Hamlet, I.iI.76–86. Further references will be to this edition and cited parenthetically in the main text.

9. Petrus Ramus (1515–1572) was a French Humanist whose ideas were distinctly protestant in character. I argue in my forthcoming monograph that as a student at Wittenberg, Hamlet learnt the Ramist dialectic. Though Ramus says nothing specifically in terms of memory, his ‘topical classifications’ are nevertheless ‘classifications-for-recall, so that working with them is of itself working with a memory device’ (Ong, Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue, 213). Hamlet’s response to the Ghost’s injunctions can therefore be seen as memorial practices that Hamlet had learnt at university.
10. Though of course the Ghost’s singularity is repeated, as is obvious in the text and is accounted for in Derrida’s argument. See Derrida, Specters of Marx, 10.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., 6; 6–7; 9.

13. Ibid., 7.


15. Ibid., 9.

16. Ibid.

17. Consider Hamlet’s ‘Must I remember?’ (I.II.143) when he is explaining the power of his mourning and its relation to his mother’s hasty remarriage.


19. Joyce, Ulysses, 6.1000–1. Further references to this edition will be cited parenthetically in the main text.

20. By spectrality, I describe the living character’s encounter with a ghost or ghosts.


22. See Marcel Proust in Steinberg, The Stream-of-Consciousness Technique, 87.: ‘[A] fragment of life in unsullied preservation […] which asked only that it should be set free, that it should come and augment my wealth of life and poetry.’

23. This quoted from Johnson (ed.), Ulysses, 417.12n.

24. Paul Ricoeur notes ‘the Platonic theory of the eikon places the main emphasis on the phenomenon of the presence of an absent thing, the reference to past time remaining implicit’ (Memory, History, Forgetting, 6).

25. It is common to kiss the prayer book if it has been dropped on the floor, and when closing the book at the end of a prayer service. It is also customary to use the fringes of the prayer shawl to touch the Torah parchment prior to kissing the fringes upon reading the Torah during communal services.

27. Hezser, “‘Are You Protestant Jews or Roman Catholic Jews?’,” 179. For example, see 16.1082–5, 16.1119–20 and 17.530–1.


31. Ibid., 23.


33. Ibid., 46–7. Gibbons also analogises this with the reader’s relation to the text she reads: she must look for Dublin’s and Ulysses’ returned gaze – i.e. get to know its character by reading it.

34. It is therefore reminiscent of Gabriel Conroy’s awkward welcome into the community of spirits in Joyce’s story, ‘The Dead’: ‘[I]n the partial darkness he imagined he saw the form of a young man standing under a dripping tree. Other forms were near. His soul had approached that region where dwell the vast hosts of the dead. He was conscious of, but could not apprehend, their wayward and flickering existence. His own identity was fading out into a grey impalpable world: the solid world itself which these dead had one time reared and lived in, was dissolving and dwindling.’ Joyce, Dubliners, 160.

35. Derrida, Specters of Marx, 7.


37. In this sense, Gibbons cites Steven Connor’s argument that since the gramophone voice ‘is not live […] Bloom’s imagining of a conversation from the grave is closer to a telephone than a gramophone’ (ibid., 8). This correction emphasises the asymmetry of the encounter in “Hades”.


39. See Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 8.

40. ‘The inconsistencies are grotesque. Also, the greatgranfather [sic] could neither have hoped to see his listeners nor take any pleasure from this communication, since he was already dead.’ Senn, Annotations to James Joyce, 233–4.

42. Gibbons additionally goes so far as to argue that Rudy’s appearance in ‘Circe’ links to contemporary interest in ‘spirit photography’. See Gibbons, *Joyce’s Ghosts*, 159–64.


44. Barthes, *Camera Lucida*, 15; 27.

45. Ibid., 96.

46. This strategy also circumvents the dangers of the failure of involuntary memory, when ‘we cannot give a name to the sensation, or call on it, and it does not come alive’. Proust in Steinberg, *The Stream-of-Consciousness Technique*, 87.


49. It is also worth emphasising that Virag’s and Rudy’s appearances in ‘Circe’ adhere to this temporal displacement by appearing in the same accoutrements much later in the novel than their reference point in “Hades”.


52. Ibid., 79.

53. There are twin liminal positions: the dead are made liminal when being brought back to near-life through technology; the living are made liminal when absolute death (i.e. oblivion) is denied to them.


55. Plato, “Symposium,” 164 [205b-205c]. I use this edition of Plato here for its clearer enunciation of *poiesis*’ intimate relation to non-being and being. Diotima does immediately after this quotation specifically say that poetry – ‘music and metre’ – is necessary in order to be a poet. Nevertheless, my point is that Bloom adopts a poetic sensibility, in which continued generation and liminality are privileged.


59. In fact, it is possible to see socio-cultural parallels in Bloom’s strategy in the 1947 construction by the Republic of Ireland’s Bureau of Military History of an archive of witness testimonies of the revolutionary period. See Foster, *Vivid Faces*, 306–7.


**Acknowledgements**

Thanks are due to several parties. First to Thomas Docherty for his unfailing help and counsel. Also to Ruth McIntyre and Natasha Thomas, who have always been my *Ulysses* reading partners. To the anonymous reviewers for their keen eyes and astute suggested improvements. And finally to Emma Taylor-Collins, who has been unfailingly patient.
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