Cardiff School of Sport

**DISSENTATION ASSESSMENT PROFORMA:**

Theoretical / Conceptual

(Including: Desk-Based, Secondary Data, Meta-Analysis) ¹

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<td><strong>Supervisor:</strong></td>
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> Title to include: A concise indication of the research question/problem.  
> Abstract to include: A concise summary of the theoretical study undertake. |
| **Extended Introduction** ² |  
> To include: outline of context for the question; clear articulation and justification of the research question; indication of research expectations. |
| **Research Methods/Process** ² |  
> To include: justification of a secondary data collection approach; justification of inclusion and exclusion criteria and any search parameters utilised; process/procedure adopted; clear articulation and justification for the structure and development of the study. |
| **Critical Review** ² |  
> To include: a synthesised academic exposition and evaluation of:  
> - factually relevant data  
> - conceptual understanding(s)  
> - theoretical account(s)  
> - established line(s) of argument  
>  
> in relation to the research question(s)/problem posed by the study; logical structural divisions that evidence appropriate and thorough development in critical analysis; reasoned enquiry progressing towards the formation of a justified position in relation to the research question(s)/problem posed by the study. |
| **Explicit Summary** |  
> To include: explicit presentation of position concluded from the study; discussion of the limitations and a critical reflection of the approach/process/procedure adopted in the study; an indication of any potential improvements and future developments derived on completion of the study; an insight into any implications and a conclusion which |

¹ This form should be used to assess Theoretical/Conceptual dissertations. The descriptors associated with Theoretical/Conceptual dissertations should be referred to by both students and markers.

² There is scope within CONCEPTUAL/THEORETICAL dissertations for the EXTENDED INTRODUCTION and RESEARCH METHODS/PROCESS sections to be presented as a combined section, particularly where matters of REPLICABILITY of the study are not central. The mark distribution to be used in studies of this kind is indicated in parentheses.
summarises the relationship between the research question and the major findings.

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CARDIFF METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY
Prifysgol Fetropolitan Caerdydd

CARDIFF SCHOOL OF SPORT

DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF SCIENCE (HONOURS)

SPORTS COACHING

AGAINST SEX SEGREGATION UNDER
FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION

(SOCIO-CULTURAL)

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AGAINST SEX SEGREGATION UNDER FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION
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Abstract:

This paper has sought to justify, on ethical terms, that sex segregation ought not be imposed upon functionally classified disability sports. The findings from this paper fall into three categories: meaningful competition, sameness-difference and is-ought. When proposing the instigation of desegregated sport in functional classification through the concept of meaningful competition it was found that although opportunities to demonstrate excellence could conceivably be improved, fair play tenets were breeched due to the masculinist nature of sport. The latter conclusion was then questioned through the sameness-difference chapter where humanistic and gynocentric/difference philosophies were analysed in order to establish whether masculinity dictates sporting success, and if so why that then is significant. Although debatable, it was concluded that separate male and female competition narrows the concepts of femininity and disability and perpetuates difference and oppression. In the final chapter the significance of all that had been discussed in the paper was analysed in terms of Hume’s fact-value distinction. Through acceptance of the logic of both the analytic bridge principle and Searle’s promissory obligation it was concluded that the evaluative statement ‘desegregated sport ought to be in place under functional classification’ was found to be linked to fact and justified in terms of that link.
CHAPTER ONE:

EXTENDED INTRODUCTION AND METHOD
1.1: Introduction and Method

The sex segregated nature of sport has recently become a topical issue with the decision to not allow Lindsay Vomm to ski in a male competition, despite all of her obvious prowess and success. Arguments of inequality of physiological properties and function can be seen to work to produce an objection to Vomm’s participation on the grounds of fair play. If the same arguments were applied to functional classification- the system by which much of disability sport competition is organised, would they still be as valid? Potentially not, functional classification makes no distinction between males and females when assessing athletes to assign them a competition class and works instead on a case by case basis but in accordance with strict guidelines (Tweedy and Vanlandewijck, 2009). Thus once a functional class is assigned each member of a class, be they male or female, is approximately equal in terms of physiological function. With this in mind, it is it possible to justify desegregated sport under functional classification? This thesis will attempt to answer this question and in turn hopefully also answer the calls to research of Loland (2002) – to routinely asses which sports require separate sex classes and which do not, and of van Hilvoorde and Landeweerd (2008)- that discussion on classification needs to be continued. Thus this thesis will attempt to find an ethical justification for desegregated sport under functional classification. Chapter 2.1 will assess whether meaningful competition, and therefore fair play and room for excellence, is better fostered in a sex blind conception of disability sport. Chapter 2.2 will take a step further back from the practicalities of functional classification and begin to assess on a more abstract level through consideration of the sameness/difference equality dichotomy. Finally chapter 2.3 will attempt to ascertain whether any of the previous arguments have any basis in normative ethics by discussing the is-ought principle in order to determine if any moral imperatives can be derived from the facts written about in chapters 2.1 and 2.2. Immediately following this introduction will be a review of both sex segregation and functional classification literature, it is hoped that the concepts critiqued in this subsection of the extended introduction will prevent over-abstraction and loss of practical outlook in the rest of this thesis.
1.2: Literature Review- Sex Segregation

William Morgan’s (2007) review article on sport specific sex equality literature will be used to generate the organisational backbone to the first half of this literature review. Morgan states that sex equality (or indeed segregation) in sport constitutes only “a small body of literature” (2007, p.301), this characteristic has allowed for a highly cohesive body of work to be generated, which in turn has affected how this essay will approach said work. Many articles that philosophically analyse sex equality and segregation in sport do so by directly assessing and critiquing the arguments of another. This has generated groups of articles that directly critique, and often oppose, each other. The work of Tannsjo (2000) and Schneider (2000) is one such grouping, Schneider’s article is founded upon a sociological reading of Tannsjo’s defence of assimilated sport. A further, and perhaps more compelling example is the chain of debates that begins with Jane English’s ‘Sex equality in sport’ (1978). Discussion in this text upon equal opportunities treats sex assimilated sport as just one possible solution, a solution that is quickly dismissed. In response Tamburrinni and Tannsjo’s (2005) treatise on gene doping assesses English’s claims in the light of modern day shifts in gender – sport distributions, in particular the increased participation of women in strength based sports. The body of literature that exists on FCS’s is almost as small as that of sex segregation, but lacking greatly in terms of ethical critiques. In spite of many instances in disability sport that cry out for such analysis: misclassification, class performance overlaps and underperformance in classification testing for example, ethical literature on FCS’s is limited to the work of Howe and Jones (2006).

When assessing academic literature within the field of sex segregation the work of Torbjorn Tannsjo comes closest to considering the use of functional classification as a means of allowing male and female athletes of similar ability to compete together. In ‘Against sexual discrimination in sports’ Tannsjo (2000) establishes a pro-assimilationist approach. He declares that sex segregated sport does not have “any better rationale than sex discrimination in any other field” (2000, p 103). Tannsjo (2000) claims that sex only indirectly affects athletic ability, he appeals
against the tyranny of averages (James, 1997) by concluding through the use of logic that some women could outperform all men. Tannsjo (2000) goes on to state that sport ought to be governed by classification systems that categorise by criteria that directly mitigate performance. Disability FCS’s are not considered by the author here, he instead discusses the weight classification of boxing. Functional classification was very much in its infancy when Tannsjo penned ‘Against sex discrimination in sport’ (2000), indeed categorisation by medical condition was still in place for many sports even at the Paralympic level. A re-evaluation of Tannsjo’s (2000) arguments seems appropriate now disability sport has more fully embraced and mobilised a system of classification based on principles that are unequivocally tied to specific sporting performance. The FCS’s are arguably the most sophisticated and researched classification systems currently applied in sport (Lapore, Gayle and Stevens, 2007) and warrant inclusion in the sex segregation debate.

However, before any of Tannsjo’s work can be considered some assessment of his theoretical standpoint must occur. Decidedly utilitarian in his outlook but with focus upon logic ‘Against sexual discrimination in sport’ could be described as sociologically naive, such is the description given by Schneider (2000). Schneider goes on to compare Tannsjo’s (2000) ideal of sex neutral sport to Plato’s republic— an utopian ideal society where all are equal and all sports are valued to the same degree. In her text Schneider works from a more deontological grounding. Schneider argues that desegregated sport is, at worst, poorly disguised chauvinism and at best a “vision of philosophical purity… [divorced from] the world in which we live” (2000, p137). Within her work Schneider (2000) discusses theories and thought experiments that directly oppose Tannsjo (2000). She writes of the pandering to male societal domination that assimilated sport will bring about, principally because the most valued worldwide sports would promote male success at elite level to the exclusion of female participation and success. Biomedical and performance analysis research supports this idea (Lewis, Kamon and Hodgson, 1986, DeHaven and Lintner, 1986). However, Tannsjo (2000) questions whether this matters by describing this statistical occurrence as a possible motivational challenge to women. Nevertheless Schneider’s (2000) point is compelling, it is conceivable that a first order moral judgement, in this case
prolonging subjugation, would be crossed if sport became sex blind. It is possible that women could be systematically outcompeted at elite level, thus reinforcing societal gender bias and sex stereotyping.

The work of Tannsjo and Schneider will directly influence the approach of this thesis to question that require abstracted thinking and analysis. Although it is this authors intention to work with logic and philosophical critique any conclusions must not be drawn without first referencing and framing them within sociological realities. It is expected that the effects of some of these societal conditions will be mitigated through the fair play concepts that form the basis for FCS’s, but a wariness and scepticism towards any a propositions within this thesis seems to be an intellectually healthy behaviour. This thesis will also attempt be sensitive to the many theoretical standpoints in ethics and try to reconcile arguments made to them, or in some way account for criticism that is likely to arise from proponents of deontology, utilitarianism and virtue theory.

Jane English’s ‘Sex equality in sport’ (1978) is held in high regard in sports ethics and forms the basis for Tamburrini and Tannsjo’s (2005) critique of gene doping. In her work English describes “[sic] the gap between male and female performance” (1978, p.272), a statement later acknowledged by Tamburrini and Tannsjo (2005) as too great for even the most fervent remedial action to account for or nullify. This ‘gap’ is then treated by English as a justification for sports catered towards “women’s specific traits” (1978, p.272). Events such as netball and synchronised swimming that reward the use and possession of a smaller stature and flexibility are heralded by English as a possible solution to the need to “aid [a] physiologically different group” (1978, p.273) by allowing them access to the basic benefits of sport. By championing, for want of a better term, feminine biased sport English provides a way to avoid the feminine paradox- the phenomenon observed by Clasen (2001) where adoption of masculine qualities in lieu of feminine traits is viewed as analogous to sporting competence. However, sports catering towards femininity do not mitigate for the injustice, perceived or actual, of more established sports. Women and men are still not afforded the opportunity to compete with each other in the vast majority of sporting competition and the concept of a protected competitive class for women is railed against by English as suggestive of female inferiority. English goes on to claim that a sense
of athletic achievement divorced from sex classes can be found in the performances of women in sports like synchronised swimming and the female components of gymnastics. How this sense of achievement and pride can be sustained when competition is limited to female participants only is questionable, are not netball and other such feminine sports protected in a similar (but less overt) way to the female classes in other sports? This will be discussed further in the critique of Tamburrini and Tannsjo’s (2005) response, where gender exclusive sports are discussed in terms of sporting and social stagnation.

Despite the dated nature of English’s (1978) theorising many of her concepts will be useful in discussing the rarely articulated (Tannsjo, 2000) justification for sex segregated sport. Basic and scarce benefits, and the distinctions therein, should prove to be a useful set of concepts when discussing what could be termed as the essential principles of sport. For instance, analysis of claims to meaningful competition by FCS’s (functional classification systems) and segregated sport will gain a degree of sociological grounding if addressed by first questioning whether meaningful competition should be available to all (a basic benefit) or can only feasibly be given to the elite (a scarce benefit). Inclusion of English’s (1978) benefits distinction can only help to give discussion on segregation “significance for life… and being in general, and justification in terms of such a totality” (Wolff, 1950, p.23) bringing about Simmel’s concept of philosophical sociology- a brand of enquiry sensitive to the social realities from which philosophy abstracts its questions and concepts (Turner, 2011). Scarcе benefits are essentially an expression of what is necessary to create, and is only realistically available in, elite sport. Athlete funding is necessary and fundamental to elite sport and could not feasibly be made available to all sporting competitors. However, can the same be said of meaningful competition, or indeed any of the other concepts used to justify assimilated sport? By assessing whether such ideals fall into the basic or scarce categories it is possible to assess their importance in sport, relative to the foundational sporting concepts listed by English in her description of basic benefits- the chance to improve, the building of character and “plain fun” (Englsih, 1978, p.272).

Although containing useful tools for the remedying of any possible over-abstraction in the philosophical analysis of segregated sport English’s (1978) ‘Sex
equality in sport’ is far from infallible. Much of what can be identified as at fault in her work is mostly due to developments and athletic achievements made after its publication. English’s (1978) belief in the sporting attributes of strength, speed and size as less present in females has been challenged by several outstanding performances by the likes of Florence Griffith-Joyner and Ye Shiwen. Both of these athletes have attained world records, in athletics and swimming respectively, composed of split times than those of their male counterparts (Official Olympic records, 2013 [1], [2]). On the other hand, weightlifting research performed in 1991 gave empirical life to the proclamations English made concerning female strength and power, the findings of Garhammer (1991) supported an inherent comparative lack of the aforementioned qualities in female athletes. However, Garhammer described large performance discrepancies as likely to not stem from a male advantage but instead from the fact that women were only permitted to compete in the sport three years prior to the publication of his research. “Mechanical advantages coupling muscle forces to outside resistance is unlikely to account for such large differences [between] men and women in the same bodyweight division” (Garhammer, 1991, p.9). Garhammer’s research is particularly insightful here as it details the large increases made in winning lifts in the first three years of women’s weightlifting, results that suggest more such improvements could be made in the years to come: “[A comparative] lack of power… was likely related to the fact that weightlifting was a new sport for women in 1987. More time will be needed to recruit and develop the most gifted female athletes for this sport…this hypothesis is supported by the large increases in winning lifts for several bodyweight divisions at the 1988 and 1989 Championships compared to 1987 results” (Garhammer, 1991, p.10).

The accelerated development of female power and strength noted in Garhammer’s weightlifting literature is useful in explaining discrepancies between male and female performance in sports where women have traditionally been barred or have not competed out of choice. What is not addressed are sporting events where women have enjoyed a relatively long history of performance, such as swimming and athletics. Hudson’s (1994) ‘It’s mostly a matter of metric’ fills this void and discusses categorisation in a manner that closely reflects the ethos of FCS’s, in spite of being written several years before functional classification came
to be the norm for disability sport. By factoring key performance mediators into male and female swimming and athletic world records Hudson found that the resulting speeds were greater in the female performances. The conclusions made in Hudson’s (1994, p.148) paper were that “when measurements were made from the context of the individual (that is, size and bodily proportions), the physical abilities of females appear to be equal, if not superior”. Ultimately Hudson’s findings are of limited use as they only account for a single contextual feature, although the feature in question and the resulting conclusions are drawn from a broad investigation using fifty or more athletes from each sex. Far more useful in creating parity are the FCS’s of disability swimming and wheelchair basketball, where many functional aspects specific to the event in question are quantified and assessed. A recurring black mark in segregation literature is the unwillingness or lack of awareness of such a well-developed system for the instigation of performance from a level functional starting point, a starting point that could very easily and justifiably be made sex blind.

This seemingly inescapable feature of sport sex segregation research taints the work of Tamburrini and Tannsjo (2005). Here, as with English (1978), the authors dismiss out of hand the possibility of using categorisation by functional ability as a method of allowing the sexes to compete with parity- “the classes where the best results are produced will be occupied exclusively by men” (Tamburrini and Tannsjo, 2005 p.182), “remedial programmes or just institutions cannot obliterate all differences in size and strength” (English, 1978 p.212). In spite of this oversight there are many aspects of Tamburrini and Tannsjo’s (2005) work that merits consideration, not least the simple fact that few academic articles approach sex segregation so straightforwardly. As with Tannsjo’s (2000) previous work, ‘Against sex segregation in sport’, the authors structure their proposals around what they consider to be key anti-assimilation arguments. It is this recurring feature of Tamburrini and Tannsjo’s (2005) work that gives clarity and logic to their writing. Whilst helpful in terms of legibility this feature is also essential to any discussion of assimilated sport, as was mentioned in a previously discussed article “sex discrimination is seldom defended straightforwardly” (Tannsjo, 2000, p.101) therefore forcing any anti-segregation thinker to make assumptions as to the arguments from which segregated sport is justified. It seems churlish to count this
feature among the negative points of Tamburrini and Tannjo’s (2005) work, or indeed sex segregation literature as a whole. There appears to be no official stance on this issue from any large sports organisation, such as the International Olympic Committee or a world governing body. Little research has been done to prove the supposed sporting inferiority of women. The few arguments that are made in favour of segregated sport are often founded upon statistical relationships and are embedded with “an ancient prejudice” (Morais, 1988, p.1159) that renders a belief in female physical inferiority to be considered intuitive and obvious (Newman, 1985; Tuana, 1989). The arguments devised by Tamburrini and Tannsjo (2005) in both ‘Genetic design of the new Amazon’ and Tannsjo (2000) ‘Against sex discrimination in sport’ that reflect this anti-assimilated view will form a key part of further discussion in this work on sex segregation in disability sport FCS’s. Not only do they represent the closest approximation of an academic argument in favour of sex segregated sport but the topics and concepts they touch upon cry out for discussion alongside disability, fairness and classification. The authors site discouragement, violence and preservation of meaningful and closely contested competition as the most well know of all the “subtle [unpublished] defence[s] of sexual discrimination, cast in gender essentialist terms” (Tamburrini and Tannsjo, 2005, p.181). The counter arguments used to address these paternalistic concerns will be laid out in the discussion of the rebuttal article published in response to Tamburrini and Tannsjo (2005) by Sherwin and Schwartz (2005). This article represents the final link in the chain of arguments and counter arguments centred around sex segregation that began with English’s (1978) ‘Sex equality in sport’. It is in Tamburrini and Tannsjo’s (2005) critique of English’s (1978) work that can be found a key feature of segregation literature that must be used in this essay if sociological grounding is to be achieved.

In Tamburrini and Tannsjo’s (2005) gene doping critique a fundamental flaw in English’s (1978) thinking is exposed: “the assumption that there are physiologically-grounded male and female sport disciplines” (Tamburrini and Tannsjo, 2005, p.184). Tamburrini and Tannsjo (2005) refute this assentation simply by taking it and assessing it in the light of recent sporting developments, in particular the growth of participation in female strength based sport.
Acknowledgment of shifts in societal attitudes through concepts that can be empirically measured is commendable and provides a reliable basis for grounding ethical abstraction. There can be little doubt that English's (1978) discussion around redistribution of resources to improve participation in ‘female sports’, as a way of achieving just recognition, is an outmoded solution. However, Tamburrini and Tannsjo’s (2005) defence of this position is itself also outdated. 2012 has seen several gender exclusive sporting barriers break down, not just through increased female participation in traditionally male sports but also through the legitimisation of several female combat sports. Women’s boxing has experienced such acceptance recently with its inclusion, albeit in a reduced format, in the Olympic games. However, despite the magnitude of such a change a more telling sign of a changing perception of traditionally male sports is the inclusion of a female division in mixed martial arts. Violent and high injury risk sports are now not only open to female participants but are endorsed by world governing bodies, bringing about the logical conclusion of Tamburrini and Tannsjo’s (2005) objection to English’s (1978) resource appropriation. It is now not necessary to encourage sports catered to a gender essentialist interpretation of female capabilities, even the most masculine of sports is now a viable option for female participation. The basic resources that can only be provided for though sporting governing bodies, access to sanctioned competitions for example, are now available to women in most sporting activities. Tamburrini and Tannsjo’s (2005) objection to English’s (1978) essentialist approach forms the main body of their criticism of her work, however they miss the chance to take her considerations of resource division further. This fault, if it can be described as such, may be attributed to the focus of Tamburrini and Tannsjo’s (2005) gene doping exposition which delves into the ethics surrounding cheating rather than a detailed consideration of classification-an area that could provide an equitable division of resources of both the scarce and basic variety. The failure of segregation literature to fully consider classification means that English (1978) and Tamburrini and Tannsjo (2005) do not acknowledge that a more equal distribution of scarce resources, and thus a semblance of equality in accordance with English’s (1978) terms, could be achieved if male and female sport was amalgamated (as is readily possible in FCS’s). Male dominance of professional earnings and media coverage could conceivably become the pool of resources that both sexes share. This argument,
however, is naïve and does not fully acknowledge one of the main counter segregation arguments acknowledged in the research of English (1978) and Tamburrini and Tannsjo (2005). Both authors include discussions of the possibility of male dominance in assimilated sport, this argument necessarily prefaces any points made about equal access to scarce resources in assimilated sport. Male dominance in elite performance to the effective exclusion of women would lead to a reinstating of male dominance of prize money and other such fundamental components of elite participation.

The final segregation article this essay will review provides counter arguments to the pro-assimilationist points raised by Tannsjo (2000) and Tamburrini and Tannsjo (2005). Sherwin and Schwartz (2005) critically evaluate the responses of Tannsjo and Tamburrini (2005) to the assumed rationalisations for segregated sport. In considering the proposition that males will dominate assimilated sport; leading to discouragement of female competitors, the two latterly mentioned authors conclude through logic that an atypical woman with characteristics that are crucial to winning developed to a significant degree could outperform most men. To ensure that the ‘best person’ wins; or perhaps the most deserving person, Tannsjo (2000) and Tamburrini and Tannsjo (2005) argue sex categories must be abolished in order to give the hypothetical atypical female the chance to compete with males. Sherwin and Schwartz resist this reasoning and have stated that the “outcome of nearly every sporting event is local” (2005, p.199) with winners found without the inclusion of world class athletes. Following this line of reasoning the authors stated that finding the ‘best’ athlete is not the purpose of many sporting competitions. Rather the athlete who produces the best performance benefits from luck and contingent factors, thus preserving the spectacle element of sport through the sweet tension found in the uncertainty of outcome (Fraleigh, 1984). As this combination of athleticism, unpredictability and spectator excitement can be found in segregate sport Sherwin and Schwartz (2005) argue that the loss of the unique values of female sport is not worth the outright and all-considered winners that assimilated sport would produce. Although persuasive Sherwin and Schwartz’s (2005) reasoning can be seen to fail on one particular level- that of elite, high performance sport. The Olympics and Paralympics are decidedly not ‘local’ and do seek to find the ‘best’ athletes. However, perhaps what Sherwin and
Schwartz (2005) describe as local has a broader meaning. It is conceivable that all contingent elements are contained within the concept of local—each sporting event is affected in some way by unaccountably changeable features such as weather and performance of officials. If local is accepted as an expression of contingency then all sporting events can be described as such. Therefore all winners may only be the best adaptors rather than the outright ‘best’; “sometimes the ‘best’ person does not win… unless we declare that the winner is, by definition best” (Sherwin and Schwartz, 2005, p.199).

Sherwin and Schwartz (2005) continue to counter Tamburrini and Tannsjo’s (2005) work through a much discussed ethical and sociological trope: equality and sameness. Sherwin and Schwartz’s (2005) argue that Tamburrini and Tannsjo’s (2005) pro-assimilation stance equates equal treatment with same treatment thus denying important differences that form part of self-conception and identity (Hardin and Whiteside, 2009) through enforcement of a male orientated norm. The assimilation and gene doping described in Tamburrini and Tannsjo’s (2005) work when considered through the work of Jane Flax (1992) is an expression of the discrimination it is trying to circumvent, rather than its cure. Sherwin and Schwartz (2005) go on to discuss how women’s sport has blossomed despite its segregated state and now constitutes an entirely separate entity from male sport, with its own unique character and values. Tennis is sited as the best example of this phenomenon, Sherwin and Schwartz (2005) describe the women’s game as highly distinct from the men’s due to the reduced reliance on the serve and a more compelling and more often exhibited front-of-court play (volleys, serve and volley). Rather than assimilation Sherwin and Schwartz (2005) recommend an appreciation of difference, and presumably in doing so endorse the reduced format of women’s tennis where in grand slams three sets are played instead of five. In turn Tannsjo (2000), in ‘Against sexual discrimination in sports’, calls the paternalistic ideals behind segregated sport and the reduced format of women’s sport as “simply degrading to both men and women” (2000, p. 109). Tannsjo (2000) acknowledges the differences between gendered sports but chooses to deny the essentialist approach of Sherwin and Schwartz (2005) by advocating assimilation, but assimilation into a changed sport. His recommendation is a more androgynous form of competition where the narrow conception of masculinity that
dominates much of sport today is replaced by equal valuing of masculine and feminine qualities. This conception of sport allows for credit to given for both power and grace regardless of the gender of the performer. The type of moderation laid out by Tannsjo (2000) conforms to Iris Marion Young’s (1980) conception of a less aggressive and instrumentalist sporting landscape where the essentialism that dominates segregated sport is eradicated, thus granting recognition of the skill required to perform with grace and sensitivity whilst not demanding constant displays of strength to ensure success. Tannsjo (2000) justifies this moderation by distinguishing between strength and typically feminine qualities on the basis of moral and non-moral virtues, as well as in terms of fascistoid admiration. In Tannsjo’s (2000) vision of moderated (and assimilated) sport virtues that can be learned would be valued to a greater extent, to the detriment of non-moral virtues where learning and application have little effect on qualities that are genetically predisposed. The elitism that arises from the veneration and reward of innate qualities is railed against by Rawls (1971, p.103), “no one deserves his place in the distribution of native endowments, any more than one deserves one’s starting place in society”. That so much of elite sport in its current form descends to competitions of strength; the serve in men’s tennis for example, is described by Tannsjo (1998) as fascistoid in nature. Coined by Tannsjo (1998) the term fascistoid can be attributed to something “that is tending to or resembles fascism” (1998, p.25). In a paper on mental toughness Caddick and Ryall (2012) attribute the sincere admiration of successful sportspeople as resulting from a fascist love of strength. It is in Tannsjo’s (2000) suggested amendments to sport and the sports market, in particular those sports and attributes that are rewarded with scarce benefits, that there can be found room for criticism. Within the functional classification of disability sport there is consideration of innate, non-moral virtues. This is particularly true of strength, both runners and swimmers must complete a bench test before being awarded their classification (Wu, 1999). Taking strength as an expression of all qualities that are impossible or unfeasibly difficult to learn/train; such as height and limb proportions, functional classification forces similarly strong athletes to compete together thus ensuring that moral virtues and trainable attributes become the deciding factor in competition.
In only briefly considering classification as a means of bringing assimilated sport into fruition Tannsjo (2000), as with all authors on sex segregation in sport, can be accused of not making a complete argument. Chadwick and Wilson (2005) arguably put this best in a brief critique of English (1978), Tamburrini and Tannsjo (2005) and Sherwin and Schwartz (2005): “A person’s sex ‘should not be taken into account when a system of different classes is established in a certain sport’ [apostrophes original], they [anti-segregation authors] acknowledge the existence of such classification systems without following through” (Chadwick and Wilson 2005, p.205). To put the importance of such an omission into perspective (ibid): “Segregation on the grounds of ability is arguably a pre-requisite to the successful playing of competitive sport… inequalities in rewards or access based on arbitrary factors which reflect wider social inequalities demand justification, not rationalisation” (Chadwick and Wilson (2005, p.207).

It may be advisable to forgive this widely replicated omission. From its inception with Jane English’s ‘Sex equality in sport’ sport sex segregation literature has had to address the unpublished and “uncritical division of sports into men’s and women’s competitions” (English, 1978, p.213). Alongside this hampering factor were the early iterations of functional classification, developed to a degree that was not acceptable for serious academic consideration. Disability sport’s functional classification systems have seen many changes since then. It is my hope in this essay to answer “the need to continuously evaluate what kind of sports ought to have sex classes, and what kind of sports ought not to” (Loland, 2002, p.59) with reference to disability sport.

1.3: Literature Review- Functional Classification

No academic literature thus far has taken the sex segregation discussion and applied it to disability sport. It is regrettable that there are no specific peer reviewed publications that could be used to guide this thesis, however the body of work on functional classification makes up for this lack. It is a larger area of research than sex segregation, though it has a relatively small ethical/philosophical component. Fortunately even in some of the hard science empirical works there can be found components that are invaluable to any critique
of functional classification. Published works from Tweedy and Vanlandewijck (2009) and Wu (1999), to name but two, contain both the founding philosophies behind FCS’s and expositions on the sport specific factors that used to generate athlete classes. As has been established in the critique of Tannsjio’s (2000) work, functional classification works to ensure that non-moral (or perhaps un-trainable) attributes do not limit athletic performance and achievement.

As impairment constitutes the measured factor in functional classification the onus and main determinants of performance becomes training volume, commitment and technique. This is one of the purposes of classification given by Tweedy and Vanlandewijck (2009) in the officially sanctioned International Paralympic Committee’s justification and strategy for the implementation of FCS’s. As has been alluded to previously this paper, like many academic works on FCS’s, contains little in the way of philosophical justification or discussion. However, much can be gleaned and extrapolated on the subject of founding philosophical ideals such as fairness and parity. The use of impairment as the unit of classification in FCS’s brings about an increased impact of “the relative impact of other performance determinants” such as mental toughness and technique “is increased and the athletes who succeed will do so because they are stronger in these areas” (Tweedy and Vanlandewijck, 2009, p.12). Thus one of the founding principles of classification by function can be seen- that of distributive justice. The consequentialist ideals behind distributive justice dictate that the gifting of resources must bring about an equal outcome (Adams, 1963). Equality of outcome is achieved through distribution of resources; in the case of disability sport one could assign place on the competitive/ability spectrum as a ‘resource’, in a suum cuique manner. To assign to each person according to their need brings about ‘sameness’, as to whether sameness and equality are synonymous is a matter of great debate and will be addressed later in this essay. It is also pertinent that what can be considered as due to, or belonging to, a person need not be tangible. Therefore functional class can be viewed as a resource to be treated with great care as disabled athletes under functional classification are ‘bound up in the use’ (Taylor, 2011) of it to the extent where misclassification, or a similar mishandling of their competitive class, would be injurious- thus meeting the Kantian descriptors of belongings or resources. In spite of these grounding ethical factors many
papers on FCS’s, in swimming in particular, have revealed a distinct problem of just class allocation (Gehlson and Karpuk, 1992; Williamson, 1997; Wu and Williams, 1999). Tweedy and Vanlandewick’s (2009) paper makes only a brief reference to deliberate under-performance in classification testing and the subjective nature of said testing, placing the onus on the athletes and classifiers for classification faults, with little consideration of the potential for failings within FCS’s in their current state. Results from Gehlson et al, Williamson and Wu et al have demonstrated that performance overlaps occur in both male and female S/SB classes 1-5.

Failing to acknowledge widespread performance discrepancies is a definite black mark against the work of Tweedy and Vanlandewick (2009). It is a particularly glaring error due the papers endorsement by the IPC and the fact that the performance anomalies mentioned above were noted many years before the publication of Tweddy and Vandlandewijck’s work (2009) However it should also be noted that these discrepancies are potentially addressed, albeit without reference to the work of Gehlson et al and Wu et al; “the validity of the methods used in functional classification is often questionable” (Tweedy and Vanlandewick, 2009, p.8). It is possible to read from the aforementioned quote and the diction of Tweedy and Vanlandewick (2009) on the subject of classification research as a whole; “classification research [has] not matured as rapidly as other areas of Paralympic sport” (2009, p.8), that an official acknowledgement of FCS frailty has been made. As to whether this awareness enhances the viability of FCS’s as a subject for consideration in the sex segregation debate is another matter, it could be suggested that the rigour shown by Tweedy and Vanlandewick (2009) and Howe and Jones (2006) in their assessments commends the system to a greater degree than other forms of classification- weight categories in combat sports for example.

Howe and Jones’ (2006 work is particularly pertinent as it addresses one of the most overt recent issues with disability classification, the case of cerebral palsy (CP) wheelchair racers. Although discussion in this paper centre around the medical classification model currently employed by disability athletics there can be found elements that are shared with functional classification. Severity of impairment mirrors functional ability as the deciding factor in class allocation.
Athletes who compete under a T31-34 classification are capable of propelling a wheelchair but are impaired in the control of any/all of the following: trunk, arms, legs and hands. As with the more severely impaired functional classes in other disability sports, notably swimming classes S/SB 1-3, the T31-34 classifications are typically scarcely populated and struggle to fill heats at major championships.

Howe et al recount what they term as an injustice from the 2004 IPC Athletics World Championships where T31-34 athletes competed against T51-54 racers. The three T31-34 athletes who qualified for the championships were not permitted to race solely against each other and could only continue in the competition if they raced in the more heavily populated T50 classes. Previous performance data from the athletes was used to justify this arrangement, they had the times necessary to be competitive in round one. Despite holding several world records and titles between them the T30’s only just progressed on from the heats and did not reach the final. How et al objected to this strenuously stating: “Using performance as a premise for classification in the context of sport for the disabled appears to contradict the principle of equity on which systems of classification should be based” (Richter 1999; cited in Howe and Jones, 2006, p.41). From a study of both Howe and Jones’ (2006) paper and Tweedy and Vanlandewijck’s (2009) remarks it can be seen that functional classification in 2006 was flawed in terms of performance practicalities and founding classification principles. However, the objection raised in Howe and Jones (2006) could be considered as outdated. Although a similar miscarriage of justice was made in the 2006 World Championships with the omission of all CP wheelchair classes, this specific oversight did not occur in the 2012 Paralympics. Due to the ever increasing popularity of disability sport recurrences of ‘equity contradictions’, in particular those surrounding participation numbers, could be considered a thing of the past. Unfortunately, a dearth of more current research in disability classification prevents a more substantial case from being made for this argument.

It is hoped that this literature review has demonstrated the need for a contemporary discussion around sex segregation in functional classification. Howe and Jones’ (2006) work has demonstrated that there exist serious and contentious ethical issues in classification theory; an updated but similarly in-depth study seems warranted. Much has changed for disability sport since the publication of
Howe and Jones’ 2006 paper, particularly in terms of participation numbers thus making a current ethical investigation not just warranted but necessary, especially in the light of Tweedy and Vanlandewijck’s (2009) admission of the immaturity of classification research. Still more urgent than any need to update or progress FCS academic work is the imperative given by Loland (2002) to continuously assess sports in order to best judge which activities require sex classes and which do not. This type of on-going critique into sport and sex segregation can be seen as having stalled, or failed completely depending on how closely one wishes to adhere to Loland’s call. What is undeniable is that segregation has not received the attention it warrants from academia, and that classification as a whole (inclusive of both able and disabled sport) has not been seriously considered in what little segregation literature there is. That a reasonably sophisticated, or at least prolific and well known, classification system such as FCS’s could have existed for so long but have not inspired any interest in segregation theory is almost astounding. It is this author’s hope that he might address this deficiency in the literature and not allow, as English (1978) put it, a further uncritical division of sport into men’s and women’s competition to occur.
CHAPTER TWO:

CRITICAL REVIEW
2.1: Meaningful Competition

In disabled sport a fraught balancing act has been in place since the inception of its elite competitive element. National and International governing bodies have striven for equitable competition and in doing so have encountered several barriers to that process, barriers that tend to oppose each other to the extent that addressing one means disregarding another. Meaningful competition and fair play could be listed amongst such dichotomies. Functional classification in particular struggles to reconcile these two concepts, as is pointed out by Howe and Jones (2006) who contend that functional classification does not best serve of the disability sport practice community.

Meaningful competition within the context of disability sport can, and especially those sports governed by function classification, can be viewed as analogous to Wu and Williams’ (1999) concept of credible competition. Credible or meaningful competition demands that there are enough athletes within each class (and by extension few enough classes to promote this ‘crowding’) to ensure success; be it round progression or medalling, is not achieved by default. Reduction in numbers of classes in a functionally classified disability sport event does bring about the appearance of meaningful competition through improved contestation for places—be that in heats or teams. Howe (2008, p.74) best describes the pleasing spectacle that such crowding brings, “viable races are also produced by the system [in this case the swimming’s integrated functional classification], because they are likely to involve a sufficient number of competitors and are therefore unlikely to be cancelled or haphazardly combined at the last minute”. However, whether this face value reflects truly meaningful competition is debatable. Upon reflection it is possible to see how in striving for competitor numbers and heat-semis-finals progression similar to that of able bodied sport functional classification loses sight of fair play, a concept inescapably entwined with meaningful competition.

It is crucial to an understanding of meaningful competition that the concept of merit, or the deserving victor, be considered. Merit can be discussed both in outright, practical terms as Tamburrini and Tannsjo (2005) do by claiming it is of the upmost importance that the ‘best’ athlete wins. Merit may also be described in
a more broad and abstract manner by assessing the influence of a variety of contingencies upon a sport. Desert and deserving praise are useful as bridging concepts between meaningful competition in disability sport and meaningful competition within the wider context of sex segregation. Thus merit will be examined once another key facet of meaningful competition is addressed - fair play.

The work of Howe and Jones (2006) opposes any distinction made between meaningful competition and fair play and argue the latter should not a contending factor to the former. The authors propose that a just, or fair, competition can only justifiably impose its rules upon athletes if it can produce a fair and accurate indication of athletic performance. This is a potential sticking point for functional classification and a large obstacle to any anti-segregation efforts. As has pointed out in previous chapters of this thesis class overlap is a point of contention and concern in functional classification (see Gehlson and Karpuk, 1992; Williamson, 1997; Wu and Williams, 1999). Whilst this potentially points towards the excellence of a few athletes who transcend their classification it also points toward the possibility of mis-classification. Allowing training to improve performance without affecting class allocation is a mainstay of functionally classified sport. It is in the importance ascribed to permitting excellence that merit can be shown to be a key component of disability sport. However, the spectre of mis-classification haunts all discussions of excellence in elite disability sport. If an athlete performs above and beyond other in their category surly, at the elite level (where class atypical performance is common) training discrepancies cannot be the sole reason for their success. Questions pertaining to fair play must be asked, even if it is only in an effort to training as the reason for excellence as opposed to flaws in categorization.

Before any assimilationist argument can be made concerning functionally classified sport, arguments that potentially carry with them their own considerations of fair play, the frailty of functional systems must be discussed. Do the performers who out-class their class, as it were, represent a failure of functional classification to accurately and fairly differentiate and indicate athletic performance? Alternatively, does line of reasoning belittle the efforts of excellent athletes? One possible answer to concerns over excellence produced by class
overlap is contingency- perhaps a dominant performance by a disabled athlete must inevitably lead to questions over classification in the same way that an excellent performance by an able bodied athlete tends to lead to allegations of drug taking. Performance that crosses categorisation lines is also an indication of excellence in able bodied sport. The term 'best pound for pound fighter' in boxing is suggestive of an athlete whose fighting prowess is belied by their weight category.

The current proliferation of classes in sport, including the separation of male and female competition, appeals to a conservative approach towards merit (or excellence). Merit, or excellence, is currently prefaced with class allocation contingency to the point where any praise bestowed upon an athlete sounds backhanded- ‘that was a great performance… from an S9 female’. For merit to be conserved in a deserving or just form contingency must be fought in both its agent innate and environment centred forms. Allowing sex amalgamated competition in functionally classified competition may not bring about this type of meaningful contest. Although, it can be contended that any doubt can be placed not on any supposed female inferiority, but that sport in current form is unworthy of praise, regardless of sex segregation. Even the arguments of Aristotle and Locke of experiential labour contributing to the actualisation of innate abilities cannot lend moral significance to sporting action. This is due to what Carr (1999) terms the erosion of moral goals by pragmatism and individualism. Sport is currently conceived in such a way that Carr (1999) is forced to demand an ethical overhaul of its educational, moral and spiritual ethos- all of which points towards what Boxill (2003), Elias (1986) and McIntosh (1979) have articulated in their work: that sport is geared to make meaningful and fair men’s able bodies competition. How can amalgamated sport stand if women are asked to compete within “dominant masculinist frameworks of analysis” (Hargreaves, 1996, p.287) where “sporting practices are defined in ways that allow men to display their physical strength, speed and power” (Dewar, 1991, p.18-19). Until sport can escape its label off ‘the ultimate arena of contingency (Carr, 1999) even Tannsjo and Tamburrini’s (2005) vision of ultimate sex amalgamated excellence is meaningless. Sport can be seen to violate a key tenet of meaningful competition- fair play in Anderson’s (1999, p.290) conception, “equality requires eliminating the ‘arbitrary’ effects of agent-
independent factors for how a person’s life turns out”. Additionally, Jones and Wilson’s (2009, p.127) conception of unfair play is also met by current sport, “advantages may be considered unfair…if they are not available to all competitors equally [and] if they are not the product of the athlete’s own efforts”. Therefore amalgamated sport is unfair towards women, that is unless an argument from the next chapter on sameness and difference can redeem sport and its gender bias.

2.2: Sameness and difference

Taking a step further back from the practical realities of segregated and functionally classified sport this thesis will now consider the dichotomy of sameness and difference. Initially conceived as a gender specific quandary this issue can also be seen to apply to ability and disability, especially with the advent of cross-over athletes such as Oscar Pistorius and Natalie DuToit who chose to compete in both the Paralympic and Olympic games. Sameness and difference is concerned with equality, indeed this is shared goal of both philosophies, but each view arrives at a separate conception of equality. Humanist feminism and humanist approaches to disability stress the shared qualities that all people can be argued to have and from this build an account of equality that centres around the idea of same treatment as analogous to equal treatment. All incorporating socialised identities, such as gender and disability, are in the humanist perspective viewed as contingencies serving only to allow models of oppression and domination to flourish (Young, 1990). Importance within this philosophy is placed upon shared qualities that amount to a common humanity and this drives the perception of separate treatment in humanist philosophy as, at best, paternalism, or at worst discrimination. The ultimate expression and end of the logic chain (or perhaps just the most overt expression) that sameness thinking creates can be found outside of, and inside, sport. Outside of sport Shulamith Firestone (1970) argues that a woman’s biological difference when compared to man is a part of what oppresses her and that child bearing ought to be made separate from sex and gender, hence her support for extra-uterine gestation technology. Similarly, denial of the significance of biological difference can be seen in desegregated sport where men and women compete together with no handicaps to mitigate for any supposed physiological advantage.
Theories that reject the tenets of sameness and place importance and the beginning its theorizing upon the differences between the sexes (and by extension the abled/disabled) has received a surge in popularity in recent times. This surge can be seen as reflected in the writing of several authors in previous chapters of this thesis such as: Sherwin and Schwartz (2005), Chadwick and Wilson (2005) and Jane English (1978). Arguments from this philosophy, termed ‘gynocentric’ within feminism, stress the importance of qualities that a sameness (or humanist) thinker would consider extraneous- such as gender, gender typical behaviour, typical moral qualities and physiological differences. These attributes and their importance form the basis for equality within this sphere of thought where equal treatment is the result of considered mitigation for the “needs, interests and characteristics common to [the group in question]” (Carole and McCann, 2003, p.381). Much of what is discussed within the sameness-difference debate can be seen to apply directly to functional classification, “the relationship between the Olympic and Paralympics is in a way similar to the relationship between male and female sport… because of their physiological differences… these two groups have separate competitions” (Giordano and Harris, 2005). Proponents of equality through recognition of difference do not necessarily deny what could be termed as the essential shared qualities of people but choose to ascribe greater significance to the differences that can be found between men, women and the able and disabled. When applied to sport many of the differences discussed are physiological in nature and particularly pertain to (relatively) unattainable non-moral virtues such as height, weight and dis/ability. Appeals for same treatment from humanist theorists are answered both in practical, and more commonly, philosophical terms- where concepts such as fair play, parity and chauvinism see regular action. It is to these criticisms, and to the thinking of difference theorists as a whole, that this essay must answer if amalgamated functionally classified sport is to be justified.

As was discussed in this thesis’ extended introduction, sport and successful performance are highly associated with masculinity. This is best demonstrated in Clasen’s (2001) feminine paradox, a phenomenon where traditionally male traits are adopted in order to succeed- a reflection of Wollstonecraft’s (1792/1988) call for women to adopt and accentuate masculinity in an effort to achieve equal (that
is, same) rights with men. Also discussed previously, amalgamated sport (governed by functional classification or otherwise) may not adhere to fair play concepts due to the male predisposition towards masculine behaviours and attributes—such as aggression and strength. Theorizing gender and gendered behaviour is always contentious, an acknowledgement of the sameness-difference debate can add depth to this discussion and perhaps justify desegregated sport under functional classification.

Firstly, if sport in its current state is so dominated by masculinity why are female participation levels at an all-time high? Is sport and its implied celebration of all that is male really so abhorrent? A simple answer to all of the above is readily available: that women do not necessarily assimilate in the masculine ideal when competing. This is demonstrated in tennis (see Sherwin and Schwartz, 2005) where the serve, a powerful and violently fast action plays far less of a role in the women’s game than in the men’s. Female sport has arguably carved out its own niche in the sporting landscape, a niche founded upon a gynocentric feminism that values the unique qualities of women to the point where discrepancies between male and female sport have become boasts of prideful liberation (Greer, 1999). It is not too large a step to apply this thinking to functionally classified female sport—would amalgamated sport not best demonstrate and recognise the unique qualities of women? Would masculinity be forced upon female competitors?

It can be argued that the answer to these potential problems for sex blind sport lies in what can be considered masculine or feminine. Difference philosophy rejects the notion that essential feminine (or disabled) attributes can be reduced to products of socialisation and thus deny that these qualities are subject to change depending on prevailing social factors (Edwards and Jones, 2008). Yet there is much to suggest that the ‘female essence’ (Bacchi, 1990) is malleable and open to incorporation of what has previously been labelled masculine. Clasen’s feminine paradox (2001) can be seen as an expression of this phenomenon and its relatively recent notoriety can be seen as coinciding with Dyer’s (1989, p.86) observation that “women’s performances are improving faster than men’s in virtually all events in all sports and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future”. This observation in turn coincides with Garhammer’s (1991) observation of rapid female improvement in weightlifting. More recently in snowboarding the
progress and success of female riders has been noted by Thorpe (2005, p.91) who comments on how the female athletes overcome “patriarchal ideologies that associate power with masculinity”. From these examples it is possible to see that attributes traditionally associated with male sporting excellence need not be excluded from the concept of feminine.

However, why should women aim for what is currently thought of as sporting excellence (unwavering cast in a masculine frame) when the end result is androgyny on male terms? Amalgamated sport does nothing to question to current normative sporting standards and practices. This has been observed by many authors (Scheider, 2000; Giordano and Harris, 2005 and Mackinnon, 1987), hence why anti-segregation literature so often calls for ‘sport transformed’. A more overt moral component in desegregated sport can be seen as wishful abstraction and is problematized by the cases of women like Lindsay Vomm and Arron Brundle. Both have striven for inclusion in their equivalent male sports, regardless of the moral state of said sports. Further names can be added to this list including Sarah Taylor and Maribel Dominguez. The needs of these women in their far from isolated cases are hard to ignore. Even harder to continence is the mirrored state of disability sport where female athletes are permitted to ‘opt into’ (LaVaque-Manty, 2005) able bodied sport but may not compete in male disability sporting events, despite that under functional classification they are more similarly able to their male counterparts than able females. From the actions of the women listed above it is possible to see an illustration of the argument that difference philosophy perpetuates male domination and reinforces the ill-defined reasons used to justify segregated sport. Arguably desegregated sport would provide greater chances for self actualisation for women. In this regard in disability sport the imperative to bring about desegregated sport can be argued to be greater than that of able bodied sport, it is desirable for disability sport to bring about functional parity through sameness (Taylor and Myktiuk 2001). Even the easily envisaged domination of one group over another under amalgamated functionally classified sport can be viewed as conducive to meaningful and excellence producing competition, “sport is a competitive practice, whose internal logic consists of the display of an unequal distribution of abilities [that is, moral virtues]” (van Hilvoorde and Landeweerd, 2008, p101).
2.3: The Fact-Value Gap

Of the several concepts discussed thus far in this thesis all can be considered ethically grounded only to a certain degree. What prevents arguments of meaningful competition and equality through sameness from being applied to functionally classified sport, besides practical considerations, is the fact-value distinction or is-ought gap. It is in this concept that can be observed the sticking point for normative ethics. No amount of argumentation through the presentation of facts necessarily entails the creation of a moral imperative, as was first articulated by Hume (2000, p.627) “the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded upon the relations of objects, nor is it perceived by reason”. Thus drawing an evaluative (that is, value based) conclusion like ‘amalgamated sport is just’ from facts such as ‘sex blind sport provides a more meaningful competition’ should be rejected on logical grounds because a factual premise cannot generate an ethical conclusion (Morgan, 2007).

All that has passed before in this thesis can be dismissed as failing to cross the is-ought gap. Drawing moral conclusions from a non-moral premise is patently illogical. What may redeem the logic chains and arguments made previously in this paper is the analytic bridge principle- the use of a priori, self-evident truths to link evaluative claims and fact (Pigden, 2010). Applied to meaningful competition the bridging principle can be seen to permit amalgamated functionally classified sport to be presented as an evaluative conclusion. Sex blind sport allows for a greater demonstration of excellence within under a FCS, provided one accepts the humanist approach of equality through same treatment. Sport, described by Simon (2004, p.27) as “a mutual accepted quest for excellence through challenge”. Challenge and excellence have been argued in this paper as appearing to a greater extent in amalgamated sport than segregated sport, therefore sex blind sport is just. Thus an analytic truth- that sport is the pursuit of excellence, can provide a link between the value based judgement of ‘desegregated sport under FCS’s ought to be in place’ and the fact that ‘desegregated sport provides enhanced opportunities for excellence’. However, this logic only holds for as long as one is willing to accept that any practice in sport is excellent or worthy of merit.
Finally, the fact-value distinction can also be nullified through Searle’s (1969) conceptualisation of promise. In Searle’s theorising promise is intrinsically linked to the notion of obligation; “when we assert ‘He made a promise’ we commit ourselves to the proposition that he undertook an obligation. In exactly the same way, when we use the word ‘triangle’ we commit ourselves to its logical properties” (1969, p.194). Thus there is nothing subjective, nor any matter of moral decision, involved in accepting that promise - a fact or ‘is’ can result in an evaluative conclusion. Indeed, without obligation and the moral imperative behind promise the concept of promising becomes meaningless. What remains to illustrated now is whether Searle’s promissory obligation allows for the facts surrounding amalgamated sport to generate an evaluative judgment. To achieve this end exposition upon sporting rules is necessary. Engaging with sport in a fair manner has long been associated with contractarianism, “when we engage in a rule governed practice we enter a more or less tacit social contract in which a moral obligation arises” (Loland, 1998, p. 85; see also: Rawls, 1971). Rule adherence in turn has been compared to promissory obligation, “to abide by the rules…is a moral obligation undertaken in joining the game, roughly akin to keeping one’s promises” (McFee, 2004, p.123).

Is it conceivable that segregated sport violates Searle’s promissory ought? The contract of sporting rules, as it were, is undertaken by athletes in part to ensure that the sport functions (perhaps based on an intuitive understanding of the constitutive nature of some sporting rules) but also, as Suites (1995) contends, on the understanding that they will be permitted to attempt to achieve pre-lusory goals: achievable states that determine the sporting victor. Can excellence (through meaningful competition) and equal treatment be viewed as pre-lusory goals? The answer to this question will either compel upon sport a moral obligation to adopt sex assimilated competition under functional classification or render much of this thesis’ arguments on is-ought defunct. In ignoring how desegregated functionally classified sport can bring about enhancement of both excellence and equal treatment does sport as a whole fail to abide by a promise? It could be argued that sport makes no such promises and thus cannot be held to promissory obligation. However, as has been stated previously, sport is a mutual quest for excellence (see Simon, 2004) and this quest is only rendered meaningful
through equal treatment and fair play (see Jones and Howe, 2005\textsuperscript{[1]}). It would seem that sport is inescapably tied to the principles of excellence, equality and fairness - to the point where it ought, through Searle's conception of promise, to facilitate their growth in functionally classified sport by introducing amalgamated sex classes.

\textsuperscript{[1]} p.135 “fairness [is] a procedural requirement or an obligation... when one voluntarily engages in a rule governed practices”. For similar accounts of fair play and distributive justice see Rawls (1971) and Loland (2002).
CHAPTER THREE:

EXPLICIT CONCLUSION
In conclusion this thesis is able to provide a mixed account of the possible justifications for sex blind competition under functional classification. Discussion upon the subject of meaningful competition displayed the biased and un-praiseworthy nature of sport in its current conception and also concluded that desegregation was likely to reinforce the masculinist domination of sport, including its allocation of basic and scarce resources (English, 1978). The prospect of amalgamated sport has been argued to be brighter when viewed through the lens of sameness and difference. Here sex blind sport can be shown to address, rather than pander too, male dominance through adaption of the femininity concept. Arguably desegregated functionally classified sport allows greater room than is currently present in segregated sport for the growth and self-actualisation of individual women and femininity as a whole. To paraphrase Tamburrini and Tannsjo (2005)- who is to say that power and raw strength cannot be feminine? Finally, the ethical conclusions drawn in this thesis can be seen as valid due to promissory nature of the sporting contract competitors place themselves under, as well as the self-evident truths that can be seen to link fact statements on desegregated sport with the evaluative conclusion that segregated sport ought to be in place under functional classification.

However, the latter two conclusions listed above are by their nature abstract and removed from the practicalities of sport. To what extent conclusions that are arguably divorced from reality are valid is an inescapable doubt inherent to normative ethics. It is hoped that references to the practicalities of disability sport (English’s resources, class population) has at least partially grounded this thesis. This author is persuaded that the functional classification system that presides over most disability sports can produce a fair and accurate indication of athletic performance (in accordance with Howe and Jones, 2006, conceptualisation of fair play), adequate to the needs of desegregated competition. Much research and investigation is needed before the system can be called anything other than adequate or fit for purpose but the already sex blind nature of functional classification means desegregated sport (Tweedy and Vanlandewijck, 2009) could initiate today. This author is further persuaded that desegregation is the future for all sport, instances of female drive for inclusion in male sport, both successful and
unsuccessful, are increasing. Female competitors already compete alongside men in the NFL combine and English premier league cricket. It is only a matter of time before the oft overlooked functional classification system of disability sport is considered to be the next area for inclusion in the humanist vision of equality through sameness. Finally it is hoped that this thesis answered the call of Loland (2002) to continually assess all sports to best judge which require sex classes and which do not.


