CARDIFF BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION –
A critical review of a case study in urban regeneration

By

Efstratios Babalikis

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University of Wales Institute of Cardiff
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DECLARATION

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

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Statement 1

Except where otherwise stated this thesis is the result of my own investigations. Other sources are acknowledged by explicit references.

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Director of Studies: Gareth Jones (Senior Lecturer, Business School)

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ABSTRACT

Recent times have seen through changing social, political and economic circumstances the gradual, or perhaps in some places acute, running-down of parts of urban systems leaving in some cases entire inner city areas derelict and devastated. To tackle this problem, urban policies during the nineteen eighties and onwards were geared towards urban regeneration strategies.

In this context, the increasing influence of “New Right” ideology, which advocated a deregulated state together with a market-led regeneration as favourable solutions to urban dereliction, constituted the main topic of discussion in the literature review section of this thesis. The effect of “New Right” ideology on urban planning policies pursued by a succession of Conservative governments since 1979 and into the mid-nineties, was sought in this thesis in order to appreciate the shift away from the Welfare State regime to a new era of encouraged private sector-led development. As had been argued in the literature review, the changing roles of public and private sector agencies in the urban development arena had resulted in a fragmentation of planning styles which could be drawn into a typology of distinctive planning styles ranging from market-critical to market-led, as identified from the review of several British cases studies by Brindley et al. (1996).

More specifically, in this thesis it was decided to review the changing ideological climate that had affected urban planning during this era within the case study area. The thesis examines the view that the “New Right”, due to unique arrangements featured in the particular case, had not been as dominant in Cardiff as in other English urban regeneration areas. In order to verify this belief, the research methods chosen included first a review of secondary sources of information for the locality, and second semi-structured in depth interviews with “key-actors” in the particular redevelopment scheme. The information gathered was used for the evaluation of the case study against the typology of planning styles, in order to assess if the particular case study had reaffirmed the typology or had suggested a new one. Ultimately, the issue of a “good practice” regeneration model has been discussed in the conclusion of this thesis, in light of the recent “New Deal” initiatives by the Labour government during the second half of the nineties, where a greater community involvement has been considered essential in order to achieve considerable improvements in urban regeneration programmes.
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Abbreviations

ABP – Associate British Ports
Cadw – Conservation lobby of Wales
CBAT – Cardiff Bay Arts Trust
CBDC – Cardiff Bay Development Corporation
CBTEG – Cardiff Bay Training and Employment Group
CLES – Centre for Local Economic Strategies
CRAB – Cardiff Residents Against the Barrage
DoE – Department of Environment
EZ – Enterprise Zones
GEAR – Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal project
GNP – Gross National Product
GOR – Government Office for the Regions
IHRA – Inner Harbour Residents Association
LDDC – London Docklands Development Corporation
NEG – Nippon Electrical Glass
PDR – Peripheral Distributor Road
PFI – Private Finance Initiative
QUANGO – Quasi-Autonomous Non-Governmental Organisation
SG – South Glamorgan
SMEs – Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
SPZ – Simplified Planning Zones
SRB – Single Regeneration Budget
UDC – Urban Development Corporation
UDG – Urban Development Grant
UK – United Kingdom
UPG – Urban Programme Grant
URG – Urban Regeneration Grant
US – United States
WDA – Welsh Development Agency
WO – Welsh Office
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INTRODUCTION

Urban planning has always been closely linked to market processes through its regulatory function. As various academics (Ball, 1983; Hague, 1984) argue, the function of planning is to contribute, through its legitimising function, to the conditions necessary for the maintenance of a capitalist market system. Furthermore, Thornley suggests that

planning provides an ideology of intervention in the public interest while, in reality, supporting dominant economic interests.  

(Thornley, 1991:p21)

Of course, notions such as "public interest" or "dominant economic interests" can be the subject of controversy and ambiguity, especially in the light of the major influence that the "New Right" (a concept discussed in chapter 1) has had on many policy-making arenas within the Conservative government which came into power in Britain in 1979. That new government's leaning towards the "New Right" had undoubtedly a major impact in some fields such as education, housing and local government finance. It remains an important topic for research and evaluation, therefore, even after the Labour electoral victory of 1997. For the purpose of this research, it is the "New Right" impact upon urban planning that is particularly sought. More specifically, an investigation into the effects the "New Right" ideology had on urban policies geared towards regeneration is pursued in this research within the redevelopment experience of Cardiff Bay during the Nineteen eighties to date. The principal research question that is to be addressed is whether the Cardiff Bay regeneration experience may be distinguished from the main urban policies pursued under a succession of Conservative governments since 1979 which were apparently, as discussed in the literature review, attached to the idea of promoting a free-market approach to regeneration initiatives.
The central theme implicit in Thatcherite/Majorite policies was the attack on state intervention as part of which the long-standing debate over the appropriate role of the public versus the private sector in development issues had been revived. In the literature review laid out in the first two chapters a discussion is included on the confusions over the purpose of planning that reflected its position of being caught in the ambiguity between the egalitarian aims of the Welfare state and the individualistic attitudes implicit in the capitalist free-market economy. This research seeks to participate in the debate relating to the public and private sectors involvement in development. In particular, it seeks to identify the perceptions of key-actors (identified in chapter 5) in this development of their ability to influence and determine policy directions in the urban restructuring process. The research also seeks to establish the perceptions of both professionals and citizens on aspects such as the attainment of a "public-interest-orientated" development or an encouragement of development that aimed in favouring “dominant economic interests” (notions mentioned earlier) or perhaps a balance between them. The input from both professionals and citizens forms a significant part of this project aiming to enlighten the research question of the differences exhibited in the case study, because:

- firstly, the opinions of the former group will aid a critical evaluation of the views of key-participants in decision-making within the urban regeneration practice; and

- secondly, the latter group’s views will provide an account of community awareness and input on the strategies devised for the renewal of their area as well as an account of their, perhaps direct, participation in the reshaping of their area.
The case study approach has been selected in order to investigate the debate identified between public and private sectors involvement in development within its real life context. The reason for selecting the case study approach as well as the limitations of a case study strategy are analysed in detail in the research methods chapter. Cardiff Bay has been selected as the case study because the area represents the major urban regeneration initiative of recent years in the City of Cardiff, and also because of the active involvement of both public and private sector agencies in the project in an arrangement that appears to be unique in the UK. This is so since the Cardiff Bay Development Corporation (CBDC) is a quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation (quango) with the statutory and constitutional powers of an Urban Development Corporation (UDC), without however acting as a planning authority within its boundaries. Instead it is the local authority (Cardiff City Council) which is primarily responsible for approving planning proposals brought in by CBDC and private developers, and this reflects a rather corporatist approach that has been envisaged in the arrangements for CBDC and this is exactly why the particular case study is considered to be worth investigating.

There is a vast body of theoretical literature exploring the debate of planning versus market input in development; in particular, when one considers the effects that Thatcherite policies have had on urban policies and planning (Abercrombie, et al., 1980; Ambrose, 1986; Atkinson & Moon, 1994; Hall, 1988; Lawless, 1988; Thornley, 1991, 1993). A systematic review of this literature forms the background theory (see Phillips & Pugh, 1994) of this research and is included in chapter 1.
Primarily, it is intended in the first chapter to draw the picture of the gradual move, since late 1970s, away from the Welfare State towards a state considerably affected by the “New Right” philosophy. In the light of this discussion, the reader is invited to appreciate the changing political and ideological climate that has resulted in the encouragement of greater private sector involvement in development issues in conjunction with the subsequent by-passing of local government controlling and regulatory functions that were previously associated with it. To do so, chapter 1 begins with a discussion of the shift from the Welfare State to a deregulated state with the private sector assuming an increasingly major role in development and following is the discussion of the changing face of local government from a provider to an enabler (Ridley, 1988). The local government role in urban development is then reviewed within the context of the inner city problem and the emerging theories of urban renewal and regeneration. The chapter concentrates on the urban policies pursued during the eighties and onwards and how they have subsequently affected the role that urban planning came to assume during the "New Right" era.

The planning-led (or market-critical if one considers the functioning of planning profession as an expert regulator controlling market forces) and market-led approaches to urban regeneration are discussed in more detail in the second chapter, whereby several planning models are included as verified by the research of six case studies in Britain (Brindley et al., 1996). The purpose of this chapter is to derive a typology against which the experience of the Cardiff Bay urban regeneration initiative can be put into perspective. Hence, the chapter concludes with an attempt to raise a number of issues with regard to the Cardiff Bay redevelopment scheme, the major urban regeneration initiative within the City of Cardiff, against the typology framework which has been devised. It should be
emphasised herein, as discussed earlier in this section, that Cardiff Bay has been selected as a case study for two main reasons: firstly, because of a fascination of the researcher with the area's rapid reshaping, and secondly because the whole redevelopment project appears to be distinguishable from some of the practices of rigidly property-led regeneration schemes elsewhere - the latter reason being the principal area of research in this thesis. It is the researcher's belief that this is so because Cardiff is a relatively new and modern city with a city council that considers itself quite visionary and which has been showing over the years - coinciding with the time span considered in this thesis - a considerable amount of effort for urban restructuring projects. In addition, the particular case study is considered distinguishable by other regeneration practices because of the enforcement of a unique arrangement which required that both the public and private sectors should assume an active role in the area's regeneration programme.

Therefore, the research hypothesis is that there is a variation from urban development programmes associated with the "New Right" ideology in the particular case study and that the reasons for this variation lie in the different structures and policies being pursued in this area. It is further argued that this is best evidenced by examining the influence of each group of "key actors" in the urban restructuring process and their contribution in determining policy directions. The way in which individual and rather subjective responses of people involved in, or affected by, the urban regeneration process are to be obtained constitute the subject of discussion in the third chapter where there is first a theoretical discussion on the evolution of research methods and their distinctive approaches; secondly, the research methodology adopted for extracting the aforementioned
information in this research, identified as a qualitative approach, is set out in greater detail.

Following, in chapter 4, is a review of secondary sources of information from development plans for the former county and the locality initially and for the later reformed local authority, in order to gain an understanding of the perception of Cardiff Bay's problem by the public sector and the consequent actions taken. The chronological and contextual framework is associated, as is discussed in the literature review section, with the wider adoption of the "New Right" philosophy since 1979 and in this context the establishment of a Development Corporation responsible for the regeneration of Cardiff Bay is also discussed in detail in chapter 4. The central aim of this chapter is to provide a thorough investigation into the reality of what has been happening in the Cardiff Bay area's regeneration process during the past two decades, so that the issues that need to be further explored in the interviews can be identified.

Chapter 5 includes a list of the interviewees who were identified as "key-actors" within the various agencies involved in, or affected by, the regeneration process in Cardiff Bay, and explains the reason for their selection. Then, there is a discussion on the key-aspects that are raised in the interviews; those are the perception of each group of "key-actors" on issues such as:

- the nature of the development taking place in the area;
- the attainment of "public interest-orientated" development or one with an emphasis placed on private capital;
- the influence of each "key-actor" in the urban restructuring process and consequently their contribution in determining policy directions;
• the collaboration of the agencies involved;
• the sustainability of the regeneration effort; and
• the benefits attached to it.

This chapter principally included the analysis of the interviews and aims in assessing the input into the regeneration process by each "standpoint of the key-actors" on the key-aspects of the research as identified above.

In effect, following the discussion and the arguments made in this research and having read, heard and seen many different versions and views on the role that urban planning has been let, forced or just maybe came to assume in recent times, a general discussion of the role that urban planning and the private sector have played, and are still playing, is included in the final chapter 6. To do so there is a summary of the main issues discussed in this research followed by a discussion on how Cardiff Bay fits within the typology discussed in chapter 2. Finally, in this chapter is argued if indeed the selected case study has shown any diversification from the urban policies that have been pursued under the Conservatives regime of a free-market approach to urban regeneration, and if it has why this has been the case.
CHAPTER 1: THE LITERATURE REVIEW
1.1 - An overview of the "New Right" era of the late seventies

1.1.1 - The historic background

In the light of the criticisms to which the Welfare State was subjected during the late 1970s and early 1980s, and in order to put the discussion into its historical context, its emergence in the post-war period is discussed.

Titmuss (1950) suggests that the deprivations of the war, the impact of evacuation, the greater awareness of poverty and social differences all led to a mood of greater collectivism and desire for equality at the end of the II World War. However, Marshall (1964) argues that the idea of a more egalitarian "new society" had already been devised before the war and thus the impact of the war itself as a major reason for the establishment of the Welfare State needs to be kept into perspective (for a fuller treatment of these issues see for example Bruce, 1968, or Fraser, 1973).

Following the First World War, as Stewart (1986) suggests, British governments were preoccupied with returning the country to the Gold Standard, thus achieving a powerful currency and keeping budget deficits balanced. However, the emerging Keynesian theory, stressed the importance of greater public expenditure and reduced taxes in order to tackle unemployment, which had doubled in the 1930s. Harris (1972) points out the failure, during the 1930s, of the free-market-orientated policy in returning Britain to the golden era at the turning of the last century clarified a need for a protectionist economic policy requiring a role for the state, which supported the Keynesian view for the Welfare State.
Following the Second World War during the 1940s legislation on income support, health and education was the climax of the development of a comprehensive Welfare State, with the public sector taking primary responsibility for the delivery, financing and regulation of welfare. Thornley (1991) points out that a political consensus was evident at that time for a larger public sector and a reduced role for the market. The resulting role for the state covered a number of interconnected areas, such as state control of basic services and industries, provision of social welfare and the requirement for high public expenditure and taxation. The social expenditure was deemed necessary for engendering the stability needed for the growth of the economy.

Eventually the Welfare State has developed as a partnership between government and expert administrators. Kavanagh (1987) argues that this led to an elite and corporatist approach where increased importance and power was given to experts and bureaucrats in many fields of the policy arena -including planning as discussed later. The public were happy with this arrangement of power as long as the prosperity of 1950s and 1960s lasted.

However, as Thornley (1991) argues,

...the most compulsive force operating in society in recent times is that of economic crisis...in the context of the economic crisis facing many advanced economies in the late 1970s the major obstacle to a radical reorientation of economic strategy in Britain was perceived to be the value system that had evolved under the post-war Welfare State, and hence there was a need for an ideological attack on this value system as a pre condition of the economic restructuring.

(Thornley, 1991: pp.5-7)

Indeed, by the 1970s there was growing dissatisfaction with the Welfare State. Marilyn Taylor (1994) argues that to some extent the system sowed the seeds of its own destruction. She suggests that the improved standards of living to which it contributed meant that initial satisfaction gradually gave way to rising
expectations and frustration with the lack of choice offered. Another criticism of the Welfare State was that provision of services was felt to be standardised and insensitive (ibid.). Efforts were made during this period to introduce more participation into the decision-making process, particularly in housing, planning and community development (Loney, 1983). By the end of the 1970s alternative models of welfare involving a reduced role for the state were being canvassed, prominent among them being the concept of “welfare pluralism” (Gladstone, 1979) which allowed voluntary organisations a much greater role.

Critics from the right of the political spectrum saw no major role for the government in welfare, either. Public sector provision was accused of “stifling innovation, denying choice, and voraciously and insatiably consuming people’s money” (Anderson, Lair, and Marsland, 1981:p14). Known as the “New Right”, this school of thought advocated using the market as the principal mechanism for welfare, claiming that its neutrality made it the only mechanism that could both respect individual liberty and, through competition, guarantee the efficient use of resources.

Meanwhile, economic recession, rising unemployment, and a series of crippling public sector strikes combined in 1979 with more general criticisms of the Welfare State to pave the way for the election of a Conservative government committed to rolling back the frontiers of the Welfare State.

Implying her views on individuals and the necessity for a Welfare State to care for them, Mrs Thatcher in her much-quoted comment had suggested that “there is no such thing as society; there are only individuals, and families” (Thatcher, 1977). Within this line of thinking the language of politics under Mrs Thatcher shifted
from “public good” to “individual choice and entrepreneurial flair”. Bureaucrats and professionals, who had concentrated the political power in their hands under the Welfare State, were no longer held in particularly high regard. The implications of these individualistic and anti-bureaucratic attitudes for the role of professional planners were considerable. Under the Welfare State planners usually saw their role as guardians of the public or community interest but this goes against the grain of Thatcherism - a term commonly used in academic textbooks simply as a rather crude shorthand for "the ideas and policies of Thatcher's governments" (Wilding, 1992: p211).

From the previous discussion the reason why a major element of the ideological rhetoric of the 1979 election campaign was an attack on post-war Welfare State values becomes clear. The comprehensive town planning system was established in this post-war setting - does this meaning that an attack on the values of this period undermines the basis of planning? This is a question that is attempted to be addressed in this chapter, where the influence of Thatcherism upon planning is sought.

In the next section, an examination of how the state and the individual are viewed by influential “New Right" academics, such as Hayek and Friedman, and the way their ideas have inspired the Conservative government's policy directions are discussed so as for the reader to appreciate the changing ideological context that was being imposed during the 1980s.
1.1.2 - The ideological leaning of the Conservative Party to New Right philosophy

As highlighted earlier on, the election of a Conservative government in 1979 saw the introduction of many of the policies associated with the "New Right" philosophers such as Hayek (1944) and Friedman (1962) who stressed the importance of a "minimalist" role of the government in relation to the workings of the macro-economy.

Generally speaking, Friedman (1962) argues that the preservation of the individuals freedom is achieved by recognising two broad principles with respect to government's role: first, he argues that the scope of government must be limited to the preservation of law and order, to the enforcement of private contracts and to the fostering of competitive markets; the second broad principle according to Friedman is that government power must be dispersed so as to represent a more decentralised structure.

To review matters in their historical context, in the early nineteenth century, the intellectual movement that went under the name of liberalism emphasised freedom as the ultimate goal and the individual as the ultimate entity of the democratic society. It supported laissez faire at home as a means of reducing the role of the state in economic affairs and thereby enlarging the role of the individual. Furthermore, Hoggart (1997) argues that, left to democratic institutions (read a capitalist economy), limited government intervention and open trade policies, economic advancement is seen as most likely. Cross-national empirical investigations provide some comfort for this view (Goldsmith, 1995; Eusufzai, 1996). On the other hand, following a similar approach de Haan and Siermann
(1996) argue that democracy is not unambiguously allied to economic growth and prosperity.

In factual terms, Thatcher's conservative government that came into power in 1979 was acclaimed to be a "neoliberal" government. In that new era, favourable notions of Thatcher's government were "rolling back the state" or "new times" (Cochrane, 1993: p.19) in conjunction with the notion of "freeing-up" of markets in order that they might function more efficiently and effectively. The interference of market forces with development and the process of economic advancement in general, adheres to the neoliberal viewpoint, which, to quote Hoggart,

has been forcefully accepted by so many states and multinational organisations.

(Hoggart, 1997: p110)

However, Glennerster (1989: pp109-110) argues that the legacy of Thatcherism showed not a simple rolling back of the state but a more complex pattern of government activity aiming to reinforce central control; Levitas (1986a: p103) agrees with this as she argues that one of the consequences of Thatcherite policies was the concentration of power in the central state "in order to establish and maintain the deregulated market" -this fact with its effects on by-passing local government and planning controls over development is further discussed in the Conservatives' centralisation versus decentralisation paradox in section 1.2.

In order to appreciate how the "New Right" concept was embodied in planning practice, one important aspect of Thatcher's government neoliberal policy initiatives was the perceived need to loosen planning regulations and introduce private sector involvement, particularly in the redevelopment of deprived urban areas. The neo-liberals want a strong system of law to protect the "deregulated" market, and did not object to authoritarian measures to enforce it (Belsey, 1986).
Ambrose (1986) argues that this move towards economic management by market forces rather than democratic agencies was inevitable as the capitalist "crisis" has deepened since the early 1970s and the Keynesian philosophy of a public sector-led recovery has been supplanted by the rigid orthodoxy of the "New Right", as highlighted in the previous section. However, he suggests that the balance between market forces and democratic agencies would probably have stayed somewhere within the expected range in British politics had it not been for "the advent of brutalist politics in the shape of the Thatcher government, with its explicit commitment to deregulation and market-based solutions to virtually all problems" (preface to Ambrose, 1986). As Rider and Zajicek (1995) make clear, too often the introduction of deregulation, liberalisation and privatisation has owed much to a seeming blind faith in their positive virtues. In real terms though, in the UK alone, the privatisation of many services which have occurred under Thatcher's government had significant negative implications for the democratic basis of local government (Patterson and Pinch, 1995).

In order to put this discussion into the context of the attack to the Welfare State, both Friedman's and Hayek's works which mounted a concerted attack on bureaucrats are considered mostly relevant. This is of particular interest, with respect to the central question within this research of how urban planning was affected through the new ideological climate, given that most of the planners operate as state bureaucrats. Friedman (1962) sees this bureaucracy performing its duties on the basis of false concepts such as "equality of outcome" and "fairness". Hayek (1960) also noted that an army of government officers' arbitrary power, who in addition have never been elected, represented one of the main threats to society:

it would scarcely be an exaggeration that the greatest danger to liberty today comes from the men who are the most needed and most powerful in modern government, namely, the
efficient expert administrators exclusively concerned with what they regard as the public good.

(Hayek, 1960: p262)

Furthermore, regarding issues of bureaucratic interference with capitalism, Kristol (1978) has talked about a “new class” made up of public administrators in alliance with liberal intellectuals who had a “hidden agenda” for the destruction of capitalism. Although Kristol’s argument can be criticised as a rather exaggerated viewpoint of a latent anti-socialist ideology, the issue of bureaucracy versus capitalism had emerged much earlier. Schumpeter, writing in 1942, was one of the first people to raise the issue of the adverse relationship between bureaucrats and the efficient operation of capitalism. The above views strongly shaped Thatcher’s government anti-bureaucratic attitude. The subsequent effect that this attitude had to the status quo of the professional planners was considerable; their operational efficiency, their integrity as experts, and their professional ability to act upon public interest and benefit were questioned, and this was something that inevitably left their position jeopardised.

To cite Mrs Thatcher on her views of bureaucracy and socialism,

To believe that socialism is in some way morally superior to a free enterprise system is to believe that it is better for an official to take a decision than for an individual to take it for himself. What is more, one has to believe that bureaucrats, and the Socialist functionaries that direct them, are free from any normal human faults and actuated purely by a selfless desire for the public good.

(Thatcher, 1977: p27)

Boyson’s statement (1971) takes the assault to the Welfare State even further beyond when he was writing:

a state which does for its citizens what they can do for themselves is an evil state...in such an irresponsible society no one cares...why should they when the state spends all its energies taking money for the successful and thrifty to give to the idle, the failures and the feckless?

(Boyson, 1971: p5)
Implying that bureaucrats not only have motives of their own but also are directed by socialists aiming in undermining capitalism, clearly indicates Thatcher's bias towards officials. More specifically, how the "New Right" rationale affected local government is described in the following section and is epitomised in Cochrane's "fairy-tale" about local government.

1.2 - A discussion of Local Government post-1979: from a "provider" to an "enabler"?

In this section, it is attempted to explain the changes which have taken place in this "post-1979 era", in a more detailed fashion, in relation to local government's role in the urban planning process. It is not the purpose of this study to judge the gains and losses of neoliberal policy, a task which undoubtedly engages major difficulties if one wishes to generalise, but to seek the effects of this line of thinking on the urban planning process.

The role played by local authorities in market economies such as Britain has been changing over the last two decades, and the structures and procedures within which policies are made and implemented have changed as a result. Peter Malpass (1994) points out that central to what is still happening is that local authorities are being required to become firstly more business-like, and secondly business oriented, in both their internal administration and their external relations. Harvey (1989) discussing competitiveness between cities has characterised this changing process as a shift from managerialism to enterpreneurialism.

In order to review the matter within the time scale chosen for this study and in relation to the central theme herein of Thatcher's leaning towards "New-Right"
ideology, Cochrane is quoted with his widely accepted fairy-tale about British local government in the last quarter of the twentieth century. It runs a little bit like this:

Once upon a time there was something called local democracy. Every few years (every year in some places) people voted for their local councillors. These councillors ran the council with the help of appointed officials. Together they decided how to provide services to the local populations. In general the levels and forms of service provision reflected the demands of local electors. There was little conflict between central and local government, because each knew its place in the greater scheme of things. But then -around 1979- the evil "Snow Queen" came to power. She changed everything. Local electors were no longer able to make their own choices, because she -or her almost equally evil henchmen- made those decisions for them. She wanted to stop ordinary people receiving the benefits to which they have previously been entitled, and which had been promised to them by their friendly local councillors.

(Cochrane, 1993: p2)

Like all fairy-tales, of course, there are elements of truth in the above. Indeed, local government grew in importance during the post-war period as it became the major administrative agency of an expanding Welfare State. Responsible for education, housing, personal social services and a whole range of protective and environmental services, it employed nearly three million people and accounted for one-third of public expenditure by the mid-1970s (Stoker, 1988; Horton, 1990). Its expenditure was consuming an ever larger proportion of GNP and it was heavily dependent on central government financial support. There was a feeling that its spending was out of central control and that this was a major cause of the fiscal crisis of the state.

In the context of the earlier discussion on the "New Right" ideological perspectives, local government was also under attack in the 1970s for its lack of accountability and responsiveness to consumer demand, and -in the line of the attack to bureaucracy as discussed in the previous section- its wastefulness and inefficiency resulting from unnecessary bureaucracy, and poor management (factors that were considered as the major reasons for local authority's overspending). It was accused on the one hand of too much professional
autonomy and on the other of overpowerful trade unions willing to exploit their "essential service" position and hold the public in ransom in industrial disputes. Whilst these arguments came mainly from the right, there were many within the Labour and Liberal Parties who were advocating more decentralisation, democratisation and participation in local government (Cochrane, 1993).

Considering the concern over the resources allocated to local government finances, the first attempt to contain local government expenditure was made by the Labour government back in 1975 who had succeeded in curbing it with a two-pronged strategy of cash limits and a reduction in grant support. However, when the Conservatives came to power in 1979 local government expenditure still accounted for 28.1 per cent of public expenditure and 12.4 per cent of GNP, with central government providing 60 per cent of local government tax revenue (Horton, 1990). As a result, the Conservatives aimed mainly in controlling local government expenditure centrally. Central control became the rule over their period in government and the overall impact of the local government finance legislation introduced since 1979 has been that more than 85 per cent of local government current expenditure was controlled by central government (CLES-Centre for Local Economic Strategies, 1994). Michael Ward (ibid.), the Director of CLES since 1987, argued that when local authorities only controlled 15 per cent of their income, they no longer had the discretion, the resources, or the autonomy required to match policies to a local assessment of local needs.

The remarkable centralisation of political power that took place since 1979 and over the following ten years or so is stressed by several academics (Newton and Karran, 1985; Blunkett and Jackson, 1987; Parkinson, 1987a; Stoker, 1988). Parkinson (1987a) stresses that the centralisation which took place under the
Conservatives was a paradox. He suggests that the government's original strategy for urban regeneration involved a major redistribution in political power—but not centralisation. One element of the strategy was to decentralise power and shift control of policy from central to local level. The other strand was to use private markets to break the control of monopoly public suppliers at local level and liberate consumers. Thus, both central and local government were to lose power, and consumers were to gain. However, Parkinson (1989) argues that a different, more powerful, pressure pushed the Conservative government in a quite different direction -towards the increased centralisation of state power. He argues that the pressure to centralise was driven primarily by the Government's macro-economic strategy and in particular its view that in order to regenerate the British economy, overall public sector expenditure had to be cut to encourage a private sector investment-led recovery. Indisputably though, any effort to restrict public spending was guaranteed to produce conflict between central and local government. This structural division exaggerated the existing tension between the Government's philosophical commitment to decentralise power, and its need to intervene in local affairs to achieve its more important ideological goal of controlling public spending which required it to centralise state power (ibid.).

During the 1980s the Conservatives used three methods to reduce local authority powers. The most direct was to impose strict limits on their revenue and capital expenditure. A second method was to privatisé or deregulate many local services either by forcing the sale of assets or by opening up the supply of local services to increased competition from private suppliers. The third method was to audit local authorities more extensively and make more information about their performance available; this in the light of an improved democratic basis was fair enough, but given the restrictions both in financial resources and in decision-
making powers that were imposed to local government, wasn't it that the most likely result would be that better informed local taxpayers would, through the ballot box, further curtail local authority spending?

The impact of these measures was dramatic. The Government argued that it was transforming an expensive, inefficient bureaucracy into an organisation which was more accountable to its citizens and more democratic. Local government, by contrast, argued that individual consumer choice was being reduced and the centre's determination to bypass local authorities left them reduced to mere functionaries of an increasingly powerful and undemocratic central state (Blunkett & Jackson, 1987). On this matter, as Hambleton (1989) points out, the Conservative Government has sustained a relentless attack on local government. The emphasis throughout the 1980s on strengthening the power of the British central state has reached the point where "there is a real danger that pluralism as a political value will be jettisoned and an authoritarian regime will result" (Loughlin, 1986: p201).

In conclusion, when considering the effect of the "New Right" ideology framework of Mrs Thatcher's government to local government, one of her major concerns was apparently to diminish the Welfare state and instead increase market provision. Local authorities during the eighties have lost considerable powers, duties, independence and the right to raise revenue at a level they and their electors consider appropriate (Wilding, 1992). Young (1989) sees the removal of the right to make decisions about the revenue to be raised as "an undoubted violation of any principle of local self-government" (Young, 1989: p125). The essence of the idea behind all the changes brought about in local government seems to be that local authorities should move from being the key providers of
key services to being the enabling bodies to facilitate the provision of these services (Ridley, 1988). In order to achieve the transformation of local government from the providing agency under the Welfare State to an enabling one as well as dealing with local government inefficiencies, the Conservatives were formulating policies aiming in reducing local government's expenditure and increasing its efficiency by pursuing policies of competitive tendering and encouraging contracting out in a bid to make local authorities more accountable to local ratepayers. Urban Development Corporations [UDCs], which are further discussed in section 1.3.2, were one of the mechanisms that the government introduced in the early eighties that had considerably reduced local government powers over large derelict areas. UDCs took over local authority and other public sector land in order to encourage development -as it is further discussed in section 1.3.2-, UDCs were given increased power to buy private land. Hunt (1995: p194) and Pliatzky (1992: p556) argue the necessity of having executive bodies to deal with the day-to-day delivery of public services, leaving important decision-making and crisis management outside the control of traditionally acknowledged formal state institutions (i.e. planning authorities). Horton (1990) argues that the Party's "New Right" leaning with support for a "property owning democracy", "individual responsibility and self-help" and "consumer choice" implied the major changes planned for local government. Clearly then, the ideological commitment of the Conservatives to the market and their determination to roll back the state seemed to herald an attack on the near-monopoly position of local authorities as providers of services.

As several academics suggest, this "attack" on local government made it the centre of politics throughout the 1980s (Stoker, 1988; Wilding, 1992; Cochrane, 1993). More specifically, the government's anti-state ideology brought it into
conflict particularly with Labour controlled authorities, still wedded to the idea of the state as an instrument of social justice and determined to resist pressures to dismantle the Welfare State system. Nevertheless, the lesson learned through that period showed that opposition and resistance did not stop the radical changes in the local government system from taking place, although they may have slowed the process. After all, as in so many other areas of government policy there has been a hidden agenda; in the light also of the earlier discussion of the Conservative’s government ideological leaning to “New Right”, here it might be speculated that the aims have been to remove the opposition to government policies, to weaken the local power base of the Labour Party, to undermine and destroy public sector unionism and to provide new markets for the private sector. With hindsight, a revolution was taking place throughout the 1980s and an era of local government was coming to an end. Several observers of local government in Britain (see Stoker, 1988: Butcher et al., 1990) argue that something profound happened to local government at that time. Local government has certainly lost functions but primarily on an ad hoc basis for pragmatic managerialist reasons (Moore, 1991). Since 1979 it has lost functions because of a sustained ideological -Thatcher’s and Hayek’s views in section 1.1.2 being most indicative- and political challenge which questioned its legitimacy as a local service provider and representative of local interests. Later reports suggest that within the Conservative Party further radical ideas for reducing the role of local government were being actively considered (The Guardian, 28 August, 1990).

However, Cochrane (1993) argues that the changing face of local government through the 1980s owed as much to local politicians as it did to the initiatives of central government, and - more important, perhaps - the changes can only be understood in the context of wider processes of economic and political
restructuring, both in Great Britain and world-wide, in which actors such as the above have had limited room for manoeuvre.

In the following section, a review of the urban policies pursued during the last two decades is included, so as to enlighten the removal of controls away from local to central government and the resulting shifts in decision-making powers from the public to the private sector as far as urban regeneration strategies are concerned. Through this discussion the way in which the urban policies introduced have reinforced the involvement of the private sector in the development process becomes more clear.

1.3 - A dicussion of Urban policies in Britain during the last two decades

In this section the issues of urban policies within the framework of the “New Right” ideology and also within the emerging problem of inner city decay during the seventies, are reviewed in order to aid a better understanding of the processes involved so that the changes that were brought about in planning can then be investigated.

1.3.1 - Introduction: the inner city problem

The inner city as a political issue has had a rare longevity. Margaret Thatcher’s famous declaration on election night in June 1987 that “we’ve got a big job to do in some of those inner cities” came just a decade after the previous Labour administration has published its 1977 Inner City White Paper to deal with urban deprivation (DoE, 1977b).
This section is about how the inner city issue has been conceptualised and addressed over the last two decades and how it is being perceived in the 1990s. In the early 1980s several issues were diagnosed as being the weaknesses of the economies of older urban areas, such as: inappropriate labour skills, derelict land and property, the lack of entrepreneurship, poor quality public housing, inadequate opportunities for owner occupation, and business-hostile local government were then regarded as the main reasons why the cities had not responded as successfully as other places to the changing of the economy (Solesbury, 1987).

The first attempts to contain the above problems are dated back in the late 1960s with the modest beginnings of the Urban Programme, its expansion then during the 1970s, the creation of partnership and programme local authorities with successive attempts to divert mainstream programme resources to the cities, the creation of Urban Development Corporations and Enterprise Zones in the early 1980s, the 1988 Action for Cities package which delivered on the 1987 post-election commitment (Edwards and Batley, 1978; Stewart, 1987; Lawless, 1989; Parkinson, 1989), and more recently the City Challenge and the Single Regeneration Budget of the 1990s - these initiatives are the subject of the discussion in the following sections. However, as Young (1990) argues, the thrust of urban policy remained essentially a welfare policy for places rather than people and, as such, the successor of regional economic policy.

1.3.2. - The emergence of Urban Policies

For the purpose of this research, the significance of policy frames must be acknowledged and the following parenthesis taken from Solesbury (1993)
provides its theoretical context. The process of deriving a policy frame goes a bit like this: problems are diagnosed and policy prescriptions follow that usually rest within a common perspective; such perspectives have been called policy frames. A frame, according to Schon (1980: p263) is "a perspective from which an amorphous, ill-defined, problematic situation can be made sense of and acted upon". Frames in policy are therefore generically akin to what in other contexts are called paradigms (Kuhn, 1969), appreciative systems (Vickers, 1965) or conceptual frameworks. Thus, their purpose and value is in ordering knowledge for action.

In this context, Parkinson (1989) argues that the restructuring of the international economy, the emergence of highly mobile finance capital, the decline of some sectors of manufacturing industry and its export to low-wage economies, the rise of the service sector with its dual labour market has created in Britain, as in other advanced economies, a pattern of uneven urban development. This had subsequently resulted in growing regional and individual economic inequality and the marginalisation of particular social groups. This being the problematic situation, the Conservative Party's political response to that and the related themes of economic change, urban decline and the prospect of urban regeneration are sought in this section.

The evolution of urban policy in Britain under the Conservatives during the 1980s, as Parkinson (ibid.) claims, illustrated the way in which politics rather than economics had dominated national response to urban restructuring -thus, changes were primarily ideologically driven as discussed back in the earlier sections of this chapter. The Conservative government cited profligate expenditure and "burdensome" planning by local authorities as the cause of inner
city problems and the private sector as the solution. The government introduced a wide range of initiatives designed to give the private sector a lead role in urban policy. This way it replaced public intervention, investment in physical capital displaced the investment in social capital favoured under the welfare regime, and the values of urban entrepreneurialism replaced those of municipal collectivism; overall, as highlighted in earlier sections, wealth creation replaced the distribution of welfare as this Government believed that if wealth was accumulated, then improvement in social infrastructure would inevitably follow.

Hambleton (1989) argues that a major source for the Conservative Government's ideas for relying upon market mechanisms rather than public intervention to regenerate its cities was the United States [US]. He argues that US in the 1980s increasingly served as a model for British urban policy, through its more laissez-faire perspective, where redirecting the resources of the state and a greater reliance on market intervention were perceived as the way-out from inner city decay. In the UK, a national policy of urban decentralisation was promoted and pursued initially during the 1970s with the establishment of regional bodies, such as the Scotish and Welsh Development Agencies, and then in the early 1980s with the introduction of separate English Urban Development Corporations. The latter were allocated nationally-provided powers and resources to stimulate, or even undertake, property development, business expansion and retraining in priority localities, but they also exhibit a bias towards state or market action and little recognition of the potential of voluntary action. Needless to say, given the discussion in section 1.2, what was planned as decentralisation of power, which was the urban policy objective in the American conservative strategy during that period, in Britain within the Conservative's strategy devised had exactly the reverse effect -increased centralisation of power and loss of local control.
Indeed, before 1979, local authorities traditionally exercised a degree of control over their own economic welfare. Initially, their economic development strategies were focusing on the provision of land for industry and the encouragement of the building of manufacturing industry. In the early 1970s though, the introduction of the Urban Programme Grant [UPG] under the Local Government Grants (Social Need) Act 1969 acknowledged also the necessity for improving social services in areas of acute social need; hence, it was recognised that economic recovery was to be achieved alongside social improvements. Most importantly, the policies introduced during this time created inner city partnerships which were intended to link central government, local government and community groups in a novel partnership with collective responsibility for developing innovative policy responses to urban decline in the cities (Stewart, 1987). Harding (1990) points out that this assisted the promotion of community involvement in economic and urban planning. However, in the 1977 White Paper on urban policy for inner cities, the focus of attention switched from environmental and social problems to the question of the economic decline of the inner cities. With the further attack on local government finances and powers that was pursued by the Conservatives as discussed back in section 1.2, local initiatives remained peripheral to market forces. In retrospect, as Parkinson (1989) argues the real reason behind the weakening of local government has been the ideological imperative to eliminate the spectre of socialism in the cities (see also the discussion of Thatcher’s views on socialism in section 1.1.2).

Therefore, the view of local government adopted by the Conservatives meant that the innovative, albeit economically-marginal policies of local authorities were overshadowed during the 1980s by the financial and legal powers the Government gave to the private sector and to some government agencies. For
example, the primary piece of machinery the Conservatives inherited from Labour were the inner city partnerships, a potentially innovative relationship between national and local government, the community and the private sector, as mentioned earlier. The Conservatives distanced themselves from the Labour legacy, reducing local government's role in the partnerships and increasing that of the private sector and central government, and eventually marginalised the partnerships to an extent that they ceased to play a significant part in the decision-making machinery (Lawless, 1988).

The Conservatives also introduced a variety of new initiatives designed to impose their own ideological priorities upon urban policy. The Enterprise Zones [EZs] which were established in 1980 were one obvious example. EZs rested on the premise that local economic development was prevented by bureaucratic planning and high taxation imposed by Labour politicians. By eliminating physical and financial controls in specific parts of cities, the Government argued, enterprise, investment and new jobs would be created. Hence in these zones, land use controls, local property taxes and occupational safety regulations were relaxed. However, as Lawless (1986) argued, since the programme had cost £180m in the first five years, the jobs it created were expensive and heavily subsidised. Equally, the majority of the jobs were not new but transferred from other parts of the city to take advantage of the tax breaks and created few new opportunities elsewhere (ibid.).

In the light of these criticisms in 1988 the Government announced no new zones would be created. Nevertheless, the principle of loosening city control over planning was extended in the Simplified Planning Zones [SPZs]. Although they did not provide financial benefits to private developers, these zones reduced local
government control and increased that of the private sector and central government over development. In this way, the Government attempted to bend the planning process so there was a “routine assumption in favour of development” (Harding, 1989).

The fiscal initiatives for urban redevelopment introduced by the Conservative Government during the 1980s -Urban Development Grants [UDGs], Urban Regeneration Grants [URGs] and City Grants- displayed similar features. UDGs, based on the American Urban Development Action Grant model (Boyle, 1985), were intended to give local authorities incentives to collaborate with the private sector in development projects that would not otherwise proceed without public sector support -up to 75 per cent of the cost. However, in 1986 the Government, as Parkinson (1989) argued, not satisfied that Labour local authorities were collaborating sufficiently with the private sector introduced a complementary Urban Regeneration Grant which eliminated the local authority completely and offered central government funds directly to the private sector for development projects. The principle was extended in 1988 when a new system of City Grants replaced the two original arrangements and eliminated entirely the local authority role in the development grant process (Lawless, 1988). The effect of these urban policies, as Davies (1985) argued, was to reduce the coherence of the financial system, induce fiscal stress and make it increasingly difficult for local authorities to manage their environment and deliver services, and hence found them bypassed.

However, the two most distinctive examples of the Conservatives' urban strategy during the 1980s was their support for public-private partnerships and Urban Development Corporations [UDCs]. The public-private partnerships are difficult to
define precisely since, as informal associations, they lacked well-defined legal, organisational or financial status. Whatever precise form they took, as Harding (1990) states, the model was clearly imported from the US. Within these alliances two trends were visible during the 1980s: first, there was the growth of national-led partnerships responding primarily to the impulse of corporate responsibility and central control. The second wave of partnerships which emerged during the mid-1980s, reflecting the Government’s interest in physical regeneration, were more obviously local property-based regeneration schemes with construction interests playing a leading role. Within them, one of the Conservative Government’s goal was to encourage local authorities to collaborate more willingly with the private sector in development. Indeed, local authorities realising that the resistance of the mid-1980s to the Government’s strategy had failed, allied themselves with the private sector and formed public-private partnerships to lead the physical and economic regeneration of their cities, and appeared to have some success at least.

UDCs were the other major instrument of urban regeneration in the 1980s. They were designated, empowered, financed by, and were directly accountable to, central government and they were given substantial powers to regenerate their areas. They were appointed rather than elected bodies intended to eliminate the political uncertainty produced by local democracy which the Government regarded as a major deterrent to private investment. UDCs were given extensive powers over land acquisition, finance and planning by the form of incentives to reduce their costs and risks. In some cases they were even given direct ownership of land or else powers of compulsory purchase; and finally UDCs were made the planning authority in their area. Local authorities, thus, lost their
customary powers to control development and decide planning applications within UDC areas.

The UDCs adopted strategies for urban regeneration would emphasise a property-led urban regeneration which inevitably diluted wider social goals of urban policy. They also adopted a more relaxed, entrepreneurial approach to planning in contrast to an allegedly bureaucratic local authority regime with its traditional emphasis upon planning as development control. In keeping with the property-led model of regeneration, heavy emphasis was placed upon immediate action and visible results, often prestige “flagship” redevelopment projects, which were intended to improve the environment and image of an area and generate the confidence needed to attract private sector investment.

Regarding their implications to urban policy, UDCs experience raised three broad questions about their efficiency, accountability and equity. Obviously the UDCs encouraged the efficient physical regeneration of their area. However, on the equity and accountability criteria their records were much more uneven. Parkinson (1989) argued that the benefits of much of regeneration (jobs, houses and environmental improvements) might not go to the original low-income communities that were intended to benefit; inevitably in some cases a process - known as gentrification (i.e. higher income groups moving into the upgraded regeneration areas) might follow, and it is a public sector (i.e. planning authority) responsibility to take measures to safeguard residents against this process. Also, the exclusion of local authorities in UDCs would have heightened the danger of regeneration of a narrowly-defined area while the surrounding neighbourhoods, being outside UDCs jurisdiction, would appear as public squalors as there is not a comprehensive urban regeneration strategy in place for an entire locality (see
Butetown). The final difficulty and disparity with the UDC model of regeneration that gradually emerged through the decade was that the first wave of UDC policies had concentrated virtually exclusively upon physical regeneration, with little attention paid to social provision or to the development of human capital.

In conclusion, in many respects, as demonstrated through the discussion before, public-private partnerships and UDCs were different kinds of initiatives, but they shared many of the same ideological characteristics (an emphasis upon private sector leadership, a concentration upon physical regeneration and a diminished role for the local government).

Following the above discussion on the shortcomings of urban policies during the 1980s, the early 1990s saw the introduction of the City Challenge Programmes which have resulted in a reinforcement of local power in issues of local governance (Cox, 1993). Michael Ward, the Director of the Centre for Local Economic Strategies, suggests that with the City Challenge launch in 1991 local authorities were again accorded a central role in planning for the reconstruction of their communities. City Challenge is a central government initiative which embraces both economic development and renewed emphasis on innovative partnerships between local authorities and a range of private, voluntary and community organisations. As such, Malpass argues that it provides an appropriate setting within which to explore key aspects of urban governance in the mid-1990s (Malpass, 1994: p301). It also encouraged competition between cities in their formation of the initial bids. The Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) established in 1993 also emphasised local community involvement and sustainable regeneration to achieve economic development. Programmes funded by SRBs are administered by integrated Government Offices for the
Regions (GORs) which have been set up to combine the former regional offices of the Departments of Environment, Employment, Trade and Industry, and Transport and as such were designed to improve communication and coordination between the different departments.

Thus, from the discussion above and the previous sections it becomes quite clear that the urban policy frame adopted by Thatcher's government during the 1980s to deal with inner city problems sought to privilege and invigorate markets through deregulation, through fiscal stimulus, through privatisation and through the incorporation of local business into local governance. Terms common in public policy discourse at that time, being also in accordance with Thatcher's "New Right" era, were privatisation, internal markets, regulation, contracts, charters, enabling, choice, quality, fiscal neutrality, subsidiarity (Solesbury, 1993). They are expressive of new kinds of policy frame characteristic of the 1980s and 1990s.

In the 1990s, the "public versus market" debate continues but with increasing agreement that neither the minimal state of the Right nor the minimal market of the Left offers practical politics. Instead, Solesbury (ibid.) argues that for urban policy the state-market dichotomy may be too simple; for it ignores the role of voluntary action through which households, neighbourhoods and communities achieve much social change and some economic and environmental change in cities (Babalikis, 1995).

In the following section some issues of urban regeneration, with urban renewal as a part of it, are considered since its emergence in the 1970s came to be a popular urban policy, mainly though during the 1990s. Urban renewal was
generally considered to be a more appropriate approach to inner city decay as opposed to demolition and redevelopment, and within aspects of community-based renewal, it appears to be more sensitive towards the need to invest in social infrastructure and human capital as well.

1.3.3 - The Process of Urban Regeneration and Renewal

The importance of urban regeneration has been increasingly recognised from the 1970s. Urban regeneration can involve the rehabilitation of existing structures, redevelopment of existing building and sites, or simply the re-use of urban land. The process of regeneration frequently involves derelict or contaminated land which may need to be treated before any redevelopment is planned. It has been the case from the experience of urban development in the Western world throughout recent times that urban conurbations often include disused or derelict industrial sites, left from the restructuring of economic activities, which may provide strategic opportunities for services and infrastructure linked to urban centres - the case of Cardiff Bay redevelopment being most illustrative.

Urban regeneration is defined as:

The process of reversing economic, social and physical decay in our towns and cities where it has reached the stage when market forces alone will not suffice.

(UK's Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors)

This definition implies that a holistic approach is paramount, that society as a whole should take responsibility and that there is a need for intervention, directly or indirectly, by the public sector.
On the other hand, urban renewal is a narrower concept of urban regeneration where mostly the physical aspects of urban regeneration are considered; however, it may provide an explanation of the way in which urban areas change in response to economic and social variants. This can be seen in the definition of urban renewal given by Couch (1990, p1), who suggests that urban renewal is defined as "the physical change, or change in the use or intensity of use of land and buildings, that is the inevitable outcome of the action of economic and social forces upon urban areas". These forces are mainly market forces applying in the restructuring of inner city areas according to land demands and development trends, with an ultimate goal of profit maximisation. In realising this, and given the privatisation of many services -in particular under Thatcher's government- the need for careful planning and control on behalf of the state in order to resolve potential conflicts and secure a fair delivery of services to people, was becoming eminent, as discussed also in the previous paragraph. In addition, the failure of previous urban policies to achieve equity and enhance social and human resources made it clear that a more sensitive and community-based regeneration is needed.

Within the administrative context, a major issue that evolves when considering urban renewal, is the allocation of resources and responsibilities between central and local government. The preparation of statutory local plans can be influential in determining the general nature and disposition of urban renewal and they can offer local authorities with a powerful weapon in the defence of development control, and hence, strengthening the decision-making power and accountability of the urban planning system. However, with the active involvement of UDCs in the urban regeneration arena during the 1980s and with their granting as planning authorities within their boundaries, the very ability of local authorities to intervene
and maintain the enforcement of controls and regulations in development is questioned.

Therefore, from the previous discussion, it becomes apparent that both intervention and development control regulations, on the part of the state, are essential if satisfactory urban renewal policies are to be implemented.

Finally, there are two points that should be made clear at this instance and are to be further explored when considering Cardiff Bay regeneration in detail. First, that alternative models of urban renewal, such as community-based renewal or city partnerships are approaches more socialist in nature to urban renewal rather than the ones based solely on free-market intervention. And second, a distinction should be made between the process of essentially physical change -that is to say urban renewal- and the wider process of urban regeneration. In the latter the state or local community is seeking to bring back investment, employment and enhance the quality of life within the urban area.

1.4 - Conclusion

In the conclusion section, a summary of the main points raised in the literature review is included so as to lead on to issues of urban regeneration in Cardiff within the typologies reviewed in chapter 2.

1.4.1 -Has planning died?

In this section the central question asked in the first section about how planning has been affected in the free-market era imposed by the Conservatives is
addressed. The election of the Conservatives in 1979 saw the relaxation of many controls, the introduction of enterprise zones and simplified planning zones, the transfer of planning powers to urban development corporations, the greater stress on market criteria in development control decisions; all those have been taken by several academics as lethal attacks on planning itself. Ravetz (1986), for example, observes that:

the Thatcher administration...is fast dismantling much of the planning system, along with many other parts of the Welfare State. This puts planning on trial, so to speak, for its life.

(Ravetz, 1986: p9)

For Ambrose (1986), who asks Whatever happened to planning?, the execution has already been carried out and it is time to write the obituaries.

Yet if someone looks at what has actually happened to planning in the past two decades, reports of its death would probably sound exaggerated. While there has been a sustained attack on planning from the "New Right" advocates, Brindley, Rydin and Stoker (1996) argued that this has been vigorous in its rhetoric but rather less drastic in its actions.

In the following pages a discussion of how planning has been affected by the "New Right" is included.

1.4.2 - Planning under the "New Right" philosophy - an overview

In this section the changes that have been brought about in urban planning, as a result of the "New Right" philosophy adopted by the Conservatives after their election in 1979, are sought in detail. Inevitably, the legacy of Thatcher’s policies of deregulation and market-based solutions to virtually all development problems
(Ambrose, 1986), as discussed earlier on, could have not left planning and development issues unaffected.

Local authority planning in the UK has undergone considerable changes since the 1968 Town and Country Planning Act which introduced a two-tier system of Structure and Local Plans. Structure and Local Plans replaced Development Plans, introduced by the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act, which had concentrated entirely on preparation of detailed land-use schemes. This form of planning was increasingly criticised during the 1960s as being too inflexible, slow and bureaucratic, and for failing to take account of general policy issues affecting local development (Shaw & Williams, 1982). In contrast, the main aims of Structure Plans were firstly, to state and justify the county's general proposals and policies for key issues by formulating them against a background analysis of the broad social and economic trends in the country, and secondly, to interpret national and regional policies in terms of physical and environmental planning within the county. Local Plans were formulated as more detailed plans for the locality. Later, as discussed in section 1.3.2, during the early 1980s, new techniques to control physical form developed, such as zoning and subdivision control. Today, planning at local level has a much broader frame of reference than the physical alone, that was further discussed in the previous section on urban renewal and regeneration. This frame of reference may be termed "comprehensive development planning", where economic, social and institutional changes are considered, in addition to physical improvements (Fortune, 1977).

There are various alternative frames for urban policy which can be exemplified from practice in Britain and abroad over the last decade. One example is that of national settlement planning. This has not been a strong British tradition -British
planning systems have always been bottom-heavy and top-weak (Solesbury, 1993: p34). But the Dutch have adopted indicative national plans over the last two decades through which they have sought to guide the evolution of the settlement system, through investment in property and infrastructure, to serve defined urban functions with a long-term vision. Other planning models identifiable in Britain are reviewed in the typology of the following chapter where the way in which the Cardiff Bay urban regeneration strategy fits into this typology is discussed.

Generally speaking, planners, and this is a widely-accepted and strongly-believed consensus among the profession, felt that they suffered significant pressures from the Conservative Government and have seen many changes in development and planning issues as a result of the ever increasing dependency on free-market involvement in development. Of course, it seems rather prejudicial to doubt market's efficacy to solve development problems but, as has been very clear through earlier discussions, there has to be a regulatory mechanism so that to avoid potential conflicts. After all, maintaining people satisfaction should be the ultimate goal of the professional planners, and ideally of the private developers too, as planning discipline is somehow socialistic in nature. The 1947 Town and Country Planning Act, and within the Welfare State values and the role assumed for planners as a result, did just that by providing the statutory framework for controlling land development processes so that to deliver fair services to citizens. Furthermore, in the post-war period there was an understanding that there should be some form of local citizen participation in the regulation of development. But Ambrose (1986) argued that Thatcher's Government appeared not having the time for this "equal citizen" concept.
As it has been pointed out in section 1.1.2, Mrs Thatcher's rationale was to roll back the state, that is to say allowing the decentralisation of certain decisions but retaining strong central controls to ensure that these decisions conform to set rules; this action is referred to as "authoritarian decentralism" in academic terms (Thornley, 1990). The concern for reducing the intervention of the state was particularly evident in local government with the increasing pressure for contracting out and the limiting of its role to "enabling" functions (Ridley, 1988). Ridley argued that local governments should have duties as stimulators, facilitators, enablers and monitors instead of their traditional role as providers perceived, as such under the Welfare State. He also suggested that local government needs to use public money to provide services where they feel it is necessary for social reasons but only in the case that the market does not supply. This adhered to Thatcher's view that social regeneration would inevitably follow on from economic buoyancy. However, very careful planning and control are essential as local government is reduced to an "enabler" rather than a "provider" - the latter needless to say represents a more socialist approach to governing the deliveries of services- so that citizen's satisfaction is maintained even though the provision and delivery of some services become market-led.

In conclusion, as discussed in the previous sections, during Mrs Thatcher's period of office the approach to urban deprivation was one of centrally controlled, property-led urban regeneration (Turok, 1992; Thornley, 1993). This, as highlighted, often involved the by-passing of local democracy and the planning system. Urban Development Corporations were expanded in the last years under Mrs Thatcher; however the property market went into decline and the property-led strategy for regeneration embodied in their approach came under increasing criticism (Turok, 1992). Thus in retrospect, urban planning has been definitely
affected by the changing urban policies pursued since 1979 onwards. It has been discussed through this chapter that emphasis in development issues has shifted from planning to market-led approaches in line with the ideas of "New Right" philosophy. Cardiff Bay regeneration is discussed in more detail within the typology of "market-led" and "market-critical" approaches, which are reviewed in the next chapter, in order to identify if the empirical evidence support this shift.
CHAPTER 2 : The Typology
2.1 - Introduction

The long-standing debate over planning versus market input into the development process has been revived initially in the light of the changed circumstances of the late 1960s and early 1970s with the perceived failure of the consensus and more intensely through a succession of Conservatives administrations, as discussed in more detail in the first chapter. This led to a crisis in planning, a collapse of confidence amongst both the public and professionals, and disillusionment about the roles assumed by key-actors within the sphere of development process.

Subsequently, the above complications had resulted in fragmentation of planning into a number of distinct approaches (Brindley, Rydin & Stoker, 1996). This appears to be the case throughout the 1980s as other commentators have noted "the increasing apparent variety in planning practice" (Healey, 1983: p271) and the competition between a number of different proposals for the planning system (Nuffield Commission of Inquiry 1986, chapter 7).

One way to categorise such plurality is through the use of a typology. It is therefore the aim of this chapter to identify a framework of typologies representing the experiences of planning practice in the 1980s onwards. It is expected that it will be within this framework that the debate of planning versus market input in urban regeneration will be critically evaluated in the subsequent chapters. More specifically, the typologies derived will provide the context within which an analysis of policy initiatives and outcomes in the Cardiff Bay redevelopment strategy may be pursued, so as to establish the relative power of the competing forces in development (planning versus market), and hence assess how does the
Cardiff Bay regeneration practice fits into the urban regeneration practice experienced in Britain through the past two decades.

In terms of the specific aims of the project this stage of work satisfies the analysis of different planning approaches to urban regeneration and as such lays the foundation for the next specific aim that is seeking the perceptions of an appropriate cross-sectional sample of the various key-actors involved in the planning process on their ability, or not, to influence the regeneration strategy in Cardiff Bay.

2.2 - Typologies of planning styles

As a starting point, it is useful at the outset to distinguish two different approaches with regard to the government's role in the development process on behalf of the policy makers. Those, with reference to Collinge and Mawson (edited in Atkinson, 1994), are in turn:

(i) The active approach, whereby government (central and local) uses positively the powers and instruments at its disposal to intervene in the development process so that a desired end result can be achieved.

(ii) The counter-active approach, whereby government reduces its use of the powers and instruments at its disposal, and acts to limit the powers at the disposal of other bodies, such as local authorities or private cartels, and thereby releases market forces as a way of achieving a particular end result. This approach is based on the belief that by leaving market to its own devices will the desired result be achieved.
These two approaches may be labelled alternatively as "interventionist" and "disinterventionist", and, as they perhaps suggest, they define opposite ends of the political spectrum from Left -interventionist- to Right -disinterventionist. Each of them has been operative over the years and each has been adopted on occasions by local and national governments (ibid.). This can be seen in the approaches of planning processes where the degree of state interventionism in urban policies is considered.

A comprehensive and coherent account on typologies of planning practice dominant in the UK throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s can be found in the work of Brindley, Rydin and Stoker (1996) who have researched six case study areas and have subsequently identified six distinctive planning styles.

For the purpose of this study, two dimensions envisaged in the typology can be illustrated in a matrix (Figure 1); the first with respect to the attitude to market processes, and the second with respect to the severity of the urban problem of an area, as perceived for the locality. Regarding the former, in styles which embody a positive view of the market, the "market-led" category, demand as measured by the consumer's purse is the main indicator of where and when development should occur. The market mechanism determines who receives what and at what cost. The main actors are in the private sector and profit is their motivation for their actions. Such market actions require a framework of state support, and planning policies are one way of providing this by bringing in additional powers when market outcomes are judged to be inefficient.

By contrast, in styles lying within the "market-critical" category, the outcomes of market processes are considered to be partly or even wholly unacceptable.
inequalities resulting from such processes are stressed, creating a need for planning policies to readdress them. Planning is also needed to rectify imbalances, such as that between short- and long-term perspectives on resource use and implementation. These categories are reviewed in turn and in more detail through the following pages.

Finally, in relation to the approaches described at the previous page, so as to assess the degree of state interventionism, market-led approaches lie within the counter-active approach whereby the market assumes the leading role in the development process; market-critical approaches, on the other hand, lie within the active approach where the government assumes a more active and direct role in the development process.

// Attitude to market processes //

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived nature of urban problems</th>
<th>Market-critical: redressing imbalances and inequalities created by the market</th>
<th>Market-led: correcting inefficiencies while supporting market processes</th>
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<td>Buoyant area:</td>
<td>regulative planning</td>
<td>trend planning</td>
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<td>Marginal area:</td>
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<td>Derelict area:</td>
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<td>comprehensive urban problems/depressed market</td>
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</table>

Figure 1: an illustration of the typology

Source: Brindley et al. (1996), "Remaking Planning", p9
2.3 - The typology

In the following two sections is included a discussion of the various planning styles illustrated in the matrix of the previous page, categorised into the "market-critical" and the "market-led" approaches. The more in-depth discussion of the typology is intended to assist in evaluating Cardiff Bay regeneration experience and conclude later on in the thesis if there has been a distinctive planning model adopted in the particular case study.

2.3.1 - Market-critical approaches

Regulative planning

Regulative planning lies at the heart of post-war planning system established in Britain in 1947. Under planning legislation (Town and Country Planning Act 1947) local authorities had two principal functions. First, they were required to draw up plans for future development and land use. Second, they were given power to grant or refuse planning permission for most private sector building and redevelopment schemes. It was argued that by these two means local authorities could guide urban change so that it fitted their planning blueprints. To some degree British planners have been successful in this aim, particularly where they have sought to restrain development and contain urban sprawl as in Green Belt policy (Hall et al., 1973; Best, 1981; Munton, 1983). By reacting to private sector initiatives many local authorities have exercised considerable negative control and displayed some potential for redirecting demand in line with public plans, in partial opposition to market forces.
Regulative planning is central to the ideology of the planning profession. It enables the planner to pose as the expert manager of the urban system, a role that involves the assumption of an underlying consensus within society so that, in the face of competing interests, planners can claim to reach a judgement in the best interest of all (Ravetz, 1980). However, this view as discussed in the first chapter has been extensively challenged. Criticisms have emerged from a variety of sources: left-wing analysts have emphasised the weaknesses of some aspects of the development control system, and the uneven distribution of benefits (Simmie, 1981). Whereas, from the viewpoint of property developers and the political Right, regulative planning has been criticised as bureaucratic and unnecessarily restrictive and constraining for the private sector (DoE, 1975; House of Commons, 1977). As discussed in section 1.1, this criticism has been reinforced by an intellectual attack on the ability of state to intervene rationally and effectively from the “New Right” advocates who re-emphasised the primacy and efficiency of the market (Hayek, 1960; Adam Smith Institute, 1983; Green, 1986).

Despite these criticisms, regulative planning remains the dominant image of planning, and the tools of the system are essentially geared to this end. Effective regulative planning is based on hierarchical strategic planning and a range of development control powers. While planners no longer expect to have total control over the pattern of urban change, they still seek to control individual private sector developments in pursuit of public policy goals. However, there is a new emphasis on negotiation and network-building skills in planning education (Underwood, 1981). Through these skills planners seek to influence development proposals before and after planning applications received, and to extract community benefit in the form of planning gain.
Popular planning

Popular planning is rooted in the public challenge to major planning proposals which emerged during the late 1960s. This took the form of organised opposition to development which threatened local communities, including slum clearance (Lambert et al., 1978), urban motorways (Hart, 1976) and large-scale commercial developments (Wates, 1976). This protest produced a large number of local action groups and campaigns, each fighting a specific issue.

The advocates of this style of planning see many benefits of popular participation. First, it can help to restore confidence to the people of areas subject to declining or fluctuating private sector investment interest. Secondly, a plan drawn up after extensive popular consultation is more likely to be in line with local needs. It stands some chance of avoiding the unpopular blunders of the recent past, such as multistorey housing for families and deck-access apartment blocks, and holds out the promise that the knowledge and expertise of local people can be incorporated into decision-making processes. Thirdly, popular planning can establish a base of political support and pressure which is needed if the planning proposals are to come to fruition. As Wainwright noted, "support for popular planning has meant helping people develop the confidence and organisational strength to challenge the power of those at the top" (Wainwright, 1985: p7).

Indeed, during the 1980s, the tendency has been for local campaigns, so as to revive local economies and neighbourhoods, to form broader alliances with local Labour parties and with trade unions, pursuing their specific aims under the banner of "local socialism" (Lowe, 1986). This was partly in reaction to the
Thatcher government's centralising tendencies; and partly an expression of a new concept of municipal socialism which was evolving independently on the Left.

Though, popular planning should not be perceived as a uniquely socialist ideal. Rather, it can be seen as part of a politically diverse movement for neighbourhood Revival and local control of resources. Closely related are the community architecture and the community technical aid movements, which aim to bring control over both design and building to the end users of development (Wates & Knevitt, 1987) - a process widely known as self-help in development. Popular involvement in planning and development has come to represent a moral ground which appeals to most political interests and ideologies. This unlikely consensus at least suggests that there will be continuing opportunities for popular planning in marginal areas.

**Public-investment planning**

There are many examples of this style of planning in the post-war period, in war-damaged areas where major public investment was deemed necessary in dealing with severe dereliction. The most widely praised example of the ability of the public sector to plan urban change, though, is found in the New Towns where their successful implementation depended upon massive public sector investment programmes.

More recently, public-investment planning has been specifically directed to the rescue of derelict areas - the most famous example being the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal project (GEAR). Given the dominance of the "New Right" ideologies at national government level during the 1980s, it is perhaps surprising
to find that there were still at the time localities in which planning by public investment has been strongly promoted. The initiative has come from some left-wing Labour local authorities, who have made an attempt to rebuild inner areas on non-market principles. Underlying these policies, and public-investment planning in general, is the view that the British economy has been weakened by the investment plans and priorities of private sector financial institutions (Community Development Project, 1977).

This style of planning therefore exhibits great faith in the public sector, given comprehensive planning at all levels, good coordination between levels and adequate funding. The goals that can be achieved are similarly comprehensive, covering housing, employment, social welfare and regional balance, amongst others. The potential of such total planning for an area still attracts many of the Left. The question mark which hangs over this strategy concerns the ability of area-specific and limited investment resources to counteract the trends set in motion by huge flows of finance under the control of private institutions.

2.3.2 - Market-led approaches

Trend planning

Trend planning described a head-on challenge to the existing regulative style, attempting to reorientate it to a private sector perspective. In this form of planning, development plans consciously reflected market trends in the allocation of resources, and planners were charged with facilitating development in line with market demand. The expression "trend planning" was first coined in the 1970s by analysts keen to emphasise the powerlessness of regulative planning, where
development control was seen to have retreated from a directive, if reactive, system to a passive and completely ineffectual one (Broadbent, 1977; Pickvance, 1981). The tools available were seen as both clumsy and weak (Kirk, 1980). Planners were frequently subordinate in their dealings with property companies and developers, being easily persuaded and led (Wates, 1976; Goldsmith, 1980). In particular, the lack of public control over both land and investment funds meant that development control could not live up to its name. As Pickvance commented:

...in city centre business and financial districts most planning authorities would not consider any other sort of development besides offices. In other words, certain types of land use are seen as "logical", "sensible" and "financially sound". In city centres it is seen as "illogical" to zone land for uses which are not the most profitable and which do not bring in the highest rates incomes.

(Pickvance, 1981: p70)

This style of market-led planning has been strongly promoted by the Thatcher administrations since 1979. It emerged in the concern to streamline the planning system and reduce delays (Thornley, 1981) and in the explicit introduction of market criteria into development control decisions (DoE, 1980). The priority was private sector development activity and responsiveness to market forces.

Where necessary, local discretion has been reduced to enforce the adaptation of planning system to this style, through structure plan modifications, planning appeal decisions and the call-in powers of the Secretary of State for the Environment. As discussed in section 1.3.2, attempts to impose trend planning in the 1980s were the introduction of Enterprise Zones and the then more recent
Simplified Planning Zones (SPZs) in the 1986 Housing and Planning Act. A scheme of permitted uses was prepared for each zone and any conforming development would not require planning permission. Furthermore, Farnell (1983) argued that trend planning in structure and local plans helped private investors and developers to coordinate and manage their investment plans more effectively.

Trend planning therefore represented the end result of reorientating regulative planning from the public interest to the private interest. The response to the exposure of weaknesses in development control was not to reform or strengthen it, but to strip it to the bare bones. Only those aspects of planning would be retained which seem to be functional for private development or which were electorally sensitive. As such, Brindley, Rydin and Stoker (1996) argued that trend planning seemed to be only suited to areas broadly free of urban problems. However, with the Inner City decay problem identified during the late 1970s - discussed in section 1.3.1- it becomes quite rare to sustain a view that areas broadly free of urban problems exist.

**Leverage planning**

The essential ingredient of leverage planning is the use of public-sector finance to stimulate a weak market and to release a greater volume of private sector investment. Although, as discussed in chapter 1, the idea of bringing in the private sector has been strongly promoted by the Conservative governments since 1979, there have been many examples of partnership between the public and private sectors in development throughout the post-war period. By either providing the physical infrastructure or effectively subsidising development
schemes that might not otherwise have gone ahead, the state has been willing to underpin the private sector in many occasions.

However, since 1979 leverage planning has had a more prominent role, particularly within carefully delineated spatial boundaries which define a market capable of stimulation. This was first seen in the establishment of Enterprise Zones, discussed in section 1.3.2, or the Urban Development Grants to subsidise, heavily sometimes, redevelopment schemes. Hidden subsidies from local authorities in the form of reducing, or eliminating sometimes, site acquisition costs -see also the discussion of Urban Development Corporations in section 1.3.2- had been also made available during the 1980s to back up development schemes that otherwise might not have attracted private investment (Forrest et al., 1984).

The prime example of leverage planning in the 1980s was the London Docklands Development Corporation, followed by other schemes, with strong indications as discussed later for Cardiff Bay being one of them. These Urban Development Corporations were each allocated public funds (about £160 million over a five-year period) with the ultimate aim of stimulating a dramatic increase in the level of private sector investment in their areas.

Another feature in the practice of leverage planning has been a flexible, entrepreneurial attitude to development proposals, involving the by-passing of local authorities and planning powers in many cases. Furthermore, leverage planning, according to Young's (1985) views, is highly interventionist. Although, as highlighted in chapter 1, the political rhetoric behind this approach has emphasised the role of the private sector in conjunction with the "rolling-back" of the state, in practice it depends on strong initiatives and a very active role by the
public sector. Public officials are required to develop contacts with private sector agencies and, in some cases, to put together a complete development package to be sold to the private sector investing institutions. Young (ibid., p21) notes that "this is not an arm's length activity; it is a "hands-on" interventionist approach".

**Private-management planning**

From the perspective of the "New Right", as stressed in section 1.1, the recovery of the most deprived and run-down areas of cities ought to be achieved not by massive state intervention, but by handing over the management of the whole renewal process to the private sector. This goes well beyond leverage planning, and draws in not only private sector financial resources but also the managerial methods, skills and experience of the private sector. Its dynamism, creativity and energy, it is argued, can be harnessed to pull the run-down areas up by their boot straps, with the co-operation of local people and businesses (Heseltine, 1986).

In the early 1980s some policy advisers went even further and proposed a new type of private sector managed and funded city development agency to bring deprived inner areas up to national standards in housing and employment. They argued that it is only by the private sector taking such areas into its care that the processes of renewal and recovery can be made to work (Moor, 1984; Henney, 1985). A number of ad hoc initiatives have supported this vision of a new role for the private sector. The disposal of council estates to private developers for renovation and resale has encouraged the idea that private agencies are able to take over such areas. In a few cases (i.e. Stockbridge Village) the process has been extended to private sector involvement in the management of renewal, through the mechanism of a non-profit-making private trust. A similar growth in
private sector involvement can be observed in the economic development field. In 1982, with the government’s encouragement, "Business in the Community" was formed to promote enterprise trusts and agencies to be actively involved in development issues.

Young (1986) identifies these ideas and initiatives as part of a broader strategy of privatisation by the Conservative governments since 1979. Under this strategy, private sector agencies take on tasks that were previously seen as the exclusive responsibility of the public sector. Since these tasks are pursued within a broad framework of government policy, what is achieved amounts to the private management of public policy.

Consequently, many questions follow, like: on what basis can the private sector be persuaded to undertake the role of a broader corporate responsibility for the community? Or, how big public sector subsidies, either hidden or more openly provided, are likely to be necessary for the success of such privately-managed projects? And maybe most importantly, who is going to benefit through this arrangement of privately-managed development?

2.4 - Conclusion

In this section, a brief summary of the main aspects of the planning styles in terms of the severity of the urban problem that an area is facing with, as discussed earlier on, is included and their relevance to Cardiff Bay regeneration is sought.
As a general observation following the arguments raised both in chapter 1 and 2, one could suggest that control and regulation are the key planning tools. This is true of both regulative and trend planning in buoyant areas, the big difference though between the two styles being one of degree. Regulative planning involves an attempt to control and direct market pressures in order to manage urban change in the public interest. Trend planning, by contrast, does not try to redirect market forces but applies minimal planning powers to facilitate development in line with market pressures.

In marginal areas, and in order to upgrade them to the standards of surrounding areas, positive planning is needed to stimulate urban change and market involvement. Debate focuses on the planning mechanisms that should develop in order to bring the public and private sector to undertake together the task of restructuring any given locality. In popular planning the public sector is dominant, but acting primarily through the community rather than through government institutions -for example see Coin Street development in London (Brindley et al., 1996). In leverage planning the public sector also plays a significant role but the private sector is seen as the main agency to direct urban change.

In derelict areas there is a widely perceived need for large scale action to reverse, or at least manage, the urban decay. Rather than the individualistic and atomistic nature of decision-making typical of market forces, the derelict area is brought under the control of one agency. Public-investment planning, on the one hand, holds the public sector responsible for the redevelopment of an area, by purchasing land and providing all or most of the capital investment, and is usually favoured by groups on the political Left. Private-management planning, on the other hand, involves private sector agencies taking control of an area, even where
public sector assets are involved, and is a style favoured by the political Right. The two of them can be viewed as being in direct competition with advocates arguing about the ability of either the public or the private sector in delivering the most effective solutions.

As far as Cardiff Bay area is concerned, and with reference to the matrix illustrated in figure 1, it seems to lie somewhere between marginal area- and derelict area-type of urban problem. Being adjacent to the City Centre it certainly features potential market interest, but on the other hand with port and industrial activities having gradually being reduced there are large amounts of derelict urban land left. Therefore, it is easily realised that in order to attract private investment in the area, major public investment is needed beforehand or else, major funding has got to be secured for the area so that comprehensive and overall development may be achieved. This takes the form of public commitment to provide the physical infrastructure work in the form of transport links to the City Centre and incentives for the private sector to be encouraged to participate, which represents the public-investment style of planning, discussed in section 2.3.1. An example, in the first instance, of the government’s commitment to the regeneration of the Bay area was the erection of the County Hall by the Atlantic Wharf.

However, the approach envisaged in Cardiff Bay redevelopment project appears to be by far a market-led one. And this is the case as Cardiff Bay Development Corporation is a privately-managed quango and has been allocated the responsibility of the regeneration of the area. And it is also an example of leverage planning where a public-private sectors alliance has been informally formed to stimulate market forces. As many agencies, both private and public,
are involved in this project, it is therefore intended for the next stage of the research to arrange informal, in depth semi-structured interviews with key-participants so as to gather inside information on the partnership aspects featured in Cardiff Bay development programme, which is further discussed in research methodology chapter 3.

Finally, as far as the scope for using a typology as a measure of organising and evaluating planning practices, is concerned, there appear to be certain advantages in using a typology but some limitations at the same time. Considering the advantages first, a typology simplifies the complexities of ideological debates and economic processes to a limited and manageable set of categories. The typology also provides a basis against which other case studies may be evaluated. The limitations involved are the very arguments on the above advantages, and more specifically, the argument of an over-simplification of ideological stances and a failure to take into account the particular economic individualities of each locality. However, it is the researcher's expectation that the specific details which will be drawn from the fieldwork survey, will overcome the above limitations and manifest the reality for the locality.
CHAPTER 3: THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1 - Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is twofold: first, it is to discuss some theoretical issues regarding research methods, their historical evolution into two distinctive approaches, quantitative and qualitative analysis, and second to identify more practical issues on how this particular research was carried through.

Clearly, a qualitative approach was required in this research as it was personal opinions regarding the impact of the regeneration process that were sought. Hence, the research question, was clearly one associated with qualitative evaluation (Dey, 1993:2). This indicated that the information sought was consisting of very subjective forms of data. Given this, it is the researcher’s belief that the validity of the data collected was very much dependent on developing a set of questions designed to limit uncertainty to the greatest degree possible. This is why an approach which envisaged personal in depth semi-structured interviews was considered to be the best for the purpose of this research. Also, a triangulation method was used, as explained later, in order to reinforce the validity of the data collected. Finally, due to time limitations and because “closed” questions featured in questionnaires (see discussion in following sections) would restrict the respondents’ input it was decided not to distribute questionnaires or carry out a thorough investigation of the situation by other alternative means.

More specifically, in order to answer the principal research question, the method used was a combination of collecting and analysing documentary data and interviewing [i.e. in depth semi-structured interviews] the people who have been involved with and affected by the urban regeneration process. These people were identified as planners, councillors, corporation officials, residents,
commercial concerns and public agencies. They represent for the purpose of this research the “key-actors” as these people were considered to be representative of their profession or some other interest group in the locality. In this context, representatives of each group of the “key-actors” were approached (the interviews with them are included in chapter 5), their selection depending both on the ease or not that they could be accessed and their expected contribution to this project (with due consideration to the degree their responses were considered to be valid). Inevitably, this do compromise the representativeness aspect in the research but emphasis in this project in the light of the qualitative approach -see discussion in section for research methodology later- has been weighted on the validity rather than the representativeness of the information that was sought.

The above issues are further explored in the following pages and were intended to identify the key-issues concerning the research strategy.

3.2 - Research Methodology

This section is divided into two sub-sections; the first one includes a discussion of the theoretical basis for research methodology, and the second provides an account of the practical issues relating to this study in particular.

3.2.1 - Research Methods - the theoretical issues

In the historical context, research methods were developed as a means for studying the natural world initially, and then the social world, in the late 19th and early 20th century and were initiated in the works of prominent theorists such as
Marx and Durkheim. At the time, following scientific discoveries and the successes of Victorian civil and mechanical engineering, a philosophical concept under the name of positivism was developed which assumed that there are laws that govern the operations of both the natural and social world, and that use of the appropriate methods of analysis will uncover these laws. Positivists, and as mentioned earlier classical sociologists such as Marx and Durkheim believed that there is absolute truth, which in addition is objective and value-free, and can be used to create a better society; that is to say that knowledge already exists and the challenge the researcher faces is to devise methods to extract this knowledge.

However, another of the classical sociologists, Max Weber who lived and wrote in that same period of late 19th- early 20th century, had reservations about this approach based mainly on the difference between social and natural sciences. He, as well as the Chicago School of Sociology a bit later at around the post-First World War period, stressed that people are active, conscious beings, aware of what is going on in a social situation, and capable of making choices about how to act. Subsequently, the central feature of social life is that actions are the result of people's interpretations of the situation that they are in. It follows that, if one wants to explain social actions, he or she has to understand them in the way the participants do. Therefore, research methods which take into account this understanding had to be developed. This led to the tradition of social research that has given rise to ethnographic studies -ethnography meaning simply writing about a way of life-, particularly the technique of participant observation (McNeill, 1990). This philosophy that had evolved during the 20th century is called phenomenology. In other words, as described in the vast body of social and research methods textbooks, the terms positivism and phenomenology may
otherwise be respectively found as survey-style or quantitative research the first one as opposed to participant observation or qualitative research for the phenomenologist approach.

Whatever their standpoint may be, all scientists involved in research would argue, as also various academics suggest (McNeill, 1990; Gilbert, 1993; May, 1993) that the main features of every research are: its reliability, its representativeness and its validity. In turns, reliability means that when a research method is repeated by another, or the same, researcher at another time the same results would be obtained; representativeness refers to the question of whether the group of people or the situation under study are typical of others and hence one can conclude that what is true of the group or situation under study is also true of others (i.e. generalisation of findings); and finally, validity refers to the problem of whether the data collected is a true picture of what is being studied and thus if it really provides evidence of what it claims to be evidence of. They are all important features and none could or should be considered of a particular significance over the others. Ethnography, as stated earlier on, is concerned with the collection of data which are qualitative in form, that is, it concentrates on presenting the quality of the way of life described rather than on presenting statistics. Qualitative data is in the form of words rather than numbers and this is why much of the research report is composed of word-for-word quotation from those being studied. Thus, the emphasis of these methods [i.e. qualitative] is on the validity of the data collected, which may be achieved at the price of its reliability or its representativeness; where the survey researcher may claim reliability and representativeness, the ethnographer will claim validity. As McNeill (1990) argues the survey enthusiast will point out the dangers of bias and unreliability in ethnography, and stress how the representativeness of a sample can be
calculated precisely. The ethnographer may concede all this, but would point out that it is not much use being able to produce the same results over and over again and to say how representative they are, if they are invalid in the first place. The questionnaire may produce the same statistics whenever it is used, but this may be just a matter of repeating the same distortions. He concludes (ibid.) that the survey-style research imposes a structure on that which is being researched, rather than allowing the structure to emerge from the data as it is collected.

This being the theoretical context, the rest of this chapter deals with more practical issues of research methods as they relate to and applied in this study.

3.2.2 - Research Methods - the practical issues

The hypothesis of this research is, in the aftermath of the greater market involvement in urban development process as a result of the influence that the “New Right” philosophy has had in the urban policies pursued by recent Conservative governments, how is Cardiff Bay considered to be distinguished from that. It is common knowledge that in the western world and in recent times there has been an apparent shift towards free-market involvement in the urban restructuring process and this represents for the purpose of this research the “independent variable”. That is to say the variable which is controlled in the project (or in a manner of speaking taken for granted, though its validity is being demonstrated by the discussion in the first chapter of the literature review and also later by the findings from the fieldwork phase of the research). Anything else that varies as a result of this “independent variable” is called a “dependent variable”, which in this case is the influence the free-market involvement has had in the urban regeneration process in Cardiff Bay.
Furthermore, as it was explained in the introduction of this thesis the key-aspects that this research is aiming to address are:

- the dominance of the “New Right” approach in the urban restructuring process (the paradox of this study though is to test if the “New Right” philosophy might not have been as dominant in the urban restructuring experience of the City of Cardiff as in the rest of Britain because of the individuality and differentiation of the institutions involved in the particular case study);

- the resulting debate between public and private sector's involvement in urban development;

- the perception of the key-actors on their influence in the urban restructuring process, on the nature of the development and how does it comply with the local community's aspirations, on the benefits accrued, and on the sustainability of the regeneration effort;

- their contribution in determining policy directions.

It becomes clear that these concepts are non-quantifiable and hence in order to operationalise them, as they cannot be directly measurable, one must follow a qualitative approach. The key-actors' involvement in the urban restructuring process is investigated both as the actual and desirable, thus meaning both what these people perceive as their role in development as opposed to what they would wish that role should have been, and what may be verified as actual involvement in the urban restructuring process by studying official reports. In other words the former set of responses will provide personal opinions and the
latter facts as identified by studying documented sources. Clearly then the qualitative approach is the more appropriate and the process known as triangulation (Cohen, 1987; Gill & Johnson, 1991)-i.e. a multiple methods approach- was used for the purpose of this research; these multiple methods are in turns explained in the following paragraphs.

First is a method which involves review of documented sources in the form of secondary data as they relate to the urban restructuring process; that is to say strategy reviews, planning briefs, annual reports, government and city council reports, articles published in newspapers, as well as the Cardiff Bay Development Corporation’s web page. This information is important for two reasons: firstly, to investigate what has been planned versus what had actually been done so as to assist in the identification of the specific issues that needed to be raised in the interviews and secondly, the documented information was expected to provide a corrective tool on the opinions of people that were sought, which apart from being subjective, there should be allowance for the fact that people genuinely forget.

The second method envisaged in the triangulation process and more significant perhaps are in depth semi-structured interviews so as to gain an insight from the people who appear to be the most qualified to offer it and also to fill gaps that the secondary data review might leave.

As far as the choice of these people is concerned it has already been mentioned in the introduction that the criteria engaged in their choice are both their accessibility as well as their anticipated contribution to this study. In textbooks (McNeill, 1990; Saunders et al. 1997) this method of sampling technique is called “purposive sampling” as it occurs when the researcher chooses a particular group
or place to study because they are identified to be the type that is wanted - here being the key-actors in urban restructuring process as identified in the introduction of this chapter. In this study also another sampling technique is envisaged and that is the “snowball sampling” which though it may be the least systematic and representative it involves, however, interviewing certain key-individuals (see purposive sampling and “judgement sample” towards the end of this section) and then asking them to suggest others who might also be worth interviewed, and hence the original small nucleus of people grows by adding people to it in stages, much as a snowball can be built up by rolling it along the snow to the ground (Mars, 1982).

At this instance a point should be made on the validity of interviews; various academics often refer to the interview bias or “interview effect” (Oakley, 1979; Bell, 1987; McNeill, 1990; Saunders et al, 1997) as having an interview may affect the responses the interviewee gives. Also, race of the interviewee may be of some significance to this study as the Cardiff Bay area is inhabited by ethnic minorities who might, or might not, feel the issue of racial discrimination to be of some relevance. Therefore questions -"open" as opposed to “closed” thus meaning with a limited spectrum of possible responses- will be included in the interviews to allow for parameters such as the above that might have an effect, as trivial as it might be, in the validity of the interviews. Also a draft report of the analysis of the interviews is to be sent to selected interviewees from each group of key-actors so as to obtain their comments and thus enhance the validity of the data collected and collated. The above justify the selection of in depth semi-structured interviews as opposed to entirely unstructured or structured ones, because subjective responses such as perception and opinions are sought via these interviews meaning that some space and freedom should be allowed to the
interviewees so as to express their opinion that might have not been encountered or anticipated by the researcher. This is very important as "internal validity" should be achieved, which as Yin (1994) suggests it means seeking to establish causal relationships between events; in this case investigating causal relationships between the independent and dependent variables is of major importance since these causal statements are needed to enlighten the debate between public and private sector's involvement in the urban restructuring process and how urban policies in the particular case study have been affected within the argument herein of "New Right" influence during the eighties and early nineties.

As Yin (ibid.) points out the task of constructing validity is particularly problematic in case study research. Before discussing this task further, case study research needs to be explored a bit further; in an attempt to define case study research Schramm (1971) suggests,

the essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of case study, is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result.

(Schramm, 1971: p.22)

This definition thus cites the topic of "decisions" as the major focus of case studies. Similarly, other topics have been listed, including "organisations", "processes", "programs", "neighbourhoods", "institutions", and even "events" (Yin, 1994). Yin argues that one common flow was to consider the case study as the exploratory stage of some other type of research strategy, and as such a tool for a description of reality associated mainly with ethnographic or participant-observer methods (Yin, 1981a, 1981b). Hence, he suggests a more "technical" definition of case study as being an empirical inquiry that investigates a
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context (ibid.). In particular, the fact that this study seeks for perceptions suggests that it does heavily rely on qualitative evidence. Patton (1980) points out that case study has a distinctive place in evaluation research as it intends to explain the causal links in real-life interventions that are too complex for the survey or experimental strategies. Within this research, seeking to establish the causal links between free-market approach and the urban policies pursued in this context, the selection of the case study is considered essential in the least. In addition, as it was discussed in the introduction, the particular case study appears to have a distinctiveness and uniqueness in the arrangement of the roles that public and private bodies were assigned to. A comparative approach is not considered at this stage -neither is absolutely ruled out- as it would require more time and resources not readily available, and it is not the researcher’s intention to judge the urban restructuring process which took place in Cardiff Bay against other examples. However, knowledge of relevant projects is considered essential in a theoretical level in terms of its contribution to the understanding of parameters involved -or perhaps perceived at some stage of project preparation or implementation as crucial to be involved no matter if they actually have not- in such projects.

Finally, to return to the initial discussion about constructing validity Yin (1994) argues that critics of case studies often point to the fact that a case study investigator fails to develop a sufficiently operational set of measures and that subjective judgements are used to collect the data. He suggests that to meet the test of construct validity, an investigator must be sure to cover two steps:

1. Select the specific types of changes that are to be studied (in relation to the original objectives of the study), and

2. Demonstrate that the selected measures of these changes do indeed reflect the specific types of change that have been selected.

(Yin, 1994: 34)
Yin (ibid.) suggests that there are three tactics available to increase construct validity. The first is the use of multiple sources of evidence; the second tactic is to establish a chain of evidence; and the third tactic is to have the draft case study report reviewed by key informants. In this study the first and third approaches are used; as explained earlier the multiple sources of evidence refer to information from documented sources and information from the interviews. The interviews being semi-structured suggests that primarily open questions are being designed. As Dey (1993) argues open questions increase validity by freeing-up respondents selection of answers, whereas closed questions increase reliability since possible responses are restricted and if one wished to re-apply them one would not expect big deviation from original responses.

In conclusion, it is expected that the research methods selected will address the central question of how have urban policies applied in Cardiff Bay been affected within the free-market approach in urban restructuring. The task of evaluating the extent to which they have been influenced is to be achieved with questions focusing on insight views of the key-actors with due regard to the typologies of the second chapter. The key-actors as identified in the introduction of this report are expected to represent a "judgement sample" (Oppenheim, 1992: 68) -see also purposive sampling mentioned earlier. This does not necessarily mean that representativeness is reduced since the information that is sought mainly lies within very specialised disciplines. Initially, professionals from the City Planning Department (i.e. judgement sample) were contacted informally so as to gain insight knowledge on the role of the public sector in the urban regeneration of Cardiff Bay, get further suggestions for existing published material and hence assist in the formation of a list of the other key-actors, both from the private and the public sector, who were considered worth to be interviewed.
CHAPTER 4: Review of secondary data
4.1 - Introduction

Chapter one discussed the apparent shift which both academics, such as Ambrose (1986), Thornley (1991) and Brindley et al. (1996), as well as professionals have observed during the eighties and nineties in relation to the urban policies pursued in Britain within the context of the increased influence of the “New Right” ideology in politics at the time.

More specifically, in the focal literature review (see focal theory Phillips & Pugh, 1994) of the second chapter six planning styles as identified by the research of case studies around Britain during the eighties and nineties by Brindley et al. (1996), have been considered and put into a typology which aims to provide a framework against which Cardiff Bay regeneration strategy could be evaluated. As discussed in chapter 2, this typology encompasses two dimensions: the first one is a measurement of the perceived “urban problem” an area is facing, ranging from the buoyant areas which appear to prosper to the marginal and derelict areas which show a varying level of urban decay and a need for comprehensive regeneration. The second dimension of the typology concerns the planning models which have been devised as the most appropriate for a particular locality, and which range from the market-led to the market-critical with respect to the arrangements of decision-making and responsibilities between the private and the public sectors in the regeneration process. Within this context the chapter concludes with a discussion of where the Cardiff Bay regeneration initiative fits within the typology. In particular, the area was found to lie between marginal and derelict type of “urban problem” and consequently the most appropriate approach for the area’s regeneration was conceived by the Welsh Office to be a partnership between public and private sector bodies (which was actually forged by the
political realities at the time as is pointed out in the interviews in the next chapter). Generally speaking this was an area with a very active past that came to suffer through the changing socio-economic realities from the seventies onwards mainly due to the closure of heavy and predominant industries and a drastic reduction in the port activities in its docks. In this context, the typology is expected to provide a wide background framework against which the urban regeneration experience in the case study area may be put into perspective and hence evaluate the relevant dominance, or otherwise, of the "New Right" ideology of a free-market solution to urban regeneration; also it should assist in identifying any variations in the case study from the regeneration practice of the time elsewhere in Britain, as is discussed in the typology of chapter 2.

It is the purpose of this chapter to review secondary sources of information. In doing so the area’s history and main characteristics can be explored, and the problems that the area was left to deal with can be identified. Following this historical review, and hence having explained the need for the area’s regeneration, it is sought to evaluate the action of the former local and regional authorities, the Cardiff City and South Glamorgan County councils respectively, which were in the mid-nineties replaced by a unitary authority, in order to deal with the regeneration of the Bay area. Then after having reviewed the public sector’s conception of the problem the Bay was facing, as well as their input and involvement in the regeneration process, the chapter continues with a discussion on the establishment of the Cardiff Bay Development Corporation (CBDC) during the late eighties. The CBDC is the quango charged with the responsibility of the comprehensive regeneration of the area over a limited time (set out as ten years initially and extended to around thirteen years later on) in order to supervise the operations to achieve the revitalisation of the area and also to handle the
channelling of the financial resources made available by central government funds.

The review finishes with an investigation of the council's response to the CBDC's regeneration strategy including an account of the approach taken by the Unitary authority which came into power for the city of Cardiff in April 1996. A document was produced then which superseded all previously produced structure and local plans by the County and City / District Councils respectively, and in turn this document having been produced at a time when CBDC was approaching almost one decade of existence, allows the City Council's response to and perception of the Cardiff Bay regeneration project to be evaluated.

In this context, the chapter concludes with a critical evaluation of the input from the local authorities initially and CBDC later on so that it should be possible, firstly, to appreciate the changes, if any, in focus and intensity of action concerning the regeneration of the Bay; and secondly, to assess the effectiveness of the partnership formed between private and public sector agencies towards the successful implementation of the comprehensive and accountable redevelopment of the Cardiff Bay area (accountable to the local population needs and aspirations, and the objectives of both the public and private sector for the future of the area). This discussion identifies the specific issues raised and explored in the primary data collection, and also, as pointed out in chapter 3, provides a corrective tool to reduce the inevitable bias caused by personal opinions.

More specifically, the next section will deal with the questions that need to be asked and the different groups of interviewees that are considered to be the most
suitable to answer them, including a discussion of the method used to pursue the gathering of this kind of information, that is to say in depth semi-structured interviews with the key-actors; alternatively, the distribution of questionnaires to them has also been considered.

4.2 - An introduction to the case study - the historical background

Both in the introduction of this chapter and when the typology was discussed in the second chapter it has been mentioned that Cardiff Bay lies within marginal to derelict type of “urban problem”. The discussion which follows in this section is intended to shed some light on this characterisation by reviewing the historical background of the area so as to identify the main problems that the Bay was left facing with during the seventies and afterwards.

Cardiff Bay covers an area of 1,120 hectares equal to one sixth the size of Cardiff (Llewelyn-Davies Planning, 1988). This area stretches from the city centre in the north to Bristol Channel in the south, and the river Rhymney at Wentloog in the east to the river Ely in the west (see map in appendix 1). The area being adjacent to the city centre, has considerable market potential representing as it does an extension of a vibrant city centre to its waterfront in the south - as Llewelyn-Davies partners suggest in their report that the area provides one of the largest and finest urban development sites in Europe which is a unique opportunity for Cardiff and for Wales.

Research into the history of the area suggests that the city of Cardiff had experienced a dramatic growth in the nineteenth century which was almost entirely based on the Docks developed by the Bute family from the late 1830s to
overcome the limitations of the original river wharves and canal basin to deal with the increasing trade of coal. More specifically, the first dock, Bute West, was opened in 1839 to cater for the export of iron and coal from the Glamorgan Valleys. From then on and well into the twentieth century the Docks had undergone rapid expansion and progressively gained a world-wide reputation as the largest coal exporting port in the world. During this period various developments took place, most noticeable at Mount Stuart Square, the commercial heart of the docks which grew rapidly as the power base of wealthy landowners and industrialists. Also as a result of the increasing trade in the area, Butetown, the main residential settlement in Tiger Bay -the former colloquial name of the middle to south part of Butetown-, developed into a quite cosmopolitan dockland community. The boom years at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century saw the rebuilding of much of Mount Stuart Square with impressive buildings of distinguished architectural qualities as the area became the centre of an international trade in coal. But by the time of the first world war the trade was declining rapidly and the lack of diversification in port activities and limited industrial and import trade left the docks totally dependent on the demand for coal; which demand, with an exception during the years of the second world war, had been steadily falling due to the increasing use of alternative sources of energy.

Hence, by the 1970s parts of Mount Stuart Square and its surrounding dockland area were sinking fast with decaying, unfit and derelict buildings, that had remained long after they had served their useful purpose as commercial premises, and acres of redundant and over-grown wasteland. In essence, decades of economic stagnation had led to neglect and decay, selective demolition and high vacancy rates. According to figures included in the South
Butetown District Plan (1980) a considerable amount of property was vacant, especially former office space with a calculated vacancy rate of approximately 25 per cent, which was then the highest figure for any non-central commercial area in the city. Approximately 40 per cent of all vacant property was estimated (from rates records) to have been vacant since 1970.

Furthermore, apart from derelict or vacant sites and decay in the physical fabric of the area, it was recognised that the socio-economical implications brought about from the economic stagnation in the area were very significant. A large and vital community of around 5,000 (South Butetown District Plan, 1980) which had depended at one time on the docks for its livelihood were suffering the results of economic decline. Jobs that were lost were never really replaced and unemployment levels in that area were considerably higher than in other parts of the county for many years - the unemployment rate was over 60 per cent in Butetown (Cardiff Independent's special supplement on Cardiff Bay, 1988). It should be noted also that the proportion of Butetown Council tenants in receipt of housing benefit was in the late eighties 80 per cent, the highest anywhere in the city, with the adjoining districts of Grangetown and Splott -partly lying within the Cardiff Bay regeneration boundaries- following close behind (City Council's response to the Cardiff Bay regeneration, 1988: 7). Matters became worse with the closure of East Moors Steelworks which occurred in 1980 when thousands of local jobs were lost. Perhaps the saddest part of all was that so many young people were without work and were left in the seventies and eighties with no hope of finding employment in the area. Generally speaking, it appeared that the toll of unemployment would hit the overall environmental quality of the area and consequently leave poor housing stock with people unable in many occasions to finance maintenance works in their properties (separate statistical information for
the specific area under study is not available in Welsh House Condition Survey reports that are commonly carried out and produced usually every five years).

So this was the bleak scenario: an area where the population was being hard hit by the effects of economic decline and social deprivation and which has come to be surrounded by dereliction and decay, although it was situated not a quarter of a mile from the city centre but being effectively isolated by both social and physical barriers -as discussed later on in this chapter.

In the light of the above discussion of the Bay’s characteristics and problems, the County and City Councils’ responses to those problems as included in the Structure and Local Plans produced for the County of South Glamorgan during the past two decades are sought in the following section. The findings from the review of this material will show the strategic framework of policies and proposals derived for the area so that the initiatives and actions taken on the behalf of the public sector can be consequently discussed.

4.3 - The public sector’s response to Cardiff Bay’s “urban problem”

The first structure plan that was produced for the County of South Glamorgan was in 1977. This structure plan concentrated upon economic development, improvement and renewal of the existing urban fabric, the transport needs of the county and the best use of available resources (written statement, 1977: para.6). It was intended to provide the strategic framework of land use development and transportation policies for the county over the fifteen year period 1976 to 1991. However, from the very beginning it was realised that flexibility and adjustability of policies and proposals to allow for unforeseeable changes were essential
elements both in the preparation and the implementation of such a document. Hence, although the structure plan was overall judged by professionals and council officials as providing a firm and successful guide for major investment decisions by both public and private sectors (Draft Explanatory Memorandum: first review of the county structure plan, 1984: para. 1.2) regarding development proposals during its operational time, modifications were deemed necessary during the eighties. These modifications arose due to a need to allow first for updates which became both necessary and feasible in the light of the statistical information gathered in the 1981 census; and second alterations were deemed necessary as far as employment issues were concerned due to the unexpected recession of the early eighties which have resulted in unemployment rates being considerably higher than it was anticipated (ibid.).

To put the discussion in a historic context during the late seventies, the County Council having recognised the issues of economic decline, physical deprivation and social upheaval in the Bay area formulated several policies in order to ameliorate the situation. Thus policy no.7 of the Structure Plan (1977) stated that:

a presumption in favour of industrial expansion, redevelopment and reclamation in the waterfront strip (the waterfront strip is defined as being that area from the Wentloog levels east of Cardiff through to Penarth Docks).

The Wentloog levels (see map provided) were selected as a site for industrial development and it was decided that substantial capital expenditure should be tied there (para.274-276). However in subsequent modifications applied in the structure plan in the mid-eighties (Structure Plan Written Statement 1987: para.
3.8) it was stressed that the area apart from a proposal to be used as a Nissan plant failed in attracting any other large-scale user and so consideration for other land uses including residential housing was put onto the agenda. The city council though strongly opposed the area’s release for either industrial use, arguing that the locality was already oversupplied with such sites, or for housing for which they argued it was unattractive.

Furthermore, in the 1977 structure plan policy no.8 was concerned with the availability of well-serviced industrial land in order to subsequently enhance employment opportunities for the county, an objective that was a priority in the 1977 document. The same policy was also concerned with the development and availability of, apart from serviced industrial sites, operational land for port-located industry within the Cardiff Docks. Policy no.9 stressed that consideration should be given on the clearance of the east Moors Steelworks after their closure for redevelopment. In the context of enhancing employment opportunities for the county, the closure of the East Moors Steelworks cost the county 4,600 job losses, the council decided to form task forces to cater for the people made redundant and also look for alternative employment opportunities (policies no. 98-101). In this line of thinking, policy 101 stressed that, given the council’s recognition that a recovery of the county’s economy depended greatly on the manufacturing industry which has been suffering during the seventies (South Glamorgan Structure Plan - Report of Survey, 1977), financial assistance be given to small and medium sized firms. Also in policy 102 a further strengthening of the service sector was envisaged -with a proposal at the time for a Welsh Assembly.
Policy no.15 was concerned with the fact that large scale office development should be restricted in Central Cardiff but favourable consideration be given for the Mount Stuart Square as an office location (policies no.16-17). In this context, Conservation and Commercial Improvement Areas were declared in 1980 in particular within Mount Stuart Square with the aim of stemming the decline and conserving this important piece of townscape (Cardiff Capital Development, 1989: 6). However, in the late eighties a change at a national level with significant local implications was introduced by the 1987 Town and Country Planning Act (Land Use Classes Order) -which effectively had resulted in amendments to the previous structure plan incorporated into the South Glamorgan Structure Plan: Proposals for Alterations no.2, Draft Explanatory Memorandum 1990: para. 3.6. In land use terms this resulted in a relaxation of the previously tightly controlled office location policies under which the above policy no.15 was derived and which encouraged small-sized office development only within Mount Stuart Square as far as the Cardiff Bay area was concerned. But under the new act the potential for office space provision in Cardiff Bay has been realised in the late eighties -as can be seen retrospectively by the sort of market-led development that the CBDC was seeking and encouraging for the Bay.

Transportation policies to cater for the county’s transport needs were developed and the proposals affecting the Cardiff Bay area were mainly the construction and completion of the Peripheral Distributor road to make the Dockland more accessible to the national motorway network, the city and its surrounding areas and also the widening and refurbishment of streets in the Bay was in the agenda to ease the through traffic congestion to the city centre.
In this structure plan (1990) policies no.24-32 related to the need for new housing in the county and also the need for alterations in the nature of the housing stock available as a result of changing trends throughout the eighties towards smaller households as well as an increasing single market -information which was made available in the 1981 census. These policies dictated that emphasis be placed against clearance of existing dwellings unless cost of refurbishment was considered unjustifiably high. In this context general improvement areas were designated in the Butetown area with assistance to households for overall improvements in their properties, in the form of grants available by the city council and also council's commitment to overall environmental improvements.

Finally, as far as leisure and recreational facilities were concerned policy no.83 (SG Structure Plan, 1977) stated a presumption in favour of water recreation purposes along the coastline so as to enhance the area's potential to become a tourist attraction site. Overall this policy was not subjected to alterations through the years since it was considered sufficient - though a more geared impetus was added to it by the CBDC which made it a specific objective of their regeneration strategy to increase the Bay's capability of attracting visitors and tourists.

To summarise, it has become clear through the above discussion that South Glamorgan County Council's number one priority in the 1977 structure plan was to encourage the creation of new jobs through the regeneration of the economy. Generally speaking, County Councils had a statutory obligation to tackle the effects of high unemployment, for example poverty, inadequate care for the needy and educational inequality. However, South Glamorgan made a conscious decision to tackle the cause as well as the effect even though economic development is not a statutory duty (Boyce, in an article in Cardiff Independent,
29/07/1988). Consistent with this priority it is clear from the previous discussion that the main consideration of council officials was to finance infrastructure projects which would enhance the area's potential as a development site for industrial purposes.

However, it was at the beginning of the eighties that the need for more intense and focused efforts towards the Bay's regeneration was recognised and hence the county council launched the regeneration of South Cardiff. The first phase was the redevelopment of land adjoining Bute East Dock. A competition was launched to identify and attract a major developer to the site - a competition won by Tarmac p.l.c. The plan submitted by Tarmac and approved by the county council secured government support, and with the help of the Land Authority for Wales, the county council and Tarmac embarked upon the redevelopment of what is now called Atlantic Wharf, a mixed-land use development. The County Council, supported by the Welsh Office, was the first to make a significant financial investment in the area from the public sector and Tarmac were the first to risk private capital to regenerate South Cardiff. Grant aid was available for restoration and conservation of older buildings through agreements with the conservation lobby of Wales (Cadw) and from city council's listed building repair funds, resources which came at hand for the rescue of such areas as Mount Stuart Square. Although often modest the grants were successful in generating considerable private investment by boosting the private sector's confidence.

In retrospect though, the structure plan policies discussed here and the subsequent plans and operations which have been carried out were rather incremental in the revitalisation of Cardiff Bay during the early eighties. This appears to be generally the case when securing substantial and major capital
resources, to finance overall comprehensive regeneration in an area. This is also discussed in the second chapter in the typology where it has been identified that in order to achieve and sustain a considerable degree of urban regeneration in an area lying on marginal to derelict type of “urban problem” public sector’s dedicated commitment is deemed essential. Furthermore another vital element of securing government support to an urban regeneration scheme is that of building up confidence about the future. Therefore, with the primary aim in mind of increasing investment confidence, strong commitment on behalf of the public sector needs to be demonstrated. This may be achieved in a variety of ways: a clear local planning framework; a firm but positive development control policy aiming to secure a townscape of high quality; and direct action to secure environmental improvements; infrastructural improvements with highway construction by the County Council to enhance the area’s accessibility and contribute towards an improved street scene. These were the efforts which were being rather slowly but gradually demonstrated by the public sector throughout the early eighties in Cardiff.

Indisputably, the above prerequisites for urban regeneration have been realised from the very beginning of the efforts towards Cardiff Bay’s regeneration by both the County and the City Councils but the breakthrough only came when major central government funds were allocated to the Welsh Office in order to undertake and achieve the area’s regeneration. After the suggestion from the Secretary of State, Cardiff Bay Development Corporation was established in 1987 as the agent which would assume the responsibility for Cardiff Bay's regeneration and arrange the channeling of the central government funds. Its role and achievements are discussed in the following section.
4.4 - Cardiff Bay Development Corporation

As it was discussed in the previous section, after the decline of Cardiff docklands and port activities mainly in the post-World War II period and the closure of steelworks in late seventies there have been large amounts of derelict urban land left. In turn the redevelopment of this derelict land appeared at the time -and still is- to be an exciting task in particular when one is bearing in mind the rhetoric of the Cardiff Bay Development Corporation (CBDC) to create a "superlative maritime city" which will incorporate "Europe's most exciting waterfront development" (advertising propaganda from various CBDC's brochures).

Also another point made in the previous section is that in order to achieve this task major financial resources are deemed necessary by the public sector so as to increase confidence in the area and as a result to secure a maximum leverage of private investment. In addition Cardiff had at the time Assisted Area Status -it is at the time of writing this thesis under review-, thus meaning that parties interested in investing in the area may be eligible for Regional Selective Assistance; also the Welsh Office back in the late eighties had allocated around half a billion pounds of central government funds for the comprehensive and well integrated regeneration of the area over a period of ten years. Of course one could quite readily recognise from the experience of other urban regeneration projects that the task of achieving a substantial degree of regeneration in an area requires most commonly a few good decades of action.

The Welsh Office charged the responsibility for the regeneration of the area and the handling of the financial packages to the Cardiff Bay Development Corporation, the quango that was set up by Act of Parliament in April 1987.
CBDC has been granted the responsibility of marketing the area as a desirable destination for business, industry, recreation and living and was given discretionary powers to add to the financial incentives available to private investors or provide tailored packages to suit specific needs. It was to continue and build upon initiatives taken beforehand by the South Glamorgan County Council, the Cardiff City Council and the Vale of Glamorgan Council. These initiatives were intended to stimulate the regeneration of Cardiff and Penarth Docks and included construction of a peripheral distributor road to link the docklands with the rest of the city and the M4 motorway, a proposal included in early Structure Plans of the South Glamorgan County Council in the seventies as mentioned earlier on in the review of the 1977 Structure Plan. Major infrastructure facilities such as this one in addition to proposals for an improved Bute Avenue to provide the direct link between the city and its waterfront and the acceptance of the construction of the barrage, one of the biggest engineering projects currently being undertaken in Europe to provide an attractive permanent freshwater lake, represented the commitment of the public sector on the rebirth of the area with the ultimate view of encouraging private sector-led development. This can be seen also in the objectives of CBDC which were set out by the Welsh Office as follows:

- reunite the city centre of Cardiff with its waterfront;
- promote development which provides a superb environment in which people will want to live, work and play;
- achieve the maximum leverage of private investment (in a ratio 4:1 of private to public investment) and also the highest standards of design and quality in all types of investment;
• bring forward a mix of development which will create a wide range of employment opportunities and will reflect the hopes and aspirations of the communities in the area;
• stimulate residential development which provides homes for a cross-section of the population;
• establish the area as a recognised centre of excellence and innovation in the field of urban regeneration.

(Cardiff Bay Regeneration Strategy, 1988)

The initiative for the establishment of CBDC came from the Welsh Secretary of State at the time, Nicholas Edwards, who later became Lord Crickhowell and director of the Associate British Ports (ABP), the major land owner in the Bay.

From its objectives it can be seen that the corporation considers it vital to secure the maximum possible level of private sector investment and maintaining the cooperation and support of the local authorities, principally Cardiff City Council and the Vale of Glamorgan Borough Council and of other public bodies with an interest in the area. On the other hand though, being a privately-managed UDC with a major objective of securing the maximum possible leverage of private investment, the corporation is bound to be focused on commercial interests rather than the socio-economic implications and impact of the developments it has originated.

The next section is a discussion of the achievements made in the first ten years of operations by CBDC in the regeneration of the Cardiff Bay area.
4.5 - Towards the achievement of the objectives

At the starting point, as was stressed in the previous section, the importance of providing a sufficiently well-serviced area in order to boost the confidence of the private sector has been realised through major infrastructure improvements financed by public funds. These are, first the Peripheral Distributor Road (PDR) to improve accessibility from and to the Valleys, Penarth and the M4 with the construction of a subway to avoid environmental damage in the Cardiff Bay area (initial plans for the PDR included development on ground level) and which has been completed, and second the barrage which was expected to be completed by September 1998 initially but has been delayed and not delivered as yet, at the time of writing this thesis. Measuring 1.1 km in length spreading from Queen Alexandra Head (North) to Penarth Haven (South) the barrage will impound two of the main rivers in South Wales -the Taff and Ely- to create a 500 acre freshwater inland bay and a permanent waterfront of some 12.8km (Wales 2000, 1997). The project was perceived as an integral part of the regeneration of the Cardiff Bay area in so much that it is expected to provide an attractive setting which will enhance the development potential of the area -including plans for a mile-long waterfront "arc of entertainment" recreational parade - a job that is currently carried through by Sovereign Land developers.

Another important feature of the barrage according to CBDC is their determination that, unlike other barrages across the world, Cardiff Bay's one would not be a plain concrete wall across the sea but a very pleasant addition to the local environment (ibid.) - though one should bare in mind that Cardiff Bay's barrage has been constructed purely to fulfil aesthetic purposes. The barrage constitutes from a flank embankment acting as a dam which stretches from
Queen Alexandra Head southwards and was planned to be landscaped during the summer of 1998 so as to form a park. The barrage features sluice gates, a fish pass to allow for fish migration and lock structures for movement of small yachts and boats. Although it is certain to assist in improving the Bay’s appearance there have been many criticisms by environmentalists mainly on its effects on the Bay’s wildlife and to the foundations of existing houses from increased ground water levels, and fundamentally on its ability as an investment magnet (Cardiff Independent, 29/02/94). Peter Boyce from Cardiff Friends of the Earth in a letter to the European Commission and in an attempt to block the £191 million barrage scheme showed as evidence of the uselessness of the barrage a letter from the vice-president of Schotte Glaswerke who was astonished at the suggestion of a relationship between their decision to build a TV glass factory at the old Tremorfa Steelworks and the construction of the barrage (Schotte Glaswerke was bought out and the factory is now called Nippon Electrical Glass - NEG). Conclusively, he suggests that companies are attracted to invest because of factors such as infrastructure, availability of trained workforce, low wages and financial incentives rather than a nice office window view to an estuary or lake. However, these are motives for industrial development, and NEG in addition does not lie in direct vicinity to the waterfront, but there was an opposing viewpoint expressed in an interview with a private developer in the next chapter, who argued that the barrage’s main function was to improve land values around the Bay, and as such act as a catalyst for economic development. Yet the barrage which was first conceived and proposed in 1986 is now close to completion and its attributes, though debatable, will soon be manifested and only then its impact truly be assessed.
Another physical infrastructure scheme which was planned to go ahead sometime in autumn 1998 -though it appears to have been just initiated recently- is the construction of Bute Avenue. CBDC had commissioned Christopher Glaister & Company Ltd with Ove Arup and Partners to prepare a proposal for Bute Avenue. In physical terms this task addresses the first objective of CBDC, to reunite the city centre with its waterfront (the socio-psychological dimension of this is further discussed in the overview section). Indisputably, if the Cardiff Bay regeneration is to become successful there has to be a landmark development to provide the link between the city centre and its waterfront. As it was pointed out in the consultants' executive summary (1993) without this link new developments at Mount Stuart Square and the Inner Harbour would remain isolated from the city centre and the full potential of the regeneration effort around the Bay would fail to be realised. It was proposed in this report that Bute Avenue will provide a clear, unambiguous framework for new development as well as improved vehicular, public transport and pedestrian links between the city centre and the waterfront; in each edge of this high-quality corridor there will be "piazzas" which will enhance physical appearances as well as psychological factors of connection and continuity within the city. Subsequently, detailed plans of a high standard "boulevard" were approved by the planning authority. However, the enforcement of a Private Finance Initiative (PFI) to undertake the construction of Bute Avenue and stringent negotiations with the Highway Authorities, very much tied with regulations and meticulous road safety controls, had delayed the project considerably on the one hand, and had compromised its aesthetical quality on the other.

The above physical infrastructure schemes give an indication of priorities of CBDC, that are set out in accordance to directions from the Welsh Office. These
priorities represent fundamental prerequisites, in order to reinforce the foundation stones for the regeneration of Cardiff Bay. In the rest of this section the achievements made towards meeting the specific objectives for the regeneration of the area are discussed in the same order they were included in the previous section.

As was mentioned earlier in this section the Bute Avenue proposal addresses the first objective. Towards meeting the second one, that is to say promote development which provides a superb environment in which people will want to live, work and play, the construction of the barrage constitutes the cornerstone. In addition there are overall piecemeal environmental improvements planned, as far as the physical appearance of buildings (some listed) is concerned -mainly within Mount Stuart Square and the Inner Harbour area- and the landscaping of open space. With regard to the latter the Inner Harbour has seen considerable environmental improvements with the attempt to establish an "arc of entertainment", that is to say the waterfront promenade including restaurants, coffee shops, leisure and entertainment complexes, Techniquest, the award winning visitor's centre to inform people of the regeneration scheme and process, projects that in all have contributed in establishing the area both as a visitor attraction and a recreational focus for city residents.

Furthermore, within the context of creating a superb environment to set out an example in imagination and originality, CBDC back in 1988 had invited 12 leading urban planning consultants (four from the USA) to submit a summary of how they would approach the problem of redeveloping the area (Lane, 1988). The winning submission was by Llewelyn-Davies Planning of London who were commissioned to prepare a land-use plan and regeneration strategy for Cardiff Bay by May
1988. The consultants produced a regeneration strategy report comprising imaginative and innovative mixed-use developments of distinctive design qualities, and included in their report detailed studies of projects which they perceived as feasible and complementary for the Cardiff Bay area. This brings forward the third objective of achieving the highest standards of design and quality in all types of investment. A fine example of that is the architectural award winning building which houses the UK headquarters of the NCM Credit Insurance. Also, developers within the area are obliged to contribute 1% of their budget to the Cardiff Bay Arts Trust (CBAT) which was set out for the provision of public art schemes within the area. As far as the leverage of private investment that has been achieved by CBDC according to financial year 1997/1998 figures published in the CBDC’s Corporate Plan, no.10, £845 million have been attracted to Cardiff Bay with estimates of CBDC to reach more than one billion by the year 2000 (see appendix 2); this represents a ratio of around 2:1 of private to public investment, which is considerably less than the target of a 4:1 ratio of private to public investment envisaged in CBDC’s remit (see the debate on over-ambitious targets in chapter 5).

In meeting with the fourth objective to bring forward a mix of development which will create a wide range of opportunities, Cardiff Bay has benefited from developments such as the retail park at Ferry road, Ocean Park which is the Bay’s principal business zone, Mount Stuart Square where major financial services have been relocated, the restaurant quarter which is continuing to develop around Mount Stuart Square and ample office space which has been provided among others by Grosvenor Waterside, the property arm of the Associated British Ports. There are also plans for another major office development at the city centre end of the Bay and a waterfront and leisure
scheme in the Inner Harbour, designed to bring the festival atmosphere of Baltimore or Sydney harbour to the Bay, is under construction at present. The latter is anticipated to open in time for the big influx of visitors to Cardiff for the Rugby World Cup (Wales 2000, 1997). Overall, nearly 10,000 permanent jobs have been created (from a letter by the Welsh Secretary of State to the CBDC board of directors on the 22 July 1997, edited in CBDC’s Corporate Plan 9, 1997, appendix 3), a proportion of which though is attributed in relocation of companies as is discussed in the next chapter. Supposingly, priority was, and is, given in employing local people; Harry Ramsden’s restaurant has devised a policy of employing people living within a two mile radius of the site -though, there were favourable financial incentives in doing so (see also appendix 4, where is evidently shown that a very small percentage of jobs were offered to local people from figures available since 1997). As far as residential development for a cross-section of population is concerned, as stated in the fifth objective, the area has seen the development of Atlantic Wharf and Penarth Marina as major residential sites and the current development by St. David’s developers in proximity to Roath Basin. However, the type of development sought in the above projects appears to target mostly higher income groups as one would characterise it as up-market residents. Also, housing development by CBDC has been focusing on private market housing whereas the City Council in their response to the Cardiff Bay’s regeneration strategy (1988) had stressed the need for more social housing. Finally, towards the last objective of establishing the area as a recognised centre of excellence and innovation in the field of urban regeneration it appears to be realistic in the sense that CBDC has geared substantial finances towards marketing, promoting and advertising of the area and also by the fact that development which took and is taking place in the area is of high-standards as professional people would argue.
Overall, the Corporation anticipates that by the year 2000 more than 70% of the overall target for private sector investment will have been secured. Meanwhile, the Welsh Secretary of State announced in the White Paper "A Voice for Wales" published in 1997 the finite decision that CBDC should be wound up at the end of March 2000. Of course as discussed in the first section the successful process of regeneration should continue in the next decade and in view also of a Labour government in power and the Welsh Assembly different institutional arrangements are bound to be implemented for Cardiff Bay, with responsibilities being delegated most probably to Cardiff and Vale of Glamorgan Local Authorities, the WDA and maybe trusts formed especially for securing the sustainability of Cardiff Bay's regeneration.

In the next section, the overview, some issues that have been raised by the above review of documented sources are further discussed so as to provide some focal points for the interviews.

4.6 - Overview

People who are living or have lived in the City of Cardiff can realise that following the so called "rebirth of the city centre" (Cardiff Independent, 29/06/1988) in the eighties introducing pedestrianisation schemes, refurbishment of arcades, new shopping centres have resulted in a well-integrated city centre, whereas at the same time the docks were further sinking into oblivion and deprivation. It appears that there is a series of both physical and psychological barriers which have subsequently emerged and have to be overcome in order to achieve urban renewal of the city fabric.
On the one hand there is the London to Swansea railway line which marks the southern edge of the city centre and on the other hand the British Rail embankment stretching to Bute Street Station which divides Butetown from the Atlantic Wharf (the rail embankment was intended in earlier plans by CBDC to be removed, but the owner British Rail in negotiations was reluctant to offer a consent since they anticipate that the line would become profitable in years to come). Furthermore, the up-market development in the Atlantic Wharf site, on the one hand, and the council houses in Butetown, on the other, seem rather contradicting instead of complementing each other. In this context, although Cardiff Bay has indisputably been transformed in the course of the past twelve years since CBDC’s establishment, there are questions emerging such as who benefits from these changes and how are obstacles imposed by the physical and psychological barriers between North and South Cardiff to be overcome. As discussed earlier, the free-market is bound to have commercial and speculative development in mind and profit as the ultimate goal and the public sector is to be called, to the researcher’s belief, to control the development process so that the community’s pride is maintained and the newcomers in the area are socially integrated to the existing community. The actual situation regarding this issue is sought through the interviews in the following chapter.

For instance, quite recently the public has seen the debate on the selection of a site for the Welsh Assembly. The sites considered were the old City Hall building next to the National Museum of Wales in the city centre, and the others in the Inner Harbour and in the centre of the proposed Bute Square at the Northern end of Bute Avenue. The first appeared to be the one which traditionally was the "public’s choice". The other sites -the Inner Harbour one was finally selected-, would incorporate the development of another "flagship" landmark building to be
added in the collection of award winning buildings in the Inner Harbour (in fact the chosen development includes two existing buildings, the Crickhowell House and the Pierhead Building). This might be judged as narrow-minded especially when there is a considerable effort to upgrade the docks area in Cardiff but it seems that the decision-making is geared towards new, innovative and "excellent" development without taking into account the aspirations of the people who after all sit at the receiving end of this development. In the fourth objective of the CBDC's regeneration strategy is highlighted that development which is seeking to reflect the hopes and aspirations of the community in the area is to be promoted. However the reality, as discussed earlier in this section, and in greater extent is investigated in the following chapter, on several occasions indicates otherwise.

These are some issues around which the questions to be asked in the interviews will evolve. More specifically, the interviews were both concept- and person-driven. That is to say that the concept aspect concentrated on questions which were expected to help in assessing and analysing the key-aspects of the research. These were: to assess if the particular case study had shown differences from an entirely market-led approach, to investigate the key-actors involvement in the decision-making and their contribution in determining policy directions so that the relationship between public and private sector involvement or perhaps the dominance of the one over the other in the urban regeneration process in Cardiff Bay can be evaluated and then be put within the typology of planning styles of the second chapter. Also, other key-aspects that were addressed in the interviews were the nature of the development, the importance of private capital, the consultation process envisaged, the sustainability of the regeneration process and the benefits accrued to it.
The person-driven aspect meant that the questions were formulated with due regard to the person to whom they were addressed. Therefore, council officials were expected to answer questions about the public sector's input in the decision-making process and their provisions, if any, to assure that people were the recipients of a development which met with their aspirations; professionals were expected to provide their professional opinion on the institutional arrangements envisaged and their perceptions on public versus private input in the development process; private developers and investors were expected to provide information on the reasons for their interest over the area, their incentives and the consideration, if any, of factors concerning and affecting the particular locality; councillors or key-informants, as representatives of the community were expected to express their views on the development, their perceptions of their input in the decision-making process and their opinions of how they had been affected by the changes brought around. Inevitably, there is a resulting bias of person-driven questions which has been minimised by having a draft document on the analysis of the interviews reviewed by selected interviewees.
CHAPTER 5: The interviews
5.1 - Introduction

In the literature review there has been an extensive discussion of the major influence that the “New Right” philosophy has had on many policy-making arenas in the UK under a succession of Conservative governments that came into power since 1979. In this context the shift from the Welfare State to a more deregulated one, in which local authorities were gradually transformed from providers to enablers (under the Thatcherite rhetoric), has been reviewed and its effect on urban policies pursued in the eighties and early nineties has been elaborated in the first chapter.

More specifically, the research hypothesis dictated that the wider adoption of “New Right” philosophy during the time considered in this research has led to the encouragement of greater market intervention in the urban planning process. Consequently, the urban planning models which have emerged were becoming more private sector-led. From those models one was particularly more widely adopted during the eighties in order to deal with inner city decay and deprivation, the Urban Development Corporations. They largely focused on property-led regeneration and most commonly demonstrated the principle of focusing towards physical improvements rather than socio-economic enhancement within their areas. This issue has been also debated in the second chapter of this thesis where there is included a typology of a range of approaches to urban restructuring and development. The planning models that are considered in that chapter vary from those which are principally market-led, focusing basically on property-led regeneration, to those ones which are market-critical, featuring greater public sector intervention or an
underlying principle of community-led regeneration. These models represented different planning styles drawn into practice throughout Britain in the eighties and early nineties, and they were intended to provide the framework against which the Cardiff Bay regeneration process would be evaluated.

The backbone of this research has been the belief that the regeneration effort in Cardiff Bay, although it is subject to the realities and ideological climate of the “free market” “New Right” era, has demonstrated an adaptability to locality and has adopted an approach which is more “sensitive towards the community”. The initial conception, following the discussion in chapter 2, is that this is so because of the fact that Cardiff Bay Development Corporation (CBDC) is one of the last UDCs set out in the UK, and also because statutory planning powers were left deliberately with the local authority (as stressed in interviews laid down later in this chapter with the Cardiff council principal planner C, Davies on the 29th/07/98 and the deputy leader of the County Council G, Houlston on the 17th/09/98). In this context, and in order to evaluate the role of the private and the public sectors as well as that of the local population into the process, it was decided in the research methodology chapter that interviews were the most appropriate technique since the information sought was basically based on judgments of participants in the urban regeneration process. The purpose of the information gathered through the interviews has been to assess at the first instance if the redevelopment of this area of Cardiff has indeed showed any difference from the urban restructuring policies pursued at the time elsewhere, as laid down in chapter 1 and the typology of chapter 2. Hence the particular case study can be
reviewed, in the conclusion chapter, against the typology of planning styles included in the second chapter so as to assess the approach adopted in dealing with the regeneration of Cardiff Bay. It must be emphasised here that it is not the researcher’s belief that the Cardiff Bay experience had demonstrated a radically distinct approach to revitalising a large area of derelict or redundant former docks and industry, but that it has been more sympathetic to the local situation and population following valuable lessons that have been drawn up by other practices. In this sense it is the researcher’s wish to critically assess the approach adopted in the particular case and identify opportunities that were successfully created and others that might have been unfortunately missed out.

The structure of this chapter includes, firstly, a discussion of the selection of the interviewees and an evaluation of the manner in which interviews as such were conducted; secondly, is the analysis of the interviews where the information gathered is thematically divided to include the viewpoints of the interviewees on the issues identified. Finally, a summary of the main points is included in the last section together with an assessment of the validity of the findings from the interviews so as to bring forward the conclusion chapter, that is to say the critical evaluation of the case study.

5.2 - The interviews and the interviewees

As identified in the introduction the specific objectives of this research are, on the one hand to seek the perceptions of key-actors in urban development on their ability to influence and determine policy directions in the urban
restructuring process. On the other hand, another objective is to seek the perception of both professionals and citizens involved in or affected by the developments on aspects such as the attainment of a “public interest-oriented” development or one that is aiming to favour “dominant economic interests”, or perhaps a balance between them. The former objective refers to the input into the decision-making by each key-actor and is intended to shed light as to the extent to which each interested party in the redevelopment of the area was allowed and encouraged to participate and contribute to the process. The latter objective is directly connected to the typology of the second chapter. According to the typology, a market-led approach in urban planning suggests a redevelopment that favours dominant economic interests, whereas a market-critical approach refers to a more democratic process in development that is orientated towards securing public interest and controls market intervention in development decisions. As such a market-critical approach appears to correspond to processes of regeneration that are more in line with recent initiatives introduced in urban policies concerned with local capacity building and community-led regeneration - e.g. “New Deal” from the Labour government dated in 1997 (Nikki Greenleaf, Director of Communications and Marketing, Urban Villages Forum - UVF - in a discussion on such initiatives in a conference organised by UVF in London, 17/10/98). The above specific (i.e. secondary) objectives are aiming to enlighten the principal (i.e. primary) objective of this study which is if the particular case study has shown any substantial differences from the urban policies pursued under the “New Right” ideological climate. It must be emphasised at this point that another important aspect of the interviews was to provide an understanding of the attitudes of the key-actors towards the particular regeneration scheme in Cardiff Bay and their
perception of who is benefiting through the regeneration process.

In order to succeed in operationalising the aforementioned objectives, both primary and secondary, there were certain themes identified in the analysis of the interviews which are discussed in the next section. Regarding the key-actors, they are largely categorised into professionals and citizens and were selected on the grounds that they represent an appropriate cross-sectional sample of the people involved in or affected by the redevelopment process of the Cardiff Bay; the appropriateness aspect was decided against time considerations and willingness or availability of individuals to be interviewed. That is to say that interviews can take some time to be arranged which was clearly demonstrated in this case. Also, the fact that one aspect of the research has been to investigate perceptions of professional people on their contribution or not in decision-making, it meant that the individuals who were chosen for interviews had to be at an executive level and as such on several occasions they appeared to be either reluctant or too busy to agree to an interview and would suggest delegates. However, in a self-assessment exercise of the procedures engaged in selecting, approaching and talking to people, it is the researcher's view that the interviews that were conducted were successful in providing a sufficiently wide spectrum of responses by key-participants largely representing the key-interests in the area (see also discussion in last section of this chapter).

The interviewees are hereafter categorised into groups which are identified as representing specific standpoints. They are, first, public sector professional planners, second councillors, third Cardiff Bay Development Corporation's
employees, fourth residents, and the last category includes interviews with a private developer, an official from the Welsh Development Agency (WDA) and a professional from a voluntary organisation for enhancing employment opportunities in the area. The above categories with the interviewees names, positions and the reason why they were selected as sources of information for the purpose of this research, were:

- city council and county council planners who were selected so as to provide the viewpoint of professional public sector officials on their contribution in the decision-making process and the cooperation between the public and private sectors with regard to the Cardiff Bay regeneration. They were Ceri Davies and Dave Holtam, who are both principal planners in the County Planning Department;

- councillors who were selected so as to provide an account of the participation in the process of elected members from the county and the constituency in the area under study and provide valuable information on the awareness and powers, if any, of the communities in shaping their environment (i.e. a firm basis of local democracy). Those were Gordon Houlston, the Deputy Leader of the County Council, Ben Foday, the Butetown councillor and former chair of the Docks Residents Association, and Sue Essex, Riverside councillor, ex-leader of the former City Council, and an academic planner;

- employees in the Cardiff Bay Development Corporation from various levels in the administration of the agency were interviewed so as to obtain their
perceptions on the constructive partnership with the public sector authorities and an account of the decision-making process in the organisation. Their efforts to increase community awareness and participation so as to deliver a "comprehensive" regeneration of the Cardiff Bay area were also investigated. Those were Peter Southerby, Director of Business Development, Liz Court, the Community Team Leader, Chris Ashman, the Cardiff Bay Training and Employment Group (CBTEG) Leader, and Sue Martin, the Cardiff Bay Visitors Centre Manager;

- then, in order to get the residents' viewpoints on their participation in the regeneration process, their opinion on how do the developments coincide with their aspirations, as well as their understanding of the efforts, if any, by the public and private sectors towards increasing community awareness and involvement, four interviews were conducted with people perceived as key-representatives of the community. They were intended to provide a general picture of what people believe has been going on in the area they live. The interviewees were Mani Santos, the Chair of the Inner Harbour Residents Association (IHRA), Betty Campbell, former councillor in Butetown and chair of the Butetown Residents Association, Neil Sinclair, local historian, and Father Liam Shore from the Docks Residents association;

- three more interviews were conducted: the first one with a private developer in the Inner Harbour area, Tim Binnington, director of Sovereign Land development who provided a private sector investor's point of view; the second one with Paul Morrissey, manager of "New Employ" which is a
voluntary organisation working closely with the community, the Economic Development Unit of the County Council and CBDC for enhancing employment opportunities in the area; and thirdly, Bet Davies who is the Media and Communications Director of WDA was interviewed in order to provide an account of the agency's involvement in the process.

In total there were 16 interviews conducted. Generally speaking the interviews were deemed successful in providing the information sought after and the research techniques engaged had proven suitable in facilitating the primary data collection phase. That is to say, that the sampling techniques of purposive and snowball sampling which were chosen in order to decide who the interviewees should be, as explained in the research methodology chapter, and the method of in depth semi-structured interviews being adjusted to the particular interviewee (person-driven) with open questions to allow for personal perceptions on the key-concepts of the research to emerge (concept driven), have both worked well. As far as the manner in which the interviews were carried through it was in all cases reasonably friendly and relaxed, a factor that assisted in having some very stimulating conversations with people whose responses were valuable in that occasionally allowed reading between the lines and in effect making some very interesting points. They were carried out either in the interviewees' workplace or their home on occasions -one, with some residents took place in a local pub-, their duration varied from 30 minutes the shortest to about 2 hours the longest. Finally, most of them were taped and transcripts were produced in order to enhance accuracy and detail. The information gathered was during the analysis stage tabulated in a framework of two dimensions, the one consisting of the themes that are discussed in the
following section, and the other consisting of the interviewees' standpoints - group- as identified earlier in this section. The table formed has greatly assisted the researcher towards a systematic and rigorous treatment of the interviewees' input. This table is not included in the thesis but its direct merit has been the formation of the following sub-sections (5.2.1 to 5.2.7) in which the information gathered in the interviews is analysed.

5.3 - Analysis of the interviews

There were seven common themes which emerged from the interviews and which are used as a basis of analysis of the primary and secondary objectives of this research. More specifically these themes represent issues that were commonly emerging in the discussions with the interviewees although it has not been the case that each interviewee was commenting on them. They were, in the order that are reviewed in the following sections, the input in the decision-making process and hence the influence of each category of interviewees in determining policy directions, the interviewees' opinions on the nature of the development and also their opinion on the importance of private capital, their perceptions of the consultation process with the community and of the partnership between the public and the private sector; also, their viewpoints on the sustainability of the regeneration process in the area and last on who is to benefit from the process were sought after.

5.3.1 - Decision-making

Within this theme it is sought to appreciate the decision-making power of each
group of the interviewees.

More specifically, it has been strongly argued by both planning officials and councillors that following the experience and lessons learned from other UDCs and LDDC in particular, the Welsh Office was politically determined to establish a free-standing UDC without, however, granting them planning powers over the area. As it has been discussed in earlier chapters CBDC had to apply to the planning authorities in the normal way in order to get planning permissions for developments to go ahead; this appears to constitute the main council’s input in the decision-making process. Apart from that, as Ceri Davies (in his response to the draft analysis report, 9/03/99) suggested, there was considerable input on the council’s behalf, through consultations, to the original regeneration strategy, to subsequent area briefs that were devised for providing more detailed planning guidance, and through liaison on a wide range of topics such as the provision of social housing. However, generally speaking the fact that a development corporation with a strong commercial focus is responsible for the area, does not allow for a direct control over the decisions and thus the determination of policy directions. This view was shared by the councillors who were interviewed who have stressed the County Council’s insistence during negotiations with the Welsh Office on local government representation on the Board of CBDC. This followed the realisation that in most of the previous UDCs an important element missing was local government input. Also the Cardiff Bay Liaison Committee which was set up at the time of the Corporation’s establishment to devise strategies for social housing, land exchange and liaise with other UDCs so as to learn from them, had provided a medium which could influence the setting out of
priorities in the policies devised for the area (however, this committee was
discontinued after the local government reform in 1996); together with the fact
that councillors are democratically elected representatives of the public,
provided for the democratic element in the process according to the
councillor's viewpoint (B, Foday, 4/10/98).

However, as far as the public sector's perceptions on decision-making are
concerned, it was a consensus opinion that the council could have taken the
responsibility for the area's regeneration if central government funds were
made directly available to them. After all, in their view they have been the
initiators of an effort to bring some attention to the area with moving down to
the Bay the Headquarters Offices of the County Council which acted as a
catalyst in demonstrating their commitment to the area's redevelopment, as
also argued in chapter 4.

In hindsight, the researcher believes that there is a possibility here that council
officials might have felt competitive and belittled against the outsiders from the
newly established development corporation. This is so, on the hypothesis one
could make that since council officials believed they were capable to do the job
but instead they were forced by the imposed establishment of a development
corporation to coordinate with that agency, they might have been left
disappointed. Subject to the urban policies pursued during the eighties it could
not have been otherwise but the corporation officials have several times been
criticised in the press for excessive company expenses (Western Mail, 3/11/94,
p11), which together with the fundamentally diversified principles between a
privately-managed organisation and a public-managed one, gave rise to the
above suspicion. To reinforce this view, interviewees' opinion both from the private and public sectors were sought but no explicit confirmation has been obtained.

Finally, council officials argued that the local government reorganisation of 1996 had not so much affected relationships between the local authority and the corporation nor had it affected relationships in the Board -apart from the discontinuation of the Cardiff Bay Liaison Committee as mentioned earlier on in this section. This is not at all the view from inside the corporation where there is a view that the local government reform together with the issue of the imminent winding-up of the corporation and the resulting speculations over the future arrangements have resulted in a policy of non-cooperation between the corporation and the council. Furthermore the decision-making mechanism of the corporation itself is divided into Executive and Area Managers levels with the substantial powers left apparently to the Executive level; as insiders have suggested it is not permitted for lower level employees from the CBDC to meet with council officials on an ad hoc basis unless they get permission from above. Therefore, it appears not to be the case that there has been a constant effort at collaboration but rather there has been a difficult relationship between the council and the corporation, as individual attitudes have been frequently unhelpful and have not encouraged a cooperative approach -this issue is further discussed in the discussion on consultation and public-private sectors partnership, sections 5.3.4 and 5.3.5 respectively.

As far as the residents input in the decision-making process is concerned Father Liam Shore (interviewed on the 24th/09/98) suggested that it has been
actually embryonic. He pointed out that his parish -south end of docks area near Hamadryad Hospital- attitude has been that they can only make a minor difference, if any at all, and as such they retreated to an ignorant or inert stand on their capacity to influence the process; also, he argued, they became very sceptical believing that there is a hidden agenda by either the public or the private sector where decisions were made well ahead and hence their ability to change or even influence them was minimal. However, as all residents of the existing local community who were interviewed have agreed, with the passage of time they came to realise that they should become more involved and aware of what is happening and how they could secure as much as possible for their own benefit.

Overall, it has been pointed out in the interviews that because of the proximity of the Bay redevelopment area to Cardiff city centre and a strong council, and although UDCs were the norm at the time for redevelopment of inner city areas, the one established in Cardiff had to be different in that it had to collaborate with the local authority. Nevertheless, the private sector's point of view coincides with the rationale behind UDCs that the main aim of a development corporation is to carry through a rapid and intense regeneration programme in a relatively short period as opposed to an allegedly bureaucratic, controlling and regulative local authority's cumbersome mechanisms.

5.3.2 -Nature of the development

This theme intended to investigate the sort of development sought after for the
area by the various agents involved. The Cardiff Bay Regeneration Strategy commissioned by CBDC was a very loose context plan which primarily had to be responsive to market forces. This is very much in line with the commercial focus of the UDCs where, as discussed in chapter 1, flagship projects were commonly introduced in order to achieve a maximum leverage of private investment. The planning officials, C, Davies and D, Holtam, who were interviewed have criticised CBDC on their insistence in attaining targets set out which, as the councillors have remarked also, were over-ambitious and unrealistic (it appears that this argument over targets had initiated a long debate between the council and the corporation as discussed later in sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.5). The council’s concern was to gear its efforts towards promoting and allowing development which would not affect adversely the well-established and vital city centre of Cardiff. They asked for a proportion of the new residential developments to be for social housing and the figure that was originally featured in their response to CBDC’s regeneration strategy was 40%, but has been eventually reduced to 25%. The public sector’s comment on this reduced figure, which appears to the researcher to be a compromise on the council’s behalf, was that as in real terms they could not retain much control over decisions they should accept what was on offer (this, to the researcher’s opinion, although it holds true if one considers the proceedings within a market-biased organisation such as a UDC, it seems rather contradictory to the public sector interviewees’ suggestion of a strong local authority in Cardiff Bay case).

Also for the development to have the minimal adverse effects on the city centre and the region in general the council was trying to exercise development
control in order to limit retailing and office development. Anyhow, there were in the mid-eighties strict planning regulations governing the kind of development allowed on the fringes of the city centre; but, D, Holtam, one of the planners who was interviewed on the 5th/08/98 has pointed out that the changes in use class orders introduced in the Planning Act 1987 Use Class Orders (II) have facilitated CBDC in obtaining planning permissions for developments that otherwise would have not easily gone ahead (as industries and offices were classified under the same use class order, as discussed in the previous chapter).

Dave Holtam in his interview also suggested that the regeneration model envisaged by CBDC was very much a supply-led one in the sense that developments were not proposed on the grounds of planning-generated forecasts for future demand but instead they were promoted within the rationale that demand should follow availability. P, Southerby the CBDC executive interviewed on the 22nd/08/98 had an opposing view on that claiming that although developments might have appeared to compete with the city centre and might have resulted in some incidents of relocation, it is inevitable for a modern city that wants to be internationally competitive to replace old and poorly maintained properties with modern, excellent ones that reflect modern businesses needs. In this context, he stressed that the interest among private investors generated in the area since the regeneration begun has been constantly high; to reinforce his view he argued that there is demand for the developments that have been taking place demonstrated by the lack of vacant premises in the core regeneration area (however, one should not forget that financial incentives favoured businesses locating in the Bay to the city centre,
and also that most office developments in the Bay were built for a client).

Residents from the old local community have criticised housing developments which adhere to an up-market, single and professional portion of the population which makes their integration to the existing socially distressed local community even more difficult. However, as was discussed in chapter 4, this was in accordance with population forecasts from the 1981 census of a growing single professional market in the region, figures which were additionally increased given the kind of jobs created in the new businesses set out in the Bay area. On these grounds and given the private developer's speculative motives many luxury one-person households were provided.

Consequently, although both the public and private sectors have suggested in the interviews that they have been committed to prevent gentrification, the process has resulted instead in the segregation of the local population, the existing one and the newcomers. This appears to be so, as the existing local community' viewpoint regarding the nature of the development was that developments were not necessarily matching their aspirations; they came to feel quite intimidated amidst glamorous developments, with only piecemeal environmental improvements in their neighbourhoods and the constant disruption while the regeneration process was shaping up became a nuisance without bringing at least any direct benefits to them (B, Campbell, 20/10/98). P, Morrissey, the interviewee from New Employ (interviewed on the 7th/08/98), pointed out that the new residential settlements in Cardiff Bay have resulted in an influx of population who are increasingly becoming the majority population in the redevelopment area and as such, inevitably, future policies would have
to cater for them as well as the old local communities. The diversification of
the new from the old housing sites and the railway embankment that acts as a
physical barrier are bound to reinforce segregation and perhaps sustain
pressure towards gentrification. Certainly it has been CBDC’s rhetoric behind
Bute Avenue’s construction that it will link the old residential site of Butetown
with the new one in the Atlantic Wharf but given rising land values, speculation
from private developers and low income households in Butetown it seems to
the researcher that gentrification could become harder to be prevented due to
the prevailing circumstances.

Afterall, interviewees in general have agreed that the model envisaged in this
development is very much a market-dictated one with increasing land values
and attracting private investment being the ultimate goals. This is further
discussed in the next theme.

5.3.3 - Importance of private capital

It has been extensively discussed in the previous chapter that in a sense the
essential feature of the Cardiff Bay regeneration effort has been the
construction of the barrage and the idea that it would create an attractive
waterfront. This might seem a controversial statement but if one reviews the
history and the bulk of reports produced about the barrage it can be easily
realised that it is the main development which is expected to be the catalyst for
enhancing the area’s image. This view coincides with the private developer’s
point of view that the barrage indeed acted as an investment magnet (T,
Binnington, 12/10/98). The council officials interviewed last summer, C,
Davies and D. Holtam, also agreed that when the barrage was nearing completion the amount of planning applications received by the authority has considerably increased -C, Davies suggested they have nearly doubled. Historically, its construction was begun at the same time the country was seriously hit by recession and investors were very reluctant to invest in the property market, even more in a deprived area accompanied with ambitious promises but also severe physical degradation and social distress. But progression of work together with the commitment demonstrated by both the public and private sector in investing vast amounts of money have eventually increased confidence in the area among private investors at least (T, Binnington, 12/10/98).

On the other hand, residents have strenuously opposed the idea of the barrage because of the effects it would be likely to have on their properties (CRAB, Cardiff Residents Against the Barrage being the most prominent instrument in residents' discretion formed in order to question and oppose the idea of the barrage). Nevertheless they believed that the regeneration programme was bound to succeed given the resources allocated that enabled environmental and infrastructural improvements and the proximity of the area to the city centre. So here there are two directly opposing views and the reality is that there is no absolute justification and at the bottom line as Ceri Davies pointed out “the barrage is an expensive sort of experiment in the sense that the economic, and other, benefits would not prove themselves until later”.

Overall, interviewees from all different strands who were approached have agreed that the regeneration strategy is very much a marketing strategy with
targets, as council officials argued, being tailored to suit market forces. This, as mentioned in the previous section, has been the cornerstone of the debate that has since arisen between the council and the corporation over the targets. The former has been accusing the latter on their targets which are not planning-generated but adhere to a supply-led regeneration model as discussed in the previous section; this debate is further discussed in section 5.3.5. CBDC of course has been arguing that their remit explicitly dictates that a quadruple of government funds must be attracted from private investment. Hence, from their standpoint the strategy of market bias is justified, and efforts had to be concentrated on promoting the area as a desirable destination for businesses and industries initially and in time also as an attractive residential, recreational and tourist landmark.

5.3.4 - Consultation

In this theme it was intended to investigate the local community involvement in the regeneration process in Cardiff Bay. It was stressed by both council officials, councillors and CBDC employees that although community involvement was not within CBDC’s remit, there was a conscious decision on its behalf to demonstrate some commitment in this direction. This was not a pro-active approach but one that was deemed necessary in the light of the criticisms other UDCs have received for excluding local communities. The council’s efforts concentrated on pressurising CBDC to finance environmental improvements which, though, had a rather “surface effect” since there were no substantial funds allocated but just a negligible proportion of the entire budget. According to figures published in the latest CBDC Corporate Plan (1998) the
cumulative expenditure for both community development and training for the period 1987-1997 was almost £4.3 million (less than one per cent of the total public expenditure at the same period).

On the one hand some people in CBDC enthusiastically protest the corporation's conscious commitment to consultation and close work with the community. There have been committees formed such as the Inner Harbour Partners Group and the Cardiff Bay Business Forum both of which were introduced to cater for the needs of existing local and new businesses. As far as the local community and its involvement in the process are concerned there were the CBDC Community Team and Cardiff Bay Training and Employment Group (CBTEG) introduced in the early nineties. The former tries to collaborate with all agents involved in a proposed development and inform local people in a manner that is comprehensive to them. The latter is concerned with providing support mechanisms to employers in the form of wage incentives and training schemes so as to encourage employers to employ local people. Also, it approaches employers so as to assess what skills are needed and inform the community accordingly. The above two groups employ jointly five specialist people and as discussed in the next paragraph have no discretion on the budget allocation.

On the other hand though, other CBDC employees and people from the old local community argue that as the area is inhabited mainly by ethnic minorities there is, to a degree, an ignorance of the British language and customs which together with high long-term unemployment figures in the area result in low self esteem. There is a consensus opinion that there are genuine efforts from the
aforementioned CBDC teams to raise awareness so as to restore the pride of residents. However, in order to change attitudes and promote capacity building and self-help, as features of ultimate community participation in regeneration, extensive resources and time are required, means which are both in short supply under the current arrangements (C, Ashman, 7/10/98). Furthermore, this situation is being worsened by the fact that these teams do not have actual access to the decision-making at the executive level and the allocation of funds; their role, as insiders argue, is restricted to presenting to the local community decisions made well ahead and to try to persuade them that they are to benefit. Apparently this is a difficult task as people are sceptical and cannot help feeling that there is a hidden agenda and that these are only piecemeal attempts to satisfy them so as to go ahead with plans that focus on economic rather than social improvements.

Butetown councillor Ben Foday (interviewed on the 4th/10/98) pointed out that consultation takes place when a development is close by a residential settlement and consequently has a direct effect on residents. In this context, ways to minimise the disruption caused by a development are sought, but there is not much scope for justification of the development and if, in the first instance, it corresponds to the community’s aspirations. There is certainly an argument that it is not so practical to bring public into decisions over technical and specialised issues; but history showed that resident’s resistance and reservations in the case of the barrage have resulted in a better quality design and more favourable clauses for compensation in case of damages.

In conclusion, it is clear that CBDC had adopted a very much economic model
of regeneration but there has being a wide-spread feeling that the opportunity to involve the community has been missed out and it is very much down to individuals to raise their voice and be heard.

5.3.5 - Public-private sector partnership

In this theme it was intended to evaluate the partnership between the public and private sector. It has been mentioned earlier in this chapter that although council officials and councillors believed that the regeneration programme could be supervised by the public sector if funds were directly channeled to them, subject to political realities of the time it was clear that this was not feasible. Therefore, it was stressed by interviewees from the public sector that the authorities have made a conscious decision to be co-operative with the corporation established. They suggested that the partnership worked reasonably well but the main debate has arisen from CBDC being criticised over rigid attainment of the original targets (C, Davies, 29/07/98). To the council's understanding targets need to be flexible and maneuverable so as to adjust to changing prevailing circumstances; whereas to CBDC targets attainment was and is perceived as the main criterion against which their success can be assessed.

Generally speaking it is just common sense that there is a differentiation between public and private sectors as they represent entirely different philosophies. A local authority is meticulous in having planning-justified programmes as it is accountable to the public, whereas a UDC has got only to justify its expenditure to central government. UDCs established in derelict
areas as regeneration authorities were assumed to be able, acting on an ad hoc basis, to deliver more effective solutions as they were allowed by the powers invested in them to by-pass slow bureaucratic solutions, as was extensively discussed in chapter 1. In this context, from a private developer's viewpoint (T, Binnington, 12/10/98), CBDC is perceived as the facilitator for the developers, the marketing entrepreneur who promotes the area and the communicator with the public sector. To the CBDC executive's viewpoint (P, Southerby, Director of Business Development in CBDC) the unique feature of a free-standing UDC without planning powers over the area which was imposed in Cardiff might have slowed the regeneration process with the bureaucracy involved but had as a result a consensus opinion among all actors involved.

In real terms, it was pointed out both from the councillor's standpoint (G, Hulston, 17/09/98) and the council official's one (C, Davies, 29/07/98) that, as there was agreement in the loose land-use plan for the area and in the objectives of the development, the partnership was positive and constructive. They suggested that the corporation could not have succeeded without their support. However, in CBDC there appears to be a differing view that this working relationship has not always been so smooth (L, Court, 22/09/98). The local reorganisation which has resulted to departmental and staff changes have affected, in her view, the partnership aspect. As Mani Santos, chair of Inner Harbour Residents Association (IHRA) has pointed out in one occasion of a meeting with the Highway Authority of the County Council, officials were reluctant to admit in the meeting CBDC representatives from the Community Team. This reflects the perception of the residents on the public-private sector
partnership that of them being caught in the conflict between the council and the corporation. Furthermore, in the light of the wind-up of CBDC in March 2000, and the uncertainty over future arrangements at the time the interviews were conducted, the tension between them was bound to increase and according to a CBDC insider’s view had reached a point where a policy of non-cooperation was in place. This brings forward the next theme of the implications involved in devising future arrangements.

5.3.6 - Sustainability and future arrangements

Councillor and academic Sue Essex had as a chair of the Cardiff Bay Liaison Committee, visited London Docklands on two occasions in an attempt by the committee to draw lessons from the development corporation there. In their second visit when LDDC was nearing its wind-up day they realised the complexity of the issues connected to the winding-up of a UDC. This holds true in Cardiff Bay also where extensive discussions were on-going, during the summer and autumn months of 1998. According to these discussions it was identified that high maintenance costs and liabilities and not so many assets would most likely be the legacy of CBDC to its successor body. This is Cardiff City Council and clearly there would be a financial burden on the local authority unless government funding became available. This has been the major concern of the council together with the mechanisms envisaged for the successful continuation of the area’s redevelopment, during the negotiations over the future arrangements. At the moment of writing there appears to be the beginnings of an agreement between the parties and some financial support appears likely to emerge.
CBDC executives have been and are very optimistic in that, by the time of wind-up they will have succeeded in attaining 80% of their targets, the impetus is there for the process to practically continue itself. Then, as it is argued, development in the area will follow with the development rates applying for the city. This view is also shared by the private developer interviewed (T, Binnington, 12/10/98) who argued that the imminent completion of the major projects in the area - e.g. the barrage and Bute Avenue - has secured the momentum for the regeneration process to continue into the next century. Moreover, the International Rugby Cup in late 1999 is expected to provide a major boost, both financially and psychologically.

Though another grim view of the future of the development is that as the Bay development has been of exceptionally high standards comparing to the rest of the city then, once central government funding is terminated and if it becomes the local authority’s responsibility to finance the area’s maintenance it is inevitable that it will drop the standards to the city-wide ones; hence, if one assumes that the Bay development is to follow on the city-wide development rates it might mean that the area’s development could stagnate.

It is imperative therefore, in the researcher’s opinion, that ample resources are made available and the whole operation becomes cost-effective. One way to do that, as councillor G, Houlston, one of the three local government representative to the Board of CBDC, stressed is for the CBDC to come out with suggestions in their exit strategy for reducing administrative staff, perhaps by using secondees from relevant council departments. Another way is by promoting the development of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs)
which is also in accordance with current European Union directives. As residents and both the CBTEG and Cardiff Bay Community Team leaders have suggested SMEs are after all the traditional way people usually generate money. The Welsh Development Agency (WDA) official who was interviewed has also stressed that recently emphasis is placed upon indigenous development and supporting SMEs.

Finally, as far as the sustainability of the regeneration effort is concerned and with regard to the successor regeneration authority there was a lot of speculation on what the arrangements should be, at the time the interviews were conducted; a favourite consortium appeared to be the WDA. However, the WDA is responsible for the whole of Wales and as such it is unlikely to maintain a high priority-bias over this particular part of the city of Cardiff, the Bay.

5.3.7 - Who benefits?

This last theme is indisputably the most philosophical one, one where there are no “black and white” concepts. Historically speaking, when the corporation was established and following the speeches and promises there was euphoria in people about the plans but shortly after in the process people got disillusioned on the development (B, Campbell, 20/10/98). Jobs were created but they were not good enough and many developments have been happening but they did not reflect people’s aspirations.

One must consider, as discussed earlier on, that a great majority of the
existing local population has been out of work for long periods. Additionally there is a significant ethnic minority who are further disadvantaged in that they are not native British so as to master the language and be perfectly accustomed to the customs which as discussed in section 5.3.4 results in low self esteem among the community. Furthermore, there still exists an intimate apprehension among the existing local population that there is a prejudice against them which dates from many decades back. Then, it is only natural that people are cautious towards the “new” and “unknown”, and as was discussed in section 5.3.4 there is a great deal of work to be done in changing such attitudes and perceptions. N, Sinclair (7/08/98) has pointed out in the interview that ever since the early sixties, when the council has demolished the existing run-down residential settlement of Butetown to replace it with the council estate in place nowadays, its residents have started feeling misled and disillusioned. In this context some feared that when the corporation came it was its intention to finish what the council had initiated, to sweep out the community altogether. Farfetched view as this might be it has preoccupied people’s minds and in order for them to see the benefits in investing in skill acquiring and long-term education, issues that were rightfully advertised and promoted by CBDC community programmes and CBTEG, naturally takes time. Most of the interviewees though were confident and optimistic enough that benefits are bound to come to next generations.

In this context, they appear to be determined to make an effort and benefit as much as possible in the light of the wind-up of CBDC and make sure that they safeguard arrangements beneficial to their own interests for the future. They have built up their self esteem through “fights won” such as the one regarding
the barrage where residents’ opposition to plans have resulted, as some argue, in a better quality design and in favourable terms of compensations, as was discussed previously.

Last but not least, there is another dimension on the question of who benefits, one that has been a major concern of the public sector over the last twelve years since attention has been drawn onto Cardiff Bay. It is the issue of the strictly defined boundaries that came under the corporation’s regeneration regime. A perhaps oversimplified perception of the population outside these boundaries, in either the adjacent also severely distressed areas (more socially rather than physically) or city/region-wide is that vast amounts of money are intended to bring direct benefits over a very limited area, the size and population of which are negligible when the whole of Wales is considered. Councillors have suggested that eventually benefits will be more widespread and another argument made has been that it is better to have some attention brought, even to a restricted geographical area, rather than have none at all. Also, historically Cardiff Bay was the place from where the city begun growing and its revitalisation should restore pride. Finally there is the dichotomy of the urban -capital- centre which out-balances the investment potential that could be drawn to the rural regions. However, as was discussed in the previous section the possible bigger involvement of the WDA in the future is likely to change this reality (B, Davies, 16/11/98).

In the final section which follows it is attempted to draw the main points made in the analysis of the interviews. The discussion that follows aims in introducing the reader to the conclusion chapter that follows where the Cardiff
Bay regeneration model is evaluated against the typology and the relevant dominance, or otherwise, of the “New Right” ideology in the case study is assessed.

5.4 - Overview

Through the analysis of the interviews it has been verified that an economic model has been the case in Cardiff Bay regeneration programme. This model has been evidently in line to Thatcherite urban policies of inner city revitalisation, within which in development it was commonly the norm to favour dominant economic interests rather than assuming a public interest-orientated approach, as is explicitly reviewed in the first chapter.

However, it has been the argument sustained in this research that a more “sensitive” approach was in place in Cardiff Bay. More specifically in the interviews it has been clearly argued that the particular case study did not follow the trend of totally excluding local community but had allowed for some scope for the locals to get involved and get benefited. Still it is quite far from more participative models such as SRBs -Single Regeneration Budget- and more recent initiatives in the light of “New Deal” where community involvement is an essential feature. In this sense, the particular case study proved to be reactive rather than pro-active in devising strategies that encouraged community programmes and this was the case, as discussed in the interviews, because CBDC wished to avoid the notoriety surrounding other UDCs on their policy of excluding local community, in particular LDDC. However, it has been stressed in the interviews with residents of the existing local community, the Butetown
ward councillor and the CBDC Community Team that consultation was limited on matters of convenience while carrying on development projects close by the community, rather than adopting a consultation process that aimed in substantial input from the residents on the kind of development they aspire to. That is to say, that residents' contribution into the decision-making has been embryonic. Neither the public sector, the alleged representative of public interest, was allowed to exercise substantial influence into the decision-making under the regime encountered in the particular urban regeneration scheme, as the evidence gathered from the interviews have suggested.

Nevertheless, one would expect so in a strongly market-biased model. More specifically, there is in the one hand the UDC which is acclaimed to be a rapid and effective facilitator of development. People who work in them are most likely entirely detached from the population of the area under the UDC's remit and as such some argue they are more enthusiastic as well as open-minded and unbiased to deliver drastic changes (P, Southerby, 22/09/98). There are of course also all the criticisms of UDCs that were extensively discussed in chapter 1. On the other hand there is the local authority which is regulative and controlling and as such subjected to bureaucracy and cumbersome procedures of development control. There is also a view of the local authority, as L, Court has suggested in her interview on the 22nd/09/98, that although it ultimately represents the public and acts on its interest, it is quite exclusive as well, in that it involves a professionalism and technical language which are incomprehensible by the majority of the public.

In Cardiff Bay there has been a unique combination of the above strands, the
private and public sector, and according to the perceptions obtained through the interviews contacted, despite the shortfalls occurred on occasions and opportunities missed out, has worked reasonably fine.

More specifically, as discussed in this chapter, a shortfall of the particular UDC was its commitment to targets attainment. On the one hand, following the discussion of the fourth chapter this was their remit and what they came to Cardiff Bay to do: set up some targets and satisfactorily deliver them (see appendix 5 about the extent to which targets have been achieved). However, as it is often the case when pragmatic conditions apply, things do change over extended periods of times and one has to be flexible and modify situations accordingly. This appears to be the council’s argument. Also, one should bear in mind that the council acts as a representative of public interest city-wide, and in their agenda they need to consider the impact a development is likely to have not only to the whole of the city but the region as well. CBDC, on the other hand, is restricted within very limited boundaries and the council is the agent that should ensure that the redevelopment within these defined boundaries complement rather than harm the periphery. Apparently this is a very difficult task, especially if one considers that in the case of UDCs local authorities cannot exercise great amount of influence, as mentioned earlier in this section and was argued in the interviews with council officials (C, Davies, 29/07/98 & D, Holtam, 5/08/98). In Cardiff though there were such arrangements envisaged so as for the local authority to maintain some degree of influence; to what extent it is very debatable, but from the information gathered in the interviews, to the researcher’s opinion, it appears not to be the case that the local authority has been very influential. And this was so
because the regeneration model in Cardiff Bay is property-led and as such biased towards market forces.

In this context, and from the interviews, it appears that the community involvement aspect has been missed out as was stressed earlier and this is so because it was confined to surface tactics that would be “people-friendly”. Some piecemeal environmental improvements, some community programmes in place, and some training for the locals to become more “employable” seem to be CBDC’s legacy. Certainly, one should not forget the tight budget under which CBDC had to operate and prioritise, a fact which dictates that a development corporation, as a mechanism for redevelopment, need be first “market-friendly”, and then, if only some funds were in surplus, may assume the role of a “people-friendly” organisation. The latter, as has been argued in the interviews, it is not anyhow in a UDC’s remit. Instead CBDC’s remit was to achieve maximum leverage of private investment, actually to quadruple the public expenditure. Operating under such conditions it became imperative that a marketing strategy must be adopted to encourage private sector’s involvement and hence secure a constant influx of private investment in order to safeguard the sustainability of the regeneration of the Cardiff Bay area.

Finally, in order to evaluate the regeneration effort in Cardiff Bay against the typology of the second chapter of planning style approaches ranging from the market-led to the market-critical, in the next chapter, it is imperative first that the information gathered must correspond to validated evidence. In the research methodology discussion in chapter 3 it has been extensively debated that in a qualitative research representativeness and reliability are
compromised against validity. As such the 16 interviews that were conducted for the purpose of this research are considered enough in representing a sufficiently wide spectrum of the differing views of the key-actors involved in or affected by the particular regeneration process. The initial thought of questionnaires being distributed was abandoned because a fundamental feature of this research was that the persons who should be either interviewed or given a questionnaire had to be free to express their opinion and contribute their knowledge to this research; this could have not been achieved with questionnaires featuring "closed" questions that would indisputably have restricted the set of probable replies. Nevertheless, as explained in great detail in chapter 3 it was neither representativeness nor reliability that were sought after in this research but validity of responses so as to establish evidence that can be used to assess the case study. As discussed in chapter 3 and in order to increase validity two methods have been encountered for the purpose of this research: first, a review of secondary data has preceded the interviews so as to provide an account of the reality of the particular regeneration programme as based on documented evidence; and second, a draft document of the analysis of the interviews chapter was sent to selected interviewees from each of the identified standpoints of key-actors mentioned in section 5.2 to obtain their comments (tactics involved in constructing validity by using triangulation method -i.e. multiple methods approach- suggested by Yin, 1994). The responses obtained on the draft of the analysis chapter were quite complementary and a few comments that were made were subsequently applied in the final version of the chapter. As such, it is the researcher's belief, that a satisfactorily high degree of validity has been accomplished in the analysis of the interviews and that the main points brought forward in them
have been elaborated.

It is hence the purposes of the next final chapter of this thesis, firstly, to further elaborate on these issues raised, so as to evaluate the particular regeneration model in Cardiff Bay against the typology of chapter 2, and secondly, to conclude if the case study can be considered substantially diversified from the market-biased approaches exhibited by other Urban Development Corporations.
CHAPTER 6: The conclusion
6.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, it is intended to further discuss the argument proposed in this thesis that the “New Right” ideology’s influence in urban regeneration during the eighties and early nineties has not been as dominant in Cardiff Bay as in other similar programmes in the rest of the United Kingdom. To reinforce this view the case study is to be evaluated against the typology of the second chapter in which the planning styles reviewed represent a wide spectrum of planning experiences in Britain during the period under investigation. This typology, as discussed in chapter 2, ranges from market-critical approaches to urban development to the market-led ones. More specifically, and in order to work towards achieving this first goal, a more in depth discussion on how the case study fits into this typology with respect to the evidence gathered in the review of the documented sources, chapter 4, and from the analysis of the interviews, chapter 5, is included in section 6.2.

It is the researcher’s wish, that a parenthesis should be made here on the use of the typology. That is to say, that the typology does not provide a rigid and accurate standardised guide of urban planning practices throughout Britain, and was not alleged to do so in the discussion of the second chapter, rather it provides a framework of planning styles which can be used as a basis for critically assessing the case study. Hence, it is the researcher’s belief, that it provides a fairly sound background of acquired knowledge on the fragmentation of planning styles which has been experienced in Britain during the eighties and early nineties. As such it is expected that it will assist in identifying a combination of planning styles, that corresponds to the processes involved in the urban regeneration experience of the Cardiff Bay area. Ultimately, a new typology
consisting of a combined scheme of several planning styles included in the original typology can be introduced and this is discussed in section 6.3.

The second aim of this chapter, which is dealt with in section 6.4, is to assess the case study regeneration model in the light of the evidence collected in this research so as to shed light on the partnership between the public and private sectors in the urban regeneration programme in Cardiff Bay. In doing so, the appropriate role of the various agencies involved in urban development is discussed with a view to devising an ultimately "good practice" regeneration model. In such an idealistic model, the scope for the local community to be encouraged to participate in the regeneration process is explored (in light of initiatives introduced under the “New Labour” where the active participation of the local community becomes an essential element of the regeneration process).

6.2 Evaluation of the case study against the typology

Following the discussion in the previous section on the scope and validity of using a typology, it has been mentioned in the conclusion of chapter 2 that the typology as a measure of organising and evaluating planning practices appears to hold certain advantages and limitations at the same time. Its advantage is that it simplifies the complexities of ideological debates and economic processes to a limited and manageable set of criteria, and as such can provide the basis for evaluating a particular planning style. In contrast, its limitation is that it oversimplifies the ideological climate and fails to take into account the particular economic situation. However, even though there are limitations in this typology, when used with the other secondary and primary sources of information about the locality, it has proven to be of some benefit in this research.
More specifically, in line with the discussion in section 2.2 on the two distinct approaches that central government may adopt in policy-making within the urban development arena, it appears that the Cardiff Bay experience reflects the counter-active approach (Collinge & Mawson, in Atkinson, 1994). That is to say, a process where government reduces its statutory powers and the instruments at its disposal, so that local authorities' responsibilities can be restricted and the private sector's involvement maximised. This approach is based on the belief that only by leaving market forces to their own devices will the desired end result be achieved, a belief strongly promoted by "New Right" advocates during the Thatcherite/Majorite eras. This approach may be labelled as non-interventionist or market-led, and epitomises the rationale behind the establishment of Urban Development Corporations.

They were, as discussed in great detail in the literature review section, quangos appointed by the central government and as such they eliminated local governments' input into strategic planning issues with regard to regeneration. In this line of thinking, CBDC being a UDC illustrates a planning style adhering to private management planning; that is to say that this approach is not only featuring use of private sector financial resources but draws in also the managerial skills and experiences of the private sector. This appears to be in accordance with the discussions in the interviews with both a CBDC executive and a private developer, who argued that run-down areas are bound to gain by the dynamism and expertise of entrepreneurs who are responsible for the decision-making in development corporations. However, the particular situation in Cardiff Bay, as discussed in chapter 2, lies somewhere between marginal to derelict area-type of urban problem, and required huge amounts of financial
resources to become available over a considerably extended period of time so that the private sector's attention could be drawn to the area.

At the same time, as was argued in the interviews by public sector officials and councillors, the political reality in Wales made it imperative that the responsibility for the area's regeneration could not have been solely devolved to an agency totally unaccountable to the local authority. In this sense, it appears that elements of public-investment and regulative planning styles, suggestive of an interventionist planning style, were forcefully incorporated in the Cardiff Bay regeneration strategy. Regulative planning, as discussed in chapter 2 is central to the ideology of the planning profession as it enables planners to pose as the expert managers of urban systems, a role that involves the assumption of an underlying consensus within society so that in the face of competing interests planners can claim to reach a judgement in the best interest of all (Ravetz, 1980).

However, the ability of planners to represent the public interest, historically a feature of the Welfare State, was put in jeopardy under the "New Right" ideological stance of the Thatcher/Major governments and consequently this traditional function of planners appears not to have been so significant in the mechanisms involved in the Cardiff Bay regeneration. Instead it appears as though public sector officials were rather forced to form partnerships with the private sector, which was increasingly becoming more powerful within the urban development arena, and this "tactical move" epitomises in a sense the trend followed by many local authorities within the free-market era favoured by the Conservatives during the eighties and early nineties. In essence, this meant that planners during the eighties and early nineties realised that opposition to market forces, in an era when increasing emphasis was placed on private sector
involvement, was not a “tactical move”. Instead, negotiating with private developers and forming alliances, formally or informally, with the private sector appeared to be more beneficiary as a “means to an end” tactic (a view that has been suggested in the interviews with council officials).

With regard to elements indicative of public-investment planning style being adopted in Cardiff Bay's regeneration strategy, it has been argued in chapters 4 and 5 that especially during an era when the country was hit by recession it could not have been feasible to succeed in attracting private investment without the financial commitment of the public sector in order to boost the confidence of the market. Furthermore, Cardiff had held during that period an Assisted Area Status and as such regional financial assistance could selectively be given to development projects in the area. However, public-investment planning corresponds to a style of planning which exhibits great faith in the public sector and attempts to rebuild inner-city areas on non-market principles. Underlying this rationale was the view that the British economy has been weakened by the investment plans and priorities of private sector financial institutions (Community Development Project, 1977). In contrast though, Thatcher's view, in line with viewpoints of "New Right" advocates, was that British economic prosperity was hindered by placing too much faith to the public sector and by discouraging a market-led recovery.

However, the regeneration model in Cardiff Bay adheres most closely to trend and leverage planning styles where an alliance was informally formed between the public and private sector to stimulate a weak market - i.e. a strong commercial focus. In trend planning, the local authority still holds considerable responsibilities but it is required to produce development plans which consciously
reflect market trends (or, in other words, planners are charged with facilitating development in line with market demand). In leverage planning public officials are required to develop contacts with private sector agencies and adopt a flexible, entrepreneurial attitude to development proposals which need to be responsive to what the market dictates. Leverage planning is, then, slightly more interventionist than trend planning. Leverage planning was the style adopted in the London Docklands development and appears to hold true within the practice of all Urban Development Corporations. As such, it appears that the regeneration experience in Cardiff Bay followed along the lines of leverage planning where a marketing and corporatist approach has been brought together by primarily CBDC and also other parts of the public sector. The local authority was statutorily granted an amount of responsibility with having to be consulted but in essence appears that it was forced to cooperate (this was also argued in the interviews where there were views expressed by council officials that the regeneration programme could be carried out by the public sector solely if it was granted the financial resources necessary).

Overall, it appears that Cardiff Bay's regeneration model incorporates features of all the planning styles described in the second chapter as distinctive approaches within a fragmented planning practice in Britain during the eighties and early nineties. This appears to be the case as the Cardiff Bay regeneration programme had, historically, the benefit of bringing in lessons drawn from other experiences. The one style though that was only superficially encountered in the model appears to be the popular planning style which intends to restore confidence to the local community and promote local control of resources. Some effort towards this direction has been made as discussed in the interviews but they seem rather
as surface tactics to avoid the criticisms attached to UDCs on their policy of excluding local communities.

Following the previous discussion, the question that emerges is has the Cardiff Bay regeneration programme reaffirmed the typology of chapter 2 or does it suggest a new distinct typology? This is the issue debated in the following section.

6.3 - Cardiff Bay regeneration model: a distinctive approach?

As it has been extensively discussed in the interviews, the particular case study has strongly indicated a market-led development, which indisputably is opportunistic and adapts to whatever mechanisms will give the best deal. This realisation coincides completely with the capture of intellectual arguments by the "New Right" ideology, at the beginning of the eighties, of a market-led recovery to urban degredation.

However, the case study review has strongly suggested that a corporatist planning style had emerged in the Cardiff Bay regeneration process. The reason for this was, as debated in chapters 4 and 5, that the political realities in Wales of the mid-eighties made it imperative that the UDC imposed in Cardiff had to be different in that it was required to consult with the local authority. One should not underestimate, the English/Welsh dimension which meant that a UDC, primarily an English urban policy, needed be adjusted to the local particularities. That is to say the Welsh Office (WO) operating as the representative of central government had decided at the time of CBDC's establishment that the local authority could not be excuded by the development in Cardiff Bay. Apart from political pressures
towards this, one should appreciate the fact that Cardiff Bay lies in the immediate vicinity of the city centre, and as such a redevelopment of the area as a "twin centre" had to be controlled by the city council in order to minimise any adverse effects to the already established city centre.

Another consideration as far as the differences of CBDC from other UDCs are concerned, appears to be the old and versatile existing local community adjacent to the redevelopment area that was difficult to ignore, because of its strong community sense and pride. It was discussed in detail in chapter 1, that UDCs were criticised for sweeping out local communities. In Cardiff though, and according to WO directions, it was proclaimed that local people, in the specific area but also city-wide and in the region, should receive benefits by the regeneration of Cardiff Bay. This, at least, was the rhetoric in the objectives set out for the area (discussed in chapter 4), but in real terms the local community has not been actually included in the CBDC's remit. After all, it is common sense that the notion "community" is equivalent to "trouble" in the parlance of development corporations and private developers. As such CBDC has been principally attached to the idea of creating the type of physical environment to suit private investors, with the minimum amount of interaction with the local community. This idea has created tensions in Cardiff with groups seeking to promote social and community regeneration (Imrie & Thomas, 1999). As such, it was only at the beginning of the nineties that some effort towards community enhancement programmes was demonstrated by the CBDC, by introducing a Community Team, but, as was argued in the interviews, this was a reactive rather than a proactive approach to community involvement (this issue is further discussed in the next section).
In conclusion, though there have been the differences of the case study debated above there have also been fundamental similarities of the particular regeneration programme to others undertaken by English UDCs (e.g. the emphasis placed on the importance of private capital, see also relevant section in chapter 5). As such, it appears that the case study has not demonstrated substantial differences from the typology, however, the few minor ones suggest that a new typology might be developed as a consequence of the way in which CBDC operated. Unarguably the regeneration model implied a capitalist rather than a community focused approach. However, there were features from various planning styles described in the typology which were incorporated in this particular model. This resulted in a corporatist planning style, which, as interviewees from both the public and private sector stressed, succeeded in reaching a more consensual opinion (although, as interviewees from the private sector had argued, this corporatist approach, being subjected to the public sector bureaucracy, had slowed the regeneration process). This corporatist approach is, in the researcher’s opinion, indicative of a planning model in which the “New Right” ideology has not been as dominant as in other English UDCs.

The section that follows includes an overall assessment of the case study, considering the partnership between the public and private sectors and the people within an ideally “good practice” regeneration model.

6.4 - Conclusion

This thesis has discussed the criticisms of the Welfare State, especially during the "Thatcher era", and subsequently the freeing-up of market forces within the urban development arena. In this context the confusion which had emerged over
the role urban planning came to assume, was also discussed in the literature review chapters. Thornley's quote in the introduction that "planning provides an ideology of intervention in the public interest while, in reality, supporting dominant economic interests" (Thornley, 1991: p21) appears to hold true of the duties and responsibilities assigned to the planning profession in this new era. In this context the market-critical planning styles examined in the literature review were no longer promoted as the desirable course of action with respect to urban regeneration initiatives. Instead market-led approaches were apparently favoured by the Thatcher administrations in the urban policies formulated, with the most indicative example among them being the UDCs.

Falk (1995) suggests that the slowness of development, the government's distrust of local authorities, and the desire to maximise investment from the private sector, has led to a number of "grand projects" undertaken through UDCs. More specifically, as was discussed in chapter 1, UDCs were allocated huge government funds in order to regenerate areas of physical degradation and social distress but with potential interest to private investors. UDCs were largely focused on physical renewal with little or no respect for social aspects of regeneration; after all it appears that it could not have been otherwise since Thatcher's view of social regeneration suggests that it would inevitably follow economic buoyancy. But in real terms, UDCs were strongly criticised that they were acting in a manner that excluded local communities and have resulted in gentrification or isolation of communities.

In order to avoid these perceived shortfalls of UDCs, when one was set up in Wales to regenerate the Cardiff Bay area, it was determined that it should consult with the planning authority, the formal representative of the public interest.
Furthermore, elected local representatives were appointed as members of the Board of the corporation so as to maintain some input from within the locality into the decision-making.

An interim evaluation of CBDC in the early 1990s portrayed it as an organisation pursuing objectives largely shared by powerful political interests in the city and the sub-region (Thomas and Imrie, 1993). The view that, fundamentally, there was an agreement on the objectives set out in the regeneration strategy for Cardiff Bay, was also verified through the interviews with council officials and councillors. More specifically, if one looks at the objectives which CBDC was required to achieve one can see that the corporation was asked to promote development that adhered to the aspiration of the local population, on the one hand; on the other hand, another objective, which was much more heavily emphasised, was to maximise private investment and as such, as was argued in the interviews, meeting the community’s aspirations has never been a top priority in CBDC’s agenda. It is the researcher’s belief therefore that the objectives imposed on the CBDC and the mechanisms envisaged in the regeneration strategy to achieve them seemed quite contradictory. Namely, if one considers the emphasis placed on attracting private investment one automatically comes to the realisation that there is not much space allowed for community-based approaches. This is so, because the principal motive of private investors is profit maximisation and speculation and social improvements are the least of their concern.

In this context, another particular objective of CBDC has always been that beyond the physical regeneration of Cardiff Bay, they have been primarily concerned with promoting Cardiff as a nationally and internationally competitive city, “whereby the
ambience and style of the city become economic assets” (Jewson and MacGregor, 1997a: p.5). Thomas and Imrie (1999: p.106) appear to be astonished “with the apparent vanity, even absurdity, of a provincial city of 300,000 population in seeking to compare with maritime cities worldwide” (such as Sydney, Baltimore, even Venice). Of course, CBDC has invested heavily in consultants’ studies and infrastructure, which have paid particular attention to urban design quality; but, in their drive to emulate Baltimore and Sydney, Falk (1995) suggests that they may have missed out on the potential to make the most of Cardiff’s heritage, including the ever-changing tidal landscape, and a rich stock of existing buildings.

The regeneration strategy, as discussed extensively in chapter 4, has been based largely on the idea that creating a fixed stretch of water, rather than a tidal bay, would generate the values from new housing and prestige offices that would justify the public investment. CBDC being fixated on this idea had on the one hand, it may be argued, succeeded in the expansion of Cardiff’s commercial core into the Inner Harbour. This is essential if the city is to have facilities of a range and standard necessary to be considered seriously as a regional capital in Europe. On the other hand though, if the city’s (and region’s) quest for growth is unsuccessful then, it may have neither the population nor employment to support twin-centres. This scenario has been the constant concern of the city council, whose grip on the regeneration was undermined by the imposition of a UDC and changes in planning legislation (e.g. 1987 Act on permissive land-uses, see argument in chapter 4) which favoured tactics of the development corporation, and also limited the local authority’s control on restricting commercial development to the city centre.
However, CBDC, operational until two years later than the last of the English UDCs, has been somehow different from the English UDCs in that, being imposed to the Welsh capital (the English/Welsh dimension) a unique partnership between public and private sector agencies has been encouraged, or perhaps following the analysis of the interviews in cases forced, to be developed. This took the form of consultation on planning proposals, as was discussed in chapters 4 and 5. In retrospect though, it appears that only an elementary and incremental enhancement has been achieved. The partnership, due to political reasons or competition or most likely towards the wind-up due to uncertainty over the future arrangements, has not proven to be a very fruitful one and in a sense each actor appeared to concentrate its efforts on excluding the others (a suggestion made to the researcher by an insider in the development corporation).

Generally speaking, in the researcher’s opinion, CBDC has displayed the main characteristics of UDCs and shares their subsequent criticisms. These are a strategy with short-term vision (as was argued in earlier chapters, a little more than ten years is certainly not enough to reverse processes of degredation ongoing for decades before) and primarily the partial nature of the UDCs’ policies and practices. Falk (1995: p.23) suggests that “a fundamental change is needed in the way we evaluate regeneration projects, particularly where urban waterfronts are concerned”. Instead of focusing on grand projects that may never be built, he suggests that regeneration authorities should pursue grand ideas, but through a series of small projects and the creation of sustainable urban neighbourhoods. More recently, within the “New Deal” and “third way” initiatives promoted by the current Labour administration there is a shift into urban regeneration practices towards the directions discussed above. Greater community involvement in the decision-making in the regeneration process is emphasised. Citizens should
become assets rather than passive recipients in the regeneration process as this may help create a new form of local democracy, with communities having a better chance of survival when they are given economic powers (Planning, 12/02/99). In particular, in Cardiff Bay one should bear in mind that the local community has been one of the oldest and most versatile multi-racial communities in the UK and as such it was difficult to be ignored. And this is so, because generally speaking, the existing local population together with the existing urban fabric constitute the history and character of an area and any effort to enhance and sustain it, is bound to increase the area's pride, dynamism and potential for self-improvement.

However, as was argued in the interviews, the low spend on community projects, set against physical improvement schemes, leads to questions concerning who gains and loses from the regeneration process. For Harloe and Fainstein (1992), most of the changes in places like London and New York benefited the financial and service industries, higher-level consumer services, the new service class working within regeneration areas and finally real estate and property interests. Cardiff Bay has displayed similar patterns to change while providing limited job opportunities for the poorer residents in the area (mainly short-term construction-based employment and part-time low wage jobs, employment that did not meet with the aspirations of the local community, as argued in the interviews). However, the limited community projects by CBDC appear to leave a legacy of a consolidation of an interest in the planning of the docklands among businesses and residents. Local people perception, following the interviews, is that they have been intentionally left out by the redevelopment, but at the same time they have been "educated" by the experience and have realised that they can play a role. Finally, the new arrangements for the area, with the City Council, the Vale of Glamorgan and the WDA, assuming the responsibility for the Bay's continuing
regeneration, is expected, in the researcher's opinion, to bring forward an emphasis for an increasing role of the community in the redevelopment process. This is in line to the "New Deal" approach of the Blair government where a planning style which allows for a greater involvement of the community is encouraged. This is usually achieved with efforts to raise community awareness and increase their input into the reshaping of their environment through holding community workshops, in which the community is invited to express their opinion and aspiration.

In conclusion, it seems that a more egalitarian, and hence "good practice" regeneration model needs to allow for a more central role for the indigenous population, encouraging a "partnership approach", within a long-term strategy for balanced incremental development. Involving people in the decision-making is likely to sustain development that reflects a community's aspirations on the one hand, and on the other hand can establish a base for political support and pressure which is needed if the planning proposals are to come to a fruition (Wainwright, 1985). To do so, it is the researcher's belief that both strategic implementation policies and attitudes need changing. That is to say that, under the regime reviewed in this thesis, local authorities are statutorily required to publish planning proposals for public examination over some considerable period of time but it must be recognised that everyday people lacking the knowledge and expertise to interpret the information displayed are disadvantaged on occasions in expressing their views. Therefore, the planning system must become more accountable by raising people's recognition on the significance of their participation and this can only be done if powers are given to them and thus people become consciously aware of their powers.
Moreover, in this line of action and in order to improve the effectiveness of regeneration programmes, market forces need be controlled by alliances formed between the public and private sectors and the citizens. Such a partnership approach, which ideally allows for different interests to be represented and recognises the significant role that Development Trusts, charities, and the voluntary sector can play in urban development, may eventually succeed in promoting the equal-citizen concept which was denied under the “New Right” regime.
Appendices
Appendix 1 - Map of the Cardiff Bay area (including the development areas and the Strategy as devised in 1988 Cardiff Bay Regeneration Strategy)

THE STRATEGY

- Key landscape features
- Wetland habitat
- Development areas
- New Development
- Reclamation/Improvement
- Key buildings
- Key building proposals
- Peripheral Distributor Road
- Distribution roads
- Scenic routes
- Railway
- Railway stations
- Anchor area

Source: Cardiff Bay Regeneration Strategy - The Summary, 1988
Appendix 2 - Private sector investment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annual</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td>231.6</td>
<td>180.5</td>
<td>444.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>1,077</td>
<td>1,257</td>
<td>1,702</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dear Sir / Madam,

I have discussed with you and the relevant local authorities the response to your consultation document "Sustaining Success" on the future of the Development Corporation. I have also taken into account your Board's exchanges with Peter Hain on this subject at their meeting on 7 July.

The Corporation was established to address the severe economic and social deprivation of South Cardiff. This was a major assignment and I am conscious that, under your leadership, the Corporation has made enormous progress in tackling it. Already nearly 10,000 permanent jobs have been created and private sector investment of almost £900 million has been attracted to the area. You anticipate that substantial further investment and jobs will be generated by the year 2000. By then, the main infrastructure projects will have been completed, including the barrage, reclamtion in the Ferry Road area and construction of Bute Avenue, which will deliver one of the Corporation's key objectives of reuniting the city centre of Cardiff with its waterfront. I know that the Corporation has also dealt sensitively with the community's social needs with important schemes completed in education, training and youth development. Overall you expect that more than 70% of your overall target for private sector investment in the Bay will be secured within the next 2-3 years.

In my discussions with interested parties, there has been a unanimity of view that this successful process of regeneration should continue into the next decade. I agree very much with this and want to ensure that effective arrangements are firmly in place to bring it about.

As you know, there are different views on the institutional structure best suited to carry the work forward. Having now carefully reviewed the arguments, I have concluded that the achievements of the Corporation have indeed brought us to the point where it would be possible and appropriate to pass responsibility for the continuing regeneration of South Cardiff to the Cardiff and Vale local authorities. I have therefore decided that the CBDC should be wound-up at the end of March 2000. I am announcing my decision in the White Paper "A Voice for Wales" published today, which sets out the Government's proposals for a Welsh Assembly. I enclose a copy.

Appendix 4 - Job creation and employment of local people

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permanent (cumulative)</td>
<td>10,799</td>
<td>12,006</td>
<td>14,123</td>
<td>31,027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary (cumulative)</td>
<td>8,081</td>
<td>9,687</td>
<td>11,920</td>
<td>20,046</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local people in jobs</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>350</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 5 - Percentage of achievement towards target attainment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Remaining % after 31 December 1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residential</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector investment</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land reclamation</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public open space</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs permanent</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sustaining Success, CBDC, 1997
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