A Low Dishonest Decade...

...Smart Acquisition and Defence Procurement into the New Millennium

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PhD
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A Low Dishonest Decade...Smart Acquisition and Defence Procurement into the New Millennium

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A thesis submitted in full candidature for the degree of PhD to be awarded by the University of Wales Institute, Cardiff

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Dedication

This work is about many things.

It addresses the discourses and narratives with which we frame our lives and picks at the physical, organisational and emotional structures that enwrap us and through which we learn to derive meaning and understanding.

It is about the tragedies of surrender and loss. Perhaps, a plea for redemption and a song for a different tomorrow.

I could not have begun, let alone delivered, this thesis without the support and encouragement of my wife Annie. To say she is everything to me – light and dark, history and hope – woefully understates what she means. She is the truth that I cling to daily, the meaning in the madness, and has, as ever, my love and deepest gratitude. As with everything in my life, this work is dedicated to her.

My children, Nick and Abi, are remarkable young, independent-thinking people, who have been critical to the delivery of this thesis. They have inspired, amused, stopped me in my tracks, burst any ego or pomposity that was in danger of being developed and, generally, chivvied me along beautifully. They complete my family and make me unbelievably proud.
I also owe a debt of gratitude to Rebecca for constantly challenging my ideas, never allowing me to be lazy or ill-considered and for guiding my work with wisdom and empathy. Thank you.

Lastly, in these pages, I refer to British military personnel who have lost their lives, drawing a causal line between their sacrifice and prevalent managerialist defence procurement policies. It is inadequate in the extreme to offer in dedication any words in memoriam for what they gave. But I do so, with humility and respect.

I offer my deepest sympathies to the families of the fallen, their loved ones, friends and comrades.

My hope is that you find peace and reconciliation. I hope we all shall.
Abstract

A Low Dishonest Decade...
...Smart Acquisition and Defence Procurement
Into the New Millennium

Smart acquisition was the change programme introduced at the end
of the twentieth century charged with transforming the
effectiveness of defence procurement within the United Kingdom.
The initiative was rolled-out as a cornerstone of the Blair
government’s strategic defence initiative from 1998 onwards and
represents, today, the management philosophy, public sector
organisational structures and UK industrial strategy for delivering
defence equipment.

This research seeks to understand the manner and extent of changes
to defence procurement derived from the smart acquisition
initiative, viewed as a ‘technology’ through which government
exercises power. Accordingly, understanding smart acquisition
develops and deepens our knowledge of the nature of government
itself.

I offer, initially, in chapters 1 and 2 an introduction to smart
acquisition, its background and historical antecedence. I discuss the
methodology employed for interrogating the phenomenon as an
auto/ethnographical study of UK defence practices.

Chapter 3 details the factors that drove defence reorganisation,
whilst chapter 4 derives smart acquisition as rational and benign
managerial change. Chapter 5 critiques this perspective by unveiling smart acquisition as a neoliberal construct through which government procurees and cements assemblages of regimes of control and socialisation, legitimised through managerial narratives and governmentalist forms. A revised critical analytical model of smart acquisition embracing governmentalist notions is, consequently, provided in chapter 6.

Chapter 7 introduces a specific defence procurement project team and describes its transformation strategy and emerging business model. In chapter 8 the project team is superficially revealed as a rational change agent embedding and embracing management reform. Chapter 9 critiques this, presenting the team as a constructed governmentalist regime, an expression of control, socialisation and surrender of agency. Chapter 10 concludes the research by observing that smart acquisition is a complex set of understandings and a multiplicity of forms and discourses.

Key Words:

Smart Acquisition
Defence Procurement
Governmentality
Neoliberalism
Risk Management
Public Sector Management and Reform
Power
Managerialism
Declarations

This thesis is submitted in full candidature for the degree of PhD to be awarded by the University of Wales Institute, Cardiff.

The work is submitted wholly and exclusively as a result of the author’s investigation. Sources are acknowledged and a bibliography is appended.

It is certified that the work has not already been accepted in substance for any degree and is not currently being submitted in candidature for any degree other than that stipulated.

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Certified

Date: ......................... Signature: .........................
John Patrick William LOUTH

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<td>ALDS</td>
<td>Acquisition Leadership Development Scheme</td>
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<td>AMS</td>
<td>Acquisition Management System</td>
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<td>AS</td>
<td>Acquisition Stream</td>
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<td>CADMID Cycle</td>
<td>Concept, Assessment, Demonstration, Manufacture, In-Service, Disposal Procurement Cycle</td>
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<td>CIMA</td>
<td>Chartered Institute of Management Accountants</td>
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<td>DEC</td>
<td>Defence Equipment Customer</td>
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<td>DE&amp;S</td>
<td>Defence Equipment and Support Organisation</td>
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<td>DLO</td>
<td>Defence Logistics Organisation</td>
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<td>Defence Procurement Agency</td>
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<td>IAB</td>
<td>Investment Approvals Board</td>
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<td>IPT</td>
<td>Integrated Project Team</td>
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<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<td>MODPE</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence Procurement Executive</td>
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<td>NAO</td>
<td>National Audit Office</td>
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<td>PUS</td>
<td>Permanent Under-Secretary of State</td>
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<td>RAB</td>
<td>Resource Accounting and Budgeting</td>
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<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
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<td>SA80</td>
<td>Small Arms 1980 (UK standard combat rifle)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRD</td>
<td>System Requirements Document</td>
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<tr>
<td>URD</td>
<td>User Requirements Document</td>
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Part 1

This section introduces defence procurement in the United Kingdom and the transformation agenda known as smart acquisition. In chapter 1 I explain the background to smart acquisition, viewed as a change programme. I present an overview of the organisations produced by smart acquisition and capture the emerging issues and derived research questions.

In chapter 2 I set out what I describe as my ‘Autobiography of the Method’, explaining my core reasons for researching the drivers for change and their perceived impacts. I reveal my professional involvement in matters military and industrial and position my work as case study of a specific project team.
1.1 **Background**

The projection of the power of a nation-state through any act of war, offensive operation or peacemaking mission is usually brutal and invariably bloody. Likewise, the procurement process for arms and materials, not surprisingly, is far from benign. Rather, the business of conceptualising, testing, manufacturing and delivering military equipment and functionality to a country’s armed forces is a complex and expensive one. Within the United Kingdom alone, Page (2006) estimates that close to £30bn is spent on national defence and security each year by the UK, with £21bn of this consumed by procurement and logistics activities. It is, by any standard, a high-cost government activity that drives military adventures around the globe in pursuit of the British government’s foreign policies, whilst securing jobs, corporate revenues and a myriad of business opportunities throughout Britain and the developed world.

‘Smart acquisition’ is the change programme that was charged with transforming the effectiveness of the process of defence procurement within the United Kingdom. It was designed and developed around 1997 by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and its management consultants to deliver defence capability ‘better, faster and cheaper and more effectively integrated’ than was considered
previously possible (MoD, 2004). The initiative was rolled-out as a cornerstone of the Blair government’s strategic defence initiative from 1998 onwards and represents, today, the management philosophy, public sector organisational structures and UK industrial strategy for delivering military equipment.

My research unpicks the manner and extent of changes to defence procurement engendered by the smart acquisition initiative and offers a powerful insight into the factors that underpin its implementation. As a process or technology through which government is attempting to exercise change, understanding smart acquisition develops and deepens our knowledge and critique of the nature of government and of governing itself, especially if we consider smart acquisition to be a microcosm of the macro features, competencies, behaviours, structures and forces of government. In this sense, smart acquisition offers a similitude or modelled representation of this larger public construct.

Defence procurement within the UK is of course a long and complex story. The purpose of my thesis is not to tell this story, nor to explain the challenges that a nation-state may face when procuring research or equipment for the use of its armed forces. Rather my concern is around smart acquisition as a fractal of governmentality – what I come onto in section 1.4 to define as the narratives, accounts, discourses, assumptions, processes and behaviours through which
consider, somehow, governing both ourselves and others across a wide range of society’s borders.

My work, therefore, is interested less in the modes of procurement but rather with how the technologies and practices of smart acquisition coagulate to form and ensnare the individual and team populations. Smart acquisition itself, in consequence, viewed as a technology of this sense of governmentality.

In this thesis I begin by offering a common-sense, highly rational view of smart acquisition, its organisational lineaments, doctrines of programme and risk management, and systems of financial recording and resource allocation. Additional perspectives and dimensions are, thereafter, introduced taking the nature of smart acquisition beyond the institutions, conventions and norms to a paradigm where government procures and cements assemblages of regimes of control and socialisation, rationalised and legitimised through the very managerial narratives that have been previously articulated.

In the chapters ahead I lay out through a derived, synthesised genealogy of subjectivity – what I define as the manner in which a person generates meaning, understanding and value – a coherent approach to the study of knowledge, personal agency and notions of power, whereby these factors align to inculcate and produce the individual within smart acquisition. This analytical lens, as a
critique of the technorationalist, managerial perspective of smart acquisition, is used to view a specific defence procurement team where managerial ‘truths’ are classified and embedded within scientific, engineering and organisational practices and explanations, rejecting and repressing – perhaps even punishing – creativity, individual initiative and non-conformity.

Within the thesis I come to discuss and characterise these managerial truths and organisational orthodoxies as residing within a ‘neoliberal’ context. I now offer my definition of this term.

I have used neoliberalism to refer to and define a multiplicity of agendas and occurrences around the significant expansion of private capital into the public sphere. For me, the term echoes the triumph of managerialist constructs, notions, forms and processes applied to address and somehow solve perceived societal problems and organisational, economic and governmental ills. Neoliberalism is a term that embraces impenetrable public/private programmes of ‘partnering’ and ‘teaming’ and resides within notions of the ‘risk society’ (Beck, 1992), whereby senses of individual freedoms and rights associated with the civil society (Larner, 2000) are sacrificed to managerialist agendas of risk mitigation, military responses and security controls.
In this sense, neoliberalism in part is identified within the colonisation of defence and procurement and the military by these managerialist practices, behaviours and organisational reforms. I suggest that my use of the term is quite distinct from an economist’s use of ‘neoliberal’ which is often characterised as the rolling-back of the state whereby a variety of providers can compete to deliver erstwhile public sector services and outputs: a phenomenon often described in the UK as ‘thatcherism’ or in the US as ‘reaganism’ (Larner, 2000). My sense and use of ‘neoliberal’ dovetails with and enables my emerging critique of governmentality and smart acquisition’s place within this governmentalist wrap.

Drawing on Giddens (1990) and Dean (2007), neoliberalism is a form of governmentalist rationality that constructs a critique of the state and public sector as bureaucratic, inefficient, expensive, dependency-forming and ineffective; a set of practices and arrangements that require profound reform through the injection of commercial and industrial notions of management and private sector self-styled competencies. Thereby both the individual and the institutions of the state benefit from this managerialist reformation to become appropriately modern, competitive, efficient, risk conscious and effective in the critical utilisation of economic resources – something that through the gaze of the neoliberal is philosophically beyond the public sector without such reform.
In this way, neoliberalism in a sense both, concurrently, rolls back the state and enables the establishment and triumph of private sector practices and discourses in what could be perceived as critical public sector life such as defence; what Giddens (1990) thinks of as a ‘third way’ of analysing and making sense of the structures, policies, processes, beliefs and values that come to encapsulate and articulate governments, economies and societies – as well as individuals and groups – in the new millennium.

1.2 Explaining Smart Acquisition

The roots of smart acquisition can be found within the government department it sought to change. The UK MoD has, at its centre, a small ad hoc team of very senior officials known as the Change Delivery Group. After 1997 it was chaired by Sir Kevin Tebbitt, the then Permanent Secretary, and – unusually for Whitehall – had a secretariat comprised solely of senior staff reporting to the Permanent Secretary and 2nd Permanent Secretary. Its stated role was to deliver the changes necessary to transform the MoD into a ‘world class organisation.’ The overwhelming majority of civil servants and military personnel were in ignorance of the Change Delivery Group’s existence, as indeed was wider society.
I attended a meeting of the Change Delivery Group in March 2003\(^1\) where Ian Andrews, the 2\(^{nd}\) Permanent Secretary, stated that the premier change initiative, both for the defence sector and within the public domain generally, was the defence through-life procurement initiative known as smart acquisition, closely followed in importance by ‘Resource and Budgeting’ (RAB). This latter initiative was the programme by which accruals accounting and budgeting replaced cash accounting throughout central government in the UK (Kincaid, 1999). It heralded an influx of hundreds of accountants and technicians, and significant investment in accounting hardware and software. Smart acquisition, in distinction, was the change programme established to transform defence procurement and equipment support, with its strap-line of delivering military capability to the frontline ‘faster, better and cheaper.’ Both initiatives, Andrews reported, were concerned with:

The liberation of information to enable effective decision making and the empowerment of our people, enabling decisions to be taken at the most effective level.\(^2\)

Smart acquisition, perhaps enabled by resource accounting, the 2\(^{nd}\) Permanent Secretary believed, was concerned with decentralisation and the transfer of power and control to people best able to deliver what was described at the meeting as ‘effects-based decision making.’ However, there was no attempt to define this phrase or

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\(^{1}\) 20\(^{th}\) March 2003 in the Defence Council Suite, Old War Office.  
\(^{2}\) Ian Andrews, 2\(^{nd}\) Permanent Under-Secretary for Defence, CDG 20\(^{th}\) March 2003.
capture any implications it might have for an emerging change programme. Rather, there was an apparent consensus within the Change Delivery Group that smart acquisition was profoundly transforming UK defence for the better and would provide an exemplar for all UK public sector reform.

I attended this meeting deep in the heart of Whitehall in a professional capacity. My background is as a Royal Air Force officer, joining the military in 1987 and retiring in 2003 to join a management consultancy specialising in defence and security. Most of my early professional life was spent working in either defence finance within the Royal Air Force through which I became head of the accounting profession for the Service or, latterly, within the smart acquisition development team. I am unsure whether structures, behaviours and processes have indeed been transformed to match the assertions of smart acquisition’s champions. More significantly, I am concerned with understanding whether programmes like smart acquisition indeed offer their practitioners insight and agency through the ‘liberation of information’ or whether something much more profound – individually, socially, even politically – is being revealed even as the change banners are unfurled.

I have another motivation. As a military officer I served on operations in a number of hostile environments and depended on the quality and effectiveness of the equipment procured for my use
and on my behalf. A significant proportion of the tools and apparatus of war were, in my view, not fit for purpose and critically exposed the lives of the women and men charged with their use. For example, the standard personal weapon in the British forces is the SA80 rifle. SA80 stands for ‘Small Arms 1980’, its name revealing when the procurement programme for the weapon was first conceived.

The SA80 was first introduced in 1985 (Page, 2006: 21) to a shocked military community. It was, and remains, an astonishing design for a military rifle. The magazine catch stands proud of the rifle’s workings, meaning that if it touched anything, which is a likely scenario during both training and combat, the bullets would fall out from the rifle. The main build of the weapon was plastic mould which would melt when the weapon became hot. Moreover, the mechanism which locked bullets into the breech of the rifle would jam making the weapon useless, with all of these things occurring during live operations. Would a programme such as smart acquisition eliminate the procurement difficulties and challenges that had led to the initial failures of the SA80 and costly redesign and rework? How could this be understood within the context of a public sector change initiative?

The first point to note is that before smart acquisition’s launch in the middle of the 1990s, defence procurement in the UK was provided through contractual and informal relationships between politicians and civil servants, the military and, mostly UK, industry.
Programmes were often reported as significantly late, overtaken by technological advances, unfit for purpose and far too expensive. The MoD and military were held to have no expertise or training in programme or project management, financial management or cost/benefit analyses. Moreover, there was no clear sense of who the military customer was within the Department, who was ultimately responsible for supplying the front line, and no robust delegation or lines of responsibility. Money was spent by a single department, the Ministry of Defence Procurement Executive, in a manner that was perceived as inefficient, inconsistent and secretive (NAO, 1995).

Partly as a consequence of these perceived failings, aligned to strategic feedback from the Gulf conflict in 1991, the MoD was tasked by the government of Prime Minister John Major during the 1990s with considering changes to what was sensed to be a failing procurement process. The Ministry sought the help of the management consulting company, McKinsey, to redesign the procurement organisations, processes and behaviours necessary to generate the production of effective military equipment (MoD, 2004).

In parallel, the Labour party in Opposition was developing its own defence review which shared the government’s critique of the procurement process. As a consequence, smart acquisition as change programme was designed, initiated and subsequently
evolved around the time of the Blair electoral victory of 1997 (Kincaid, 1999). The Procurement Executive was scrapped.

In chapters 3 and 4 I describe and critically assess the causes and narrative of discord that yielded the smart acquisition implementation from 1997 onwards. For now, it is sufficient to state that the change initiative had as its core objective the acquisition of defence capability at a quicker and cheaper rate, and more ready to effectively integrate with other equipment, than was considered possible under the Procurement Executive regime (MoD, 2004).

To do this, smart acquisition introduced a number of significant organisational, structural and procedural innovations. The first of these was the identification of an organisational customer within the MoD. The Defence Equipment Customer (DEC) was created with terms of reference to identify the equipment needs for future project teams to successfully procure against. The research, development and purchase funds would flow from the DEC to the project team and, thereafter, through commercial contracts to industry. Secondly, a formal equipment supplier integrating all appropriate project processes and competencies was formed through a new organisation called the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA). Throughout the DPA, integrated project teams from the military, civil service and industry were tasked with delivering for the DEC a unique set of co-ordinated activities, equipment and support contracts to generate an identified military capability within defined
Chapter 1/Introduction

and scheduled start and finishing points. These were to be undertaken – usually by industry – within agreed time, cost, performance and integration parameters, paid for by the DEC.

Thirdly, a large logistics support community was created to manage equipment after its purchase and delivery date. This community was called the Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO) and was charged with developing a unique relationship with the armed forces to secure and enable the effective ongoing maintenance and of equipment and future upgrades, largely through support contracts with industry.

A high level process for all defence procurement activities known as the CADMID Cycle (comprised of the first letters of Concept, Assessment, Demonstration, Manufacture, In-service, Disposal) was mandated, to which all equipment projects had to conform (MoD, 2002: 4). Within this process, key milestones for financial approval were set, with this approval coming from the Ministry’s most senior staff sitting as the Investment Approvals Board.

In addition, smart acquisition sought a re-defined, energised and engaged UK defence and security industrial base fully integrated within this change programme. A Defence Industries Council was formed after 1997 comprising senior figures from the MoD and the UK’s leading defence and security industry actors. A Ministerial
Steering Group chaired by a defence minister, was established to oversee these arrangements and the relationships it was hoped would emerge (MoD, 2002: 25).

Lastly, the MoD sought through the smart acquisition change initiative to insert perceived modern skills and competencies within military, civil service and industrial staff. This intent was pursued through the development of the Acquisition Leadership Development Scheme and the Acquisition Stream, both of which were new and centrally funded national development and learning initiatives. This revised structure and high-level process is illustrated in Figure 1.1.

Within this model, smart acquisition possesses a number of key, purposefully designed features. Firstly, it sought to generate what practitioners described as ‘a whole-life approach’ to defence procurement embodied within a single integrated project team accountable to both the Defence Procurement Agency and the Defence Logistics Organisation.
In 2007 the functional divide between the two organisations was itself perceived as too cumbersome and inflexible and both organisations were combined into the Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) organisation. The project teams, however, retained their focus as the guardians of the newly procured equipment for the life of the capability, physically transferring from procurement to support at a pre-considered level of programme.
maturity. Critically, from inception, industry was perceived as an intrinsic part of these project teams.

Secondly, the DEC provides a clearly identified customer for individual project outputs. As an organisation it was designed to take responsibility for identifying the capability required to meet the UK’s military and defence objectives, for translating those requirements into an approved equipment programme and for acting as the organisational customer for the equipment until it entered service. Thereafter, a specific branch of the armed forces takes responsibility for converting the procured equipment into a usable military capability, managing the equipment in-service and for providing relevant and timely expertise to support the DEC’s search for future defence capability (MoD, 2002: 9).

The smart acquisition model assumes a willingness to identify, evaluate and implement effective trade-offs between equipment performance, their whole-life costs, an annualised cost of ownership to the MoD and, of course, delivery times and project delays. Moreover, smart acquisition was said to sit upon an open and constructive relationship with industry, based on partnering principles and the identification of common goals underpinned by competitive contractor selection whenever this provided the best value for money (MoD, 2002: 25).
It seems striking that this change programme is framed and articulated in the language of business and management rather than notions of public service, be they military or civil. This is of profound significance as I discuss in subsequent chapters. For the moment, however, these features remain wedded to self-described core values and beliefs that, under smart acquisition, defence procurement practitioners within the military, civil service and industry are said to embrace. These core values are

- An empathy with the customer…a commitment to providing equipment, which meets the user’s needs, on time and budget.

- The drive to deliver a high level of performance.

- A desire to work co-operatively with fellow team members and others, valuing the diversity of the team and understanding the different role of colleagues.

- A predisposition to share ideas and information, and the resolve to overcome problems.

- A wish to challenge convention and improve processes rather than hide behind “the rules” and be satisfied with current performance norms (MoD, 2002: 3).
During the early years of the twenty first century the MoD’s developing, on-going guidance on smart acquisition (MoD, 2004) asserted that the change programme had evolved and matured significantly beyond its early promise. With the high level model in figure 1 now in place and with a legacy of self-assessed success, the change initiative would direct energies towards an enduring theme of a through-life equipment capability to reduce whole life costs and timescales at lower levels of risk (MoD, 2002: 13).

In addition, for the first time, smart acquisition sought to cover the provision of all defence requirements, including not just equipment but also support services such as guarding, real estate and business information systems. Its champions were confident that it could cover both conventional activities and contracts and those outsourced through public-private partnerships.

This is a remarkable managerialist vision for smart acquisition, breathtaking in its range and scope of services: there is no offensive or defence activity within UK military operations that has not been enfolded into the smart acquisition process, stated behaviours, desired competency or managerial language. Indeed, the 2004 version of the smart acquisition guidance (MoD, 2004) overtly sets as its goal the application of smart acquisition principles throughout the whole of the Ministry of Defence and UK defence industrial policy, constructs and practices.
In the words of a senior civil servant interviewed for this study:

The Department does business only through Smart Acquisition. It covers the procurement of equipment, the training of people, the development of doctrine and war-fighting techniques and the way of managing the relationship with industry and other defence contractors. There isn’t a person – soldier, sailor, airman or civil servant – who isn’t touched by this. (Interview: Havermeyer, 2004)

1.3 ‘Bang for Buck’ – Emerging Issues and Questions for Research

It is clear, therefore, that the change initiative that smart acquisition represents has provided an all-encompassing regime for defence procurement within which all activity and people are enfolded. It has created the equipment organisations in the form of the Defence Procurement Agency and Defence Logistics Organisation, themselves coming together in 2007 under the banner of a single Defence Equipment and Support organisation. This entity currently employs close to 14,000 people, making it one of the largest stand-alone public sector organisations in the country (IISS, 2008).

Smart acquisition has developed and mandated the use of an all-embracing high-level process for acquisition, supplemented by
managerial toolkits and techniques through which the provision of defence and security equipment is commercialised and delivered to the armed forces. The very language of military procurement and defence equipment is overtly economic and managerial in tone and content, whilst the stated values are derived from the world of commerce rather than the traditions of public service or notions of military sacrifice.

This thesis interrogates the significance and importance of this managerialisation of the military equipment process, setting it within the context of wider government reforms, but also presenting smart acquisition as an explanation of these governing forces. I start by seeking an understanding of the original case for change and what the strategic and operational benefits would be in having an effective and efficient military procurement process. Intrinsic to this is an insight into why the MoD believed it needed to change through smart acquisition, and how politicians and officials intended to present the case for change and measure its impact, along with assessing whether planned processes, behaviours and values align to actual activities within the procurement system.

A parallel issue is the manner in which these profound organisational changes have been managed once implemented, and what the consequences have been both in terms of performance and cultural implications. Critically, I wish to assess whether people within the changed, managerialist procurement system have agency
over the process in place or are, in fact, docile bodies or, somehow, passive receptors. This is significant in that my assessment will deconstruct the nature of power and notions of control within the defence procurement system and across the wider UK public sector, revealing the ways in which people become ensnared in and defined by a common, dominant narrative.

These are significant and weighty issues, both for the defence community but also the wider public sector. The nature and practice of government, as revealed through a disassembling of smart acquisition, subtly implicates the subject in a regime of control, legitimisation and explanation that is far from benign or inevitable in character and scope of ambition.

In considering these issues I am conscious of the views of politicians, military staff and civil servants that smart acquisition is successfully changing UK defence. A key thrust of this study is to unpick the evidence upon which this assertion is based, in an attempt to enable us to judge where we are in terms of effective organisational change, and what it reveals about issues of power and control within this governmental operating environment. Also, assemblages of understanding and the construction of these notions of success will be deconstructed to offer a glimpse at the impact of smart acquisition.
Both instinctively and rationally, the study of national defence provision is an important issue at a time when the UK is embroiled in what appear to be a series of high-intensity wars contextualised by two themes: firstly, a constant narrative of terrorist threats and endemic risks to social order and personal safety and, secondly, massive public spending and nation-state debt. The British gross domestic production for 2007, for example, was £1.37tr which generated a defence budget of £30bn. This services the annual equipment needs and provides payroll for an active army of 100,000 soldiers, a navy of 39,000 personnel and an air force of 42,000 servicemen and women. In addition, the UK has a reserve force of 199,000 personnel with a territorial and reserve army of 134,000 soldiers (IISS, 2008).

This is a large standing force which consumes significant public funds. But in a comparative analysis with Spain, a country of similar size, the UK spends six times as much on its military forces, but can deploy to the battlefield only 20% more personnel under arms than its comparator (IISS, 2008). This thesis, therefore, explores a simple question:

In what ways and to what extent did the managerialist initiative of smart acquisition change United Kingdom defence procurement at the start of the twenty first century?
In responding to the simplicity of this inquiry, a number of complex variables and subordinate questions inevitably come to mind. What were the initial imperatives for smart acquisition? How has the initiative been introduced and what criteria have been used to make a judgement on its impact? Has change been maintained, and what has been its cultural impact? Has industry been implicated, and what perspectives and insights can be gleaned in relation to the exercise of power within the procurement system? Do individual actors exercise authority within organisations and markets through the smart acquisition reforms?

At first sight, this is almost an impenetrable set of problems and interlocking inquiries. Yet from the outset I have sensed that viewing smart acquisition as a key function of, or perhaps even a technology to enable, the practice of government pushes the door ajar slightly to provide an image into the mechanisms, dynamic relationships and behaviours beyond organisational barriers. Management practitioners within the defence sector might take issue with this intent. Good management is self-evident, they might say, and assert that blending equipment performance, time and cost considerations into an effective project to be subjected to management review and governance is merely sensible, economically efficient and overtly within the public interest.

It is this very duality of the nature of smart acquisition that captures my imagination, presenting itself at once as both rational
management exercised by skilled and empowered practitioners and as assemblages of regimes of control where agency is denied or revoked. This binary nature, where a phenomenon such as smart acquisition can be perceived in both senses, as alternative understandings, but also existing concurrently in each state, is a key thread that runs through this thesis. At one level of understanding, smart acquisition is revealed as a phenomenon that asserts dominance and a commonality of purpose over people’s lives – their beliefs, values, behaviours and actions. A phenomenon, moreover, that reforms notions of freewill, redirecting them into a ready formed ‘knowledge base’ or ‘competence set’ (MoD, 2004). This level of understanding taints smart acquisition with a sense of the sinister that I explore in the following pages.

1.4 Military Doctrine – Theoretical and Empirical Approaches

What first prompted me to suggest perceiving smart acquisition as a ‘technology of government’ and what do I even mean by this term? Michel Foucault (1991) first offered his notion of ‘governmentality’ in a series of lectures delivered in France throughout the 1970s and initially published in the management journal *Ideology and Consciousness* in 1979. Foucault considered governmentality to be a range of discourses, assumptions and understandings around which we consider governing others and behaving ourselves within a wide range of contexts. He thinks in terms of a long, historical trajectory
by which government processes are displaced by government mechanisms to align and assure conduct – perhaps at the international and nation-state levels but also, critically, through individual agency.

Dean (2007) describes governmentality as the manner and mechanisms through which we consider questions of governing others and ourselves, and, in the context of the state, the mechanisms and processes through which power is exercised via the regulation of individuals and groups, principally through the economic, social and psychological dynamics that bond together members of society. Within this taxonomy, technology is revealed as simply the means, mechanisms and techniques that enable this governing to be accomplished. This is the definition that I enlist and expound upon throughout this thesis, in contrast to a rationalist, management explanation of smart acquisition.

The premise I offer, is that smart acquisition is such a form of technological construct through which power is exercised within derived regimes of practice. Consequently, it can be understood through my critical lens of governmentality. Its bodies of knowledge reside within mechanisms of theorising government that are transferable to other areas of society beyond defence procurement, embracing important themes of freedom, agency within society, state control and the socialisation of the many and the one into preformed channels of explanation and meaning.
Consequently, my work is a profound and deeply significant interrogation of meaning within a smart acquisition discourse that by its practitioners is presented as a rational set of business explanations, conventional economic analysis and organisational management.

Nately, a director general within the MoD and a senior civil servant involved in the roll-out of the change programme, stated during interview (Interview: Nately, 2004) that the project management approach within smart acquisition had become widely recognised as the principal managerial method for organisational control, be it in developing new assets, services or in the introduction of new equipment. Smart acquisition represented the brigading of military and procurement activities into projects, with these projects possessing a number of distinct occurrences or features.

Firstly, it enabled the development of a team structure with clear roles and clarity of responsibilities. Next, it re-aligned systems and models to offer clear project information to improve decision making. Thirdly, smart acquisition sharpened processes to reinforce project best practice. Lastly, it clearly motivated project people within this managerialist view as it provided unambiguous career paths, methods for developing skills and team and individual rewards linked to project success.
Chapter 1/Introduction

The manner in which both the economic, managerial rationalist and governmentalist perspectives of smart acquisition is analysed and critiqued is of paramount importance if a meaningful assessment of the change programme’s utility to defence procurement and through government is to be made. The analysis undertaken to unpick this duality and the complexities in which it resides is at the core of my approach to decoding smart acquisition.

1.5 Order of Battle – Overview of the Thesis

Following this introduction, in chapter 2 I reveal my methodological approach to this work by discussing what I describe as the ‘autobiography of the method’. This chapter outlines my auto/ethnographical engagement with the defence project teams, UK military and defence and security industrial apparatus, combining this approach with a range of structured interviews and informal conversations with practitioners and informed contacts. This methodological approach elucidates the theoretical model of smart acquisition as rational management change programme and introduces a richer understanding through my governmentalist critical alternative understanding.

Chapter 3 places smart acquisition in a time-bound context by unpacking key themes from a historical perspective of UK military equipment procurement. I discuss the imponderables within which
equipment is sourced and secured, such as the nature of military alliances, the maturity of emerging technological advances, future threats and political will. Moreover, the perceived failures of defence procurement prior to the early 1990s are unlocked and a rationale for the development of smart acquisition from these notional failures and tensions established.

In chapter 4 I go on to unveil and analyse the principal elements of smart acquisition, namely its organisations, self-styled body of knowledge and the functional teams and networks that champion its implementation and delivery; the people I describe as the ‘guardians’ of the change philosophy. From this simple analysis is generated an understanding of the reforms as a rational change programme. I discuss a highly ratiocinative managerial view of the procurement process, its common tools and initiatives, and present this within what I describe as the rational transformation model. Smart acquisition is demonstrably presented as common-sense, practical management reform, designed and delivered to generate greater efficiencies, economies and productive effectiveness from the market. I demonstrate that there are senior people from the military, civil service and industry championing and celebrating this perspective.

Chapter 5 critiques this rational-economic managerialist view of smart acquisition. Through the work of Foucault, Dean, Lukes and Rose, amongst others, I present an alternative view of smart
acquisition as neoliberal technology of government control and implicit socialisation. Within this critique I articulate a rival analytics of government to the rational managerial explanation, with analytics as a term used merely to represent the examination and fabrication of the condition and factors under and through which regimes of practices, behaviours and understandings come to be formed and maintained.

I go on to discuss notions of ‘problematisation’ whereby practices are critiqued and potential alternatives or solutions offered. In a sense, the problematisation of defence procurement prior to reform is that the process was wasteful, inefficient and ineffective, for which the cure was greater managerial control, homogenisation of project processes and behaviours and the modernisation of organisational structures, forms and practices. Modes of problematisation of the public sector in this sense revolve around critiques of bureaucracy, discourses of practitioner incompetence and functional rigidity to which the response is market rationality applied through institutional reform, free-market pricing mechanisms, competition and enterprise – the very essence of the neoliberal agenda.

Whilst chapter 5 places smart acquisition within this theoretical understanding and analytical toolkit, chapter 6 goes on to construct from this grounding in governmentality a revised explanatory model for smart acquisition. I introduce recurrent themes of
modernisation, managerialism and homogenisation of process and behaviour, and mature the discussion of the change programme as cultural phenomenon and neoliberal construct. I offer a revised analytical model for smart acquisition, postulated within these preceding notions of governmentality, as a critique of the simple linear change model offered in chapter 4.

I continue to lay-out and critically assess what I describe as the smart acquisition triptych formed from these introduced notions of modernisation, managerialism and homogenisation of process. In parallel, I discuss modernisation as a common theme across the public sector, and discriminate between notions of modernisation and modernity. I observe and reflect upon classical empiricist management within the context of smart acquisition, through processes of planning, organising, motivating and controlling, and discuss the notion of an agent’s response to these phenomena.

Thereafter, I anchor my alternative discourse of managerialism – through the critical lens of governmentality – within what I describe as Foucault’s twin insights. There are, Lemke (2000) believes, at first sight disparate threads in Foucault’s thinking based on his interest in political rationalities and control, and the ‘genealogy of subject’ concerned with how individuals are formed and express meaning. The bridge between these two paths, I believe, is Foucault’s thinking on governments and how we are governed.
To conclude chapter 6, I go on to further unpick the homogenisation of military procurement through enforced and learnt common aims and objectives, values and principles, and the inevitable core processes. My final argument within this section links the triptych of modernisation, managerialism and homogenisation to theoretical constructs of governmentality and my derived neoliberal critique.

My early chapters, therefore, set the context of smart acquisition in terms of its historical antecedence, organisational drivers and design intent, offering competing frameworks for analysis and understanding, namely a rational linear change model and a complex theoretical critique matured from theoretical notions of governmentality. In chapter 7, I introduce an actual smart acquisition integrated project team through which, as a fractal of the wider smart acquisition organisations, processes and people, I begin to critically assess the impact on defence procurement of this change programme.

Between 2005 and 2007 I had the opportunity to work with and observe at close hand the efforts and behaviours of an integrated project team within MoD that I label the EPCOT IPT. The team’s management offered access to their project documentation, staff and wider stakeholders, and contributed willingly and pro-actively to this work. Insights and emerging findings were shared with the project’s management as my research progressed, which, I hoped at the time, would help to influence and shape management’s critical
thinking in relation to both its own schedule of work and people. Hope and reflection seldom reside in the same space for long; I suspect my thoughts especially in relation to governmentality were received with a smile and generated administrative action in the form of filing rather than management action through some form of active intervention. Nonetheless, I remain grateful for access to this project team and sincere in my admiration for the military and civilian staffs that comprise its membership and who shared their, often contradictory, views and concerns so openly.

Using managerialist language prevalent throughout the project, I narrate what project team members describe as the transformation journey to the EPCOT IPT through smart acquisition, its strategy, business model, the perceived role of industry and its so-called project lines of development. I reflect upon this managerialism within the context of a military setting, and analyse the dominance of smart acquisition in terms of monopolising the agenda and points of reference for the project.

With chapter 8 I begin to run a critical eye over this project team as totem of smart acquisition. I frame the project, initially, as an agent of rational change, seeing the team through its own self-perceived reflection as embedding and promoting the values and principles of smart acquisition through the roll-out of its self-labelled body of knowledge. As part of this rationalism, I comment upon the EPCOT IPT’s strategy of partnering with industry to develop and deliver
military equipment to the UK’s armed forces. I further discuss and analyse project management’s intent to ‘lean the business’ as they describe it, the programme of reducing military and civil service staff from the project team replicating a number of traditional public sector functions within the industrial base. I emphasise that these initiatives and events are supported, justified, tested and evaluated, and, importantly, proven as sound management action through the dynamic of rational linear change.

An alternative discourse is then generated in chapter 9 yielding a contradictory, governmentalist understanding. I align the values, activities and stated objectives of the EPCOT IPT to a defined and critical sense of analytics of government. The dimensions of power associated with my critique of governmentality are overlaid onto the project team, peered through the critical lens of the smart acquisition triptych. In this way power is revealed as possessing a profound connection with perceptions of knowledge and senses of what is professional and best practice. These mechanisms of power found in the levers of smart acquisition are seen as repressing opposing behaviours and perspectives and producing practitioners socialised into smart acquisition’s values and norms. The project team’s application of the smart acquisition agenda is conceptualised as a multiplicity of functions and practices beyond which no personality can be effectively formed, exercised or valued. It is seen to articulate and promote a neoliberal discourse beyond the benign
understanding and self-referencing justifications and logic of the rational change agenda.

In chapter 10, I conclude that smart acquisition is possessed of a multiplicity of understandings centred on the perceived duality between its championing of self-referenced rational change, and the exercise of power, control and assemblages of meaning associated with governmentality and its emerging critique. I offer the view, assessed on its own terms and through its own language, that judgements may be sympathetic to smart acquisition as doctrine, and its practitioners as public servants seeking efficient and effective management practices. As a control mechanism, method of socialisation and pseudo-scientific dogma, judgements may be less benign.

Lastly, I reflect on what I consider to be Foucault’s greatest contribution – namely that to govern effectively, we are governed through a specific prism, that of the economy. Populations are presented as resources for economic ends, their very sense of understanding and self-worth couched in the language of business and commerce. The project team, and smart acquisition by extension, can be presented as a triumph of the neoliberal agenda as foretold by Foucault and his disciples.
1.6 Conclusion

This chapter introduces smart acquisition as the change programme which, a number of advocates believe, is making more efficient and effective the UK defence procurement process supporting military operations and national security. Smart acquisition takes the form of new organisations for military procurement, a revised core process and supporting methodologies and a new managerial body of knowledge to professionalize practitioners from the military, civil service and industry. This research challenges this simple assertion of programme efficiency, and seeks to unpick the real effects of smart acquisition through an understanding of the reasons for change and the very nature and intent of government itself.

We live in dangerous times. The early twenty first century can be characterised as a period of significant conventional and asymmetrical military conflict around the world, government intervention in all areas of society, the unparalleled power and reach of economic interests, and the globalisation of commercial enterprises and their spread into areas that were once perceived as ‘public’. Defence procurement resides at the intersection of commercial forces and the projection of military power. Understanding it reveals much about the world in which we live. I also believe it unveils something of us, matters troubling and dark. To what degree is assessed in the following pages.
CHAPTER 2 – THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE METHOD

2.1 Introduction

Writing from the perspective of October 2009, it is easy for me to reflect upon and understand my motivation in researching the imperative for and impact of smart acquisition on UK defence and security operations at the beginning of the twenty first century. It is simple to perceive why these things matter.

On 10th July 2009 eight British soldiers were killed in Afghanistan. It was reported widely across all media, though without a sense of shock or much regret – the British were used to reports of casualties by this time. The dead were men aged 18 to 28, drawn from the First Battalion, the Welsh Guards, the Second Battalion, the Rifles, the Fourth Battalion, the Rifles and the Second Royal Tank Regiment. I detail the full names of the regiments concerned because such things matter to the families, friends and comrades of the fallen. The men themselves were: Jonathan Horne, William Aldridge, James Backhouse, Joseph Murphy, Daniel Simpson, Lee Scott, John Brackpool and Daniel Hume. They were young men of flesh and emotions, desires, ambitions, notions of loyalty to their comrades, fears and hopes – my experience of young military people prompts me to think that this last feature, hope, would have been the dominant characteristic. I never knew them, of course, but these men were probably loved and, I feel sure, capable of love in
return. Something unique in the world – a person – was extinguished with their deaths and we are all diminished as a result.

The 10th July 2009 is significant because on this day, through these men, British deaths in Afghanistan reached 184 men and women: one more than the number killed in Iraq, a war that ran between 2003 and 2009 partly in parallel with the invasion of Afghanistan. A perception has developed in the UK media that these deaths were, in part, caused by the inadequacy of military equipment in terms of both quality and volume, that these young men had been provided with to fight and with which to protect themselves.

It was claimed yesterday that a number of these latest deaths, mainly due to roadside bombs, could have been avoided if British troops had more access to helicopters instead of being forced to make dangerous journeys by road (The Sunday Times, 12th July 2009).

I return to this theme of helicopter provision shortly. But for now, it is important to note the existence of this populist critique of the process – political and organisational – that procures equipment for the British military forces. It is a whispered concern that has been present since these operations began in Afghanistan in 2001 following the events of 11th September, and in Iraq in 2003 when the US and UK attacked. It leads to a fundamental question of what
actually drives defence procurement within the UK, and how such doubts can pervade.

2.2 Public Record – Private Reflections

I am profoundly concerned with these matters. They are significant and timely, with people dying as public policy is constructed through complex prisms and narratives of terrorist threats, operational risks, nation-state responses, and project and organisational efficiencies. A constant, however, is a commitment to the reform initiative known as smart acquisition and its derivatives. These enable politicians such as Lord Bach, the Minister for Defence Procurement in 2003, to assert that

Smart acquisition principles were appropriate principles, putting them in effect was a good deal more difficult…but I am absolutely content with the way things have gone (House of Commons, 2004a: 211).

This statement of smart acquisition success contradicts the financial reports of 2003, the year Lord Bach made his statement

The substantial in-year cost increases of some £3.1billion will have a major impact on the current equipment plan and must inevitably lead to cancellations or cuts in equipment projects
or delays in ordering equipment (DPA, 2003: 9).

Indeed, the House of Commons Defence Select Committee described the performance of the Defence Procurement Agency for this year as ‘woeful’ (House of Commons, 2004b: 9). It is critical to assess how this can be reconciled with the contradictory discourse of smart acquisition.

So, one key element of what I call the autobiography of the method is this public narrative relating to defence and security. Another is my own personal operational experience of serving in the military. I marry this to a third, again personal, experience of working within the MoD headquarters and then conclude with my time with the defence project teams themselves. These four key themes collide to part construct a methodology for understanding, offering access points into this complex research area.

A significant element of this collision of themes is the ability and intent to evoke a response from my informants who reside within these project teams as well as from across the wider defence and security communities. By drawing forth a number of recollections, feelings and opinions I allow my informants to summon a spirit of smart acquisition that interweaves and colludes with the public narrative to bring forward a highly visible and accessible form of the smart acquisition phenomenon. Part of my methodology and emergent theoretical construct is, consequently, this evocation of the
narrative whereby both the informant evokes insights and perspectives supplementary to and in parallel with the narrative voice given to the works on governmentality and similar forces.

I served in the Royal Air Force from 1987 to 2003, with the last three years of my military service spent on secondment to the MoD overseeing policies relating to industrial suppliers of military equipment. During my time there, I rubbed-up against smart acquisition and was exposed to the almost religiosity of its advocates within the government department.

I also served on military operations including the first Gulf War in 1991 and the conflict in Sierra Leone in West Africa, experiencing first-hand the challenges and dangers associated with the deployment of military equipment to the front line of operations. I have, perhaps inevitably, contextualised my critical reflections on defence procurement within the frame of personal experience in West Africa.

2.3 At War

My deployment to Sierra Leone was undertaken in May 2000, to act as the British liaison officer between a number of military forces in the country that were combating guerrilla paramilitaries, many of them child soldiers, of the Revolutionary United Front. My specific
brief was to shape and manage the flow of information around the conflict zone, and from Sierra Leone to the outside world.

The Sierra Leone civil war began in 1991 when a militarised band of men and boys calling themselves the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) under the leadership of an ex-Army corporal, Foday Sankoh, began to attack villages in eastern Sierra Leone close to the Liberian border. The RUF was astonishingly cruel, with its signature tactic being mass mutilation of the civilian population. An estimated 20,000 people suffered amputations, with machetes primarily used to sever arms, legs, lips and ears (Bell, 2000). As well as an act of brutality itself, I was to learn that severing an arm also politically disenfranchised the victim, as Sierra Leone’s youthful democracy required a finger or thumb press on the ballot sheet for an individual to exercise their right to vote.

Throughout 1991 and 1992 the RUF conquered much of Sierra Leone, securing control of the country’s one key economic asset, its diamond mines in the eastern Kono District. Its operational concept was to clear the land of any potential opposition by destroying villages and towns, killing the residents or undertaking group amputations as a terror-warning to other members of the populace (Koroma, 2004). Young boys were routinely captured and brutally trained as child soldiers, controlled through a cocktail of drugs, industrial-strength alcohol and fear. These victims became brutalised killers themselves and an aggressive and unpredictable
opponent to British forces when the latter deployed as peace makers and peace keepers in 2000.

I travelled alone to this madhouse in May 2000, transiting for 22 hours in the cargo hold of an RAF Hercules transport aircraft, accompanied only by spare parts for Landrovers and other vehicles, and a large generator that was being flown to British military forces based at the main national airport. I possessed one rucksack, mission documents and notebooks, a pistol and two magazines of ammunition, born from a conscious decision to travel light.

The journey itself caused me to think about defence procurement. The aircraft I was travelling in was very old, and had been in service for over twenty years. After a refuelling stop in Dakar, the aircraft was forced to make an emergency landing as part of the internal electrical system had caught fire. On landing, and abandoning the aircraft, the problematic parts were simply replaced, and we took off again, with the aircrew muttering darkly about the reducing quality of spare parts and poor contractor skills. An early seed was planted: what impact was equipment sourcing – I was aware of the term ‘smart acquisition’ by this time – having on defence operations? Was it a worthy research topic?

The effect of equipment levels on the operations in Sierra Leone continued to exercise my mind. When I finally arrived in my patched-up aircraft, at night, under fire, at Lungi airport, there was
no personal body armour for me to use. The military staff in theatre advised that not enough packs had been sent from the UK due to equipment shortages, a theme that would return during the second Gulf War conflict later in the decade. Also, I was to find out later, that the generator I travelled with and which was, in essence, the reason for the flight I used, had arrived in the country in an unserviceable state due to a number of ‘procurement errors’. The troops who were relying on that generator were to do without a major power source for another seven days until a replacement could be sourced, a transport aircraft found, and the new generator despatched to the operational theatre.

The kernel of the idea to explore emerging defence procurement issues through the construct of smart acquisition was to grow during my time on this operation. As well as a shortage of serviceable generators and personal body armour, I also witnessed shortages in ammunition and basic ration packs for consumption by troops in the field of operations. My own radios and communication sets failed to work so I was left to communicate with my commanders in the UK and across Sierra Leone via a satellite telephone borrowed from a friendly, though incredulous, BBC journalist.

The shortage of helicopters, however, was perhaps the most concerning issue facing British forces. At one time, I travelled in a Royal Navy Sea King helicopter between two population areas. The
helicopter was redeployed mid-flight, due to a shortage in availability of a sister aircraft, to collect the dead body of a badly mauled and decomposed enemy fighter. Sharing a cramped cargo or passenger area with the dead is an experience I would wish on nobody, and the aircrew involved were deeply troubled at the end of their mission, but it was an experience forced upon them, and me, by procurement failures and availability shortages. However, the commander of our land forces in Sierra Leone, who was to rise to be the Head of the Army in 2009, assured me that lessons would be learnt and effective helicopter procurement would be top of the agenda.

At the start of the millennium the RAF bought eight Chinook helicopters for the use of the county’s special forces within operations such as that undertaken in Sierra Leone. The aircraft cost £30m each, and were delivered by Boeing in 2001 (Page, 2006). Yet under the terms of the contract agreed between the UK MoD and Boeing, the aircraft cannot be cleared to fly to UK airworthiness standards. They have been in hangars since, unused in the Iraq conflict or Afghanistan.

2.4 At Home – With the Ministry

On returning from Sierra Leone I moved to the MoD as part of the change team looking at procurement and industrial relations. Up to
2003, I spent three years working with large UK and international corporations in support of military operations and was introduced to the smart acquisition initiative. Notionally under its banner, I chaired the MoD/Industry Interchange Group which was responsible for the development of policies and processes for the swapping of personnel between industry and MoD. I pushed through arrangements which allowed individuals from either industry, the civil service or the military to go on attachment to what was labelled as the ‘opposite organisation’ meaning industry if an individual normally worked in the MoD, or a defence project team if the person was from industry. I also championed the establishment of a long-term secondment set of arrangements whereby an employee moved to a role in the opposite organisation for up to three years, gaining supposedly a deeper understanding of the host organisation that could then be taken back to industry or the MoD.

These schemes had been prevalent across much of commerce but were highly innovative for the MoD and its supply base. What was interesting, though, was the amount of my time it took to get approval for the interchange process to commence, and that it had to be overtly couched in the language of change management and referenced to the smart acquisition reforms. I started to speculate amongst my peers that smart acquisition was more a taxonomy of belief system than a public service initiative.
2.5 At Home – With Defence Project Teams

When I left the MoD in 2003 to work as an advisor for a niche management consultancy I received a number of opportunities to explore MoD’s integrated project teams and to dissect and observe the smart acquisition change programme through the work of these teams. Notions of public service appeared to have been replaced by a robust commitment to some sense of loose-fitting managerialism and constructs of business targets, project management techniques and commercial ‘competencies’ – to use a word I constantly encountered – seemed in the ascendancy. Individuals within the project teams somehow found meaning within a language of business and commerce transposed on military support functions and operations. As an informed outsider looking in on these project teams this act of meaning seemed surreal, somehow dysfunctional, but an omnipotent presence within a binary wrap of management ‘good’, traditional public service ‘bad’. How had smart acquisition managed to generate such overt conformity and management zeal under its change banner? Indeed was it smart acquisition, or was this just a convenient label for other, as yet, unidentified forces at work to somehow managerialise the military and civil service? And, I suppose, was the timing significant, as Britain seemed to be constantly fighting wars and facing domestic threats throughout the early years of the twenty first century? I needed to make sense of what I was witnessing because little of it provided a sensible joined-up narrative.
This thesis is about making sense of abstract pieces of information and observations. Reading the above paragraph, I react strongly to the word ‘witness’ across a number of its senses in that I feel that I have been almost uniquely placed to witness smart acquisition’s roll-out and effects and, importantly, to contextualise them in this work, to provide a semblance of meaning, insight and understanding. But I also respond to notions of ‘witness’ in its religious sense, that is, in providing witness to a great truth or belief, because smart acquisition is possessed of this creed of religiosity and morality, presenting its assertions as objective, uncontested truths.

Between 2005 and 2007 I was able to unpack my emerging sense of smart acquisition and test, amend and refine it through the work of the EPCOT IPT. This project team exists to deliver certain specific logistics support to the UK military front line by providing serviceable support aircraft, flight systems, international airworthiness and safety approvals for the use of the military on operations. During the three years I observed its efforts, processes and behaviours the EPCOT IPT strategy, as part of the smart acquisition change programme, was to transform from an aircraft or platform based function to a project based stance whereby work was undertaken through a project management process and methodology. My role in the team was a non-executive one, simply to advise on and nurture the emerging relationship with industry.
I wished to use the EPCOT IPT as a representation or fractal of the wider smart acquisition initiative and sought permission from the project team’s management to involve their members in my work. The response was overwhelming and generous. I was offered access to project documentation, staff and wider stakeholders with many contributing widely and pro-actively. Naturally, emerging findings and insights were offered to management as they emerged, both to ensure that the project team’s management was fully aware of the direction of my work but also in the hope that I could influence and shape management’s critical thinking in relation to its people and the behaviours and processes being promoted. I remain grateful to the members and management of this project team, for their time, generosity and decency. My sincerest wish is that my work will help them to make sense of theirs, as a critical, but honest friend hopes for a better tomorrow rather than a repeat of a challenging, bitter today.

This work, therefore, is derived from my personal history and engagement with the defence community supplemented by structured interviews and additional informal discussions. With the people from the EPCOT IPT at the centre of my emerging analysis of smart acquisition, what I describe as the autobiography of my method of research has two other key strands. The first of these is the wider opinions and insights of the UK defence community beyond this one project team, and those from industry and commerce who support front line military operations. The second
strand is the theoretical context of my analysis, offering notions of
governmentality and managerial technologies alongside constructs
of power and the cultural and socially assertive narratives that
frame and define individuals.

Allow me to inject a word of caution. This is the wrong place to
look for a conventional thesis containing things such as a literature
review, some kind of theoretical critical ‘toolbox’, data collection
chapters and other traditional artefacts of research. I do not offer a
conventional structure for this work; in fact, it would be
counterproductive for me to attempt to squash smart acquisition
into the rigours of a traditional thesis, as the respondents would
simply not engage with a visiting academic from beyond the
defence community, and the literature held within the project team
that forms such a compelling part of my story of smart acquisition
would remain closed. Rather, through my personal engagement
over a number of years as a trusted member of the wider
community, fissures and chinks in the smart acquisition edifice
were opened-up to me to allow an analytical gaze to sweep over the
military, government and industrial foundations and pipework
within. Consequently my thesis reveals the site map and
construction materials of smart acquisition before critically
assessing these forms through the lens of the great works of
governmentalist analyses.
In chapters 3 and 4 I allow smart acquisition to unfold and then deconstruct through the repetitive narrative voices of informants before, in chapter 5, exposing its deconstructed raw form to the theoretical literature of governmentality and its aligned forces. Consequently, from chapter 5 onwards, the literature is allowed a robust and authoritative narrative voice to lead the subsequent unfolding of smart acquisition, whereas in chapters 3 and 4 we first hear the sounds, repetitive and evocative, of my informants.

2.6 Sources, Relationships and Theoretical Context

This, consequently, is a highly theoretical piece of work. The richest source of data available to me has been the opinions, insights, values and, perhaps even, prejudices of those working in the defence acquisition community, its integrated project teams and in industry. As an occasional part of this working community, I have been well placed over the years to observe and reflect upon the nature of change within defence procurement through the smart acquisition reforms, and to gather and critically assess the opinions of others. My ambition, and perhaps unique opportunity, has been to combine this involvement with structured interviews to augment the theoretical model of smart acquisition as rational change programme and its foucauldian critique. So, whilst the work is not a piece of auto/ethnography in the anthropological sense, I use my
involvement with the defence community to evoke an immanent critique of the smart acquisition phenomenon.

Through my informants evocation of smart acquisition it has been sensible and right to allow a significant element of repetition of opinion and perspective, giving rise to an inherent, pervading or immanent critique of the forms, functions and faces of smart acquisition. This repletion has allowed the informant, at times, to become in a sense the narrator of the smart acquisition story. When contextualised by the insights gleaned from the theoretical literature in this area, the unveiling of smart acquisition through its own discourses becomes compelling and comprehensive. Consequently, only in chapter 5 do I turn in a serious and theoretically constructed manner to the governmentalist and supporting literature to provide an analytical shroud to cover and make sense of the earlier glimpses of smart acquisition.

Defence acquisition people were targeted for both structured and informal interviews, organised into respective groups. I have presented views anonymously, with an audit trail maintained throughout, with my groups covering:

- Senior civil servants at the centre of the Ministry of Defence;
- Team leaders of integrated project teams within the Defence Logistics Organisation and Defence Procurement Agency;
• Internal consultants within the Smart Acquisition change programme;

• Practitioners from within integrated project teams, and;

• Executives from Defence industries.

To my knowledge, this is the first time that a systematic attempt has been made to capture, analyse and present the views of these groups and how smart acquisition has affected them and the way they work.

Moreover, to supplement these interviews I have undertaken a wide-reaching review of public reports and summaries relating to Defence acquisition. These include National Audit Office annual reports going by the name of Defence Major Project Reviews, Royal United Services Institute papers, House of Commons Defence Select Committee Reports, and the annual reports and accounts of the DPA and DLO themselves. There are also internal papers and reports that have been accessed for background material.

There have been ethical considerations which I have addressed throughout the course of this work. Firstly, those individuals who were interviewed have reputations and responsibilities to maintain. It has been important to present their information anonymously to allow them to express views in a manner they would consider safe
and non-threatening to their careers or professional relationships. I have cleared the note of the interview with the subject before the information or any insight they might have offered has been used. I have revealed to interviewees how their comments and opinions are being incorporated into my work, and the subject has had the right to subsequently amend comments or, indeed, to withdraw them completely.

I have deliberately not judged or attempted in any way to expose or attack informants. As I can never truly reside beyond the truth regime of smart acquisition, such an attempt would, of course, fail. Rather my informants are allowed through their own language and discourses to, somehow, self-implicate under the omnipotent wrap of smart acquisition. In many ways it would be a straight-forward exercise to concentrate on the apparent failures of individuals within the regime of smart acquisition. But this would be at the expense of the really interesting organisational questions around the phenomenon that I have set out to explore: that is what drives individual behaviours and group practices within the monolith of smart acquisition and what does it reveal about notions of agency and managerial choice. An insight that is, perhaps, beyond the bounds of ethical bureaucracies. My intent is merely to unravel this neoliberal wrap, to reveal the nature of what has occurred, and why.
I am a member of the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA). Consequently, I have followed the CIMA ethical guidelines as they relate to standards of professional behaviour, tailored for the academic context.

Moreover, the flavour of my time with the EPCOT project team and the experiences and insights gleaned from my wider work within the British defence and security communities rests on a theoretical cat’s cradle of governmentality as a critique of notions of rational, systemic, linear change. Governmentality, itself, is a ‘pick and mix’ range of discourses and explanations that elucidate the way we think about governing and organising others as well as the manner in which we behave ourselves, embracing a pervasive range of activities and settings (Foucault, 1991). The key point, in a discussion on methodology, is to note that it is a theory of govern–mentality’, in other words the ideas, narratives and technologies that provide people with their reference points, modes of sense and values by which to live – both in the public spaces of commerce and public service, but also privately where individuals dream, hope and form relationships. Governmentality, therefore, is not merely a nod of the head towards the institutions of the state, its offices and formal processes that comprise government activity. It is the theoretical lens through which we can see how notions of the ‘self’ are formed, framed and governed through constructs of knowledge, learning and understanding. It is a theme to which I return in chapter five, but this robust theoretical sense of governmentality is
at the heart of my methodological approach to unpicking the Gordian knot of smart acquisition.

2.7 Conclusion

My methodology takes my own experiences of British defence operational, industrial and administrative environments, aligns emerging insights to other data sources and yields a critical, governmentalist discourse of the rational, legitimising change management narrative in which smart acquisition is cloaked. I consider the public record relating to defence and security in the UK and offer, perhaps occasionally as a counter-balance, the views and perspectives of people from across the defence community whether of military, commercial or civil service hues. These strands are set within the contextual frame of governmentality and supporting managerial technologies; a power construct that bleeds defining ideas of ‘self’, ‘team’ and the ‘proper’ role of defence staff across the order of battle.

In this manner, smart acquisition is unveiled as a measure of socialisation and control, and a method through which power is both formed and exercised. But it is more than this.

As well as an ‘oppressive’ entity that constrains actions and responses it can be seen as ‘constructive’ in that it casts and forms
the soul, a system that moulds value and values, persons and personality. A defining, terrible, elemental social and economic force.

Of course, smart acquisition remains profoundly meaningful – in an immediate and personal sense – to those who have lost loved ones or been maimed in the battles, incidents and operational mistakes of Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Iraq and those other places that, today, merely feature as identified regions of concern but will provide ground for tomorrow’s graveyards.

Smart acquisition is the legitimising discourse that frames the production and distribution of the equipment that helps to populate those graves, albeit through a complex narrative of public policy, managerial efficiency and applications of military force as a country’s risk mitigation. So that the soldier in the desert dust, who sits at the end of smart acquisition’s supply chain, remains as WH Auden would have it

Uncertain and afraid
As the clever hopes expire
Of a low dishonest decade.³

Part 2

This section comprises four chapters. In chapter 3, I set-out and discuss the historical factors that engendered smart acquisition, contextualise the initiative, and start to unpick the elements that comprise the perceived change programme. Chapter 4 addresses the rationale for change, describes the business tools and management techniques that comprise a derived ‘body of knowledge’ and discuss notions of ‘teaming’ or ‘partnering’ with industry. I conclude the chapter with an analysis of what I describe as a rationalist, linear transformation model.

Chapter 5 introduces concepts of ‘governmentality’ and notions around theorising government itself. I discuss ideas of power, neoliberalism and assemblages of understanding and how smart acquisition can be explained and understood within this ‘analytics of government’.

Throughout chapter 6 I discuss a revised explanatory model for smart acquisition derived from this insight into governmentality. I unveil a smart acquisition triptych, capturing interdependent concepts of modernisation, managerialism and homogenised processes, and overlay them onto the emerging smart acquisition discourse.
CHAPTER 3 – THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF SMART ACQUISITION

3.1 Introduction

Whilst smart acquisition is a modern phenomenon, to understand it we need to be cognisant of its antecedence and the rational and organisational factors which motivated its design and development. The historical drivers of smart acquisition provide the stated motive for government’s investment in the change programme. The intent for smart acquisition can, therefore, be revealed in an analysis of what it was designed to solve.

Accordingly, this chapter locates smart acquisition within its historical context. I review and describe British defence procurement during the past century or so, and identify the aspects that generated the perceived need for change. In doing this, I underline the perception that the business of defence equipment provision is a serious one with potentially perilous consequences. The resources consumed are vast and people die or prosper as a consequence of the decisions taken. Smart acquisition, therefore, seeks to reform, improve and sustain an area of government and, of course, industry that is globally significant.

In section 3.2, I discuss the vast sums of money and other public resources that are, historically, committed to defence procurement and military operations. I also place this spend within an overview
of the complexities and difficulties supposedly faced in generating an effective military procurement programme or organisation.

Section 3.3 unpacks the managerialist arguments framed in the development of the MoD Procurement Executive (MODPE), its subsequent critique, and eventual disestablishment by the incoming Blair government in 1997 as a precursor to the smart acquisition reforms. Thereafter, section 3.4 provides an historical insight into notions of managing risk through the defence procurement process, and explains why this is important in understanding the context of this public sector reform. These three sections together provide my analysis of smart acquisition’s antecedence, before chapter 4 lays out the nature of the smart acquisition organisational, functional and behavioural transformation programme from 1997 onwards.

3.2 Defence Procurement – Costs and Complexities

The policies and processes governing the procurement of military equipment have to address a number of imponderables and unknowns such as future political and military alliances, the pace, effectiveness and impact of emerging technologies, the nature of future threats, and political will. In addition to all of this, the military procurement process must successfully project manage, design, construct and deliver programme lines that are acknowledged to be amongst the most complex in the world in an
environment that is far from conducive to the deployment of oft-perceived best practice acquisition competencies and processes.

Perhaps driven by the complexities of military procurement, as early as 1958 it was found that the actual costs of equipment programmes for UK defence were almost three times the forecast projected values of these programmes at their inception (HoC, 1998). Indeed, in 1961 the government attempted to improve a failing defence procurement process by requiring every major programme to state the capability required of the equipment being purchased, the main technical risks to delivery, and the key performance parameters (OMS, 1961). The Gibb-Zuckerman reforms, as the changes arising from the 1961 report came to be known, were reviewed in 1968 revealing the following facts. Costs and delays had continued to rise during the 1960s, and the defence procurement process was far from under control. Indeed, complex systems that had consumed vast resources, such as the seabug missile, were pronounced obsolete in the mid-1960s, the programme scrapped and the investment lost (Page, 2006).

Government’s response to a defence procurement process which was overspending was to establish a committee. Chaired by William Downey, a civil servant, this standing board was known as ‘The Steering Group on Development Cost Estimating.’ This committee established the Downey reforms, as they became known, which
governed all significant projects for the next 30 years. Downey recommended that each phase must be fully completed before the next phase began...so that full development could be launched with confidence that projects would meet performance, cost and timescale targets. (Kincaid, 1999)

The Downey agenda was to come to dominate defence acquisition thinking from the end of the 1960s to the mid 1990s. I met and interviewed defence civil servants and contractors who were wedded to what they described still as the Downey reforms. Yet, it appears to me that, civil service practitioners, industry suppliers and end users had become ambivalent about what the reforms actually were, other than an assertion to protect and deliver planned performance, time and cost criteria. One senior civil servant said

I was involved in procurement from the early 70s right through to now. I knew Downey was important, but I couldn’t actually articulate what it was. (Interview: Havermeyer, 2004)

Closely associated with the Downey process reforms of the late 1960s was the formation of the Ministry of Defence Procurement Executive (MODPE). Since the end of World War II, defence procurement had been split between the three Service Ministries of the Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force, the front-line
commands, the Ministry of Supply, the Aviation Ministry and the Ministry of Technology. A report in 1971 (GODP, 1971) concluded that bringing the functions and activities of these widespread and, often, competing organisations together would generate savings and offer consistency and coherence.

3.3 MODPE – Early Managerialist Reform

The MODPE was established to manage all defence procurement programmes. A customer/supplier relationship was deliberately created between it and the three Armed Services, and when Peter Levene was appointed Chief of Defence Procurement – the functional head of the MODPE – in 1985, he instigated greater competition amongst contractors for almost all defence contracts, and the replacement of cost-plus contracts with fixed-price contracts linked to milestone delivery. The simple question, of course, was: had it worked?

The creation of the MODPE, coupled with Levene’s insistence on greater competition and commercial openness, were intended to prevent cost overruns, delays in programme delivery and to assure value for money for the United Kingdom. An internal Ministry of Defence report in 1987 concluded that this whole exercise in reform, running through the preceding 20 years, had been an abject failure (MoD, 1987). The Downey process procedures had not been
vigorously or universally implemented, project management was still poor, and underpinning development work within the research programme unsatisfactorily performed.

My respondents who recollected this period informed me that in the 1980s the Ministry of Defence had a public relations problem. Whilst its reforms had essentially been undertaken in private away from external scrutiny, the UK Parliament in the 1980s insisted on greater oversight (HOC, 1982). From 1983 onwards, the Public Accounts Committee insisted on a Major Defence Project Review from the National Audit Office (NAO). Henceforth, the NAO was to produce annually a report examining the top 25 defence projects, which were viewed as having the greatest expenditure profiles over the following ten years. The NAO reports of the 1980s and 1990s revealed a Ministry of Defence that could not prevent projects significantly failing on cost and time criteria.

The 1998 report shows that for the ten common projects from 1993 to 1998, cost overruns increased from an average of 3.2% to 13.7%, and that delays grew from an average 32 months in 1993 to 43 months in 1998. (Kincaid, 1999).

The NAO also repeatedly argued over these years that the competition reforms championed by Levene could, potentially, make the UK defence industry of the 1990s and beyond a non-viable proposition without massive public subsidy (Kincaid, 1999). The
reasons for this perception are twofold. Firstly, British defence and security companies would be increasingly exposed to overseas competition which, some observers believed, could ‘hollow-out’ capacity in the UK equipment providers. Secondly, fixed-price contracts meant that industry would have to demonstrate effective project management, pricing and scheduling skills if it was to make money – a set of competency risks that would have to be carried by shareholders.

There is a delicious irony to be found in the fact that the smart acquisition reforms were predicated at one level of understanding on an assumption that superior private sector skills and behaviours could be beneficially imported to the defence public domain, when those very industry skills seemed to be in question during the long sunset of the twentieth century.

This is a key point, for my narrative is set in a period pre-dating the 1997 election. The Labour Opposition targeted the MoD as wasteful and ineffective (The Labour Party, 1995), and the Conservative Party government as inept. Labour announced its intention, if elected in 1997, of initiating a strategic defence review to totally reinvigorate the defence procurement process whilst refocusing on a partnership with industry. What this represented, and how it was to be done, would become the smart acquisition change initiative.
Yet, if smart acquisition was conceived of the specific time-bound environment of the latter part of the twentieth century, it is worth reflecting that military equipment procurement within the UK has always been difficult and success far from assured. Prior to World War I, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Jackie Fisher, oversaw a revolution in warship design and operational planning. The Dreadnought class of battleship made the various older steam-driven types obsolete due to the thick armour plating of its design. It was believed at the time that nothing could counter a fleet of such battleships with the exception, of course, of a comparable fleet.

However, at the first major fleet-on-fleet clash of the First World War at Jutland in 1916, Admiral Jellicho famously commented that there was “something wrong with our ships today.” The firepower anticipated from Dreadnought-derived ships was neither superbly accurate nor decisive.

Moreover, the Admiralty Board and War Cabinet were both loath to commit these forces to battle. They were so valuable, given their enormous costs, and strategically important that, as Page (2006) comments, nations and admirals tended to be reluctant to risk them in combat.

This procurement compromise between massive cost and operational capability is a theme that still dominates the military acquisition agenda today. Indeed the Smart Acquisition Handbook
(MoD, 2004) issued by the MoD describes the procurement process as such a trade-off between military performance, the time necessary to develop equipment and its cost.

3.4 Historical Insight – Managing Risks

The development of the Dreadnought class was, as Page (2006) contends, an argument conducted in public between the Royal Navy, politicians and industrialists, often couched in the narrative of managing military and national risks and threats. That is, if Britain failed to develop these weapons, than the country’s prestige would be damaged and militarily the home nations would be exposed to greater, unanswerable firepower. The same debate, of course, which would be had in the British press in 2007, when it came to decide on the future of replacing the Trident nuclear weapon warhead and delivery system.

It seems clear though, that this concern with addressing risk is something which has been prevalent in defence procurement from before World War I to the present. The NAO Major Projects Report (NAO, 2005) characterises this today as ‘operational risk’ and ‘financial risk’. The former is concerned with the risks associated with military outcomes, whilst the latter is the term for risks and issues found within input costs to projects.
The procurement of the Apache attack helicopter at the start of the twenty first century is an example of the difficulties associated with risk-centric procurement. Apache is an American aircraft that the British Army is in the process of procuring in the attack-helicopter role; that is one that is intended to carry air-to-surface weapons and attack enemy ground forces.

The price of an Apache helicopter purchased from the US is £12m per aircraft. We know this from the Israeli purchase of a batch of 24 in 1999 (Page, 2006). For the British purchase, however, there was a concern – identified through the procurement practice of attempting to manage operational risk – that US factory lines and associated lead times may prevent re-orders and minimize spares availability.

The decision taken, consequently, was for Westland Helicopters, in Yeovil, to manage this risk on behalf of the MoD. An engineering line was established at the company’s headquarters to produce sixty-seven Apache helicopters under licence from the US, for use by the British Army.

The trade-off in managing the operational risk in this manner is, not surprisingly, an increase in cost. The overall cost of the programme (NAO, 2005) was in the region of £2.5bn, or approximately £40m per aircraft. In cash terms this is more than 300% per aircraft than the equivalent sold to Israel.
I met and interviewed a Westland executive who, amongst other activities for and with the MoD which I come on to in the next chapter, was part of the strategic management team that ran this programme (Interview: Dunbar, 2003). He described the cost of the UK Apache helicopter initiative as a shameful waste of public money. He noted, though, that this cost inflation was visible throughout the project life-cycle and rationalised as necessary through the need to mitigate and manage what was described as financial and operational risks.

This perceived management of risk is significant and worthy of a moment’s reflection. The MoD has in place procedures to ensure that the management of risks, including the transfer of operational and financial risks to industry as defined previously, delivers value for money. Indeed, this risk transfer, as we shall see, is at the heart of the smart acquisition change agenda. However, value for money is seldom overtly defined and quantified within projects, and is usually qualitatively associated with the ‘3Es’ of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Yet of all these, input costs or economies are often the only factors which can easily be measured, often in the form of discounted cash-flows over the lifetime of a project.

In practice, it is extremely difficult to transfer risk to industry based on projected discounted cash-flows. The value for money element of the business case for a defence, or indeed any public-sector, programme is invariably based on estimating future costs and
revenues, and is relevant only at the decision point for the procurement. Given the length of most programmes, this practice could not be described as mathematically rigorous.

Edwards and Shaoul (2003) identify that in public sector contracts, it is almost impossible to transfer the costs associated with identified risks. Firstly, generating a risk mitigation net present value that is contractually robust is hard to achieve. Secondly, there is a profound challenge within the public sector to generate robust risk knowledge. The consequent ability to derive effective mitigation strategies that can be costed and factored into a manufacturing or development programme simply does not arise. Moreover, it appears reasonable to assert that if the costs associated with risks are not contractually enforceable on an industry prime contractor, than the risk has not been transferred (Froud, 2003).

We can say, though, that smart acquisition was derived from the need to respond to perceived significant failings in defence procurement abilities and attributes after World War II and to manage, or is it to mitigate, what were perceived as risks. But we can also see that much of these perceived failings – the inability to manage and transfer self-described operational and financial risks, cost overruns and diseconomies – are historically consistent with the defence experience through the ages. The challenge is to unpick whether smart acquisition reinforces these perceived norms, reforms them, or does something that is both disturbing and
profoundly fascinating. Does smart acquisition present defence procurement as modern, effective and reformed whilst, paradoxically, demonstrating that these large projects are as they ever were? That is, doomed to disappoint.

3.5 Conclusion

I have outlined the historical drivers towards smart acquisition and demonstrated the complexities and uncertainties of defence procurement. Specifically, I have loitered over the huge costs associated with a country’s desire to possess and equip armed forces and the imponderable organisational challenges associated historically with such a stance. I have also discussed the factors that led to the establishment of the MODPE, its ultimate demise to make way for the smart acquisition reforms, and the reason the Procurement Executive was perceived to fail. I then enveloped this discussion in what can appear to be the omnipresent managerial legitimisation of risk management rationalism.

Through this discourse I am now ready to move on in the following chapter to an outline and analysis of smart acquisition itself, addressing the organisations, beliefs and functions that define this phenomenon. But as an expression of a perceived rational transformation programme, smart acquisition only makes sense once it is contextualised in the grounding of its preceding years.
CHAPTER 4 – SMART ACQUISITION AS RATIONAL TRANSFORMATION

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter I unpick the key elements of what comprises smart acquisition. I address, in section 4.2, what I describe as the physicality of smart acquisition – its organisations, notions of knowledge and best practice, and the people that it frames. I then go on to position smart acquisition as a change programme in section 4.3 by discussing the high-level processes that smart acquisition asserts, the business tools and techniques that practitioners are obliged to follow, the concept of management within defence procurement, and the value placed on ‘partnering’ with industry. Section 4.4 then draws together these strands into what I describe as the rational transformation model for smart acquisition, as logical, ratio-technical legitimisation for an understanding of the phenomenon as benign change programme concerned with, self-referenced laudable issues of public sector efficiency, defence effectiveness and Exchequer economy.

Smart acquisition is glibly described and labelled in government circles as a ‘change programme’. But it actually comprises new and ever-refreshed organisations charged with spending billions of pounds every year. The soldiers, civil servants, sailors and airmen and women these organisations employ are required by smart acquisition to deploy new management processes and tools whilst, concurrently, embracing supposedly fresh values, attitudes and
practices captured and rationalised in phenomena such as behavioural competency frameworks. The perceived best of these people are invited to become smart acquisition exemplars and advocates through joining highly-prized personnel development schemes. The components of smart acquisition – the organisations, people and body of knowledge – will accordingly be described and assessed.

Moreover, I demonstrate in this chapter that smart acquisition constitutes a theory of how organisations should be constructed and people operate and behave to generate the equipment of military power for a nation-state like Britain. Bertrand Russell (1946) makes the point that, since people became capable of free speculation, they have become dependant upon their theories of the world, human life, and how to organise and maximise the benefits and returns from their activities. Russell felt that there is a dynamic and reciprocal causation at play: namely, the circumstances of people’s lives determine these theories but, conversely, the theories they embrace determine their circumstances and lives. My starting point is that we will see this insight resonating throughout smart acquisition.

The conventional premise is that the procurement of military equipment is a complex, uncertain and dangerous business. This complexity is guided today by the firm hand of a range of high-level processes and assumptions captured under the smart acquisition
banner. The dynamic nature of design and evolutionary forces within the defence procurement process attempt to address a range of imponderables and unknowns such as future political and military alliances; the pace, effectiveness and impact of emerging technologies; the asymmetric nature of future threats, and political will matched to military resolve.

This chapter also places smart acquisition within the context of change in the UK public sector. It presents and critiques a classic model of transformation characterised by traditional management methodologies and approaches. In this way the rationale for smart acquisition can partly be assessed and reviewed contextually within a conventional, well-understood framework. This is important as, given the analysis in this thesis, the argument for smart acquisition’s implementation was made, and approved, overtly and systematically through the managerial perspectives offered by rational views on notions of management and change, the literature that supports these perspectives, an underlying and enduring systematic culture of managerialism, and perhaps also the outputs from the management consultancy industry it sustains.

However, my contention is that the traditional transformational model associated with smart acquisition will not assist in accessing and understanding the dynamic forces at play within defence sector reform. Rather, in the chapters that follow, I will present an alternative model encapsulating the insights of those interviewed
for this work, and the plans and processes generated by the defence procurement and logistic organisations themselves. The contrasts within both approaches, their respective benefits and consequences, will also be unpicked, generating a theoretical framework for analysing and understanding the complex issues that underpin defence.

Additionally, it is worth noting now that the alternative model of explanation developed later in this thesis, as a critique of the rational legitimisation of smart acquisition, grows from an early grounding in this chapter. Change management is presented as a discourse dependant upon language, profound symbolism and collective learnt values. The managerialism of smart acquisition, in this sense, starts to be conceptually unveiled as a belief system or ideology.

4.2 The Physicality of Smart Acquisition

Smart acquisition is comprised of three distinct and interlocking factors – what I describe as the physicality of smart acquisition – that are derived from the recent history of UK defence procurement. The first of these factors is organisational. The defence acquisition agenda of the Labour government in 1997 led to three specific new organisations for the defence sector in government. The first of these, the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA), was introduced to
procure new defence equipment. The second, the Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO), was designed and introduced to manage and maintain the new equipment procured by the DPA; and the Defence Equipment Capability (DEC) customer organisation, a new department within the Ministry of Defence itself, was charged with identifying the military requirement for new equipment, and sourcing the monies for its development and delivery.

The second of these distinct factors, drawn from and linking together these organisations, is the self-styled ‘body of knowledge’ ascribed to smart acquisition. This body of knowledge is comprised of the high-level processes, management tools and techniques and behaviours required of and valued in defence procurement professionals.

The third distinct factor is what I shall label as the guardians of the body of knowledge. These are the people who form the members of the development schemes from which future smart acquisition professionals were to be drawn, developed and tested. The two main schemes that were introduced were the Acquisition Leadership Development Scheme (ALDS) and the Acquisition Stream (AS). I now consider each of these three factors in turn.

**Smart Acquisition as Organisations**

As chapter 1 described, the DPA was formed on 1 April 1999 as an executive agency of the Ministry of Defence. It replaced the MoD
Procurement Agency. The mission statement for the new organisation was to procure new equipment for the armed forces in response to approved requirements for the projection of military capability. At the same time, the DLO was established as a tri-Service body to provide joint logistics to the UK armed forces. In a simple sense, the DPA bought the equipment, and the DLO deployed it, maintained it, upgraded it, trained men and women within the military to use it, and disposed of it at the end of its life.

Between these two organisations some £20-30bn a year would be spent procuring and distributing equipment. To complicate matters, the MoD set up the DEC to be the central customer for the equipment before it was delivered to the armed forces for use. This virtual customer held the purse strings through a mechanism known as the Equipment Plan. This is a planning tool used to re-cost and adjust the content of the defence equipment programme over a rolling ten-year horizon. The costs featured in the equipment plan are those incurred by the DPA, while the content of the plan is the management responsibility of the DEC.

This is complex and confusing. Under these arrangements, the customer of military equipment is not the soldier, sailor or airman/airwoman user but a technocrat within the MoD. Also the maintenance costs, which for long-life military equipment will necessarily be a huge and a significant proportion of the defence budget, do not feature within the Equipment Plan. I return to this
organisational and process tension or confusion in a later chapter. Suffice to say though, for our purposes just now, the smart acquisition organisational design is complex, confusing and just a little counter-intuitive.

**Smart Acquisition as Body of Knowledge**

I touched on the smart acquisition so-called body of knowledge in chapter 1. *The Smart Acquisition Handbook* (MoD, 2002) describes this body of knowledge as residing within the Acquisition Management System (AMS), the established knowledge management tool of the defence acquisition community. It purports to provide a one-stop shop for all authoritative guidance and expertise supporting the management of defence acquisition. The AMS at its inception in 1999 replaced all existing instructions on procurement to defence teams.

The objectives of smart acquisition and the purpose of the body of knowledge are to deliver projects within performance, time and cost constraints approved at the time a major investment decision is taken by the MoD. By ‘programmatising’ equipment delivery, defence equipment will, in theory, be potentially delivered progressively and at lower risk within the optimisation of trade-offs between equipment performance, procurement time and research, development and construction costs. Moreover, this project approach was thought to enable technologies to be introduced more
quickly to the front-line, generating military and commercial advantages.

The principal process is contained within the CADMID cycle (Concept, Assessment, Demonstration, Manufacture, In-service, Disposal), a six-stage project cycle for defence procurement. The Concept Stage is designed to baseline the results and outputs users require from the equipment procurement in question. The next phase is Assessment, which seeks to identify the most cost-effective technological and procurement solution to meet the end-user requirement. The third phase is Demonstration, which is said to progressively eliminate development and design risks and uncertainties in order to fix performance and cost targets for manufacture within the industrial base. It does this through a range of programmatic and synthetic simulation modelling techniques that are prevalent throughout the defence industrial community and understood, I suspect, by very few people. The next phase, Manufacture, addresses production and delivery, whilst the fifth phase, In-service, generates effective spares and support to the equipment in use by the military. The sixth and final phase, Disposal, deals with the efficient, safe and cost-effective disposal of the equipment.

It is presented as remarkably straight-forward and linear in design and implementation. But as we have seen, defence equipment is complex and usually possessed of a long life. The Tornado, for
example, the Royal Air Force’s main attack aircraft, from concept to disposal could have a life of sixty years. Measures of military and financial effectiveness, let alone input efficiencies and economies at inception, may be profoundly challenged by project lifecycles such as these.

The key features and behaviours of smart acquisition stated within the AMS can be categorised into the following elements. Firstly, the CADMID cycle represents a whole life approach embodied in one single equipment project team. This team exists for the life of the equipment and, when the organisations were separate, moved from the DPA to the DLO at the equipment’s particular in-service date with the military. Industry is also one of the stakeholders represented within the project team (MoD, 2002).

This open and constructive relationship and ongoing partnership with industry is a further key feature of smart acquisition. The AMS promotes industry involvement through notions of partnering and the opportunity of common goals, underpinned by competition whenever this might provide best value to the Exchequer. There is something seemingly incongruous in promoting both public/private partnership and contractor competition; how this potential contradiction is dealt with within smart acquisition is unpicked in subsequent chapters.
Lastly, smart acquisition processes are said to promote streamlined and unambiguous project approvals, along with a willingness to identify, evaluate and implement effective trade-offs between system performance, whole-life costs, annual costs of ownership and time. Again though, a key question for me is how trade-offs can possibly be effective or even intellectually robust over such lengthy programme time-lines as those featured typically within defence equipment cycles.

The Smart Acquisition Guardians

In a simple sense, the guardians of smart acquisition are those people who promote and enact its processes, behaviours and objectives. The AMS states quite unequivocally (MoD, 2002) that smart acquisition places a strategic emphasis on the development, training and sustaining of people in acquisition – both those employed within the public sector and those in defence industries. Central to this commitment and investment is the Acquisition Stream and Acquisition Leadership Development Scheme (ALDS).

The Acquisition Stream was launched in February 2001 to create a stream of people in acquisition who are highly committed, skilled and well-trained in smart acquisition and project management. Membership is voluntary and open to all military and civilian staff and members of industry. The scheme operates through the development tools of an Acquisition Competence Framework
(ACF), a personal development record, training and development directory and development route-maps. Through these tools there is expressed a clear and robust methodology for working, behaving in the workplace and developing one’s career. This could be perceived as ‘best-practice’ in name, perhaps, but one-practice in design, roll-out and execution.

The ALDS operates for the perceived elite of the MoD and defence industry, as an extension of the Stream, and is designed to develop existing and future leaders in acquisition. The scheme is divided into three stages, foundation, core and expert, with the primary differentiation being the competencies which an individual is expected to possess and the progress that they are said to have made against ALDS route-maps. The ALDS is limited to 400 members, selected by competition against, once more, a pre-described competence framework. What this represents, the manner in which these people enfold themselves throughout the smart acquisition organisations, and the significance of this professional socialisation, I unveil in the following chapters. For the moment, it is sufficient to point out the view that smart acquisition people are selected and developed against heavily prescribed requirements and procedures.

These elements of smart acquisition: the organisations, the high-level process and body of knowledge, and the people, realign notions of defence procurement into a highly rational and
managerially competent set of activities. I come now to outline just how rational, systemically, smart acquisition can be presented, and how this managerial logic has driven its implementation as a change programme.

4.3 Smart Acquisition as Change Programme

Nately is a senior civil servant in the MoD who held a significant role in the ministry between 2001 and 2004 as a director general responsible for aspects of the smart acquisition agenda. He had the following to say about his responsibilities

For me, smart acquisition is about doing things better. Empowered management and clearer strategies for delivery. Transparent accountancy and forward-looking financial management. A culture that embraces partnering and delivers through collaborative relationships. Something that the rest of the public sector can look up to. (Interview: Nately, 2004)

For some, perhaps, the key words within this statement read like the outline curriculum of a management awareness course set within a western business school. This discourse, nonetheless, indicates what senior management perceive smart acquisition to be. At a superficial level it appears to be everything to everybody, accessed
equally by many perspectives and topics. Alternatively, it could be significant and complex, with change through smart acquisition profoundly shifting cultural, organisational and process paradigms enabling ‘things to be done better’ in the manner suggested. The key point, of course, is that insights cannot be offered without unwrapping the ingredients of the smart acquisition menu as listed by this director general. The menu, itself, is of little use.

In discussing this ‘menu’ with a number of interviewees it became quite clear that these key themes can be further brigaded under the headings of high-level processes, business tools for acquisition, management and teaming. What these represent is significant if we are to understand the totality of the smart acquisition initiative beyond the superficiality of its stated ingredients.

**High-Level Process**

The high-level processes revolve around the acquisition cycle from capability concept through to equipment disposal, what I described earlier as the CADMID cycle. This is driven by a ‘smart requirement’ set and managed through-life principally via whole-life cost statements, cost of ownership considerations and other management accounting processes and considerations. Smart requirements, especially, is a method of capturing, engineering and managing requirements based on the principles of systems engineering. In essence, the practice of systems engineering
generates an anatomy of a requirements set presented as a diagrammatic ‘rich-picture’ or system hierarchy.

The key objective is to deliver a complete system to address the capability sought, involving all stakeholders. This capability is manifested as effective and sustainable defence systems for military use. It predominantly focuses on user needs, as articulated by the stakeholders, and down-plays equipment characteristics.

This smart requirement process is configured around two key documents or databases within the MoD. The first of these is called the User Requirement Document. It is prepared and owned by the relevant capability customer within the DEC. The second document is derived from the User Requirement Document and is known, somewhat confusingly, as the System Requirement Document. This defines, in output terms, what the specific defence system being procured must do to meet the user requirements captured within the preceding document (MoD, 2004). It is the route-map for satisfying the MoD’s military requirement, and represents the key document against which competition is run between defence sector prime contractors.

For the uninitiated, or those who like clear and unambiguous language, this sense of ‘process’ is thoroughly inaccessible and confusing, almost as if somebody was describing the artefacts, rituals and beliefs of an ancient religion. Yet smart acquisition is
explained and legitimised in this manner, with complexity and confusion presented as rational management discourse. The practitioner’s unquestioning acceptance of this is, perhaps, part of the quasi-religious experience.

Dreedle was an integrated project team leader within the DPA. He comments that

The SRD [system requirement document] is really the key document we’re trying to generate within the integrated project team. When we have it, we know what it is that industry is going to manufacture, we know numbers to be recruited, re-rolled and trained, and we can start thinking about through-life support requirements. All of the key transformational processes within smart acquisition take their cue from the SRD. (Interview: Dreedle, 2004)

These key processes associated with the procurement cycle are systematic and prescriptive. Integrated project teams must produce a system requirement document with this, in turn, driving the contract let with the prime contractor or system integrator. Whilst the language and symbolism contained within the smart acquisition change initiative is concerned with empowerment and innovation, the journey to be undertaken by MoD staff is pre-ordained. The high level process is overtly concerned with compliance, articulated as freedom.
Business Tools for Acquisition

The underpinning business tools for acquisition address the establishment and integration of shared data environments, project management tools, performance reporting methodologies and financial and resourcing systems. Advocates argue that smart acquisition requires a coherent approach to be taken between customer, supplier and user groups on software and business tool integration.

The key is to move away from an organisational approach to defining and delivering these tools, to one where a joint approach is taken leading to interoperable or common tools to support shared business processes. (MoD, 2002)

As part of the change management initiative, a business tools for acquisition programme was set up in 2001 (MoD, 2002) to generate an understanding of the current and future business needs of IPTs, and to put in place the business tools to meet those needs. This programme was managed by the Acquisition Policy and Process Group, which is formed by the officials nominated as ‘owners’ of all the individual processes comprising smart acquisition – what Dreedle described in crude terms as a bureaucrat’s ‘ultimate wet dream’ (Interview: Dreedle, 2004).

The Smart Acquisition Handbook (MoD, 2002) states that this Group must:
• Generate a single view of how all acquisition processes were to interrelate;

• Catalogue and mandate all acquisition policies and processes, and record the maturity of their guidance.

• Prioritise the development of further policies and processes.

Havermeyer, a senior civil servant respondent has a very negative view of the Acquisition Policy and Process Group. He argues that this group failed to share or consult with colleagues. We were left with policies and processes that appeared random, bureaucratic and nobody has bought into. (Interview: Havermeyer, 2004)

This falls short of the ingredients of transparency, collaboration, partnering and empowerment, and the benign sense of smart acquisition offered by the Director General earlier in this chapter. Why this could be so is considered in the next chapter when I critique the notion of smart acquisition as rational and enabling.

Management and Smart Acquisition
Management of the smart acquisition process is concerned with approvals, target setting, financial and performance management
and commercial policy. It is focused principally on the transformation of resources, through the high-level acquisition processes, to business outputs measured by milestones and targets. This journey is articulated by commercially available project and financial management tools, assessed through a specific, highly conventional view of organisational management.

Management is a generic, all-embracing term, difficult to quantify and define. Child (1964) describes management as an elite grouping, transforming policy into outcomes, whilst Drucker (1977) believes that it can be summarised as a function, as well as the people discharging it; a discipline rather than a hierarchical social grouping. Management, therefore, is best captured through an intellectual perspective or school of thought rather than a prescriptive definition.

Taylor’s (1911) work on ‘scientific management’ has dominated the Classical School. He believed that the role of management was to rationalise and master processes through which human actions could be normalised, measured and controlled leading to significant increases in business efficiency. Indeed, he argued there was a causal link between effective management and organisational efficiency. Taylor provided guiding principles on the division of labour and standardisation which dominated the industrial landscape through their application, for example, in Henry Ford’s motor factories in the USA. Fayol (1949) contributed to the Classical
School by distinguishing between management activity and other organisational behaviour, focusing on planning, organisation, coordination, command and control.

Developing from the Classical School, Simon (1960) focused on the ability of managers to make good decisions in conditions of uncertainty; a forerunner to today’s management of risk. This Decision Theory School, in contrast to classical theory, argues that the process of decision-making is neither rational nor scientific. Sub-optimising factors can and do occur to blunt management action.

Drucker (1977) argues that the approach should be functional – that is, to assess what managers actually do rather than what they should be doing. This is mirrored, in many ways, in the work of Mintzberg (1973) and Kotter (1996) who contributed towards the functional tradition by identifying the key activities of management, through an analysis of the tasks practitioners were performing. These could be summarised under the headings of agenda setting, communicating and networking.

Stewart (1982), in contrast, argues that situational factors significantly impact upon the behaviour of individual managers. The components of the model he develops – demands, choices and constraints – define the nature of the work undertaken and drive the managerial approach. The response to earlier theories and
approaches to management is to regard it as a subjective, personal activity.

In summarising these theorists and schools it is easy to assert that management is a complicated concept, which can be assessed in a number of contradictory ways. Smart acquisition, however, does not articulate its approach to the theory of management and is not aligned to a specific school or theory. Rather, smart acquisition champions the concept of management itself which, I find, somehow unsatisfactory, and argue later that constructs of ‘management’, presented as a belief system, should be critiqued through an emerging alternative conceptual framework of governmentality.

The point here, of course, is that it is this sense of management as rational discourse through all its functions and forms that is important to smart acquisition and the constructed prism of its practitioners. This becomes self-evident as smart acquisition further deconstructs throughout the case study in part 3.

**Teaming and Smart Acquisition**

The last key ingredient to bring forward was smart acquisition’s commitment to teaming. This was analysed as partnering with industry, core and non-core project team membership, and collective training and development between MoD and industry.
A better relationship between the department, military and defence industrial base than the one perceived to have been in existence up to 1997, was one of the key themes of the smart acquisition change programme. It was believed that industrial involvement with the project team from the concept stage onwards would better enable programme trade-offs between operational performance, time to delivery and programme costs. Additionally, it would enable the MoD to become better tuned to industrial, technological and research realities.

Dunbar is a director with a major UK Defence manufacturer. He was also involved during 1999 to 2003 with the MoD/Industry joint working group on training and staff exchange issues. He told me that

Teaming was a fallacy; in fact I never quite knew what was meant by the term. I felt that the MoD believed we in industry were still trying to rip them off, whilst many of my colleagues felt that MoD was still a, frankly, un-smart customer with poor programme and managerial competencies. (Interview: Dunbar, 2003)

There is a perception here that the formal policies and processes of smart acquisition, and the assertion of successful change and improvement, do not match the perceived experiences and realities faced by some within the defence manufacturing environment. This
is explored further when I unpick smart acquisition, as it appears in operation, through the specific example of a project team.

These key themes of the rationalism of smart acquisition – change itself; commonality of business tools and processes; commitment to management practices; and, partnering between the MoD and industry – are all set within the revised structures of clear customer and supplier relationships, both internal to the Ministry and between MoD and industry. Interestingly, *The Smart Acquisition Handbook* (MoD, 2004), somewhat belated after the smart acquisition launch of 1997, places public private partnerships (PPP) at the heart of the smart acquisition toolkit as well, arguing that with industry involved in the provision of long-term services and resources to the MoD, partnering and exclusivity relationships are often the best way of delivering the required outputs.

This is significant as the National Audit Office estimates that 30% of procurement for defence is undertaken under the umbrella of PPP schemes (NAO, 2004). Yet Edwards, Shaoul, Stafford and Arblaster (2004) argue that key strands of the public-private commercial relationship are poorly understood and badly managed.

The macroeconomic argument for PPP is the provision of finance for investment from the private sector that the public sector cannot afford. The microeconomic argument is the generation of efficiency, or value for money, when private sector provision is
compared – by way of a public sector comparator – to the costs of public sector delivery. The private sector is said to be more efficient, can generate greater outputs from input raw materials and other resources and, in investment appraisal terms, offers greater economic utility. Osborne and Gaebler (1993), for example, argue that the private sector is better at economic transformation, rapid organisational change and the delivery of technical tasks than its public sector counterpart.

4.4 The Rational Transformation Model for Smart Acquisition

This discussion is significant, as both the macroeconomic and microeconomic arguments for private sector delivery to the Ministry of Defence are couched in terms of economic use – the macro argument – and efficiency – the micro assertion. These arguments are grounded in the traditional, linear transformation model of management and procurement, presented in figure 4.1 below.
The linear transformation model of figure 4.1 is a well-known articulation of the transformation process of raw materials and skills into goods and services that have an economic purpose. At the left-hand side of the model raw materials, people and financing is provided as the basic ingredients of a transformation process. The cheaper these ingredients can be generated, the more economic and efficient the process is said to be. In terms of public/private partnerships, this represents the macroeconomic argument for their use.

The transformation process itself is where these raw materials are consumed, worked and finished to generate economic goods and services or, in the defence context, military equipment or services. These, in turn, represent the system’s outputs. If they are delivered...
to agreed performance levels, on time and to budget, then the project is seen to be well managed and successful. The comparative relationship of inputs to outputs also represents the microeconomic argument for public/private partnerships, as it is an economic measure of system efficiency. Effectiveness, in turn, is measured by the impact the delivered equipment or services has within the defence environment and how it contributes to the delivery of military capability.

This model is alluded to in both accounting textbooks and in works on management theory and strategy. For instance, Drury (2001) places this model at the heart of the decision-making, planning and control process as it enables the articulation of a range of possible courses of action, or strategies, and allows the comparing of actual and planned outcomes. This, in turn, drives responses to divergence from plan and forward forecasting. The model is also the premise for all budgeting activities and financial control systems.

Koch (2000) also uses this simple linear model to help define the different parts of a business and to manage alternatives at sub-system level. It provides clarity around business performance, the achievement of project milestones and drives management concentration and focus. It can also be argued that the work of Senge (1990; 1994), and subsequent critiques, under the banner of learning organisations is heavily influenced by this simple model as,
at its purest, it articulates systems thinking or how everything within an organisation is connected to everything else, framing personal responses, understandings and values.

When smart acquisition was launched in 1997 under the banner of the smart procurement initiative, the Secretary of State for Defence, George Robertson, stated that

This review is going to include a ruthless examination of how value for money for defence procurement...can be improved. I am therefore launching a major initiative to try and eliminate the kind of cost overruns and delays that have characterised some equipment projects in the past. (HOC, 1998)

The consulting company McKinsey defined the systemic problems and recommended solutions through the rubicon of the traditional transformation model from figure 4.1. This was driven, principally, by the brief to focus on value for money identification which, in turn, generated efficiency and economy initiatives.

Milo was a senior consultant involved in capturing and defining the smart procurement initiative. To me, he recalled that the simple transformation model of organisational inputs to outputs/outcomes was at the centre of the defence acquisition cycle design (Interview: Milo, 2003). It was able to capture both material requirements as
inputs, and the production and manufacturing process requirements prior to the key investment decision points within the acquisition cycle. Moreover, the correlation of inputs to outputs, as seen in figure 4.1, enabled efficiency measures to be derived; something that was hugely significant to smart acquisition’s political sponsors.

In addition, the consulting company KPMG were engaged to train and develop the Department’s internal improvement team for smart acquisition. A management consultant, Sampson, coached this team from 1999 to 2003. He frequently commenced his training and skills transfer sessions with the traditional transformation model, arguing it was the key positioning tool for onward development and understanding of smart acquisition (Interview: Sampson, 2004).

In figure 4.2 the high-level acquisition cycle – CADMID – as the dominant defence procurement process is mapped onto the linear model from figure 4.1. The results support the assertion that this cycle and the linear model are, effectively, one and the same. This is to be expected, as the model is part of the dominant discourse that influenced smart acquisition’s design and implementation.
Within figure 4.2, the concept phase of the defence acquisition cycle relates directly to the identification of project resources, or inputs. The assessment, demonstration and manufacture stages map to the process phase within the linear transformation model, and the delivery of equipment in-service to outputs. Lastly, disposal of equipment post successful deployment to operation theatres equates to the outcome block within the linear model. The acquisition cycle, therefore, has been derived from a conventional managerial view of transformation and manufacture, with this, in turn, underpinned by certain conventional management concepts.
4.5 Conclusion

I have outlined the key ingredients of smart acquisition and demonstrated the complexities and uncertainties of defence procurement. This has led to a simple description of the objectives and key features of the smart acquisition reforms.

Through the highly rational construct of smart acquisition stated in this section however, the subject is revealed as simply a conventional and organic process of change presented as common-sense, merely an application of best practice as applied to the defence sector from elsewhere in industry and championed by management consultants. This smart practice is to be found manifested within the tools and methodologies, management techniques and the very business models themselves that practitioners are asked to embrace.

It is understandably presented by many as an overtly benign process, the sole objective of which is to enable civil servants and the military, effectively supported by colleagues from industry and commerce, to do their jobs well and secure the equipment and capabilities needed to protect the country. Through partnering and teaming with industry, defence will benefit from the sound management practices to be found within the supply base and their professional advisors. What could be more effective, benevolent or less threatening?
There is an alternative discourse. Chapter 5 reveals a more critical analysis as the common sense and benign notions displayed above are scrutinised through a critical lens, one which shades notions of government, power and the nature of learning and knowledge with darker hues. I commence with a discussion and analysis of governmentality and its derivative forces, and go on to offer a different model for analysis.
CHAPTER 5 – GOVERNMENTALITY AND SMART ACQUISITION

5.1 Introduction

As already stated, the myriad practices, processes and activities that comprise defence procurement and, thereafter, the maintenance and safe disposal of military equipment, are remarkably complex and expensive core public sector activities. It is appropriate, therefore, to conceptualise smart acquisition as a function of government, given that it is the change programme charged with transforming defence procurement in the manner discussed in chapter 4.

Understanding smart acquisition develops our knowledge and critique of government whilst, conversely, a greater awareness of the phenomenon of government yields the context of smart acquisition and provides access points and highways into its features. It represents a microcosm of the macro features, competencies, behaviours, structures and forces of government itself, and offers a similitude or modelled representation of this larger government space. But if smart acquisition represents a fractal of government within the United Kingdom at this time in its history and development, what is this ‘government’, and how can it be studied?

This chapter addresses this question. I offer a common-sense, rational response to ‘what is government?’ Beyond this superficial rationality, however, additional perspectives and dimensions are introduced, taking the nature of the state beyond its institutions,
conventions and norms to a paradigm where government procures and cements assemblages of regimes of control and socialisation, rationalised and legitimised by common-sense narratives of technical and managerial justifications. Within this governmentality, moreover, I believe there to be two key, interlocking discourses at play. There is a macro neoliberal discourse at the level of society and state, but also a small narrative of subjectivisation relating both to the individual and bilaterally between individuals. Indeed, I shall explain that this interplay between a dominant discourse and the subject or individual is the hidden-hand of power and control, more powerful than the visible institutions and overt activities of the state that shape this narrative of government intervention and action.

But first a definition. What do I mean by governmentality? There is no short answer, but I use governmentality as a term for describing how we think about governing ourselves and others in a wide societal context, and how exercises in power and control come to be articulated through the regulation of groups and individuals and the processes, behaviours and beliefs that constitute and bind them.

This chapter begins in section 5.2 with a discussion on the nature and methodology of theorising government, from pluralist and functionalist perspectives. In section 5.3 I go on to offer a richer discourse and critique of these perspectives by considering a multi-dimensional view of power and assemblages of technologies and
explanations, leading to the argument that government extends well beyond the notion of the state – a concept explored through Dean’s construct of ‘govern-mentality’ (2007). In section 5.4, I position this sense of governmentality in the context of the neoliberal state, expressed in section 5.5 through the construct of an ‘analytics of government’. I conclude by arguing that, through these sections, this chapter has generated a theoretical framework allowing me to understand dynamic interplays of notions of power and government beyond the offices and functions of the state that allow smart acquisition to be viewed as a fractal of this governmentalist application. The concepts unpicked in this chapter, consequently, provide a powerful set of analytical tools and perspectives through which smart acquisition can be unveiled.

Until now I have allowed smart acquisition to stand-up on its own terms and through its own self-referencing explanations. Through the repetitive voices of informants and via smart acquisition’s own inconsistencies and complexities the phenomenon throughout chapters 3 and 4 has started to deconstruct to allow me to pick over its newly revealed shape and form. In this chapter I turn to the literature on governmentality to enable this process and in so doing I give this body of work its voice to construct a theoretical form that is subsequently significant to my analysis of the project team in smart acquisition throughout the latter chapters.
5.2 Theorising Government

Benign Government and the Pluralist State

At one level, government could be said to be the process by which a group in society makes collective decisions on behalf of the whole of society’s members, with legitimate authority backed up by force as necessary. Indeed, for Hague and Harrop (1982), government is nothing more than the regular and settled conduct of such decision-making within conditions of orderly, normalised rule. Moreover, government is about authoritative decisions exercised through political and legal institutions and actors, wielding this legitimate lawful power.

In other words, it is self-evidently common-sense that government is sovereign and its authority over groups and individuals within society is compulsory. In western-style democracies, this authority is legitimised through electoral choice, exercised constitutionally by the populace through elections in which political parties vie for the rights to exercise the administration of this state power. For Dahl (1976), this is the key yardstick for a definition of government: the ultimate regulator of the legitimate use of power and force within a state’s territorial boundaries.

So far, government is a relatively easy concept to capture and within this critique could almost be presented as benign. The power that the state exercises has been legitimised as discussed, but the nature
of that power is critical to understanding government at this level of analysis. Dahl (1957) sees power in causal terms: the ability of one actor to influence the behaviour of another so that the latter acts in a manner he or she would not normally prefer.

Power, therefore, is a relationship of shared outcomes and enabling behaviours, which is both rational and reasonable in that political premises can be argued and traded. This pluralist approach to government – groups sharing in the synthesized exercise of power – is very alluring. We can all access legitimised state force on occasions through the effective management of relationships and personal trade-offs and compromises. For it concludes that power is a matter of the relative balance of resources within relationships, be they time, money, knowledge, eloquence, organisation or status. For the pluralist, we all share in power’s allure, matching our will to others, compromising as appropriate, all for the utilitarian greater good and a harmonised society. Government is the benign force enabling and ensuring this balance of relationships. It is the legitimate factor assuring harmony.

So, the study of comparative government through the pluralist lens could be segmented into three distinct approaches to government, namely institutional, behavioural and functional. Ball (1983) argues that these approaches summarise the principal intellectual capital on which political scientists researching government as a topic are able to draw.
This institutional approach is pretty much self-defined. The formal and visible institutions of government provide the subject matter for both descriptive and analytical treatments of government. These institutions include, of course, the legislature, executive and judiciary, but also the main political parties within our pluralist state. Attention is also paid to pressure groups, lobbyists, business, the mass media or cultural phenomena to list but a few.

A recurrent feature of the institutional approach is that constitutions and formal organisations of government are predominantly examined in quasi-legal and historical terms. Moreover, political parties are studied psephologically through the window of election results and supporting statistics such as electoral turnout. Informal relationships and the context of government go largely unstudied through an institutional methodology. Within this tradition, therefore, the study of politics and state policies as social science is merely the visible, physical bodies of government.

It would be fair to assert that this institutional approach to the study of government is also heavily rooted in western culture, confined as it largely was to the review of governments in North America and Europe. Within this context, the very apotheosis of this approach is Webb and Webb’s (1935) study of the Soviet government in the 1930s, which seems to accept with conviction that everything in the Soviet Union worked institutionally as the propaganda machinery of the state suggested. Perhaps as a consequence of this sort of
approach, an institutionalised critical assessment of politics and government has become less fashionable over time, with its antithesis being the development of the behavioural tradition of political science emerging first in the USA in the 1950s and 1960s.

The core tenet of behaviourist thinking was captured by Eulau (1963). The principal unit of study was to be the political actor rather than institutions. This behavioural approach represents a paradigm shift from structures to people, from the physical to the procedural, and from the constitutional/legal to the political. As a result, behaviourists came to emphasise explanations and meaning rather than descriptive analysis. Indeed, Hague and Harrop (1982) attest that the main benefit accruing to the study of government and politics from the behavioural approach was that the subject became genuinely comparative and explanatory in scope and ambition, if not always in critical execution.

Dahl (1961) in his classic book *Who Governs?* studied post-war political decision making in the city of New Haven. His work critiqued and rejected as simplistic a marxian ruling elite explanatory model and concluded that the exercise of power in terms of the measurement of decisions taken was overtly pluralist. That is, since different political actors and groups prevail in different areas of political conflict there must be no overall ruling elite and power through government must be distributed in a pluralistic manner. Dahl’s work generated a literature of
community studies of power and government which Lukes (2005) believes was used to justify and vindicate a robust US intellectual and lay belief in the effectiveness of local democracy in underpinning notions of the post-war American dream and perceived benevolent way of life.

It seems that the vices and virtues of behaviouralism mirror and reverse those of the institutional tradition. The functionalist approach, in contrast, was developed as a response to the perceived failings of both traditions, and perhaps also as a methodology for exploring and analysing the political and state systems of developing, postcolonial, countries. Here, it appeared that the structures and organisation of government was more fluid, variable and less specialised than either the institutional or behavioural approaches allowed.

Functionalists pose the following core question from which all others are derived: if political systems vary in their institutional structures, arrangements and activities, are there certain functions which all political systems must perform (Hague and Harrop, 1982: 10)? This question asked ‘systemically’ significantly broadens the institutional and behavioural approaches to the study of government.

In particular, Easton (1957; 1965) has especially influenced the analysis offered by the functionalists to both political science, in
general, and comparative studies of government in particular. His model takes as the basic unit for discussion and analysis the political system itself rather than just considerations of government decision-making. For him, politics and government are wide concepts embracing all physical factors and influences affecting decision making and, of these factors, the formal institutions of government play but one part.

Rather, the system of government itself takes inputs from society in general in terms of policy demands and expressions of support or political anger, and converts them into outputs in the forms of policies and programmes. The gatekeepers within this closed-loop system of government are the political parties and pressure groups themselves who, along with the media, enable ideas to be decanted into statute. These gatekeepers, for Easton, operate openly and visibly as key enabling agents to the political system, ensuring balance and even consensus in the legitimate exercise of state power. As a consequence, the political system attracts and regulates compliance and support.

These institutional, behavioural and functional traditions hardly exhaust the range of approaches to understanding the nature of government. Nonetheless, the three modes of analysis outlined above form the baseline against which other schematics or models need to be tested and assessed, not least in that alternative approaches are derived in rejection of these three paradigms.
Indeed, it was these forms of critical analysis that Lukes (1974; 2005) so powerfully critiqued. His view is that institutional, behavioural and functional methods of explanation provide but a single dimension of a self-sustaining pluralist state and its exercise of power. The nature of government influence and activity over human endeavours permeates deeper and wider modes of analysis that both dominate the political and social agenda within society, but also craft the nature of individual and societal critical thought and methods of understanding.

State Power – The First Dimension

Lukes describes the pluralist view of power as one-dimensional and shallow. Under this concept, power is distributed pluralistically within the critique and can be analysed and revealed through the study of observable behaviour. As Dahl (1957) commented, it is concerned with the intuitive notion of ‘A’ exercising power over ‘B’, in that ‘A’ can get ‘B’ to perform in a manner ‘B’ would not otherwise choose. Studying power in this dimension requires observers to unpick specific outcomes, identifiable and discrete, in order to determine the groups or individuals who prevail in public decision-making. Polsby (1963) underlines the view that this perspective stresses observable behaviour either directly or through the reconstruction of notions of behaviour from documents, specific interviews or other indirect sources.
In this manner, by observing who gains most from the decisions taken, the researcher can determine which individuals or groups at that moment in time exercise more power in society than other groups or individuals who, themselves, are competing for alternative courses of action. This is the very essence of the pluralist construct of power.

Essential to this view is the notion of conflict, in that for the pluralist an identified issue involves informed and actual disagreement between two or more parties on courses of action or required outcomes. Where there is no such disagreement, they argue, there is no exercise of power. Moreover, this conflict, where it exists, generates the observable test of power attributions to the victorious group, visible and testable by viewing the actors' behaviours within the context of the disagreement. The interests of the people involved are to be considered the same as their policy preferences, so that a conflict of interest equates to a dispute over preferences.

Pluralists, therefore, through this positivist approach to power, reject the notion that interests might be unarticulated or unobservable, and are appalled by the concept that people might strive for preferences which damage or constrain them. Indeed, they reject the very idea that individuals are unaware of their own true interests. As Lukes writes
this first, one-dimensional, view of power involves a focus on behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which there is an observable conflict of interests, seen as express policy preferences revealed by political participation. (Lukes, 2005: 19)

**State Power – The Second Dimension**

The pluralist, one-dimensional view presents power within the state as visible, measurable and overt, as it is concerned with his observable conflict of subjective political and social interests. Schattschneider (1960) and, importantly for my critique, Bachrach and Baratz (1970) argue that this approach is profoundly misleading. Whilst power can be revealed through observable disputes between groups whereby the victor within a bounded conflict has successfully exercised power over the loser, power is also exercised within a second dimension when a group or person overtly or unconsciously creates or perpetuates a barrier to the public debate of policy differences.

In other words, there is a concealed set of structures, agendas and behaviours, both conscious and subliminal, which coagulate to form an acceptable narrative within which political and social discussion and policy conflicts take place. Importantly, this narrative is selective and excludes concepts and considerations which never form part of the discussion or decision-making agenda thereby forming a powerful and bounded consensus within which policy
makers and state servants operate and exist. Lukes (2005: 20) offers Schattschneider’s often quoted phrase that political organisations and other actors possess

a bias in favour of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others, because organisation is the mobilisation of bias. Some issues are organised into politics whilst others are organised out. (Schattschneider 1960: 71)

The later work of Bachrach and Baratz (1970) and Lukes (1974; 2005) is important in bringing this idea of the mobilisation of bias into the theorisation of power itself. They argue that this second dimension, to use Lukes’ phrase, is concerned with framing the political discourse through a set of pre-determined values, beliefs and rituals which define institutional policies and processes. Through the systematic, consistent and universal deployment of these procedures, power is exercised to the benefit of certain groups in society at the expense of others.

Bachrach and Baratz (1970) also introduce within their work a specific typology of power whereby there are decisions and nondecisions. The continuance of the dominant procedures born from these pre-determined values and beliefs contrives, they argue, to enable nondecisions to have the effect of constraining and, thereafter, protecting the political consensus and its exercise of bias.
Let us pause for a moment and reflect on the meaning behind this view. Lukes argues that an analysis of two-dimensional power involves an understanding of both decision-making and nondecision-making. How to make sense of this and what are the distinctions? A definition is called for.

By ‘decision’, I understand Bachrach and Baratz to be discussing a choice amongst alternative modes of action (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970: 39). This is visible and observable, operating within a framed political discourse. This decision is taken to support the values and interests of the decision-maker which align with the retention and extension of the modes of beliefs and values which dominate political and corporate policies and processes. These, in turn, reinforce and sustain group and individual responses and behaviours.

A nondecision, in contrast, represents an action or set of actions that results in suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the values or interests of the decision maker. (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970: 44)

Nondecision-making, therefore, becomes an exercise in negating demands for change that challenge the existing allocation of benefits.
Moreover, nondecisions suffocate aspirations for change before they can even be articulated, or eliminate formed thoughts before they gain access to a policy arena. This is where, I believe, Bachrach and Baratz thoroughly part company with the pluralists of Lukes’ first dimension.

Pluralist scholars observe policy conflicts and choices being made within a balanced political arena. Bachrach and Baratz, crucially, attempt to identify through nondecisions the potential issues which nondecision-making prevents from becoming the actual of political debate and decision-making. Nondecision-making distils challenge away from policy-making and reinforces and confirms the dominance of political and societal values and beliefs.

This second-dimension for Lukes is powerful as it grafts the concept of nondecision-making onto the first dimension of the pluralist view of power

the two-dimensional view of power represents a major advance over the one-dimensional view: it incorporates into analysis of power relations the question of the control over the agenda of politics and the ways in which potential issues are kept out of the political process. (Lukes, 2005: 25)

Yet despite this difference with the pluralists, both dimensions are speared with the same dominant analytical feature: they rely on the
study of actual, observable conflict, whether overt or covert. Where this can not be observed, the logical conclusion is that there is no conflict or universal acceptance of the status quo however articulated.

I share Lukes’ view that there is something unsettling with the limits of this analysis. Firstly, and most startlingly, the second dimension is concerned with the study of overt actual behaviour as it relates to decisions or nondecisions. In this it is limited, I believe, because decisions – whether overt or agenda-sensitive – are consciously made by individuals or groups in a deliberate and selective choice between a number of alternative courses of action. Yet systemic bias can be created, mobilised and reinforced through unconscious factors that subjugate and nullify notions of individual choice.

Critical to this is the notion articulated by Lukes that the bias within the system is not merely sustained by chosen observable acts, but by socially structured and culturally patterned institutional practices. These, in turn, may be manifested by inaction and a lack of choice.

Secondly, the two-dimensional view of power is flawed in that it places too much emphasis on observable conflict. Conflict is not present within notions of authority, yet positional authority is important to conceptual understandings of power within social
groups. Moreover, it is surely too simplistic to assert that power is only exercised or revealed in situations of conflict. As Lukes argues

‘A’ may exercise power over ‘B’ by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants. (Lukes, 2005: 27)

Both the pluralists of the first dimension of power and their critics within the second dimension argue that their conceptualisation of power is only revealed within situations of actual conflict. Therefore, they argue, actual conflict is necessary to power. Yet perhaps the most effective manifestation of power is the socialisation and indoctrination characteristic of discipline that prevents such visible conflicts from arising at all.

The third point of challenge to the two-dimensional view of power relates to nondecision-making power. This power exists, it is said, where there are issues or tensions denied entry into the political process. If no grievances can be observed, than the critical observer must assume political consensus born of freewill. This is highly unsatisfactory. Rather, there is a sense that individuals can neither identify nor articulate grievances as society shapes and forms their cognitive preferences in a manner in which individuals accept and embrace their place within that society. This is because no alternative to this existing order can be imagined as this order is
perceived as natural, unchangeable and its benefits objectively measurable and provable by the initiated.

So, the second dimension of power is limited by its focus on behaviour, especially as it relates to observable choices. Secondly, by the sense that conflict has to be present in terms of competing interests and choices for power to be revealed and, lastly, that issues and tensions are visible and where none can be observed, consensus prevails.

Lukes’ third dimension of power dwells on the notion of this sense of consensus. Rather than saying that power is not exercised where ‘consensus’ is viewed, my point (from Lukes) is that this very ‘consensus’ – neoliberal and managerial – is where power is profoundly manifested within society. The discourse and behaviours associated with this consensus frames one’s thinking, personal points of reference and responses. It is this third dimension that I now discuss.

5.3 Beyond State Power – The Third Dimension

Lukes’ insight sits within a long-standing critical tradition, in that the narratives within society, manifested within the structures and processes that frame our lives, socialise and train our beliefs, behaviours and responses. This, in turn, represents a profound
manifestation of power, both of society and of the self within society.

This power is real and effective in shaping behaviours through a number of indirect and hidden ways which are most effective in securing compliance when these factors are least susceptible to observation. This inability to observe the hidden mechanisms of power and control in action inhibits both agents within society and the social scientist or other observer trying to extract meaning. The search for these explanatory tools and methodologies underscore the emerging field of governmentality (Foucault, 1982; 1991).

There are three key themes within Lukes’ third dimension of power which I wish to articulate and expand upon. Firstly, he argues for a more pervasive definition of power beyond that exercised by one person over another, framed within concepts of “state” or “government”. Secondly, there is the subliminal socialisation and subjectivisation of the self into roles and behaviours required within and of society. Thirdly, these two specific, interconnected, themes find alignment and expression within the technologies and explanations with and through which we frame our world.

The first of these, drawn from Lukes’ first and second dimensions of power, is the nature of power. Where it is not militaristic, violent or otherwise coercive, the exercise of power requires the compliance and acceptance of the willing subject. The covert mechanisms

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through which this compliance is generated and perpetuated is critical to the theorisation of the three-dimensional view of power.

Lukes argues that there is a profound connection between power and knowledge, echoing Foucault’s arguments that power is complex, multi-faceted and social, and not limited to politics or conflicts, however derived and defined. Rather, power is rooted in a multiplicity of social practices and functions that constitute life in modern societies (Fraser, 1989), what we could characterise as the capillary nature of power (Foucault, 1991).

The mechanisms of power, consequently, both repress opposing behaviours and produce subjects socialised into society’s beliefs, norms and practices. Repression is a “negative” event, prohibiting and constraining what subjects wish to do and might desire. In contrast – or more properly, complementing the negative – production is a “positive” occurrence in that it traverses wants and desires and

induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse
(Foucault, 1980: 119).

Through these negative and positive mechanisms of power, agents’ characters are forged, rendering them both capable and obliged to embrace society’s norms of the valuable, the proper and the professional. As Lukes says
…these norms mould the soul and are inscribed upon the body…maintained by policing the boundary between the normal and the abnormal and by continuous and systematic surveillance that is both inter- and intra-subjective. (Lukes, 2005: 91).

In many ways this lucid summary of Lukes captures the essence of Foucault’s core idea and contribution. This body of work can be divided into Foucault’s early studies on observation, control and discipline (1975; 1980), and thereafter until his death in 1984 his work on governmentality (1991). This term, as we have seen, deals with the manner in which modern societies exercise the pervasive positive and negative senses of power: namely, the kinetics through which modern states and their governments administer populations; the ways in which individuals shape themselves, and the mechanisms through which these respective macro and micro processes become aligned.

Governmentality, as a notion, challenges the one-dimensional view of power as legitimate and based on the rational consent of its subjects. The conceptualisation of power is moved to a multiplicity of mechanisms and functions beyond which no personality can be effectively formed or exercised. It is within these multilayered assemblages of perspective and meaning that power resides.
I return to governmentality later within this chapter, but I will now address the second theme of Lukes’ construct of the third dimension of power: the subjectivisation of the self and the socialisation of beings into society’s norms and practices. This perspective aligns with the conceptualisation of personality touched upon within Foucault’s work (1982; 1991), but perhaps actually begins much earlier in the history of ideas.

Subjectivisation of the self connotes the shaping of an individual’s beliefs, values and preferences by factors external to them – what Lukes describes as ‘the training of desires and circumstances’ (2005). These adaptations are of themselves non-autonomous and automatic rather than the gentle, considered adjustment of aspiration or purpose. As there is a lack of choice or consideration in shaping an adaptive preference, Lukes argues that power is clearly at work through a combination of external and internal – or internalised – modes of constraints on action.

Lukes draws on the work of an earlier thinker, John Stuart Mill, in unpicking the twin tracks of socialization which form this constraint – most notably in the latter’s work on Victorian women – where he addresses the bribery of women and their overt intimidation, combining to form a life-long socialization of a subject-class.

All women are brought up from the very earliest years in the belief that their ideal of character is the very opposite of men;
not self-will, and government by self-control, but submission and yielding to the control of others. All the moralities tell them that it is the duty of women, and all the current sentimentalities that it is their nature, to live for others…to have no life but in their affections. (Mill, 1999 [1869]: 26)

It is important to unpack the nature of these twin constraints – the external, and those that have been internalised.

Bourdieu (1990; 2000) addresses the challenge set by Mill, by arguing that power as domination is projected from a multiplicity of external fields and processes and, thereafter, internalised and accepted as normal, natural and objective by the individual. The effectiveness of power is to be rendered invisible, whereby the conventional structures and behaviours within society are naturalised and accepted as objective, truthful states. What is more, this is not deliberately achieved through some Orwellian schematic of propaganda and secret-police repression. Rather the subtleties of symbolism and group learning lead to an emotional, self-imposed coercion.

In this context, education, professional qualification, organisational position and rank – Bourdieu suggests – offers power to those who hold them over those who do not. I return to this theme later in the thesis when I consider technologies within the workplace. Likewise, the wearing of uniform, a person’s gender, or physical
stature offer subliminal messages and exercises of power through our expectations of norms, common practices and expectations, the infrastructure of our everyday experiences.

As Marcuse (1964) observed, these exercises, along with the presence of common, enduring, systemic values, provide a universal discourse populated by a multiplicity of pervasive, self-validating hypotheses. As these combined narratives form a monopoly of knowledge, understanding and truth, the hypotheses themselves become ‘hypnotic definitions’ (Marcuse, 1964: 56), excluding any possibility of articulated dissent.

These narratives frame and subjectivise an agent’s understanding of the world, along with the very nature of knowledge and understanding, and his or her place in the order of things. Power is revealed in its exercise, not its intent. For it is not the subjugation of one group to another, although this can be witnessed, rather the intent of power, its causal substance, is the continuation of its exercise. The modes of narratives and hypotheses are both cause and effect, both manner of exercise and objective. The individual is part of this discourse as well as its target. For we can only express ourselves and derive meaning through the languages we are taught. Thinking, valuing and framing an understanding beyond the constraints of this discourse is not within our conception.
Consequently, the technologies and explanations that provide the vehicles for this profound socialisation of agents become critical to the continual, pervasive exercise of power. This strand of observation and review represents Lukes’ third key theme in his analysis of three-dimensional power. However, it is important to pause, first, and unwrap what is meant by the terms ‘technologies’ and ‘explanations.’

As Rose (1999) argues, it is perhaps self-evident that a fact or observation described as objective is of course socially constructed: “objects of thought are constructed in thought: what else could they be?” (Rose, 1999: x). Technologies and explanations represent the manner in which objects of thought, or knowledge, are constructed. This historicity of knowledge is significant in unveiling the authorities who are able to validate these objects of thought, aligned within a self-legitimising cycle of concepts and explanatory regimes of this knowledge, to the extent that they acquire the status of truth – evidenced through the observation of fact and application of truthful insight.

So, technologies represent the technical assemblages of the means of examination, understanding and judgement, and the techniques through which human endeavour is organised, arranged, presented and judged. Explanations refer to the concepts of language of understanding and the designation of constructs of evidence and appraisal.
It is through considerations of these technologies and explanations that both Lukes and Rose intersect with the work of Foucault. The latter’s genealogy of subjectivity – the manner in which the agent derives meaning, understanding and value – contributes towards a coherent approach to the study of knowledge, subjectivity and power, whereby these critical factors align to inculcate and produce the individual.

This is important, for where truths have been established and accepted, they are further analysed, classified and embedded within scientific, managerial and organisational practices and explanations. Thus, one set of truths and realities prevents the generation of another, for the genealogy of understanding and meaning chooses one route of explanation at the expense of others.

To the extent that the production of phenomena involves resources, controversies, institutions, authorities and so forth…knowledge cannot be divorced from the sociology of power…and to the extent that human beings conduct their lives under the descriptions of themselves that are produced in these processes. (Rose, 1999: xvi)

This intersection of the self, knowledge and power is honed in the manner in which society is articulated as a series of ‘problematisations.’ Rose describes this as the emergence of problems in relations to particular economic, military, geopolitical,
organisational and moral problems and concerns, which are normally articulated and addressed through managerial explanations and programmes.

Sociologically, the problematisation of an operation or an institution provides the dividing-line between organisational best-practice, so-called, or failure, and between personal normality and deviancy. The authorities who define phenomena as problematic do so through their understanding of knowledge as applied through the self, imbued with positional authority and power. It is an intoxicating, self-referencing exposition of derived truth and understanding, through which non-conformity, even creativity, is repressed and rejected.

For the purposes of this work, the technical assemblages of judgements, understanding and their associated norms are predominantly the managerial practices, techniques and behaviours, common and observed, within the defence industry, government and the military. Much of the language of explanatory systems within these organisational areas is expressed in terms of project management. Indeed, the Association of Project Management (APM), which has members in practice in government and across industry, actively talks of a managerial ‘body of knowledge’ which is presented as both objectively fashioned and scientifically derived (Burke, 2003). Smart acquisition leans heavily
on this construct of knowledge in framing its work (MoD, 2003; 2005).

The APM body of knowledge is subdivided into fifty five knowledge areas embracing planning and control techniques, financial and management accounting technologies, risk management and even ecological environmental management. Project managers themselves have become acknowledge as global professionals, with authority as subject-matter experts, accredited with membership of international management institutes.

These managerial tools and techniques, as assemblages of technological and explanatory concepts, are explored and analysed throughout the following chapters. For the moment it is sufficient to note that the impact of this knowledge and its applications towards both the problematisation of government activity, its importance in providing strategies for implementation to solve these problems, and the manner in which these technologies and explanatory norms subjectively shape the individual.

A formal methodology for capturing and harvesting a history of the self is beyond the scope of my study. However, it is possible to construct a number of dimensions or strands through which an analysis of subjectivity can be crafted. Firstly, there is the ontological, with the self perceived as consciousness, formed of habits, emotions and expressions of will. Secondly, there is an
ethical dimension through which self is revealed as the type of
being one ought to aspire to be; that is, virtuous, fulfilled,
knowledgeable and contributing to group ambitions and
aspirations. Thirdly, there is an epistemological dimension, with
self expressed through domains of knowledge and observation,
where self can be tested against constructs of normalcy to which
individuality converges. And, finally, there is a technical strand
through which the subject exercises practices and regimens in order
to improve or develop. To become better at work or more fulfilled
in the home; in short, to gain more knowledge of, and for, oneself
and consequently a better, more fulfilling place in society.

However, it is important to acknowledge that there is no neat or
linear analytical tool here, for

the genealogy of subjectivity is not a matter of the succession
of epochs...but is complex, variable, material, technical, the
confluence of a whole variety of different shifts and practices
with no single point of origin or principle of unification.
(Rose, 1999: xvii)

Yet this sense of subjectivity of the self, albeit non-linear and
complex, glints at an understanding of the government of conduct
within the individual, and how the sum of individuals’ aspirations
reflect events and occurrences at the level of society. It is the
interplay and interdependency between discourse and subject that my analysis within the government domain explores and reflects.

In response to the theoretical challenge – how to analyse and understand government – the interplay between self, knowledge and power return us neatly to themes of governmentality and assemblages of regimes of control manifested, of course, through the very domains of knowledge, power and subject we have been discussing.

5.4 Governmentality and an introduction to the Neoliberal State

By way of an introduction to this chapter, I briefly defined governmentality as a term describing the modes through which we can analyse how we are governed and govern ourselves, and how the exercise of power and control are manifested within society. Pluralist students of politics view government as nothing more than the framework for rational decision making and the benign exercise of public order generated through its institutions and officials. For them, it is self-evident that the “state” equals “government” and that government is the same as the state. Government, therefore, is a physical entity, a noun that describes something we can see in bricks and mortar and flesh and bones.
Yet the word “governmentality” implies something much more than this. It suggests activities and practices, a way of thinking and understanding and a critique of the physical, visible explanation of government as institution. The term resonates and demands a response. My own rejoinder is a simple one. Governmentality is not the seeking of insight into “what” government is, but rather claws at the more profound question of “how” government is. For Dean (2007), Rose (1999) and others, it is the question of the age.

I need to unpick this some more. I start by addressing the lineage of governmentality as a term and the context of its initial use. I deal with the latter point first as context invariably drives meaning. Dean (1999) argues that governmentality has arisen most recently as a form of analysis for understanding a very specific, though uncertain, modernity, possessed of distinct phenomena. Firstly, Thatcherism and, thereafter, Blairism within the United Kingdom represent part of a wider macroeconomic and social trend within western democracies to marginalise the social-democratic consensus of a welfare state with social-interventionist instincts and practices. The second phenomenon of this modernity is the collapse of state socialism within Eastern Europe, whilst the third feature, Dean suggests, is the ascendancy of indigenous, neo-national concepts of rights and obligations and associated political movements within erstwhile stable polities.
If this represents the modern context of the term ‘governmentality’, then its specific genealogy is of particular interest and significance. In a lecture in the College de France in February 1978, Michel Foucault introduced the notion of governmentality, which was subsequently published a year later within the journal *Ideology and Consensus* (Foucault, 1991). The work responded to the transitional nature of liberal government and a recession from notions of welfare and state economic support, whilst also presenting a schematic of the history of social government and personal conduct and obligation. The emerging monetarist economics of the time coupled with the consensual neoliberal politics of the 1980s and beyond represent, for Foucault, the dialectical consequences of the genealogy of government.

Specifically, Foucault’s use of the term ‘governmentality’ distinguishes and analyses the specific mentalities, forms and regimes of government as evolved within Europe. Government, in Foucault’s well-known phrase, is the ‘conduct of conduct’ (Foucault, 1982), a calculated, deliberate direction of human behaviour and activity. This was startling in 1978, for Foucault was asserting that government was far beyond the benign, consensual interplay of institution and citizen, and more concerned with the profound interdependencies of the government of the state, the government of the self, and how these powerful forces distil into the government of others.
This is not the meaning of government wedded to notions of the nation-state and liberal constitutional administrations. It is the meaning of government where emphasis is placed on human conduct, modes of truth and understanding, and the alignment of the individual to these assemblages of reality through specific means and techniques.

This sense of governmentality is important through this very construct of being interdisciplinary and wide-ranging. As Dean (1999) argues, this rubric of governmentality addresses questions across a pantheon of disciplines and domains. Hence, Donzelot (1979; 1984) is concerned with poverty and welfare policies and practices, whilst aspects of political theory are addressed by Hinders (1996) and Tully (1993). Rose (1985; 1989), moreover, is motivated by issues of psychology and the self.

Indeed, the scholarship associated with governmentality goes beyond these disciplines to address accounting and economics (Hopwood and Miller, 1994), business and corporate governance (Miller and O’Leary, 1993) and sexual politics (Minson, 1993) to name but a few. It seems, therefore, that the analyses governmentality has helped to form represent much more than just another neologism and academic fashion. There is a seriousness of purpose within this body of work that resonates into the 21st century, chiming with phenomena such as smart acquisition. Yet, it appears to be a body of knowledge, substantive in nature, but with
a loose chronology or taxonomy of forms of thinking and tools of analyses, which make it hard to pin down and capture. Indeed, Foucault’s own writings are at best a fragmented and interpretive legacy on the problematisation of government through which an emerging set of analytics of government can be gleaned.

I shall return to this concept of analytics of government shortly, but first I wish to consider Foucault’s phrase ‘conduct of conduct’ (Foucault, 1982: 220) as defining government. It is a cleverly constructed phrase, combining a sense of guidance, leadership and direction with personal behaviour, comportment and actions. There is a sense of both external regulation of the self, but also self-guidance and an adherence to certain codes of conduct and norms of public behaviour.

There is also a sense that this behaviour can, and perhaps should, be monitored and regulated rationally and deliberately through both our own efforts and also external agents charged with this regulation – perhaps professional associations or universities. Government, in this sense, is a calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and actors through a variety of techniques and constructs of knowledge, that seek to shape our conduct. These work through our desires, notions of self-interest, aspirations and beliefs for definite or emerging objectives, and with a diverse sense of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and even outcomes (Dean, 2007).
Analysing government, consequently, is concerned with the interplays of these authorities and agencies, their bodies of knowledge, techniques and methodologies, as well as the entity to be governed and how it is formed and framed. Governmentality, in this diagnostic sense, is, therefore, just what we have discussed – the manner in which we think about government and governing and the different mentalities, both macro and micro, of government.

However, critically, the notion of governmentality has a wider, more complex meaning in Foucault’s work beyond this definition (Foucault, 1991). Firstly, it represents a particular regime of government that exists within a historical context from the second half of the 20th century and has as its object the population as a whole whilst being aligned to the emergence of notions of political economy. Government is for the populace as a whole, that is its end state or objective, whilst at the same time it is an economic government. This is, for me, Foucault’s great insight. To govern, therefore, to ensure the happiness and well-being of the population it is necessary to govern through a specific prism, that of the economy.

As well as conventional notions of ‘economy’: that of the means by which supposedly infinite notions of demand are matched to finite resources and selective means of production, and the role of the human being in that process as a ‘means of production’, an ‘input’ and a ‘consumer’, smart acquisition within my governmentalist
wrap becomes an economy of language, discourse, positioning and personal promotion. In the case study in part 3, I come to demonstrate that my informants within the smart acquisition project team can be seen to inhabit the economy of smart acquisition solely through its particular modes of language, as team members produce nothing physical but rather focus their efforts on discourse, managerialist commentary and measurement. And if these non-productive activities are performed well, personal promotion follows, reinforcing and further legitimising the hegemony of smart acquisition.

Secondly, the historical context of governmentality implies a relationship between government and forms of power and authority manifested in notions of sovereignty and discipline. Sovereign power is exercised through judicial arms and agencies of the state, whilst discipline is concerned with the exercise of power over and through the individual and the composition of aggregates of human beings within stratified classes, armies, factories, schools, or a myriad of other social forms and institutions. There is a historical correlation and interdependency between sovereignty and discipline that, Foucault believes, is lodged within the bureaucratic apparatus of the state that is now wedded to notions of economic ends and transformational efficiencies.

This is important in reviewing the exercise of power within this richer sense of governmentality. Sovereignty is the exercise of
authority within specific borders and through specific means such as the raising of taxes or powers of arrest. The exercise of discipline, in contrast, is the regulation and constructed ordering of the population within and across territories and borders through practices such as education, trade and the organisation of work. It is the presentation of populations as resources for economic ends.

Perhaps a third characteristic of governmentality stressed by Foucault is one which frames and contextualises this economic sense of population within regimes of risks and mitigations, presented as state security policies and functions explicitly for the protection of the population and the economic interests it enables. It is a characteristic that places people as both subject and agent through an interdependent set of arrangements within what might be described as apparatuses of security (Dean, 2007: 20). These apparatuses comprise the military and police, civil servants and the wider mechanisms of the management of the state and economy.

Functions of personal discipline and state sovereignty are recast within a concern for the security and protection of the citizen amidst wider management of risks and threats to the person. It is this identification and management of risk, however stated, which resides within government and industry perspectives, their assemblages of reality and subsequent managerial initiatives and interventions.
Moreover, risk management at state, corporate or individual levels, forms a persuasive analysis presented through techniques and technologies that define behaviours and actions, casting shadows on the way we view the world, presenting it as a series of dangers, threats and uncertainties. This is a theme which is explored in subsequent chapters. For now, this characteristic of governmentality presents knowledge, and the technical means of disseminating this knowledge, as a resource derived, dissected and described within the lexicon of ‘risk management’.

For Foucault, therefore, these specific near-historical characteristics mutate, combine and coagulate into a specific governmentality of the contemporary state, generating a specification of the dominant rationality of government, namely liberalism and an extreme derivative, neoliberalism, which I discuss elsewhere. For the manner in which sovereignty and discipline is exercised, to optimise economic effectiveness and minimize threats through the apparatus of security and the watchfulness of a fearful people, is the DNA of governmentality. We can witness it within the programmes and administrative imperatives that define government’s interaction with the population. It is to this analytics of government, so describe by Foucault (1991), that the attention is now drawn.
5.5 Analytics of Government

First, a definition: an analytics of government merely examines the conditions and factors within which regimes of practices exist and are transformed, with these regimes simply being coherent, identifiable ways of undertaking activities. Importantly, perhaps, these regimes define the manner in which institutional and societal practices are constructed into objects of knowledge, which in themselves can be problematised and subjected to management intervention to mitigate risks and inefficiencies.

An analytics of government, therefore, pulls at the thread – or, more properly, a number of threads – within the body politic to unravel the perspectives, rationalities and technologies that provide the self-evident, common-sense, self-referenced truths we see within government and commerce. As Dean (2007: 22) observes

These regimes of practices give rise to and are informed and shaped by various forms of knowledge and expertise such as medicine, criminology, social work…and so on. Such forms of knowledge define the objects of practices..., codify appropriate ways of dealing with them, set the aims and objectives of practice, and define the professional and institutional locus of authoritative agents of expertise.
An analytics of government, therefore, provides the intellectual framework and transformational vehicle through which these specific regimes of practices such as education or, for our purposes, military procurement are called into question or problematised. And it is these perceived problems, framed through this analytical paradigm, within these regimes of practices that are subjected to deliberate and systematic forms of thought and time-bound activities. The objective: to transform these practices to ones which are more economic, efficient, or socially and economically effective in terms defined by the analytical framework itself.

This analytics of government yields a number of explicit programmes which are robustly reformist and transformational in nature, deploying certain types of knowledge which can be cross-fertilised over institutions and regimes of practices, representing a multiplicity of technologies and behaviours drawn from business, accounting, the social sciences and economics. Indeed, when I introduced smart acquisition in the preceding chapters, it is clear that its formation, structure and intent characterises and manifests it as such a transformational programme.

An analytics of government is concerned with how society governs and is governed and how regimes of practices such as military
procurement are problematised, operationalised and transformed through change or improvement programmes. Dean (2007) identifies four key dimensions to such a framework.

Firstly, there is a very specific way or perceiving and presenting information as knowledge and truth. Secondly, this is aligned to manners of questioning, ways of thinking and a certain vocabulary and procedure for deriving these truths, drawn from the social, behavioural and human sciences. Thirdly, there are absolute ways of behaving and responding to these truths associated with notions of expertise that are dependent upon established techniques and technologies. And, lastly, there are characteristic ways of forming and defining the individual, ourselves and others, that are referenced from within these belief-systems, measured and valued through the manipulation of these technologies.

In the next chapter I discuss how these characteristics resonate and reflect within a neoliberal construct. By neoliberal I mean, as I described in chapter 1, the philosophical, doctrinal and practical alignment of the state to the expansion of private capital and managerialist discourses across public or societal spaces. These discourses of rule, the self, social explanations and norms, institutions and identities collude to ensure the hegemony of private capital over notions of free-will or rights, whereby society equates to economic governance, security and the control of risks rather than expressions of individual – or, rather, individualistic – agency
(Larner, 2000). In short, agency is governed through technologies and explanations that enwrap the individual through economically constructed forms and meanings.

Economic markets are viewed simply as self-regulating forces of supply and demand through free-competition unimpeded by borders without government constraint or moderation. In a neoliberal sense, the perceived natural efficiency of the global market or markets is preferable socially and intellectually to state provision of services or intervention within the marketplace. Doctrinally, the state is inefficient, bureaucratic and institutionally corrupt. Hence, neoliberals are said to advocate the privatisation of public enterprises, deregulation of the economy, a withdrawal from state welfare provision, the expansion and deregulation of international markets and the removal of constraints on global financial flows.

Yet I cannot help but sense that even this preceding discussion is a glib, almost superficial, high-level labelling of the neoliberal phenomenon. What I come onto discuss is neoliberalism at the micro-level, manifested through regimes of practices and realities that drive the agency of the individual, his or her economic and social meaning, and the collective bio-political surveillance and normalisation we all involuntarily support and enduringly preserve. For this, as we have discussed, is the nature of governmentality, its genealogy and core characteristics. As a
discipline it offers subliminal meaning and insight into the very fabric of the neoliberal state, as we shall come onto discuss. But it may also perpetuate it.

5.6 Conclusion

By way of the literature, this chapter has established a theoretical framework around thoughts of how to understand government and introduced notions of governmentality, power and authority. It has offered a theoretical toolbox of themes and insights from which to unpick the function, rationale and impact of smart acquisition as fractal of government.

Initially I undertook an overview and critical assessment of the pluralist traditions through institutional, behavioural and functional paradigms. This was critiqued by the work of Lukes (2005) in seeing government and the exercise and deployment of power it legitimises as a multi-dimensional complex set of realities. Essentially, the sense of power was rooted in a multiplicity of social practices and functions that embrace government but goes significantly beyond the limits of its institutions. These mechanisms of power – complex, individual and institutional – contribute to the wider critique of governmentality which I sought in the works of Foucault and Dean (1999; 2007), and housed in an early consideration of neoliberal perspectives.
Through the insights derived from this chapter, smart acquisition at one level represents a transformation strategy addressing the problematisation of inefficiency and cost failures within the regime of practice of military procurement. The programme provides an understanding of what knowledge is necessary within the regime, a taxonomy of ways of thinking and perceiving, and a vocabulary and framework for being, behaving and interacting. It provides a clearly articulated abstract of the ‘expert’, and details how practitioners within the programme can become one. And it provides the technologies and tools to frame and define the individual. But at the programme level also, smart acquisition hints at a greater understanding of what characterises government and governing.

Within public regimes of practices, of which smart acquisition is but one change programme, these assemblages of knowledge, behaviours and technologies provide meaning, self regulation and external validation. They represent both a soft control of individual self alignment to norms and common truths, but also an overt governmental control backed by legal and commercial notions of authority, sovereignty and individual obligation. We are left with a notion of government governing through a form of indigenous alliance between organisations, individuals and regimes of common truths. Through this alliance, government in its wider sense can construct artificial markets, develop new notions of efficiency and security, and legitimise collective rational surveillance. This sense of reflexive, pervasive government within the neoliberal state, with
smart acquisition as a complex agent of orthodoxy, observation and control, is where we now turn in the following chapters.
6.1 Introduction

In chapter 4, I described and analysed what I referred to as the linear transformation model and argued that this has been used to brand and legitimise the smart acquisition change process. My argument is that this model represents only a superficial explanation of the military procurement process in the UK. Consequently, unpicking smart acquisition through this model merely explains defence procurement in the terms through which the smart acquisition change programme has been established and implemented: in short, it is entirely self-referential. The themes within the linear model, wrapped within notions of project management economic transformation, represent a legitimisation and justification for action rather than offering a theoretical analytical lens leading to a more nuanced and sophisticated understanding and insight.

Consider the comments of McWatt, a senior cost engineer within the Defence Procurement Agency’s Pricing and Forecasting Group. His team is charged with assuring the MoD that the cost architecture underpinning a contractor’s pricing decisions is robust and accurate. He has worked on a wide range of defence programmes, both within integrated project teams and defence manufacturers.
If you try to understand smart acquisition on its own terms, through its own propaganda, you’ll end up endorsing it as a thoroughly good idea. Talk to the guys having all innovation sucked from them, and you might get a different perspective. (Interview: McWatt, 2004)

To generate a more critical lens through which to explicate smart acquisition, this chapter introduces an alternative framework, drawn from the themes of governmentality I introduced in chapter 5. This new framework is designed to access, reference and understand the key conceptual drivers of change, as well as to explore the symbols, language and dialogue through which smart acquisition can be interrogated and grasped. In this way, a nuanced understanding can be achieved that cannot be attained through the linear model.

This alternative model embraces themes from chapter 5: constructs of power dimensions, notions of knowledge as subjective narrative and discourse, and the nature of socialisation and how individuals are offered and seize meaning within organisations and society. In this chapter I contextualise these conceptual forms within a broader neoliberal discourse that, in turn, provides a grounding or theoretical anchor for a governmentalist analysis of smart acquisition through my subsequent case study in Part 3.
My rejection of the linear model has forced me to search for other ways of unpicking smart acquisition. I will show that during interviews with members of the UK defence community three themes repeatedly emerged which warrant further discussion and analysis. These are thoughts, notions and commentaries relating to managerialism, homogenisation and modernisation. I have been surprised at the frequency with which these three concepts have been offered by a number of respondents. For ease of reference I have labelled these the Smart Acquisition Triptych and, through this chapter, I demonstrate that they represent a sound starting point, or perhaps I actually mean end point, for a new model of analysis for smart acquisition.

It would be counterproductive and falsely constructed for these three themes to be left dangling, alone, within some kind of theoretical vacuum. So, in this chapter, I explore them within the context of the theoretical understandings introduced in earlier chapters, embracing notions of power and control as aligned to culture, ideology and what I describe as the context and systematisation of both problem-setting and solving. As I have explained, this construct is highly relevant at governmental, organisational and individual levels of agency.

The chapter concludes with the unveiling of an alternative model, utilised in subsequent chapters, for the analytical journey into smart acquisition through the entry-points of the triptych, perhaps acting
as some form of military route-map or battle-plan. Naturally, I make no apology for the work of Michel Foucault and thinkers who followed the trail he set forming a key component of these attack forces.

In section 6.2, I ground the approach by discussing the key notions that appear to constantly recur in conversations with smart acquisition practitioners, both civil service and military, and I offer an understanding of why these elements are important. In this manner I seek to give a voice to those who work under smart acquisition who appear, paradoxically, to embrace large elements of the smart acquisition theology whilst rejecting tracts of its hegemonic discourse. Section 6.3 unpicks these voices, distilling them in to key vessels for analysis, and contextualises these derived themes through the theoretical understandings offered by my emerging governmentalist analysis.

Section 6.4 goes on to unveil the resulting Smart Acquisition Triptych, exploring in turn each component of managerialism, homogenisation and modernisation. I conclude the chapter by arguing that this approach has armed me with a weapon set of analytics and discourses that start to make sense of the complexities and inconsistencies that form smart acquisition, allowing me to understand how the conduct of the collective, and the individual within the collective, is formed and governed.
6.2 Whispers from the Ranks

During the course of this research a constant theme that emerged from interviewees was that defence change and the constituent elements of smart acquisition embrace concepts of management, process homogenisation and modernisation. These themes, in turn, it is suggested, are critical to an understanding of what smart acquisition represents. Yet these factors are not referred to in any official discourse that emphasises the economic imperative for change, given the assertions of the traditional linear model and how it relates to public sector reform. Indeed, Daneeka, a senior civil servant from within the Defence Procurement Agency said

We’re encouraged to think modern management, not leadership, but within pre-ordained boundaries. Smart acquisition is very much about today, rejecting what we did yesterday. (Interview: Daneeka, 2005)

Moreover, Michaela, a programme manager within the Defence Logistics Organisation, talked at interview about the importance of ‘process’ to smart acquisition. She felt that it was not possible for managers to deviate from the confines of the Smart Acquisition Handbook (MoD, 2004). This document has been presented, she believed, both overtly and subliminally as best practice, and divergence from this standard was, in her view, career inhibiting. She asserted that
I don’t think or problem-solve in the normal sense of that term. I diligently follow the Handbook. (Interview: Michaela, 2006)

Milo is a director with a major UK defence company. He picks-up this theme of problem-solving, believing that MoD programme managers possess sound project and organisational management credentials but lack creativity, leadership and any sense of risk mitigation, to use his terms which, perhaps themselves, are managerialist in manner

They slavishly follow management edicts, even when common-sense should take them in a different direction. There is no ability for critical analysis, reflection or innovation. I honestly believe they would rather fail following the right management process than be successful doing something new. (Interview: Milo, 2006)

The majority of interviewees believed that concepts of modernisation, management and homogenised processes are critical to what smart acquisition represents. However, when I have explored these ideas throughout the discussions it has been as if these three perspectives, viewed together, collectively provide insight into an illusive landscape that a one-dimensional gaze would fail to grasp. Hence the concept of the smart acquisition triptych – a picture or relief carved on three panels, hinged
vertically together, offering three access-points to a greater, coherent whole.

I explore these three themes as an integral element of a revised analytical model. Before commencing this though, I believe it to be important to explain initially just what I mean by ‘modern’, ‘managerial’ and ‘homogenisation’ within the context of this work.

‘Modern’ or ‘modernisation’ in the everyday governmental or policy sense refers to the processes, imperatives and behaviours for making organisations and systems ‘fresh’ and ‘up to date’; the adapting of something that is perceived as old and unfit to the needs and ways of the contemporary world. To enable this, the body of knowledge and practices of change management are concerned with an organisation embracing what is presented as best practice tailored to the needs of the client organisation (Cope, 2000). As I discussed in earlier chapters, the structures, relationships, tools and internal market proposed by smart acquisition’s management consultants were modern within this concept and definition.

Giddens (1990) views on modernity – as opposed to modern – suggest that western society is existing within a period of high modernity, with ‘modernity’ itself defined as the norms of social life, organisational structures and economic forces that emerged from 17th century Europe to become global in their influence. Indeed, the process of modernisation – the drive for organisations
and individuals to be modern – is a significant characteristic of this period of high-modernity. A symptom of this dynamic is the professionalisation of ‘change’ into a management practice and academic body of knowledge. For Giddens high modernity ‘connects individuals to large-scale systems as part of complex dialectics of change at both local and global poles’ (Giddens, 1990).

Within my analysis of a specific defence integrated project team, the above perspective becomes important as it enables and progresses an analysis of cultural shifts associated with changes to organisational structures, and how these changes drive behaviours. This is reflected within the establishment of maturity models for smart acquisition and the development of behavioural and functional competencies for acquisition teams. Importantly, how these teams face each other within crafted customer/supplier relationships can also be considered and explored as intrinsically a modern phenomenon.

‘Managerialism’ is the term I use for the promotion of so-called rational management and business practices, behaviours and beliefs as the solution for efficient and effective organisational control, personal development and economic transformation. Managerial phenomena are observable and clearly manifested within the depoliticisation, targets and organisational practices associated with
the Blair government’s UK public sector reform agenda within the UK, since 1997 (Froud, 2003).

Armstrong and Stephens (2005) argue that management itself, as a construct of managerialism, is concerned merely with deciding what to do and then getting it done, principally through people, but also utilising other resources. Management, therefore, is a process involving a mix of rational and problem-solving activities, but also possesses judgemental and intuitive characteristics. Zaleznik (2004) further states that management emphasizes rationality and control, by adopting impersonal attitudes towards the establishment and meeting of team and individual goals and objectives. Specifically, it limits choices as it is driven by narrow, consensus-derived, purposes whilst, importantly, favouring the tried and tested ways of doing things. This is an important insight, as it suggests that notions of management, when expressed in these terms, are implicitly risk averse and intuitively closed to new initiatives and constructs.

For me, when thinking about managerialism, it is hard to de-couple the concept from earlier thoughts on governmentality. Rose (1997) sees governmentality, of course, as the assemblages, institutions, discourses and actors that, collectively, problematise, analyse and thereafter set the context for the exercise of power, provision of public services and the path of economic actions in bureaucratic states. Aligned to this construct, the neoliberal tradition rejects big
government and political decision-making for public services like health and defence (Hood, 1990). Rather, it promotes the reform of individual and institutional behaviours to enable greater competitiveness and efficiency, and projects these implied reforms through a functional sense of management (Boden, Gummett, Cox and Barker, 1998). Specifically, public sector services can be broken-up into customer-supplier relationships that are expressed through markets, whether real or created, and allows for private sector penetration of what was traditionally the public domain. At its heart, neoliberalism rejects big public sector organisations as bureaucratic, rigid and exchequer-dependent in favour of organisations constantly evolving through market dynamics (Dunleavy & Hood, 1994).

Under the heading of managerialism, I have in future pages captured and unpicked the omnipresent themes of smart acquisition, namely, those of partnering, programming and scheduling, the management and transfer of risk, budgeting and financing, and governance (Pollitt, 1995). Contextually key in this sense is the management agenda set by Gershon (2004) and the application thereafter of efficiency principles and protocols right across the public sector within Britain.

Using the concept of ‘homogenisation’ I consider how both acquisition and change is staged and managed through consulting techniques and processes and pre-ordained management and
operational processes. This suggests that the delivery of defence logistics and organisational transformation success is measured and validated through behaviours, process adherence and change models that are objective, formal and rational. Innovation and management licence within this model means adherence to stated, established and inviolate notions of ‘best practice’.

‘Best practice’ is perceived within defence to be the discipline of project management. Project management best practice, according to the *Smart Acquisition Handbook* (MoD, 2004) is the body of knowledge associated with the UK Association of Project Managers. For all UK defence activities the same activities and processes should be embraced and enacted. The first of these is project integration, where inputs from several knowledge areas are brought together. In terms of dominant process, project scope management is to be followed. This includes the processes required to ensure that the project or activity includes all the work required, and only the work required, to complete the project successfully. It consists of authorisation processes, scope planning, scope definition, scope change management and verification.

Moreover, this body of knowledge presents four key elements which determine programme deliverables: ‘scope’, ‘time’, ‘cost’ and ‘quality’. The other knowledge areas provide the means for this delivery; these are systems integration, human resources management, communication, risk management and contracting.
At one level of analysis this represents a mere list of management key words, brigaded as overarching process to which behaviours and practices should align. But these words also provide the artefacts and discursive tools through which human interaction within defence procurement has to occur and within which they are embedded. The significance of this will become clear as I develop my critical model and apply it to a specific project team.

The key issue is that the dominant discourse dictates that there is only one perceived way – that identified as defence sector best practice – for generating military power at the macro level, and only one functional process to be followed and adhered to at the micro level. These are captured within specific functional guidelines and templates, including a behavioural framework. How this homogenisation of process and behaviour is pursued in practice, and its impact on notions of agency and control, is at the heart of the analysis presented hereafter.

6.3 Contextualising the Discussion – Ideas and Themes

I know from the interviews I have conducted and the wider discussions that these have enabled that certain notions or themes are important in understanding smart acquisition for those who work in defence procurement. As I have shown, there is a strong sense of managerialism embracing all forms or notions of
management from ‘project management’ to ‘process management’. I know also that these themes and notions are heavily homogenised through constructs of ‘best practice’, somehow imbued with a sense of ‘modern’, ‘betterment’ and ‘transformational’. What I wish to do now is to take these themes and contextualise them through a discussion of the major ideas that flowed from my review of governmentality in chapter 5. In this way I will show that the emerging views of those who work in smart acquisition intersect and resonate with the wider theoretical critique.

Firstly, I wish to consider the dominant themes from my interviews within the broader context of the neoliberal discourse I previously introduced. There are a number of approaches that seek to interrogate the phenomenon of neoliberalism and its modern US version, neoconservatism. Hayek (1944; 1979), for instance, places neoliberalism at the forefront of the quest to rationalise, theorise and deconstruct the problems of government. Traditionally – at least since the end of the Second World War – these have been viewed as big, interventionist state problems. Rose (2002) sees in this and in the work of Friedman (1980) an attempt by government elites to legitimise activities and seek intellectual authority for government’s actual authority. In other words, neoliberalism provides what I would describe as an ‘intellectual technology’ for the justification of emerging themes associated with the withdrawal of the state and the championing of private sector and ‘partnered’ reform initiatives such as smart acquisition.
Consequently, a governmental rationality that could be described as neoliberal is one that, according to Dean (2003), problematizes the public sector as bureaucratic, rigid, inefficient, wasteful and dependent. Neoliberalism in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries seeks to reform and change governmental institutional conduct so that it becomes effective, efficient and economic (Pollitt, 1995); the rationale at the heart of the traditional linear model of change that I rejected earlier and the justifications for the smart acquisition reforms themselves.

To effect this transformation, Dean (2003) argues, the change agenda promotes the extension of market rationality to all governmental spheres of activity. A public, government-owned and delivered programme and culture is rejected in favour of enterprise, responsible autonomy and an emphasis on individual and collective economic choice, framed within an internal or artificially constructed market.

The problematisation of government in this manner is exceptionally powerful, for the essence of neoliberalism in practice is that it is seldom perceived as a form of political rationality but rather a techno-rational exercise in commonsense and economic reality (Dean, 2003). This is extremely relevant to an understanding of smart acquisition. I have argued that the smart procurement initiative that yielded the smart acquisition reform agenda was derived from the Labour Party’s pre-1997 election rationale of
commonsense or the so-called ‘third-way’ approach to public sector reform (Giddens, 1991). This, in turn, drove the subsequent defence review when the Labour Party was in government. I also showed that this notion of commonsense was legitimised and unveiled in terms of efficiency and economy, a rejection of bureaucracy, and the championing of internal markets, reform projects, and economic rather than political accountability.

Smart acquisition, therefore, is an inherent product of neoliberalism and a profound understanding of what the phenomenon means for the UK defence and public sectors must be grounded within this realisation. Smart acquisition would appear not merely to be something to be explored within the contextual framework of neoliberalism; rather, it is a manifestation of neoliberalism, and as such represents a core ingredient of the larger whole. Recognising today’s neoliberalism, therefore, is critical if smart acquisition itself is to be digestible.

In the rest of this chapter I explore smart acquisition as a purposive public policy manifestation that justifies and reinforces notions of the neoliberal state. Rose (1997) argues that an understanding of culture, power and ideology underpins and grounds critical reflections on neoliberalism. As I rely heavily on this neoliberal paradigm I now address these three key themes from Rose.
Culture

Governmentality, as discussed in chapter 5, introduces the notion of a cultural aspect to smart acquisition. Important here is the work of Cameron and Quinn (1999), who note that a society’s dominant culture emerges historically from forces of control and organisational stratification and hierarchy. Control is not mechanistic, but rather borne out of the individual and collective need to belong; a basic human aspiration to be recognised and approved of by society, be it an organisation or a nation-state.

In essence, we collude with others’ attempts to manage our behaviour and, subconsciously, direct the activities of others (Giddens, 1991). Moreover, within organisational culture and change management methodologies, instruments of organisational control and the assessment of performance are viewed as scientific and objective, re-enforcing the belief that alternatives to those articulated by the control system are flawed and dysfunctional (Foucault, 1994).

In earlier chapters I demonstrated that a dynamic for the smart acquisition change initiative was the perceived necessity for profound cultural change to enable demand-supply reforms. This cultural reform, it appears, subliminally reinforces the absolute supremacy of the concept of the marketisation of defence and the wider public sector. The language, symbols and communications of this cultural paradigm become the factors normalising behaviour,
and manifest themselves as knowledge and understanding for those working within and observing the sector. This becomes extremely powerful in practice as culture is a relationship between these dominant beliefs, notions of articulated core values and very real behaviours (Haralambas, 1982).

**Power**

Whilst chapter 5 discussed in detail constructs of power relationships and obligations within smart acquisition, I wish to summarise and articulate the derived importance of this sense of power as drawn from Rose (1997; 1999) Hirst (1981; 1993) and Yeatman (1994; 1998). Both Haralambas (1982) and Foucault (1975; 1991) argue that power is a relationship and discourse between system subjects, and not an absolute concept to be owned by one in relation to the other. Yet many of my respondents talked of power and control interchangeably, as a constant sum, being practiced and consumed by senior staff.

As I discussed in chapter 5, one perspective holds that those in power further their sectional interests, which are constantly in conflict with those subject to that power, through a form of legitimised functional control. The constant-sum perspective sees power used for the exploitation and suppression of one group by another.
The functionalist perspective rejects the notion of a constant-sum of power, held by one group at the expense of the weak in society or within an organisation. Rather, Parsons (1937; 1953) sees power as a variable-sum. In this sense power is measured by the degree to which an organisation’s goals are realised. It could be said that the greater the capacity for achieving goals and targets, the more power within an organisation. Co-operation on this scale requires direction, control and notions of legitimate authority acting rationally within positions of command and management. Both the leaders and the led are joined in the furtherance of collective, joined goals, to which all members of an organisation have contributed.

Power, therefore, within these two perspectives, can either be seen as the suppression and exploitation of one group by another or a manifestation of shared goals of the members of an organisation, maximising their efficiency and effectiveness. Within the first approach, the control system is designed and controlled by the elite to subjugate the subordinates, whilst the second voices and stresses the importance of ‘buy-in’ from all members of an organisation contributing towards collective goals for mutual, shared benefits.

Smart acquisition utilises the rationalism of Parson’s tradition in the manner in which it is presented to the defence sector as a considered and organic practice. However, caution is needed with this approach to power as an academic argument is providing a self-referencing justification for smart acquisition’s existence. Rather,
we shall be helped by an analysis of the space where homogenisation, modernisation and managerialism, as themes, intersect to form the dominant discourse within defence procurement.

It is perhaps more helpful to view organisational power and control principally as a systematised phenomenon, with individual behaviour socialised through norms and expectations and visible means of control. In this sense it automatises and dis-individualises power. It cannot reside in a person, or be traded and rationalised between people, for it exists within a concerted distribution of organisations, individuals and communications. Its mechanisms generate the relationships of subtle control within which we are all caught-up. Culture and power are intrinsically linked within the generic discourse of neoliberalism (Foucault, 1988; 1991) as expressions of the capillary nature of control.

Ideology

It is not my intention to spend much time discussing the nature of ideology, but I wanted to introduce the topic here in this manner for two reasons. Firstly, Rose (1997) reflects on the idea that notions of ideology join with a sense of power and culture in understanding neoliberalism. Secondly, the notion of ideology emerges in the following pages as a key theme of my analysis.
What is meant by “ideology”? Goodwin (1982) holds that ideology is a tradition of ideas and expressions of convictions and beliefs widely held from the Enlightenment onwards, and that knowledge through ideological reference is relative to the time, place and context of specific ideas. This is significant, for her work summarises a number of characteristics of ideology which can be deduced in the following ways. Firstly, ideology presents ideas and knowledge in a manner which entails and, thereafter, enables and promotes certain kinds of beliefs and actions. It provides a way of explaining the world, and provides a route-map for followers. Secondly, ideology has persuasive force and possesses moral imperatives. Moreover, modern ideology is supposedly scientific and rational, or rather is presented based on patterns of arguments like those found in scientific study and subsequent discourse. Yet, despite this presentation, ideology can be perceived as irrational, illogical and its key beliefs irreconcilable which each other, when analysed.

I shall return to each of Goodwin’s points as we unpick smart acquisition through the emerging model. It is enough to state, at present, that my contention brought forward from earlier chapters is that smart acquisition seems to possess these characteristics and can be viewed as contextually ideological.
Smart Acquisition as Risk Management

The sense, so far, from this discussion is that smart acquisition can be homed within a neoliberal discourse and, in turn, this neoliberalism is characterised by notions of ideology, an underpinning sense of culture, and power relations and dynamics. I now introduce the concept of some sense of constant risk or threat to society and its members that must be repressed and neutralised: smart acquisition, therefore, as risk mitigation. This is significant as I discussed in chapters 3 and 4 the notion of project managing constructs of risk within the defence procurement process acts as a critical legitimising factor for the smart acquisition reforms (MoD, 2002; 2004).

Beck (1992) relates designed and constructed notions of risk to the concept of modernisation. For now, I wish to dwell upon one aspect of his work: namely, his assumption that the nature of risk within the modernisation process generates causally what he describes as a ‘risk society.’ Such a society is one that is dominated by articulations of risk and mitigation initiatives formed as rational equipment or service programmes to minimise or manage away these very risk constructs. It is a closed-loop, self referencing governmental dynamic.

In addition, Dean (1999) argues that there is an alignment and affinity between the neoliberal state, the technologies and rationalities of risk management that can be applied by the state,
and notions of programme uncertainty and randomness. As a vocabulary and a set of beliefs and practices, risk management is perceived as the process through which individuals, organisations and communities take responsibility for identifying and mitigating their own senses of risk through contrived iterations of liberty in which these mitigations form choices made by individuals (Bauman, 1989).

The professional classes, within this context, act as managers and tutors of risk, taking on educative and mentoring functions associated with the ‘programmetisation’ of services and activities. As Dean states

One of the consequences of the language of risk is that the entire population can be the locus of a vulnerability that can also single out specific populations. (Dean, 1999: 167)

In this sense, smart acquisition represents an instrument or technology of the neoliberal state as it represents a risk mitigation strategy to target and manage the impact of risks associated with the erstwhile, pre-reformed and failing, defence procurement population. Indeed, when I discuss the grounding and impact of the smart acquisition reforms within the context and experiences of a specific defence integrated project team, it will be seen that the language and rationality of the programmes and projects derived from that team are presented in and possess this very discourse of
risk management. This rationality nestles at the heart of smart acquisition project initiatives and activities (Beck, 1988).

Using Beck’s (1992) arguments, individuals within the smart acquisition organisations undertake their professional activities through a calculative risk rationality that legitimises responsive behaviours, derived competencies, and their enveloping programmes. Risk becomes a governmental mechanism for both guiding this effort but also for securing self-interested concurrence. Agency, therefore, is exercised through this pre-constructed discourse of risk which suffers no challenge or offers no respite. Individuals are faced with a binary choice of compliance or programme heresy. And there are no heretics within the smart acquisition order of battle.

Indeed, as the *Smart Acquisition Handbook* underlines

> Risk is the combination of the probability of an event occurring and its consequences on objectives. Risk management allows an informed judgement to be made on the degree of risk in project proposals. It provides confirmation that the balance struck between performance, whole life costs, timescale and risk represents value for money. The level of effort and resources applied to risk management should be in proportion to the cost, timescale and level of complexity of the project. (MoD, 2004: 31)
Section 6.3 has, through a derived neoliberal wrap, introduced emerging themes of smart acquisition as cultural phenomenon, revisited constructs of power that were initially discussed in chapter 5, introduced smart acquisition as an ideological imperative and, through the guiding work of Beck (1992), further analysed smart acquisition as a function of ‘risk management’ and an articulation of the ‘risk society’. I now come to lay out my notion of the Smart Acquisition Triptych, building upon the groundwork of these preceding ideas and concepts.

6.4 The Smart Acquisition Triptych

This discussion and analysis has left a knotty problem to untangle. It seems self-evident and clear that the traditional linear model self-referentially acts as an apologist for smart acquisition. It is totally unsatisfactory as a theoretical framework for understanding the UK public sector phenomena that is defence procurement in the early 21st century.

Likewise, I have shown that concepts of modernisation, homogenisation of operational processes, tools and behaviours, and public sector management itself are important to understanding smart acquisition. I have argued that these concepts reside within a neoliberal tradition grounded in ideological characteristics and considerations of power, control and culture. The very essence of
public policy, administration and service delivery for defence has been ‘problematised’ in this way, and a theoretical framework to anchor these concepts, my response to the traditional linear model of explanation, and the subsequent analysis, is clearly required.

In this section I outline the roll the work of Foucault plays in forming the base of my analytical triptych for smart acquisition. I then discuss the three triptychal lenses themselves: modernisation, managerialism and homogenisation.

Foucault – the base of the Triptych

I argued in chapter 5 that Foucault’s work on governmentality and how an emerging public or social sector has been characterised and problematised are especially significant. This key theme responds, in Dean’s (1999) view, explicitly to the profound changes Foucault witnessed within the liberal-democratic west, especially the perceived retreat of the welfare state and interventionist modes of government.

It is difficult to fully grasp Foucault’s thoughts in this area, as it is a concept he revisits throughout his life and work, constantly developing and amending his ideas. His early writings (1969) appear to lay the foundations for the wider critique offered within his interviews and writings from 1972 to 1984, as captured within cited works in this chapter.
As shown in chapter 5, governmentality, for Foucault, is concerned with the models, philosophies and frameworks of government that emerged from early modern Europe. Foucault refers to the ‘conduct of conduct’, by which he means the deliberate and communicated direction of how we, as citizens, are to behave, think and act. Specifically, this represents the considered attempt to define and shape the behaviour of others and ourselves in relation to agreed and commonly held specific forms of truth. Foucault held this to be a startling and profound development (Rabinow, 1997).

This is significant to understanding smart acquisition on a number of counts. Firstly, it is concerned with conduct and behaviour in all contexts, and how this generates legitimate authority and indeed the new organisations and agencies through which this authority is exercised. Secondly, Foucault’s critique addresses the utilisation of specific economic resources, defined means and techniques, which enable the method of our behaviour and actions (Rabinow, 1997). Lastly, these preceding concepts are invoked within a particular form of truth that people hold to be self-evident and scientific.

Smart acquisition, therefore, could be said to have replaced political debate and analysis with discussion around efficiency, effectiveness and economic utilisation, themselves part of a wider discourse of self-evident economic truths and insights. In this manner, the changes within the defence sector that smart acquisition promotes, using Foucault’s approach, are removed from the sphere of the...
political decision altogether. Debate, and the nature of
organisational change, becomes market-led and techno-rational, not
policy-derived.

As a consequence, public policy can be said to take place through
three distinct frames (Hindess, 1997; 1998). The first of these is
dispositional, or how one organisation relates to another and how
services to the citizen are generated. The second of these is process
based; the processes, tools, frameworks and competencies that allow
and enable transactions to be performed. Thirdly, there is a reflexive
domain, as individuals position themselves in relation to the
organisations they service, tools they utilise and beliefs – about
themselves, others, and the economic and social environment – they
embrace.

Smart acquisition therefore allows the defence worker ways of
making sense of the present, and of the formulas and programmes
through which authority is prevalent and exercised today. These
formulas and beliefs are seen as incrementally derived from an
understood, almost benevolent past, and invariably will lead the
way to a significantly more effective, efficient and, overtly,
economic future. It becomes pre-ordained, in Foucault’s memorable
phrase, as ‘the right disposition of things’ (Foucault, 1975).

As a consequence of this discussion and analysis, it is clear that an
understanding of smart acquisition can only really emerge from a
contradictory explanatory framework to the classical linear transformation model offered in chapter 4. Namely, a new theoretical framework embracing concepts of the derived neoliberal state revealed through Foucauldian epistemological notions of public sector problematisation and governmentality.

These concepts, in turn, set the framework and context for three emerging discourses of management, homogenisation and modernisation within defence procurement. There are, in essence, three mutually supporting levels of exploration through which I wish to explain smart acquisition as public sector change management phenomenon.

My alternative model opens-up smart acquisition through the triangularisation offered by these three key reference points of managerialism, homogenisation and modernisation. It presents change management within defence procurement, conceptually, as an ideological discourse dependant upon shared language, symbolism and collective learnt values. Change management, in this context, is revealed as a belief system rather than scientific methodology or organisational process, and is rooted in a neoliberal construct that ‘problematises’ public sector events, activities and organisations, such as those associated with defence, and provides the logic and rationale for economic reform and its enabling social agenda.
This is where Foucault’s ideas and notions of governmentality are of real value, providing the central base of my triptych. As we know from chapter 5, Foucault’s idea is to place power and control into a multiplicity of cultural mechanisms and functions beyond which no personality can be formed or exercise within a system such as defence procurement. To reflect upon and bring-forward an insight from chapter 5, Foucault’s writings enable a set of analytics that explain the dynamic events through which governments administer populations, enable individuals to shape themselves within this administrative construct, and the mechanisms and instruments through which these interwoven processes and activities become aligned and whole. Within my model, governmentality is the theoretical bridge between the ideological context of neoliberalism and the specific themes highlighted by my interviewees.

At the heart of my triptych are the language, symbols, sense of presentationalism and visibility that position defence acquisition change management as dominant, scientific and objective. This, I have demonstrated, can be accessed and conceptualised through the work of Foucault embracing the distilled tools found within his analysis of governmentality (Foucault, 1991); specifically, notions of problematisation, cultural alignment, power and systematisation. Through this conceptual lens I assert that the process of modern managerial homogenisation is intrinsically ideological, restricts and rejects notions of individual agency (whilst purporting to promote it), and presents people within the defence procurement process –
military, civil servants or industrialists – as passive receptors and system functionaries. This, of course, is in stark contrast to the benign economic and managerial legitimisation offered by the linear transformation model in chapter 4.

My intention through the introduction of these themes of my alternative theoretical model of explanation is to provide the framework and intellectual structure for detailed exploration and comparative analysis within subsequent chapters. Specifically, I look at one identified defence procurement integrated project team through the lens of both the traditional linear model and my critique of the triptych, providing both a rational explanation of smart acquisition and a much more critical, less-benign sense of meaning and understanding.

Within this analysis, Foucault’s thoughts on power and control, culture, systematisation, and how they intertwine and drive the phenomenon of governmentality are latticed through both my proposed model and emerging critique, providing both this framework for analysis and tautness of structure between homogenisation, managerialism and concepts of ‘modern.’

This new theoretical framework allows me to place an analytical lens over the thoughts and comments of those working within the defence sector. In contrast to the acquisition toolbox explained by and represented through the linear model in chapter 4, one of my
interviewees, Havermeyer (Interview: 2004), argued that the key themes for him within smart acquisition were how power was delegated and handled, coupled to organisational control and culture. Allied to these themes were the views of Dunbar (Interview: 2004), a director with a UK defence contractor, who commented that the MoD is embracing change management as a teenager might absorb the latest high street fashions. His thoughts echo those offered by Daneeka (Interview: 2005) earlier in the chapter

They want management, and they want that management to be intrinsically hip and modern, and they want commonality masquerading as best practice. It’s a recipe for adequacy, not excellence. (Interview: Dunbar, 2004)

In military history, forces of arms usually line-up on the battlefield with a left arc or wing, a right flank, and a deepened concentration of forces in the centre (Lee, 1982). Similarly, I have introduced my smart acquisition triptych, with a left of arc – modernisation – a right of arc – homogenisation – brigaded around a concentrated core of managerialism. My deconstruction of smart acquisition is laid-out, perhaps as casualties on a battlefield, within this order of battle. Of course these forces were glimpsed and introduced in chapter 4, now set within a constructed frame of governmentality. I build upon this earlier acquaintance, mapping-out the forces of the triptych, their operational environment and the wider public sector terrain that frames smart acquisition. I discuss notions of
modernisation within the context of this wider public sector and draw-out an understanding of the processes of modernisation in contrast to the ideas associated with modernity. I go on to review management as a rational set of interwoven activities articulated within an empirical-scientific construct or narrative. Thereafter, I lay-out and analyse the core homogenised process of smart acquisition, aligning supporting sub-processes to notions of ‘management’ within a context and narrative of ‘modern.’

Consequently, I provide a bridge between the earlier part of this work which outlines smart acquisition, the rationality for change associated with its introduction, and an epistemological approach to unravelling its scriptures, narratives and beliefs, and the latter part of this thesis which explores smart acquisition through the portal of a specific integrated project team. The planks of this bridge form the triptych which, if constructed properly and with care, offers a firm foothold to the traveller as I strive into smart acquisition’s hinterland.

**The Smart Acquisition Triptych – The Modernisation lens**

A common theme from a number of my respondents is that smart acquisition derives from a perceived need to modernise the processes, the people and their organisations that are required to research, manufacture, deliver and operate military equipment. The ratiocinative hypothesis being that, somehow, the historical effects of MoD’s Procurement Executive had left a government function
That was old-fashioned, inefficient, out-of-date and even, perhaps, out of fashion, whilst the smart acquisition reforms, in contrast, were stylish, of the mode, intellectually prevalent and represented prevailing managerial orthodoxy.

A senior member of the MoD, Havermeyer (Interview: 2004), who was involved with the consultants McKinsey in deriving the smart acquisition agenda, believes that this sense of, somehow, introducing defence procurement to modern ideas was the driving ‘design objective’ for the smart acquisition planners. His considered phrase – design objective – is itself possessed of a strong modernist hue; the proposition that complex human and economic interactions can be harnessed to an organisational, process and behavioural design, articulated as a set of objectives and values.

This sense of introducing a modern perspective to historically failing organisations is a powerful rationalisation for managerialist reforms, especially within traditional public sector institutions (Cope, 2000). In this section I place the drive for modernisation in defence procurement within this wider reform agenda. I consider the nature of modernisation, its historical context, and conclude by considering why it is such a powerful element of both smart acquisition and rationalist change and, thereafter, my alternative emerging narrative. In so doing I wish to pick-up and expand upon themes and issues from earlier chapters relating to both modernisation and concepts of modernity.
Page (2006) asserts that smart acquisition is but one of a number of modernisation programmes within the public sector of the UK, forged from the managerialist political consensus of the late twentieth century. Similar initiatives to smart acquisition were generated in the early 1990s by the then Conservative government for improving UK infrastructure and the delivery of public services such as hospitals, and embraced in 1997 by the incoming Labour administration. Shaoul (1995) and Gaffrey and Pollock (1999) suggest that these initiatives have as their stated objectives the generation of increased private investment in public services, value for money in delivering these services, streamlined processes for project approvals and delivery, and the generation of long-term partnerships between public sector organisations and private sector businesses. Smart acquisition can be said to be rooted firmly within this agenda: the *Smart Acquisition Handbook* claims a key aim to be

An open and constructive relationship with industry, based on partnering and the identification of common goals including gain-share opportunities, underpinned by competitive contractor selection whenever this provides best value for money. (MoD, 2002: 3)

This sense of partnership itself is a key touchstone of the UK government’s modernisation agenda (Boden, Gummett, Cox and Barker, 1998), enshrined within the private finance initiative (PFI) and emerging public-private partnerships (PPP). I shall return to
these features presently but first, as it is such an important phenomenon, I propose a working definition of the term ‘partnership.’

The Concise Oxford Dictionary describes partnership as ‘the state of being a partner, where partner is a person who shares or takes part with another, especially in business with shared risks and profits.’ To partner, as a verb, has no greater meaning than this simple elucidation so why would government wish to partner with industry to deliver perceived key services, of which military procurement is but one example? This was touched-on in earlier chapters, but I wish to identify now, unambiguously, the rationalist response to this question. Firstly, it can be said that government and industry come together to, somehow, lever-in to public services the private money that government neither has itself nor can afford to generate through the money markets (Du Gay, 2000). Secondly, and concurrently, partnerships are believed to generate private sector capacity to potentially supplant or enhance public sector provision (Lonsdale, 2005). Thirdly, at an operational level, partnerships are believed by their protagonists to deliver value for money over sole public sector provision. This is achieved through transferring to the private sector costs and risks that would otherwise be borne solely by its public sector partner (Froud, 2003; Coulson, 2008). Moreover, it is assumed that industry is possessed of greater expertise, innovation and efficiency than its public sector
partner, and can manage these costs and risks more effectively.
(Lamming, 1993)

For me, this rationalist intent for partnerships is highly significant for it represents the very rationale behind the government modernisation agenda articulated so ably by the NAO (1998; 1999; 2000; 2003) in a number of reports on public finances and service delivery. We can see that the logic for modernisation, at the macro level for public service provision and the micro level for specifically defence acquisition, is intrinsically linked to managerialist phenomena of value for money, partnering and risk transfer (Du Gay, 2000). Likewise, these managerial elements can be said to be profoundly and rationally modern in their supposed transformation of UK public services. The homogenisation of these management elements into one set of modern, perceived best practice norms and processes will be discussed further in this chapter as fellow constituents of my critical triptych.

For now, however, I wish to come back to the private finance initiative. Partnerships, as stated, are one of the core elements of the UK government’s public sector reform agenda (Edwards, 2004). The introduction of such working practices, labelled Private Finance Initiative (PFI) by the Conservative government in the early 1990s, and then public private partnerships by Labour in 1997, was unveiled with much enthusiasm and significance by the UK polity prior to smart acquisition. Under PFI, the public sector procures a
capital asset and services from the private sector, on a long-term basis, in exchange for an annual payment. However, there is increasing evidence that PFI is not delivering the benefits sought. Firstly, it is becoming progressively difficult to offer assurance that PFI represents value for money. This is because the value-for-money comparator within the public sector against which the industry solution is compared, quickly becomes out of date (Coulson, 2008). Moreover, it seems to me that the necessary additional monitoring costs mitigate against any perceived industry savings over time, assuming that key deliverables can be contracted for and properly monitored in the first place. Hospital cleaning within a PFI contract, for example, is significant in this context, as this has become a highly politicised debate within the UK in the early years of the twenty first century.

Specifically, where risk is shared between the public sector partner and industry, its allocation at the start of the contract is usually unclear and therefore risk transfer – so central to the intellectual and business arguments for PFI – must fail. This is critical to smart acquisition, as the core tenant for industry involvement under smart acquisition is the reduction and effective management of operational and financial risk, and the generation of value-for-money services (MoD, 2002).

The early National Audit Office studies into PFI can help us here a little. The studies into roads in the 1990s, for example, revealed that
the payment mechanisms generated additional risks for the public sector and questioned the value and mechanism of risk transfer to industry (NAO 1998; 1999). It is also interesting that a significant body of evidence, summarised in Pollock (2002), suggests that there is a tension at the policy making level between the nature of service provision under PFI and policy promotion and monitoring by the Treasury and other government departments.

Why is this important for smart acquisition? There is an increasing, evidence-based premise that PFI is neither cheaper, nor transfers risk from the public sector to its private counterpart, nor offers accountability to the public. Yet still it is a mainstay of public sector policy and smart acquisition action within defence. This is because, I believe, it is flavoured with the rich and sweet tastes of the modern, combined with a heady back-note of managerialist intent and evidence. Could it be that the language of PFI, with its risk transfer and value analyses, ensures its triumph over other perspectives and critiques? The rationalist discourse offered by the PFI agenda assures that challenges to its logic and purpose must fail. The devil is not in the detail – detail and critical analysis is irrelevant – the devil resides and prospers in the language.

Indeed, when we reconnect in latter chapters with notions of risk management, risk mitigation and risk transfer to industry through the example of an integrated project team, it will become evident that the case for action, in the context of the team’s work, is derived
from narrative and legitimising language rather than any critical
construct, philosophical, numerical or otherwise. It is not the
triumph of this modern mode of management to win the argument,
it is its triumph to secure the very terms of the debate.

Modernisation and Modernity
When thinking about notions of modernisation, it is important to
distinguish between modernity and my understanding and analysis
of modern. As was identified earlier in this chapter, ‘modern’
relates to the imperatives and activities for making social systems
and economic and social processes fresh and up to date. Modernity,
in contrast, represents the norms of social life, society itself and its
economic parameters, structures and activities which emerged
triumphant from 17th century Europe. These norms are constantly
refined, refreshed and, indeed, re-invented to the present day.

Giddens (1990) believes, of course, that this process of constant
modernisation defines and characterises a period of high modernity.

This very distinction, though, is itself important for smart
acquisition. Historically, in the decades following the Second World
War, political parties in Europe, North American and of the
emerging pan-Asian democracies embraced rather extensive
interpretations of Keynesian interventionist economic practices and
complementary social policies. The neoliberalism Giddens
identifies from the 1980s onwards, in the governments of Thatcher
in Great Britain and Reagan in the USA was a profound reaction to Keynes and state interventionism, consciously linking the notions of globalisation and corporatism to the liberation of economies around the world.

In this way, the managerial and modernisation axes of smart acquisition represent a manifestation of the neoliberal response to the post-war economic and social consensus. This intellectual rejection of economic protectionism and government economic and social intervention led to a number of key features which can be brigaded under the neoliberal umbrella. Firstly, within the UK there was significant privatisation of public enterprises twinned with economic deregulation and the liberalisation of the industrial base (Eatwell, 1982). Corporate management and practices rather than government social and economic policies were viewed as the best ways for organising and running an economic or social entity, which of course led to increasing controls on and normalisation of organised labour. As part of the global economic order, this economic liberalisation inevitably generated an expansion of international trade and their markets and the removal of controls on capital and financial flows within the money markets. For Steger (2003) it represents the championing of the corporate west over other belief systems, be they theological, economic or social.

This neoliberal economic dominance has been further rationalised and legitimised by the collapse of European-Asian communism, and
the introduction of free-trade economics to China, which has been witnessed from 1989 to the present day. Consequently, the high state of modernity in which we live today can be characterised by the internationalisation of finance and trade, the hegemony of multi-national corporations and the enhanced role and legitimisation of international economic institutions like the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation and International Monetary Fund.

This sense, associated with this period of high modernity, that business practices and private finance are better than public monies, state controls, civil service governance and traditional government bureaucracy, represent the deep roots of smart acquisition. I explore in subsequent chapters the case study that unpicks the perceived reduction in public spending, the down-sizing of government and transfer of risks to industry associated with the modern neoliberal consensus.

There is significant evidence within UK defence that procurement project teams are getting smaller (NAO, 2005; 2006). This constriction is associated with notions of efficiency and economic reforms that are overtly corporate, modern and managerial in nature. In short, the defence public sector may be getting smaller, but the premise under smart acquisition is that it is significantly more effective and represents greater value for money through the capture and deployment of global business practices. High modernity as context and its requirement for ever-better
modernisation are prevalent throughout public sector and, correspondingly, defence reform. It provides a cornerstone for the intellectual and overt business-case justification for the deployment and roll-out of the smart acquisition reforms. To paraphrase Steger (1998), a triumph over alternative (dare, I say, in-house) belief systems and traditional public sector values of service and sacrifice.

By way of conclusion to this section on the modern lens of the analytical triptych, I want to touch on the notion of modernisation as narrative or discourse. Concepts of ‘modern’ and ‘modernisation’ are critical for smart acquisition in enabling both its doctrinal and behavioural power and influence within UK defence. The phrase ‘modern’ very quickly gives way to statements of ‘best practice’ which are in turn, invariably, drawn from global corporate processes. It is difficult to argue against, let alone reject these notions as to do so suggests, in the very language of the debate, that an objecting individual or team has marginal understanding of ‘gold standard’ or ‘best-practice’ processes or is wedded to the past, somehow blocking necessary reform. The consensus is imbued with a powerful logic of corporate common sense and provable benefits of reform.

This discourse is a control mechanism. I understand why Foucault and the governmentalist critique draws me, for one of the key arguments is that society does not have to control individuals, in the overt sense of that term, through oppressive acts of violence or
retribution. It merely needs to pseudo-intellectualise an economic, social and process consensus from which individuals cannot differ if they are to pursue careers, have personal credibility and status, or even receive basic economic benefits. This consensus has to be highly visible and assessable to all, and individuals have to be visible to each other through this consensus, and measured in the terms of this language and the performance indicators that capture and define it.

The ‘modern’ lens of the smart acquisition triptych, in summary, provides a powerful and intellectualised rationale for reform and legitimisation for rejecting challenge. This is homed within the public sector modernisation agenda, visible from the early 1980s, manifested in phenomena such as the private finance initiative and public private partnerships. I have also considered the nature of modernisation itself, as opposed to modernity, and considered the view that today we live in a state of high modernity of which smart acquisition is but one feature.

The Smart Acquisition Triptych – The Managerial Lens

At the heart of the neoliberal narrative and the drive to be modern is the insertion of managerial self-styled best-practice beliefs, values and activities. Within this context, I have made the case that a number of practitioners within the MoD and defence industry within the UK point to the criticality of this sense of management without, perhaps, being able to express a rationale for the
importance attached to these factors, or construct a framework for understanding the significance of these forces.

This modern managerialist regime is rolled-out through smart acquisition via a homogenised procurement and equipment support concept of high-level process which we shall come to analyse as the third view of the triptych. For now, this section addresses the managerialist element of my three-sided prism, cognisant of the underlying argument that the notion of managerialism, as defined above, perhaps provides the sharpest point.

For me this is most significant. If I look at smart acquisition through the lens of rational public discourse nothing appears to make very much sense. Actions seem unconnected, the thoughts of my interviewees often random and highly generalised around notions of reform, with the whole lacking meaning or understanding. It is, as Shakespeare’s Macbeth would say, ‘a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.’

That is not, of course, how I view the management reforms offered by smart acquisition since 1997. Rather the *ad hoc* nature, apparent chaos and perceived and stated failures of defence procurement pre and post smart acquisition have a clear and deep order to them. This order is partially revealed through two strands of inquiry. Firstly, that the events we have passed through during the formative years of smart acquisition form a coherent pattern and
understandable, rational whole. Secondly, that the actors – politicians, civil servants, military leaders and industrialists – within smart acquisition have undertaken managerialist reforms and performed their roles without understanding the meaning of their interventions and endeavours. It is this deeper sense of understanding that lies beneath the rational management discourse associated with smart acquisition.

Nately has been introduced in earlier chapters. As a retired director-general within the MoD, who served at Board level directing a strategic element of the department’s change programme, he is possessed of a senior insider’s view of smart acquisition. He believes that the introduction of sound management principles was perhaps the essential element of smart acquisition’s contribution to UK defence and wider public sector reform (Interview: Nately, 2003). This was born from both a political and administrative assessment of the management failures of the MoD Procurement Executive and its relationship with weapons manufacturers and technology businesses (Page, 2006).

Nately’s view of what management entails can be best described as a common-sense perspective or non-critical set of assumptions of management, containing a number of distinct, easily accessed features. For him, and by extrapolation his close senior colleagues, management under their smart acquisition reforms was all about ‘getting things done’ through the effective deployment and
utilisation of people, processes and other resources as necessary. It represented a purposeful, pragmatic activity which defined ends in a simple manner and then went about achieving them. As he says

Management for smart acquisition was about deciding how best to deliver military capability, about generating an appropriate programme of work to meet the operational requirement, and then delivering this through effective trade-offs and the use of resources. (Interview: Nately, 2003)

These comments echo the words of the Smart Acquisition Handbook (MoD, 2004), with management practice described as

A unique set of co-ordinated activities, with definite start and finish points, undertaken…to meet specific objectives within defined time, cost, performance and integration parameters (MoD, 2005: 22).

Throughout chapter 4 I demonstrated that defence management was concerned primarily with the planning and project management processes. Within early procurement phases the integrated project team produced a management plan that stated the required outputs from the equipment, technology or support service being procured. Thereafter project management enabled the further formulation and population of the team’s skills and competencies, identified the core technologies to be used and
obtained funding for the equipment programme (MoD, 2002). The
logic and benign rationality remains compelling.

Under smart acquisition the programme of work is organised into a
‘work breakdown structure’ and ‘organisation breakdown
structure’, resourced and expressed utilising project management
techniques drawn from within a particular, self-styled body of
knowledge (MoD, 2004). Contracts are accordingly placed between
the Ministry of Defence and its industry suppliers, commercially
articulating the organisational responsibilities and boundaries
between respective parties. Team members are said to be
motivated by the leadership team and rewarded through a range of
recognition tools and processes including individual bonus
payments and team performance review activities (Interview:
Nately, 2003). Minister (Defence Procurement) Awards are held
annually to recognise the achievements of those in perceived highly-
performing teams within smart acquisition, and to motivate peers to
match these performance levels (MoD, 2004).

Finally, the project, pan-cycle, is thought to be effectively controlled
by comparing the through-life management plan to actual activities
and statements of progress within the project. Review boards are
established across all so-called stakeholders to monitor this progress
and exercise what is described as governance and control. In
addition, budgets and resource control totals are set for which staff
are personally accountable (Page, 2006).
It is significant that, in this manner, these key rational themes of planning, organising, motivating and controlling are presented in the *Smart Acquisition Handbook* as best-practice concepts (MoD, 2004) through which defence procurement should be consistently captured, articulated and conducted. Indeed, Nately has reflected (Interviews: 2003; 2004) that smart acquisition is ‘robustly concerned’ with taking this best practice in management, and presenting it though homogenised, high-level processes as the most up to date – one could almost say modern – methodology for delivering complex multi-billion dollar defence and security programmes.

Management rationality within smart acquisition at this classical-linear level of understanding is important to its practitioners, highly logical, almost mechanistic in construction, and irrefutable as positive reform, given the documented difficulties of procurement before smart acquisition’s introduction. It is this very rationality and discursive reliability that makes it so attractive to senior staff and project team members who need to make sense of the forces they face and command whilst, simultaneously, demonstrating through this language of management their success and effectiveness in coralling these forces. Yet below this visible, gracious management discourse the alternative governmentalist perspective can be glimpsed that turns this notion of benign managerialism back on itself; an outlook that lacks the neat linear
logicality and visibility of the classical-empiricist assertion of management and its gentle aspect and rationality.

Managing Notions of Risk

I am conscious, though, that much of the language and narrative force of the management guidance for smart acquisition is couched in a sense of managing risk to MoD equipment programmes (MoD, 2004: 31-33). The reason for a project at inception is justified in terms of risk mitigation, that is developing and inserting a military capability into the armed forces of the day to manage the risk of capability gaps occurring or the exposure to superior enemy equipments, doctrines or training (MoD, 2002: 14).

The MoD defines risk as

The combination of the probability of an event occurring and its consequences on objectives (MoD, 2004: 31).

It goes on to guide that risk management allows an informed judgement to be made on the degree of risks within projects and provides a management confirmation that an effective balance has been traded-off between performance, costs, timelines and risk, representing economic sense and value for money.

Defence projects presented as effective risk mitigation provide a powerful rationalist legitimising effect for procurement action. Beck
(1992) frames what he describes as this construct of a ‘risk society’ on three parallel presuppositions. Firstly, that risk should be approached and understood as part of a narrative of modernisation. Secondly, notions of risk have uniform characteristics and properties that can be commoditised and managed through effective interventions. Thirdly, risk possesses a ‘realist’ feature of individual and collective experiences and identities – the industrial risk society has somehow generated an incalculable and unlimited set of risks which it can no longer effectively manage.

Smart acquisition fully embraces this proposition. Its guidance (MoD, 2004: 32) overtly dictates that quantitative risk analyses should be undertaken as a regular, iterative set of activities. A bespoke (note the use of this word in the context of a mandated process) risk management strategy and risk management plan should be produced for all projects referenced from the project’s Through Life Management Plan. Thereafter, investment in what it describes as de-risking technology in the early stages of the acquisition cycle, it is perceived, should be a key management commitment through the life of the project.

In this sense, Beck’s risk society can be found manifested as an extension of notions of effective project management and the managerial discourse it attracts. Just as important is the concept of risk as socially produced and culturally formed to constrain and define concepts of individual agency and the options for action. In
this sense the nature of risk can best be described as a powerful socialisation tool, itself an analytics of government promoted by self-styled body of knowledge specialists in the identification and management of risk.

The deployment and licit justification of this sense of smart acquisition management through homogenised practices, beliefs and constructs of the ‘risk society’ brings me to the third lens of the triptych.

The Smart Acquisition Triptych – The Homogenisation Lens
I have introduced the managerialist and modernisation reflections of my theoretical triptych and now turn my attention to the homogenisation of processes, structures and behaviours associated with smart acquisition. In many ways the concepts of modernisation and perceived progressive management find themselves grounded within the mandated, analogous model of smart acquisition and its dominating homiletic.

I now define what I mean by homogenisation and explain why, conceptually, it echoes so readily with, and compliments, my earlier analytics of modernisation and managerialism. I describe and critically assess the manner in which the homogenisation of defence procurement activities within the United Kingdom is referenced within concepts of programme and project management, and, furthermore, discuss the impact of what I describe as the
‘projectisation’ of all defence activities. Thereafter, I introduce a discussion on probability and randomisation as a contrast to the deterministic core assumption of a homogenised smart acquisition doctrine.

Homogenousness is the condition in which all parts of a biological, social or economic system consist of the same form or kind of matter, derived from a common descent or origin. In the context of the social sciences, the parts in question are predominantly structural, procedural or behavioural, thereby to homogenise is the activity or activities necessary to deliver an analogous economic, political or social state (Bottomore, 1979).

Importantly, it is also implied within this definition that the drive for homogenousness is a deliberate, considered and engineered occurrence (Nadel, 1957). This, I believe, is significant as, during this work, smart acquisition has been frequently described as a change programme (note the term ‘programme’) rolling-out common, even mandated, activities necessary to the delivery of defence equipment to the armed forces within the United Kingdom; in other words, the process of requirement setting, procurement management, support management and disposal, implying a whole life approach to defence capability. (MoD, 2004: 12)
We know from the UK Defence *Acquisition Management System* (AMS, 2003) that smart acquisition possesses this characteristic of homogenised structures and processes through which procurement has to be undertaken. These processes are predominantly divided into subject matter provisions brigaded under the headings such as, ‘smart acquisition aims, objectives and values’; ‘through-life management’; ‘teams, relationships and skills’; ‘requirements’; and the delightfully evocative, ‘working more effectively’.

The first point to note is the overtly managerialist style and content of the language. The phrase ‘through-life management’, I would argue, has very little meaning in terms of day-to-day interaction between people, but in a managerial context the term somehow seems important, powerful and significant. Likewise, the quest to work more ‘effectively’ to ‘deliver aims and objectives’ whilst ‘displaying smart values’ suggests, perhaps, a new and modern approach to the historical business of procuring military equipment. The language, though, contextualises the underlying reality that the smart managerialist dialogue dictates a singular, obligatory process to be assigned, articulates the behaviours and values to be embraced, and determines the organisational structures within which people will operate. It is the homogenisation of human alignment and control, not merely the guiding hand of benevolent recommendation and suggested best practice.
There is, consequently, only one way to procure military equipment and services within the United Kingdom and that is through the organisations and high-level processes of smart acquisition.

Endemic within the defence procurement organisations is the notion that defence capability is a military outcome or effect that users of military assets wish to achieve. What this means can be demonstrated in the following scenario.

Let us assume that bombs have been dropped on a runway to prevent an enemy’s aircraft from taking-off or landing. The bombs, themselves, do not represent a capability. The denial of the runway is the capability, as the bomb is just one part of the equipment trail that enables this capability. Another equipment element is the aircraft that delivers the bombs, whilst another is the naval aircraft carrier from which the aircraft has been launched and recovered. This is before we even consider the training required for flying, sailing and maintenance crews, nor the facilities from which they operate. Yet the language of defence procurement has already segmented this theoretical occurrence into discrete activities, work-packages and equipments that comprise a military mission.

This is important, as the generation of military power and force through smart acquisition is overtly being seen as predominantly a project management activity. Indeed, smart acquisition embraces this assumption at its root and defines a project as
A set of co-ordinated activities with definite starting and finishing points, undertaken by an individual or organisation to meet specific objectives within defined time, cost, performance and integration parameters to generate defence capability. (MoD, 2004: 7)

Consequently, the managerialist disciplines of project management can be systemically applied to the procurement and use of weapons and other military equipment, and is homogenised and mandated so to do.

At inception, it is perhaps tortuous in the extreme to attempt to describe smart acquisition’s aims, objectives and values as some kind of process. Yet this is what occurs within the smart acquisition reference literature itself. Consider the following from the Smart Acquisition Handbook. The aim of smart acquisition is to

…acquire defence capability faster, cheaper, better and more effectively integrated. (MoD, 2004: 4)

To do this, this document continues, requires a process that recognises solutions which, though measured as better, faster and cheaper, if not integrated with other defence capability solutions, the solution in question will eventually compromise military operations. Furthermore, the guidance asserts, that integration carries equivalent project weighting to performance, cost and time.
parameters and emphasises through-life effectiveness and efficiency. What does this guidance actually mean to people and how can they possibly relate to an aim which, itself, lacks any basis of reference or insight? Faster than what, for example, or better than which alternative?

A nuclear weapon is ‘better’ than an arrow in wreaking mass carnage. But an arrow, I assume, must be cheaper and far easier to integrate into an existing armoury. How can meaningful judgements be made in the way suggested by the smart acquisition guidance? Yet, as we shall see, corporate measurements of effectiveness and efficiency are at the very heart of the project management approach, and the homogenisation of perceived programme and project management disciplines and self-styled bodies of knowledge contribute to the ‘problematics’ discourse of defence procurement. This, in turn, has to be addressed by modern government activity, of which smart acquisition provides the change management vehicle, and the loop is complete, full-circle, back to where defence procurement started in terms of dynamic and narrative, whilst the very essence of this government set of occurrences is robustly economic.

The *Acquisition Management System*[^4] also reports that people in defence lie at the core of smart acquisition and that the values and beliefs developed at the outset of the smart acquisition change

programme remain vibrant and drive project team behaviours and practices. These beliefs and values are to be found at the heart of the integrated project teams which procure defence equipment, with these teams defined as being equipped with the core skills necessary to manage a defence project through its entire acquisition process, embracing both procurement to the armed forces and the maintenance of the equipment whilst in service along with its eventual safe and economic disposal.

These core values and beliefs, passed on from smart acquisition’s inception are said to be an empathy with the customer, which supports a commitment to providing a capability which meets the customer’s needs, delivered on time and to budget. The drive to deliver a high level of performance, underscored through programme setting, effective scheduling and progress monitoring against agreed target milestones. A desire to work co-operatively with fellow team-members and others, where the diversity of the team is valued and the different roles of colleagues is respected and understood. A proven predisposition to share ideas, information and learning, and the resolve to overcome problems by following established and proven methodologies. And, finally, a wish to challenge convention and continually improve and refine processes.

These key perceived values and beliefs, it seems to me, are not values at all – where values are defined as the standards or judgements used to assess meaning or importance in life – but
rather a vague, unformed and uninformed commitment to follow notional project management practices wherever those practices happen to take the project teams.

Likewise the following smart acquisition core principles apply to all forms of defence acquisition (MoD, 2004): A whole life approach, typified by applying costing techniques; the delivery through integrated project teams, with clearly identified customers; a better relationship with industry (better than what?); more investment in early project schedule phases; the promotion of financial trade-offs between performance, time and cost parameters; incremental procurement approaches; and, a streamlined process for project approvals.

These seven core principles are remarkable. For me they represent a managerialist wish-list or vague set of terms of reference for self-defined project teams. Principles, alternatively, in both a business and anthropological context are normally associated with stated fundamental truths, primary actions, or laws as the basis of reasoning or action.

Try as I might, I cannot reconcile the requirement for the use of costing methodologies, for example, with the application of perceived fundamental truths as they relate to a personal code of conduct for individuals or teams within defence. Rather, these self-referenced principles appear to underscore and reinforce the
systemic managerialism which characterises the smart acquisition approach to defence procurement and represent a cornerstone of its own, unquestioning governmentalist belief system, progressed through these homogenised, self-defined processes, beliefs and principles.

The Core Homogenised Process
The values and principles stated above are said to enable and drive the core, homogenised process of smart acquisition. This core process is captured from the MoD’s guidance to smart acquisition (MoD, 2004: 4-12). Firstly, the equipment, or rather capability, in question has to be ‘projectised’ through the development of what is described as a realistic and costed whole-life plan known as the Through Life Management Plan. This plan is used to manage the project across the entire acquisition cycle from concept to disposal, and is initiated, developed and maintained by each integrated project team within smart acquisition. It is said to provide visibility and appropriate project-management information to all stakeholders of the planning and delivery status of the project. The guidance states that project accuracy is improved through specific project reviews resulting in confidence in performance, time, cost and integration targets, which is used to inform decisions on approvals, resource commitments, investment and the all-important management trade-offs and equipment upgrades.
At the centre of this through-life management process is the acquisition cycle which, it is said by practitioners, provides a ‘road map’ for getting from a requirement in military capability to the delivery of equipment to armed forces. We know from earlier chapters that there are six acquisition stages to this process; each stage involves executing the management plan agreed in the preceding stage, reviewing this outcome, and planning for the remaining stages. For ease or reference, I have tabularised in summary form each of these six stages – Concept, Assessment, Demonstration, Manufacture, In-service and Disposal (CADMID) as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Required Activities</th>
</tr>
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| Concept | • Produce a statement of requirements that users require from the procurement framed as a User Requirements Document  
  • Form the Integrated Project Team  
  • Engage with Industry  
  • Identify technology and procurement options  
  • Obtain funding and agree plan for the Assessment Phase  
  • Initiate the Through Life Management Plan |
| Assessment | • Produce the System Requirements Document that defines what the procurement must do to satisfy the User Requirement Document  
  • Identify the most cost-effective procurement solution  
  • Undertake project trade-offs |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Actions</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| Demonstration | • Set targets for manufacturing  
                • Place contracts with industry  
                • Prove the ability to integrate capability                                                 |
| Manufacture   | • Deliver the solution within time and cost limits  
                • Conduct a system acceptance to confirm industry delivery  
                • Ensure the military have lead-customer status                                          |
| In-Service    | • Confirm the system is available for operational use  
                • Declare a go-live in-service date for the military  
                • Maintain upgrades and monitor industry support to contract                            |
| Disposal      | • Carry-out plans for the efficient and safe disposal of the equipment                           |

*Figure 6.1 – Contents of the Acquisition Cycle*

This is a singular process from which project teams can not diverge (Page, 2006). Government is committed to all defence acquisition programmes within smart acquisition migrating through this core set of events, possessed of its own particular taxonomy, as part of its drive for project management best-practice (NAO, 2007).

Specifically, through this approach, it is argued by MoD that cost of ownership profiles and efficiency plans, established early and refined throughout the life of the project, are used to inform effective decision making and thereby contribute directly to the
optimisation of military output and the safe, effective deployment of
UK forces (MoD, 2004: 14). In a sense, there is no project alternative
to the CADMID process as articulated above, and why should there
be when this is so self-evidently effective, in its own terms,
managerially and economically?

Indeed, the guidance (MoD, 2004) goes on to instruct that smart
acquisition, by deliberate design, is a single, overarching process
specifically designed to respond to evolved military needs, not only
to take account of changing external events and operational
environments, but also as a result of further studies into systems’
integration, managerial effectiveness and technical feasibility.
Within this context, in some cases of defence procurement, it is
perceived that technical risks to the military capability in question
might suggest a managerial programme of incrementalised
acquisition, whereby equipment is procured in stages.
Alternatively, where it is deduced by officials that requirements for
military hardware cannot be met without disproportionate time or
cost penalties to the project, the Ministry may trade this project’s
requirement against another procurement package, or against
performance, time and cost constraints within the original project
schedule of work.

This guidance, therefore, both presents and promotes the notion
that all defence equipment can be planned, procured, proven and
operated successfully throughout the military by following the same
singular process, and that this ideal is best placed to deliver managerial concepts of efficiency, effectiveness and input cost-economies. This singular process, once more, is presented as common-sense, objective and proven through factors such as value-for-money analyses that themselves are common-sense and objective. What is this, if not a closed circle of self-validated pseudo-scientific justification? Homogenised certainly, and shielded from critical review as, in terms of the language in use, any criticism of the process is anti-objective, woefully unscientific and lacking in the all-important quality of commonsense.

When reading this guidance and reflecting upon the singularity of its message, I am involuntarily drawn back to the work of Schattschneider (1960), which I first introduced under notions of governmentality within my fifth chapter. For Schattschneider there is an agenda of bias, combined with pre-described and formed structures and processes, that form a powerfully framed narrative within which activities take place and our very behaviours and personalities are forged. This dominant narrative excludes contemplations, critiques or decisions that fall beyond this agenda, thereby creating a robust consensus within which policy-makers, public-servants and, in our case, the military co-operate, self-reference and exist – for me, the mobilisation of bias into homogenised accord.
This is important, for we have Lukes’ (2005) insight that systemic bias is not sustained through observable policy making, economic decision-making or acts of deliberate intervention, but by socially structured and ever-present patterns of institutional norms and practices. These, in turn, robustly enforce a state of critical inaction and lack of choice in the shaping and context of our daily activities. Our very lives, in a sense, are forming with one another in subtle, hidden collusion to structure a load-bearing pillar to this homogenised process – Foucault’s ‘conduct of conduct’, as raw, simple, disciplined occurrence.

6.5 Conclusion – The Triptych Revisited

This chapter has argued that the traditional linear model of transformation is inadequate as a tool for unpicking smart acquisition, given that the model is self-referencing and legitimising of the smart acquisition reform process. Rather, a more sophisticated analytical lens was laid out, homed in, and addressing, the governmentalist themes brought forward from chapter 5.

In section 6.2 I have grounded the approach I have taken by outlining the key themes that were constantly raised by respondents. Section 6.3 distilled these main principles, ideas and notions into areas for analysis within my derived governmentalist
context. This led to my discussion in section 6.4 framed around the idea of the Smart Acquisition Triptych, with its reflective faces of modernisation, managerialism and homogenisation, and my belief that this represents an alternative critical lens for exploring smart acquisition.

The three parts of the smart acquisition triptych – modernisation, homogenisation and the central spike of managerialism – revolve around the notion of smart acquisition as change agent or promoter of economic best-practice, with this change agent rationale, in turn, driven in part at least by the need to respond to notions of risk. The themes of the triptych themselves represent a complex, diverse and heterogeneous set of means and mechanisms for accomplishing change, at one level of discourse, and delivering notions of government at another, framed through Foucault’s lens of understanding. They coagulate to form a techno-economic system of rationality that drives behaviours and performance through distinct economic criteria associated with the disciplines of project management (Dean, 1999: 212).

This, of course, aligns to and sits within the context of stated notions of governmentality and the wider neoliberal discourse. For the triptych represents merely the visible lens of a perspective that has deep roots within ideas of government, power and constructs of subjectivisation. If this sense of government in its broadest sense – the ‘conduct of conduct’ – represents a deliberate attempt to define,
constrain and shape the actions of ourselves and others (Dean, 1999: 198) than the mechanisms and instruments that enable this intent are found within our reflections on what it means to be modern, or the practices we must undertake to manage effectively, efficiently and economically, and through the homogenised processes, values and behaviours that deliver – and profoundly demonstrate – economic transformation and the management of risk. Thus an analytics of government such as this seeks responses in essence to one overarching question: how the conduct of collectives within the form of project teams, for instance, and individuals are controlled and governed.

To address this question, I am now armed with a governmentalist set of analytics and discourses that are beginning to make sense of the complexities and unknowns that comprise smart acquisition. In so doing, my critique encapsulates a reorientation of how to view both the tools and techniques themselves but also the power relationships within economic society, suggesting a more profound and indeed relevant analysis of how the individual is connected to the state and how the state, in turn, defines the individual.

It is the governmental toolbox of modern concepts, managerial constructs and homogenised practices that are now taken-forward in the following chapters to provide the analytical instruments for de-layering the sample integrated project team I wish now to review. I believe that we are well equipped.
Part 3

This part is comprised of three chapters. In chapter 7, I introduce the EPCOT Integrated Project Team (IPT) as a case study or fractal of smart acquisition. I reproduce and discuss the business plan for EPCOT IPT and outline the stated rationale for change that underpins the document. The beliefs and values of the project team’s leaders, managers and staff members are introduced and the inculcation of people into the smart acquisition managerial discourse is considered.

Chapter 8 introduces the concept of the project team as agent of rational change and sound management. I discuss the views of team members who support the smart acquisition initiative and see organisational and commercial benefits from the exploitation of its self-defined body of knowledge and toolset. The chapter is concluded by considering smart acquisition, through the eyes of the project team, as legitimate change management discourse.

Chapter 9 then critiques this perspective by presenting the IPT as a construct of governmentalist discourse. I discuss notions of power, neoliberal explanations and assemblages of understanding and how smart acquisition can be understood within this ‘analytics of government’ and my smart acquisition triptych.
CHAPTER 7 – SMART ACQUISITION: AN EXAMPLE

7.1 Introduction

The preceding part of this thesis discussed and critically reflected upon the nature of smart acquisition as a change strategy for UK defence procurement at the beginning of the 21st century. I have laid-out, schematically, the historical antecedents of smart acquisition, its managerialist drivers and the neoliberal context of its theorising, deriving a bipolar construct of smart acquisition as either rational, modern change programme or governmentalist, Foucauldian critique. Within the context of the latter perspective, I have framed an analytics of government and public sector reform themed around my self-described Smart Acquisition Triptych of modernisation, managerialism and homogenisation.

This chapter and the next builds upon this analysis and competing explanatory frameworks by introducing a specific smart acquisition integrated project team as a case study: the EPCOT Integrated Project Team (IPT). This chapter explains and contextualises the team, introduces its stated values and behaviours – sourced from both management plans and interviews – and discusses what the project team itself presents as ‘the transformation journey.’ I go on to address the team’s contributions towards its own procurement strategy, the role it requires of industry from within its supply chain, the evolving business model and managerial lines of development. This chapter concludes with a critique of the
language and influence of managerialist discourse within the integrated project team – itself a managerialist phrase, of course – and notions of military force, contributing towards a sense of the theoretical and practical dominance of smart acquisition.

Following this, chapter 8 then undertakes an analysis of smart acquisition as rational change initiative, drawing upon identified managerial tools, techniques and explanations. Chapter 9, thereafter, considers the team as, somehow, a more passive receptor of neoliberal discourse; a contradictory, often confusing and chilling mix of forces and effects pervading the practices of military procurement at the start of the 21st century.

Throughout this part of the thesis and within this chapter I draw heavily on the work of the EPCOT IPT. However, a search of the Defence Logistics Organisation’s website and organisational chart for this period will not reveal or identify such an integrated project team, for there is none of that name. However, the project team that features in the following pages is real enough and I managed to spend a number of years working within it, from the end of 2005 to the beginning of 2008, ostensibly to guide the relationship of its management team with industry and to mould a sustainable supply chain from the industry base, both within the UK and internationally.
I used the time to engage with, interview and re-interview its senior management, team members and broad range of industry suppliers, within the UK, North America and the Middle East. The team gave generously of its time and has allowed access to unclassified management plans and strategies. I have permission to quote from them here, as required. However, I have changed the name of the project team to maintain confidences and out of a sense of respect for the people who gave so much of themselves to help this work. Incidentally, I chose the phrase ‘EPCOT’ as a suitable label for the project team as there is a photograph of my children at the Epcot Centre in Florida above my desk.

In Section 7.2, I place the EPCOT IPT in the organisational context of the DLO, and provide a sense of historical antecedence for the IPT’s efforts. Section 7.3 unveils the EPCOT IPT in its own language and terms through an analysis of its business plan and commentary from senior managers and staff. I compare the management team’s values and beliefs to a sense of the traditional values associated with UK military defence doctrine. I go on to describe the project team’s commitment to managing risk effectively, and the role it ascribes to industry. I conclude the section with a review of the EPCOT IPT’s self-stated transformation model.

My intention throughout this chapter is to allow the EPCOT IPT to speak with its own voice through the thoughts, commentaries and
narratives offered by its leadership and members. Thereafter, in chapters 8 and 9, I re-engage my analytical critique.

Also, by evoking a response from my informants within the EPCOT IPT, I facilitate the drawing forth of a spirit of smart acquisition that can be unpicked in the chapters that follow, contributing to the immanent critique of the forms, functions and purposes of the phenomenon that was such an important element of my methodological intent as outlined in chapter 2. Of necessity, and deliberately, I allow the informants an element of repetition and contradiction to bring forth this evocative, immanent discourse to be subsequently unpacked in chapters 8 and 9.

7.2 The Defence Logistics Organisation and the Integrated Project Team

As explained in chapters 1 and 3, the UK Labour Government’s Strategic Defence Review of 1997-1998 (MoD, 1998) recommended the establishment of a single military logistics organisation to replace the existing single-service offices and facilities of the Royal Navy, British Army and Royal Air Force. A joint-service organisation was perceived as the best management structure for delivering the equipment and maintenance programmes for frontline military forces whilst, concurrently, offering to the Exchequer efficiency savings through a joint-service approach that, amongst
other things, could fund future investments in military forces (Oughton, 1998). At inception, therefore, the establishment of the Defence Logistics Organisation on 1 April 2000 possessed managerialist drivers of efficiency and input economies as well as more traditional military imperatives.

The first chief executive, or Chief of Defence Logistics, was an Army general named Cowan. He was charged by the Secretary of State for Defence with generating 20% operating cost savings year-on-year over a five year period (Oughton, 1998), as part of the macro smart acquisition transformation agenda. The MoD Annual Report and Accounts 2003-2004 (MoD, 2004) confirms that the Defence Logistics Organisation was unable to generate anywhere near these level of savings or efficiencies, though it mattered little as management focus was retuned to other change initiatives, as I discuss below.

First of these occurrences was the Defence Logistics Transformation Programme, which sought to embrace industry robustly under the smart acquisition banner whilst, secondly, the organisation sought a restructuring programme to realign organisational responsibilities to refreshed managerial roles (MOD, 2003). Moreover, I have identified an additional major change programme from this period luxuriating in the title of the ‘End to End Initiative’. This was initiated by the DLO to streamline logistics support across organisational and sector boundaries from ‘the factory to the foxhole’ (McKinsey, 2003): in short, one more efficiency programme.
Also, the PACE Programme (Performance, Agility, Confidence and Efficiency) was launched in March 2008 with the intention of turning the MoD into a ‘more effective organisation, capable of achieving its mission and making its contribution to the defence acquisition agenda’ (MoD, 2008). The three core projects of ‘capability delivery’, ‘flexible resourcing’ and ‘collocation’ of procurement teams and staff are due to finish by 2012, and are estimated to produce savings of £3.56bn over 25 years (MoD, 2009).

The consequences of this short history are manifest and profound. Each integrated project team within the DLO from 2000 onwards had, under smart acquisition reform initiatives, existed within a permastate of managerialist change; real, imagined, or as aspirational imperative. Consequently, there are two principal issues of note. Firstly, the constant feature has been flux and reform, rationalised by notions of efficiency and economy rather than traditional military requirements. In fact, it could be described as the triumph of the technocrat over the soldier (Duncan, 2005). Secondly, this period of ultra-reform, in a structural sense, has been about opening-up the military equipment supply and maintenance processes not just to industrial practices – to be conducted somehow by the military within the envelope of the public sector – but to industry itself. For the shorthand of defence transformation could be: ‘military out, industry in’. It is within this constructed reality of smart acquisition reform as practiced within the DLO and its
successor organisation, DE&S, that I introduce its EPCOT Integrated Project Team (EPCOT IPT).

### 7.3 The EPCOT IPT

The EPCOT Integrated Project Team (IPT) is a group of 150 civil servants and military officers and managers, based predominantly at the Defence Logistics Organisation’s air headquarters near St Ives in Cambridgeshire. Members of staff are also located throughout the industry base around the United Kingdom and beyond, whilst the military belonging to the IPT are also to be found on Royal Air Force operating bases, mostly in the south of the UK. The project team is led by a group captain and has a small management board of five directors, including the team leader, embracing primary commercial, financial and engineering functions.

The EPCOT IPT exists to ‘provide optimised logistic support to a safe and effective operational fleet’ (MoD, 2006:1). To do this it provides, through commercial relationships with industry, design, maintenance, repair and disposal services to four aircraft types flown by the Royal Air Force. The IPT freely uses the word ‘customer’ within its management documentation and narrative explanations when describing the Royal Air Force. The team, therefore, in its own language, provides serviceable aircraft to its frontline customer, the Royal Air Force, to undertake military
missions as required by the government of the United Kingdom and its allies. It generates these aircraft by entering into detailed service contracts with public and private companies both within the United Kingdom and abroad, based upon commercial principles and processes, as shall be discussed. In doing this, the IPT directs the spending of significant, multi-million dollar sums on industry maintenance contracts for the types of aircraft it supports.

At the risk of overemphasising this point, I wish to comment further on this brief overview and introduction. The casual observer within the UK, using her or his own common sense and intuition, would probably suggest that military technicians and engineers maintain and service Royal Air Force aircraft. This imagined, casual observer would point to documentaries and newsreel clips showing uniformed tradesmen working on fighter aircraft and bombers as part-evidence of this assertion. But that is not the case.

The large maintenance and servicing programmes and schedules of work are provided by industry. In the case of the EPCOT IPT, a publicly traded FTSE 100 company, BAESystems, and a private business, Marshall Aerospace, provide the maintenance, repair and overhaul contracts for the Royal Air Force fleets supported by the IPT. So, in a glib manner, perhaps, but certainly pregnant with poignancy, symbolism and meaning, the military in the form of the project team write the cheques and perform exercises in due diligence whilst industry maintains and delivers the military
aircraft. The IPT is the oversight entity specialising in the practice of management; industry, the service and engineering function to the frontline. This is an operating formula representing a triumph of smart acquisition over traditional military organisational forms (Kincaid, 2002).

The question is how to explore this sense of derived managerialist functionality identified through this introduction. In response, I turn to the published EPCOT IPT Business Plan 2006-2010 (MoD, 2006). This is written by the IPT itself in the form of the project team leader, and suggests where the team believes its key management focus and corresponding investment should be. I have permission to reproduce this document which I do so in extract, suitably edited, below. It is important to hear first-hand the voice of the team leader, Group captain Yossarian, who was, concurrently, both the originator of and authority for the business plan.

---

**EPCOT IPT Business Plan 2006 to 2010**

**Introduction from the Team Leader**

Our Primary function within the DLO is to support the front line in generating effective military capability.
Therefore, the purpose of the EPCOT IPT is to provide optimised logistic support to a safe and effective operational fleet.

In order to do this I need to look after you and your futures.
Which I believe to be a hugely important task.

Our Values

In the past year the IPT has faced major challenges, and we have achieved several key successes...The year has been characterised by global uncertainty and continued high demand from our customers; experience tells us that the future will be just as challenging.

We are a team going through transformation. We need a strong set of values to help us succeed. As team leader, I believe the following are our core values:

Courage – we will need to make difficult choices

Openness, Honesty and Respect – these are the basis of sound working relationships

Pace and Agility – we need to keep ahead of a rapidly changing environment, whilst maintaining flexibility.
Appropriate Risk – we no longer need to be risk averse, but must understand the nature of the risks before we can accept and manage them properly.

People – our people are key; we can and will take care of our own.

Our Behaviours

As an IPT we need to show these values in our day-to-day behaviour. We need to be courageous in making challenging decisions. We need the courage to challenge how we currently do business and to take on new ways of working.

To bring about the transformation required we will need to operate with an open and honest approach with all our partners in industry. We also need to acknowledge and respect the skills and expertise of others.

Our transformation requires us to be agile and move at an appropriate pace; it also requires us to challenge our view of risk and the levels we can accept.

I believe that you, the IPT members, are the key to this and I will do my upmost to meet your needs and requirements. We all have a contribution to make, and the best way to make it is positively.
Our Journey

Current operations of the [EPCOT IPT] can be said to be complicated. The aim of the transformation is to continue to meet the requirements but in a simpler way, increasing efficiency and effectiveness.

In order to simplify, we will move from a platform based to a project based IPT, through major projects. (MoD, 2006)

This is, in many ways, a profound document, aligning generic management rhetoric with targeted business planning intent, yet specifically for the provision and delivery of military equipment and services. It is also interesting to observe how military values of courage and respect get translated into management practices through documents such as this. The business plan can best be accessed through four distinct entry points: the management team’s stated values (or, at the very least, that of the team leader); its intended management of ‘risk’; industry’s proposed new role; and, the journey of transformation for the IPT to a new business model. I take each of these in turn.

I re-emphasise my earlier point that, through these four themes, my intention is to unveil the IPT in its own managerialist language and
on its own terms. Any intervention I offer throughout this chapter is merely as guide rather than interrogator or analyst.

**Management Values**

There is something instinctively managerial when utilising the word ‘value’ or its plural ‘values’. It can be used to indicate the worth, desirability or utility of an action, item or entity, or to express the qualities on which these things depend. The EPCOT IPT use the term both to express worth, but also to state their core beliefs and behaviours; the causal elements of that worth.

I spent a number of sessions during 2006 and 2007 exploring value and values with the team leader and his board. During early discussions with the management board members, I assumed that the IPT’s values, and therefore its sense of value, would be closely aligned to identified military values or principles of warfare. These are contained in the MOD publication *British Defence Doctrine* (MOD, 1997), cascaded within the UK military as *Joint Warfare Publication* (JWP) 0-01. This publication is the master document articulating British military defence and security principles and instructions, sitting at the apex of a hierarchy of publications such as *British Maritime Doctrine, British Military Doctrine, Air Power Doctrine*, the *United Kingdom Doctrine for Joint and Combined Operations*, and the *Allied Joint Operations Doctrine*. These publications are prevalent throughout the military, with the stated values or principles of war clearly stated, as follows (MOD, 1997: Annex A).
The Selection and maintenance of the aim: in every military operation it is essential to select and define the aim clearly. The ultimate aim may be absolute, the overthrow of a hostile government, or it may be more limited such as the recovery of territory. Once selected, the course of action chosen will lead to the identification of the mission and objectives, and establish the minimum strategic parameters and constraints resulting from political decisions.

Security: a degree of security by physical protection and information denial is essential to all military operations. Active measures include the defence of bases and entry points, the maintenance of a favourable air environment, the protection of flanks and a source of adequate reserves.

Surprise: a potent psychological weapon, surprise causes confusion and paralysis in the enemy’s chain of command and can destroy the cohesion and morale of military units.

Offensive action: offensive action is the chief means open to a commander to influence the outcome of a campaign or battle. It confers the initiative on the attacker, giving the freedom of action necessary to secure a decision.

Concentration of force: military success will normally result from the concentration of superior force at the decisive time and place, whether material or psychological or a combination of both. It
may be variously achieved, for example by capitalising on the speed, flexibility and reach of air power, or by the massing of previously dispersed ground forces. The underlying principle is the concentration of force at the point of main effort, within or between campaigns, whilst economising elsewhere.

Economy of effort: the corollary of concentration of force is economy of effort. It is impossible to be strong everywhere and, if decisive strength is to be concentrated at the critical time and place, there must be no wasteful expenditure of effort where it cannot significantly affect the issue. The application of this principle may be summed up as planning for a balanced deployment combined with the prudent allocation of resources strictly related to the aim.

Flexibility: although the aim may not alter, a commander will be required to exercise judgement and flexibility in modifying plans to take advantage of fleeting circumstances or to reflect a change in political or military emphasis.

Co-operation: most military operations are joint enterprises involving co-operation between the services concerned and between allies. Co-operation is based on team spirit and training, and entails the co-ordination of all activities to achieve an optimum combined effort.

Sustainability: this principle is concerned with the sustenance of a force during every stage of a campaign or operation from force generation, through deployment and operations in theatre, to recovery and recuperation. It is also concerned with the ability of
the force to maintain and sustain the necessary combat power for the duration required to achieve objectives.

Figure 7.2: Military Values

This set of values or principles is overtly couched in the language and symbolism of the military, and is well-known throughout the military forces of the UK. It is reasonable to expect, therefore, that the values or principles maintained and promoted by the EPCOT IPT would be framed by, to some extent, this military belief-system or discourse prevalent throughout the armed forces.

Yet the EPCOT project team leader believes that the core values of his IPT (MoD, 2006: 3) revolve around the courage and ability to undertake difficult commercial choices, and the commitment to manage people and relationships with openness, honesty and respect. Another factor that needs to be valued is the requirement to keep ahead in a rapidly changing business environment whilst maintaining flexible competencies. Through these values, the management board believes, the team will be able to appropriately manage risk, for

We no longer need to be risk averse, but must understand the nature of the risks before we can accept and manage them properly. (MoD, 2006:3)
These are subtly different values and principles from those espoused by British defence doctrine. Military values within the EPCOT IPT appear to have been colonised by management values and beliefs.

The EPCOT IPT has accepted, and promotes, a managerialist set of values and guidelines rather than a robust, traditional set of core military beliefs, born of the operational experiences of the armed forces they are designed to direct. It is almost as if the IPT has modified the militarist in favour of the managerial

We need the courage to challenge how we currently do business and to take on new ways of working. To bring about the transformation required of us, we will need to operate with an open and honest approach with all our partners in industry. (MoD, 2006: 3)

This is a direct quote from the team leader, Group Captain Yossarian, who of course is a senior military officer. Smart acquisition appears to have extricated from him any sense of alignment to consensual military doctrine and values, and replaced it with a commitment to the powers of management and the importance of industry and the market. Managerialism, it would seem, has annexed his responses and values and socialised his behaviour to the prevailing discourse of management, but more of this in chapters 8 and 9.
The EPCOT IPT’s values are to be promoted through project management strategies and techniques, underpinned by, ‘management planning to define clearly the detail of how strategy will be implemented [and] risk and opportunities managed.’ (MoD, 2006: 10). There are no corresponding statements relating to concepts of the military task, the operational roles of the aircraft the IPT support, or the military objectives of the servicemen and women billeted within the project team. Those factors and concepts, after all, fall to the project team’s customer, the Royal Air Force. The IPT, through a sense of transformation, is about management and, as such, its values are clear and unambiguous.

Treacy and Wiersema (1996) argue that there is a rationale and dynamism to senior management focusing on generic value disciplines such as operational excellence, product or service leadership, and customer intimacy and loyalty, and the statements ascribed to the IPT should be understood within this context. The project team is merely conforming to notions of the modern nature of management interventions, associated with the transforming power of regimes such as smart acquisition when viewed as prevalent constructs of explanation and discourse.

A key element of this ‘value proposition,’ which is a management term I frequently encountered through my engagement with the project team, is this sense of deliberately capturing and managing risk. This is something that needs exploring. What does the EPCOT
IPT mean by ‘risk’ and how does the project team intend to expose it to the power and force of management?

The EPCOT IPT and Risk Management

The project team attempts to take decisions through what it describes as a risk and opportunity management process, extracted specifically from project management principles and methodologies. As Burke (2003: 252-53) states

A key component of change is making decisions – ideally these decisions would be based on complete information with a high degree of certainty of the outcome. However, in the real world most decisions are based in incomplete information with an associated level of uncertainty about the outcome – it is this uncertainty that leads to risk. So risk has always been an intrinsic part of project management.

It can be seen that risk, uncertainty and opportunity are closely related. When a risk occurs, with some entrepreneurial ingenuity, this may be turned around to become an opportunity, and conversely when pursuing an opportunity there will be associated risks…

Indeed, an EPCOT IPT head of department, Wing Commander de Coverley (Interview: de Coverley, 2006), explained to me during lengthy discussions that the successful management of the project
team’s risk and uncertainty is one of the primary project management principles to determine the timely completion of programmes within clearly defined, understood and agreed timescales. He believed that what he described as ‘risk modelling’ against an indicative ‘high level’ risk schedule would generate effective project delivery dates, cost profiles and schedule impacts.

De Coverley went on to explain that a common risk management framework had been adopted by the EPCOT IPT, with project risk being defined as

…an uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, has a positive or negative effect on a programme objective. (PMI, 1996)

Accordingly, risk management, the IPT believes, maximises a project’s chances of achieving its cost, schedule and performance objectives by identifying areas of uncertainty. The process proposes methods and activities whereby risks can be reduced, opportunities exploited, and, thereafter, the team can implement and monitor derived risk and opportunity action plans. Once these risks have been identified against project objectives, they can be assessed and subsequently managed through a set of risk management process, underpinned by a risk co-ordinator, to increase the likelihood of timely completion within anticipated budgets (Interview: de Coverley, 2006).
Risk management is presented as an evolutionary and iterative process. Whilst the fundamental principles remain unaltered, de Coverley advised that in all instances the process itself can be tailored to fit the specific requirements and make-up of the individual programme. Risks and opportunities can be managed, however, through a tried-and-tested two phase approach early in the programme lifecycle that generates a shared version of the truth that then delivers a consistent and scaleable ongoing risk management process that is initially customer-driven and programme-owned. Risk action plans designed to manage the risks identified are generally less costly if implemented earlier rather than later in the programme. The IPT felt that it would manage its projects within this manner, illustrated graphically in Figure 7.3.

An initial set of risk workshops were conducted that identified risks and uncertainty to the projects. Through a variety of ‘brainstorming’ and targeted discussions a ‘total’ set of risks were identified against the following categories (representing a simplified project scope): Inbound Logistics (IL), Operations (OP), Marketing and Sales (MS), Human Resources (HR), Infrastructure (IF), Technologies (TE) and Outbound Logistics (OL). Market-leading risk software was, thereafter, utilised to undertake the actual generation of a risk model through a ‘monte carlo’ simulation tool capable of simulating many thousands of iterations of the projects. The risks identified were created as tasks within a project schedule to enable the use of
A screen capture of a risk model is shown in Figure 7.4.

Figure 7.4: Risk Model Extract
The risk model can then generate histograms, such as that shown in Figure 7.5, which demonstrates where risk resides in a project and suggests where management focus should be applied.

Wing Commander de Coverley (Interview: de Coverley, 2006) explained that for each of the aircraft fleets for which the EPCOT IPT had a responsibility this risk management process had been applied, generating valuable management information and informed management action.

Figure 7.5: Risk Model Histogram
Wing Commander de Coverley, is the self-described risk management ‘champion’ within the EPCOT IPT. He is a military officer of almost thirty years’ experience. Throughout the project team it was clear that de Coverley is widely respected and possessed of a fine military operational pedigree and record. In the language of smart acquisition he also has the energy and enthusiasm of a recent convert, a believer in the transformational power of management. This belief-system, like any corresponding act of religiosity, is projected across the population, in this case the EPCOT IPT. As the Business Plan states

The IPT will ensure that in running its business all areas will do so underpinned by risk and opportunity management, thereby ensuring best use of available resources. The risk and opportunity management process will…utilise appropriate risk management tools. (MoD, 2006: 10)

The importance placed by the team leadership in the art and science of risk management is worthy of a moment’s reflection. We know from Part 2 and especially chapter 4 that the MOD has in place processes and procedures to supposedly transfer notions of operational and financial risks to the industry base. Indeed, this rationale and narrative of risk transfer formed part of the business logic for the smart acquisition change initiative at inception. Yet the business plan and team members of the EPCOT IPT do not articulate or discuss risk management as a process for transferring
uncertainty and unknown costs and activities to industry, presumably through robust contractual mechanisms. Rather, for the EPCOT IPT, management is management, intrinsically good and valuable, which can and should be applied to all aspects of the team’s existence, certainly imported managerial constructs such as those associated with risk.

The transfer, from the IPT to industry, of costs associated with identified individual risks does not feature, whether as proposition, practice or legitimisation. There is, simply, a set of directed activities and toolkits through which the project team can practice management. The practice itself is an objective, even end-state, in its own right.

**The Role of Industry**

If there is no readily identifiable narrative of industry accepting transferred, articulated financial and operational risks, it is important to reflect upon just what role industry is perceived to play within the ‘business’ of the EPCOT IPT. The team leader is clear on his thinking and communication on this matter. He stated (MoD, 2006: 5) that the function of his project team was to deliver effective and efficient logistics to the Royal Air Force. However, under smart acquisition, the IPT was to do this by building stronger relationships, even partnerships, with industry. Joint teams of industry and project team personnel would, in the future, manage the delivery of maintenance and repair support services to the front.
line. Industry would use its expertise in management and subject-matter maintenance to enable the EPCOT IPT’s transformation to an effective and efficient management entity. Consequently, industry was only in part being used as a repository for transferred risks, however meaningful or relevant. Rather, the idea of ‘industry’ was a role model to which the IPT should aspire (MoD, 2006).

I explored this with the team leader and his senior management team during a number of discussions throughout 2006 and 2007. I was informed that the team’s aspiration for industry was for the latter to embed key management skills and competencies into the project team, through what was often described as the EPCOT IPT’s ‘lines of development.’ These are captured from the business plan as follows

Transformation: the transformation line of development is the driver of continuous improvement within the IPT. This workstream will have a direct input on all the lines of development and the major projects.

Strategic Enabling: the strategic enabling line of development will ensure we engage, support and are in turn supported by our senior stakeholders. It will also guide the IPT to be compliant with higher level governance, including a common set of values and behaviours. Ownership of finance is contained within this line of development.
Partnering and contracting: the purpose of the partnering and contracting line of development is to ensure that we deliver the best value for money partnered solution. This will be done through benchmarking, competition and negotiation. Key elements of this workstream will include governance and the delivery of business cases for the projects.

People: the people line of development is to ensure that we have an effective HR capability within the IPT. This is particularly important in our transformation programme. This capability will ensure that we have and retain the right people with the right skills in the right roles. This line of development will look at areas such as relocation, skills gaps, redeployment, engagement of the trades unions and staff satisfaction.

Lean: the owner of the lean line of development will be dual-focussed to ensure that current support to platforms is delivered in a lean way whilst gaining the skills sets necessary to apply lean concepts to all future projects. The remit of the lean manager is to ensure that we operate in an efficient fashion, maintaining our ability to be agile. (MoD, 2006: 9)
It was explained (Interview: Yossarian, 2006) that the four lines of development articulated below ‘transformation’ – strategic enabling, partnering and contracting, people, lean – would actually managerially enable this transformation and, as such, should be viewed as subordinate in hierarchy to the transformation task.

The EPCOT IPT believes (Interview: Yossarian, 2006) that these initiatives were set, somehow, to deliver the skills and equipment necessary for the projection of military force; for the UK’s Royal Air Force to perform its military roles. The symbols, lessons and language of these commodities have routed the traditional notions of defence doctrine – such as the belief in the need for the military to concentrate force and sustain effort – and replaced them with faith in management practice and a belief in the importance of industry. Alternative explanations for this are offered in the next two chapters.

It is clear, though, that industry to varying degrees has always supported the military within the United Kingdom (Page, 2006). We know from chapters 3 and 4 that, historically, this support has taken the form of traditional contracts to design, test and build equipment for the armed forces and, thereafter, to supply spares to that equipment, upgrade it as necessary, and repair or service equipment packs as scheduled or required (NAO, 2005). In essence the military performed roles of equipment operator and front line maintainer, supplemented by industry’s materials and efforts.
Through the EPCOT IPT’s lines of development, industry would no longer merely engage through these traditional support contracts. Rather, contractors would now hold what is referred to as ‘availability contracts’ whereby the taxpayer would pay key companies, through the IPT, for the provision of aircraft, serviced and maintained, which the Royal Air Force would simply jump in, fly and return to industry at mission completion.

The maintenance roles that allow this, since 1918 the preserve of uniformed service engineers, should from now be commoditised and provided by industry because, of course, industry is better placed to ‘improve delivery’, ‘generate better value for money’ and ‘better satisfy military requirements.’ (MoD, 2006: 7). Industry can do this because it is possessed of the right managerial hue rather than an inefficient, perhaps even anti-modern, military service tradition (Interview: de Coverley, 2006).

Transformation: A New Business Model

I now wish to discuss the idea of a ‘new business model’ for the EPCOT IPT, which is my fourth analytical entry point to the Business Plan presented at Figure 7.1. This business model had been credited by the EPCOT IPT team leader as an exemplar of ‘best practice’, and promoted the view that the team was to shift its main focus away from aircraft to projects in order to deliver what the management plan described as ‘daily support output’ (MoD, 2006).
In case there was any confusion, the team leader categorically stated that

Projects will be the vehicle for changing how we do business. The lines of development are there to ensure that all the projects run in a coherent and consistent way. We must ensure that all projects use the same rigour and adopt the same principles, process and templates. (MoD, 2006: 8)

To unpick this, a team comprised to a significant part by military men and women, led by a senior military officer, is to defocus its attention from supporting aircraft and, instead, direct its energies to mastering the skills and competencies of derived project management. Indeed, in discussion, the EPCOT IPT team leader and his Head of Transformation – a new military post – advise that the EPCOT IPT transformation programme was both derived from smart acquisition and an exemplar of smart acquisition (Interview: Yossarian, 2006b). For them, there is a profound link between smart acquisition’s organisational reforms and championing of modern management principles and behaviours, and their commitment to delivering both reform and services through notions and forms of projects. Also, it was pointed out that industry could understand and commercialise the language, schedules and milestones of project management, whereas the more esoteric and constructed management phrases and terms tended to confuse the project team’s industrial partners when it came to signing contracts. Better by far
to couch the need for reform and the intent for new delivery models in complicated, visual management representations and arguments, and then turn these models into project schedules through which money can flow from the IPT to industry in return for the latter’s management skills and delivery expertise (Interview: Yossarian, 2006).

To illustrate this point, the EPCOT IPT’s new business model is reproduced at Figure 7.6. It envelops the lines of development, projects a transformation from support to availability contracting with industry, and articulates the managerial transformation of the project team. It is a highly creative visualisation of management as belief system and value statement.

![Figure 7.6: The EPCOT IPT Business Model (MoD, 2006: 8)](image-url)
The EPCOT IPT management team brings this sense of representation and oversight together through constructed notions of managing the business through performance measures, indicators and targets.

The commercial director of the project team (Interview: Korn, 2007) assured me that these targets and indicators form part of the twelve major contracts between the MOD and industry that are managed by the project team. The EPCOT IPT uses these contracts to achieve the development of

...the current platform based operation concurrently to the transformational goals. The current platforms will maintain customer satisfaction levels in line with the agreed... targets, financial performance and required sortie rates. These will be measured against key performance measures and presented at a strategic level in the business dashboard.

(MoD, 2006: 6)

This is a pointed and deliberate use of language which suggests that the EPCOT IPT will measure events and actions that it has agreed with industry and then pay industry for having achieved and contributed towards the measurement of those events. Moreover, the business ‘dashboard’ quoted is not anything to do with aircraft equipment or maintenance schedules. It is a set of powerpoint slides collating performance indicators of project occurrences,
monitoring transformation (Interview: de Coverley, 2006). Modern defence doctrine is made of such things as the ‘dashboard’, which I shall come to discuss in chapter 9.

7.4 Conclusion: The Discourse of Management

This introduction has sought to place the EPCOT IPT under the lens of our analysis as a fractal or exemplar of the wider smart acquisition construct and change initiative. I have been able to do this as I was given wide access to the EPCOT IPT between 2005 and 2008, when I was engaged to help them in identifying and developing the wider supply base to their aircraft systems. I have been able to derive an ethnographical understanding of the IPT through access to its people, processes and unclassified management material, plans and papers.

Specifically, I have dwelt on the Business Plan 2006-2010 (MoD, 2006) as a significant managerial document addressing the transformation intent of the IPT within smart acquisition. Through this plan I have demonstrated that the IPT’s values, behaviour and sense of transformational ‘journey’ are all specifically managerialist in flavour and intent, with the significance of this being explored in the following chapter. However, I present this pervasive management theme as a significant development within the IPT by comparing the
premise of this managerial discourse with the sense of military ethos and values captured in previous documents (MOD, 1997). The chapter concludes with the new business model for the project team, introducing notions such as ‘lines of development’, ‘partnering and contracting’ with industry, and ‘leaning’ the IPT through the practice of identifying efficiency savings inculcated through the transfer of functionality from the public sector – in the guise of the project team – to its industry ‘partner’. The rationale and legitimising discourse for these events and activities, I believe, is the narrative and set of management practices around notions of risk identification and management, and the migration from organisation structures derived from specific military engineering platforms to a purported project management stance.

The language used by the IPT as it articulates this intent is very specific and deliberate. People within the project team appear to embrace managerialist terms and phrases without any critical reflection or challenge, seemingly rejecting previous notions of military service as somehow different from commercial management. This narrative drumbeat, the use of specific management terms when referring to the IPT and the wider military, represents a significant effect – or is it enabler – of the smart acquisition construct. Just how significant this language is I now come on to discuss and unpack, as I review the EPCOT IPT as rational, legitimate, perhaps even inevitable, change initiative.
CHAPTER 8 – THE PROJECT TEAM AS RATIONAL CHANGE MANAGEMENT

8.1 Introduction

In chapter 7 I introduced the EPCOT IPT and presented its objectives, management structures, the people it employs and the manner in which it wished to operate. I also unveiled some of the management techniques and tools that the team brings to its work, and drew-out some of the beliefs and values that lay behind the implementation of these tools. In this way, I presented the EPCOT IPT as a fractal of the wider smart acquisition community and organisational philosophy.

Hearing the drumbeat of the project team through its business documentation and commentaries demonstrated how the discourse of management had taken the EPCOT IPT to a new business model generated by powerful notions of transformation, somehow framed and shepherded by its industry guide. It was revealed that the forms and visages of the ethos of military service were shrouded in the drive to commercialise, commoditise and manage.

The language, specifically of the Business Case (MoD, 2006), was not just highly rational and managerial, it was exclusive, in that it appeared to banish all sense of alternative explanations or traditional military elucidations. There was but one discourse
within the IPT, that of the managerialist, and it appeared to possess a mighty socialising effect on all those it encountered.

One aspect of this is the manner in which members of the EPCOT IPT talked of their ‘journey of transformation.’ This was a constant phrase repeated, almost as a religious genuflexion, during conversations between team members and myself during 2006 and 2007. This ‘journey’, as articulated through the management phrases and notions entrenched within the team’s self-styled ‘lines of development’, suggested a design, plan and engagement furnished on the proposition that rationality prevailed.

Order was generated and uncertainty banished through activities such as the development of schedules, generation of work packages, and management processes to monitor and mitigate risks (Interview: de Coverley, 2006). The project team could control events through the insertion of sound management techniques and processes.

Yet the idea of change, as a verb not a project, within any operating environment, service or business is discontinuous, complex and random, with unexpected, interdependent market and other forces occurring at global, regional, national and local levels. Consequently, the notion of predictability and stability underpinning constructs of transformation as a programme of work are falsely formed. It could hardly be otherwise. For the
mechanistic level of explanation associated with a transformation programme assumes that projects and activities are linear events, a predictable series of cause and effects that can be directed by a cleverly phrased business plan, to be subsequently controlled by a project team exercising the disciplines of management. But as Cope (2000: 151) reflects, ‘life and organisations are built on a set of constructs that use chance, random disturbance, changing dynamics, turbulence and interconnectedness as the base presuppositions.’ Rejecting this sense in favour of planned, staged, scheduled, deliberate ‘transformation’ is a managerialist assertion of order and attestation of power relationships through which the EPCOT IPT is both victim and champion. This rationality, significantly, even organically, self-perpetuates and flourishes across all landscapes and seasons. In the language of management, the EPCOT IPT would call it ‘best practice’ (Interview: Yossarian, 2006b).

In this chapter I build on this introduction to the EPCOT IPT in chapter 7, presenting smart acquisition as practiced within the project team as a rational, linear management model for organisational change and equipment maintenance and delivery. In the following chapter these notions are critiqued as governmentalist initiative and construct.

Chapters 8 and 9, together, reveal the duality of the project team as, at one level, superficial, supposedly rational and managerialist
whilst, at another, deeply implicated in neoliberal notions of the exercise of power and complexities of control. Taken together, they provide a complex and rich understanding of the dominion, authority and pervasive energy of smart acquisition as governmentalist hegemony.

This emerging, dual analysis also reveals that smart acquisition is able to exist within both of these explanatory domains, simultaneously rational and benign, yet also somehow sinister and controlling. It is a theme I shall expand upon in later pages.

### 8.2 The Commercialisation of EPCOT

In his 2006 Business Plan, an extract of which was reproduced in Figure 7.1, the team leader of the EPCOT IPT, Group Captain Yossarian, asks

> What does the future look like?

The function of the IPT will be to deliver effective and efficient logistic support… to deliver military capability. We will do this by building even stronger relationships with industry. Joint teams of IPT and industry will provide and manage depth support. In order to make this work, it is critical that we manage the partnerships to achieve the
customer’s objectives. This means that we will cease to be the provider of support and move towards becoming the decider, choosing what, where and how support is delivered. In our partnered relationships we will always retain our responsibility for governance, especially air worthiness. (MoD, 2006: 5)

What the team leader is stating is that, from now, the UK MoD will pay industry to provide the engineering and servicing functions to support the military aircraft; services that were once provided by the IPT. Industry is to do this, by implication, significantly cheaper than the service the EPCOT IPT can traditionally provide through MoD budgetary lines and commitments, satisfying pervading views on economy and efficiency.

Moreover, if industry workers are now to maintain the aircraft and combat systems that were once the preserve of military teams within the EPCOT IPT, the staff numbers within the project team can be reduced in future because of this sense of efficiency. Indeed, the team leader and his senior management team advised me at the end of 2006 that ‘right-sizing’ the organisation, or ‘leaning it’ was now the IPT’s principal management activity (Interview: Yossarian, 2006c).

There is a strong sense of economic rationalism to this that is presented by the IPT staff as objective and managerially inevitable,
supported by the language and discourse of project management that we shall come to shortly. Firstly, however, in pursuit of the notion of major management activity, I engaged with the commercial director of a major international defence company that is working with the EPCOT IPT within this new, constructed, partnering methodology. I was told the following, sourced from the company’s business proposal documentation:

The industrial solution for EPCOT IPT enables the effective transformation from provider of services to an intelligent decider role. The company can work with the customer to help achieve its affordability challenges and efficiency targets whilst generating and maintaining an enhanced support solution. We will embrace a partnering ethos across the suppliers and build upon existing relationships to deploy world-class, proactive supply chain management principles delivered through a highly capable joint organisation. (Interview: Cathcart, 2007).

In the spirit of rational management discourse, Cathcart was able to confirm that the company in question was able to successfully contract with the EPCOT IPT based on this premise.

Additionally, in the language and narrative symbolism of management, both the EPCOT IPT and its industry ‘partner’ seem to be of one voice. The organisational transformation of the public
sector defence project team, to the drumbeat of the smart acquisition initiative, is driven by the business logic of reaching to industry for efficiencies and cost savings associated with sound industrialised management principles and practices.

As Handy (2004) presupposes, we live in a complex epoch where uncertainty and confusion is endemic in every discourse. Yet the tyranny of our managerial response deters robust debate around possibilities of understanding and exploring such puzzling complexity. Instead, management and public sector discourse lurches from one fashionable management theory to another, encased within a myopic view of risks, threats and conventions. Hence, intelligent people can talk uncritically of things such as ‘partnering ethos,’ ‘world-class supply chain management,’ right-sizing’ and ‘organisational leaning.’ And nowhere is this sense of self-actualised, legitimating managerial narrative stronger within the EPCOT IPT than in constructs and notions of risk management and risk transfer to industry.

**Commercialisation and Risk**

A member of the senior management team within EPCOT IPT explained (Interview: Korn, 2006) that by transferring functions and the provisions of services to industry, under commercial conditions, the IPT was effectively transferring what she described as ‘cost risk’ and ‘delivery risk’ to industry. This, she believed, was a highly rational act of management which made sound economic sense for
taxpayers. Indeed, management’s intent to reform its relationship with industry into ‘partnered solutions’ stems from explanations and understandings relating to this sense of managing risk.

Burke (2003) states that

\[
\text{Risk management is defined by the Project Management Body of Knowledge (of the Association of Project Managers) as a systematic process of identifying, analysing and responding to project risks. It includes maximising the results of positive events and minimising the consequences of adverse events. (Burke, 2003: 252-253)}
\]

With this in mind, the EPCOT IPT’s forward plan with its industry partners is to refine and, once more, define project objectives for the IPT, identify and quantify the risks, uncertainties and constraints which potentially will impact on the project meeting these objectives, and developing responses to eliminate, mitigate or deflect these risks. If any risks, thereafter, are accepted as inevitable or perhaps even unmanageable, then they are to be accepted by, and embraced within, industry (Interview: Korn, 2006).

Consequently, there is a very clear managerial line-dance for identifying and managing what the EPCOT IPT categorises as risks to its activities. The first of these steps is to define agreed project goals or objectives articulated by some sense of work breakdown.
structure. The second is to identify and voice what areas of risk or uncertainty could prevent success in achieving these objectives. Choreographing more steps involves the identification of cause and effect scenarios within a systematic identification process to ensure that no activities are overlooked or unmanaged.

The management techniques used for identifying and controlling these risks within the IPT involve processes of brainstorming between and across teams, the generation of check-sheets and flowcharts, interviews and questionnaires and widespread engineering systems analyses (Interview: Black, 2007). These management techniques chime with the detailed advice within Burke’s summary of project guidance

The university of life gives us the experience to identify areas of risk, particularly relating to the problems and situations we have experienced or observed in the past. Greater awareness and appreciation is followed by knowledge and judgement.

Learn from the past – access to a comprehensive database of relevant experience, both internal and external is invaluable. This information should be available internally from previous projects…
Questionnaires, interviews and brainstorming are all ways to generate ideas and feedback from colleagues, stakeholders, clients, engineers, suppliers, legal eagles and governing agencies. Checklists, breakdown structures and flow charts are all ways to group and subdivide (risk) information for collation and presentation. (Burke, 2003: 259)

It seems, therefore, that the EPCOT IPT’s intent to manage and transfer risks to industry aligns with the managerialist advice to be offered by project management academics, such as Burke (2003), and the professional associations like the Association of Project Managers of the United Kingdom. It is a rationalist endeavour and intent relating to notions of necessary and good governance and organisational control. In this manner, the IPT can deliver the stated management objective, articulated within its ‘Business Plan 2006’ (MoD, 2006), of

The IPT will ensure that in running its business all areas will be underpinned by risk and opportunity management, thereby ensuring best use of available resources. The risk and opportunity management process will follow...principles...and utilise appropriate risk management tools. (MoD, 2006: 10)

There is another element to this sense of managing risk that has guided EPCOT IPT’s thinking and subsequent management actions
The senior management team believes that the partnering of the IPT with its industry supply chain is a logical, systemic collaboration based on sound business principles to minimise the very risk exposure, as yet unquantifiable and unarticulated, faced by the IPT. How can I make sense of this perspective and what are these supposed business principles?

A partnering venture between erstwhile customers and suppliers is an instance of inter-business/public sector collaboration for significant, mutual medium or long term benefit usually involving cost reduction, certainty in pricing, guaranteed cashflows, product development or exclusivity, manufacturing and marketing that is not based upon commercial, arms-length transactions associated with competition through the economic forces of supply and demand. It includes substantial guarantees and contributions by partners of capital, technology, know-how and locked-in products and services, as well as other assets (Mowery, 1988).

Contractor and Lorange (1988) compiled a list of reasons for collaboration. They discuss key motivators for partnering, as between the EPCOT IPT and its industry suppliers, as being the search for economies of scale or functional rationalisations, technology exchanges and barriers to competition. Top of the list, though, as the critical motivator for customer-supplier collaboration is the mutual management of, and reduction to, risk.
This theme is taken-up by Prahalad and Hamel (1990) in their discussion on corporate reconfiguration within collaborative organisational engagements provided through notions of ‘competencies’ and ‘shared learning across the value chain.’ This conceptualises management entities as ‘reconceiving’ themselves along lines of competence and value rather than function. Alliances are used between customers and their suppliers, therefore, to develop these core competencies by processes of joint learning.

In requiring this reconceiving, collaboration (or partnering) may be seen to add a further dimension to the management process. (Lamming, 1993: 86)

I shall discuss wider perspectives and analyses on partnering and collaboration shortly, but it is worth emphasising that there is a coherent and rationalist approach to collaboration, risk reduction and corporate management that hints at interdependency and commonality of purpose. The EPCOT IPT is, in many ways, merely subscribing to the discourses on management and project control to be found in the literature on business and management; a managerialist narrative that provides a way of explaining, rationalising activities, and supposedly controlling organisations to ‘generate stated effects,’ to use a phrase often quoted to me (Interview: Yossarian, 2006b; Interview: Korn, 2007).
Returning to notions of risk management, it can be said that EPCOT’s policy of transferring traditional military activities and functions to industry accords with the sense of UK government reform of the public sector and services that were discussed in earlier chapters (Edwards and Shaoul, 2004). At the level of macro economics, these reforms at the end of the 20th century had the intent of generating finances and resources from industry that the public sector could not afford whilst, critically, creating private sector capacity to fuel and enable activities that were traditionally the preserve of the state, such as the servicing and deploying of military air assets. Hence, industry was to have the capacity and eventually the competency, rather than the EPCOT IPT, for servicing, maintaining and providing the aircraft EPCOT IPT once configured.

At a lower level of rationalist discourse, management, through partnerships, is said to embrace value for money ideas that involve these concepts of transferring risks from the state to industry. However, this transfer and sense of almost iterative management of risk between public sector and private sector partners may be an aspirational ideal rather than a commercial reality. For it is impossible to compare the actual costs of risks transferred from public to private sectors with those against a value associated with something like a public sector comparator as comparable financial data is built on assumption, probability and subjective values – complex data sets that quickly become out-of-date and meaningless.
(Edwards and Shaoul, 2003: 9). Moreover, the act of monitoring a partnered relationship for the public sector partner involves an increase to the public sector cost base that quickly undermines any notions of value for money when compared with an intended ‘partnered solution.’ And where risk exists between partners, its allocation may be unclear thereby its transfer – and any sense of efficiency and value or money – will be immeasurable, uncertain and hollow.

Consequently, the notion of risk management is a managerialist construct and discourse with a language, set of practices and legitimising academic and practitioner derived ‘knowledge base’ that provides consistent, reasonable and probable explanations, courses of action and documentation through which the EPCOT IPT senior management team believes that it is ‘controlling and governing projects to deliver management solutions’ (Interview: Black, 2007b). It is intrinsically linked to managerialist explanations of partnering and collaboration which I now go on to discuss.

**Commercialisation and Partnering**

There is a strong and common rationale within the EPCOT IPT, therefore, underlying the notions of risk management, especially the idea of transferring risk from the public sector to industry, and the emerging partnering relationship lauded within the EPCOT IPT Business Plan (MoD, 2006). Teece (1986) promotes the idea that partnering is concerned with the identification and sharing of the
key assets, physical and emotional, within respective organisations required for the completion of desired operations for the benefit of collaborators and their ultimate users or customers. Teece (1986) describes these as ‘complementary assets’ and focuses his work on what he perceives as the crucially important identification of what is required from each partner in order for the coalition to be successful.

This sense of complementing assets resonates with the EPCOT IPT’s drive for a partnered commercial relationships with its suppliers as joint teams from the IPT and industry, in future, will provide and manage core support to the air fleet (MoD, 2006: 5) in what a senior manager from the EPCOT IPT describes as a ‘strategic alignment’ through which the best skills of each partner will complement the other’s competencies, generating support to the military front line significantly greater than the sum of the parts (Interview: de Coverley, 2007b).

There is a logical business narrative to this intent which, from the IPT’s perspective, is grounded in the rational academic discourse found in the works of Teece (1986), Lamming (1993) and Dodgson (1991a), amongst others.

This managerial discourse is further articulated within the works of the management consultancies. McKinsey (1991) found that most successful partnerships are likely to be those which involved the
core business activities of the partners rather than periphery undertakings. One interpretation is that some long term collaborative framework arrangement is necessary to remove doubt between partners, thereby enabling a trusting relationship, or formalising this doubt into a working method which, over time, will cope with this lack of trust in a stable manner. Perhaps, McKinsey (1991) argue, the relationship might even gain from this approach rather like the dynamic of managing, but not eliminating, conflict between management and workers within industrial relations.

It is interesting to note that McKinsey is the firm of management consultants that, from 1997 onwards, advised the United Kingdom MoD on the design and introduction of smart acquisition. This rationalist sense of management as applied to the industrial supply chain and the intellectual justification for the changes relating to commercial collaborations has found its way to the EPCOT IPT; indeed, it is firmly rooted within its explanatory narrative.

Moreover, Dodgson (1991b) summarises a body of academic literature intellectualising and supporting the rationale for organisational collaboration from which some common themes can be extracted. The first of these is what he describes as a ‘technological primacy/innovation network.’ Because of the
importance of technologies to manufacturing and support services, entities are seeking to secure or retain know-how by locking-in technical primacy through long term partnering contracts. There is a strand of this legitimisation within the EPCOT IPT’s assertion that their partnering business model is concerned with ‘securing the supply chain’ for aircraft support (Interview: Yossarian, 2006b).

However, the principal argument drawn from Dodgson’s work (1991b) is what he describes as the need for organisational learning within notions of technological development and the role which collaboration must play within it. He argues that there are, in essence, three core learning processes within continuing partnerships. The first of these is learning about the partner, the second is learning about the task, and the third relates to partner joint understanding of mutual outcomes. This reasoning resonates with the stated aims, values and beliefs of smart acquisition in generating joint learning, a desire to work co-operatively and in a collaborative manner, with a predisposition to share ideas and overcome problems by tapping into industry’s knowledge and ways of working (MoD, 2002: 3).

The EPCOT IPT collaboration with its industry partners through long term support contracts is derived from a sense of reasoning and a proposition that is presented as common sense and simply sound management techniques. This iterative, highly rational discourse of programme governance and commercial activity is
legitimised and empowered by academic explanations and managerialist theories that make occurrences such as the project team’s partnering relationship pervasive and compelling.

The commercialisation of the IPT, at one level, through the packaging and commoditisation of traditional military activities such as servicing aircraft, which are then despatched to industry, is a rational, sensible and proper extension of this discourse, assessed in the terms through which it is espoused. It sits within the broader context and change management intent of smart acquisition itself. In the language of the published smart acquisition guidance

Partnering is essentially the development of new, much more co-operative long term relationships between MoD and industry. Partnering differs from conventional contracting relationships in that effective communication strategies amongst partners leads to trust, better and earlier identification and hence management of project risks, and increasing better value for money being gained in large scale complex requirements. (MoD, 2002: 22)

These two strands of the notional management and transfer of risk and the transformation of a customer-industry relationship into a partnership or collaboration have generated what I would describe as a state of ‘commercialisation’ within the EPCOT IPT. The overarching narrative, stated values, belief in the merits of industry,
and imported management processes no longer embrace and promote public service, soldierly sacrifice or a sense of military ethos within the IPT. And the process of managerialist reform asserts that this is a good and desirable state of affairs. Rather, the IPT can be characterised as valuing and deriving explanations and meanings around the commoditisation of activities, pursued jointly with industry, but through the drill of management schedules, cost codes, project plans, risk meetings and partnering reviews. In short, a taxonomy of invasive and pervasive private sector industrial beliefs, practices and habits.

The context of these managerialist explanations within the EPCOT IPT, and its rationalist sense of legitimisation and shared understanding through constructs of efficiency and value for money, is rooted within this discourse of collaboration and risk management. These expositions bloom and are explicated through themes of practitioner or employee reformation, unitary ways of constructing meaning, and a sense of the managerial desirability in reducing the size of the military footprint within support operations and services, all of which we come now to discuss. But the substantive connection and subtext of these themes remains this collaborative rationalisation for the purpose of controlling contrived notions of risk. It is the beating heart of this discourse of management.
8.3 From Airman to Manager – Reforming the Person

Implicit to this intent to commercialise the EPCOT IPT is the sense that somehow military staff and civil servants can be deconstructed and reformed into business people with skills, competencies and values perceived to be derived from and associated with industry. This idea of developing professional management behaviours out of, somehow, an old-style, out of time and tired public service ethos is a powerful motivator and legitimising rationale for organisational change within the IPT (Interview: Yossarian, 2006b).

The senior management team possess a collective, focused reasoning in relation to this sense of personal transformation. The notion is that only industrial practices and motivations can generate efficiencies to deliver increasingly more engineering support to military aircraft for the same financial profiles or less (Interview: Yossarian, 2006b). Military officers within the IPT have to become managers; civil servants have to trade-in ideas of public sector service and values for performance competencies, project management skills and the ability to shape stakeholders. The narrative and rationalism for change, accordingly, has significant consequences for the individual within the project team. This, though, seems accepted, perhaps even embraced and welcomed, as wholly legitimate and the logical outcome of a proven need for organisational change (Interview: Korn, 2006). As the EPCOT IPT team leader states
We are a team growing through transformation. We need a strong set of values to help us succeed. (MoD, 2006:3)

The inference, and belief within the senior management team, is that these values to be embraced are those of its industrial partners. Indeed, the processes and methodologies to enable this have been put in place by smart acquisition and, as we shall see, are being readily grasped and championed by EPCOT IPT team members.

What are these processes and methodologies? I shall start with the formal schemes of the ‘Acquisition Leadership Development Scheme’, known as the ALDS; the Acquisition Stream, abbreviated to AS, and also consider Group Captain Yossarian’s special management training to ‘explicate (his) own learning and knowledge from within’ (Interview: Yossarian, 2006c).

The MoD guidance for smart acquisition states that

Sustaining smart acquisition places an emphasis on the development, training and sustaining of people in acquisition. The Acquisition stream (AS) is central to this commitment to develop our people and is open to all in acquisition. Its goal is a thoroughly committed, highly skilled and well-trained acquisition community. The Acquisition Leadership Development Scheme is an integral part (of this intent) and is a key element of the commitment
to develop leadership within acquisition. The ALDS is a capped scheme providing entry at foundation, core or expert levels by competition. (MoD, 2002: 36)

I talked to a number of members of the AS from within the EPCOT IPT during a group session in 2007 (Interview: Black, 2007b). I was informed that the AS was launched in February 2001 within the MoD to create a stream of people from within the acquisition community to offer a range of development opportunities with the intent of acquiring a, supposed, comprehensive set of acquisition competencies. The sense from within the group was that the implementation of the AS would deliver a pan-acquisition development strategy whereby key commercial skills and behaviours would become imbedded within the public sector.

One of the interviewees was from the finance team within EPCOT IPT and she expanded on her own personal circumstances. She joined the AS in 2002 and had, with her line manager, agreed a ‘development route-map’. This involved training in skills and competencies captured within something called the Acquisition Competence Framework which represented for AS members a single, comprehensive source of all the competences that support the acquisition process as a whole. Therefore, the more training received against these competencies, the better able AS members were to undertake their roles of, in the case of EPCOT IPT, maintaining front line military aircraft.
AS members from the project team had received training, matching the competencies within the Acquisition Competence Framework, in the following subjects: shared data environments, project management scheduling tools, risk management tools and techniques, product data management tools, commercial and contractual approaches and models, performance reporting methodologies, payroll and financial management tools and Human Resources methodologies. All of these ‘skills’ had been taught by colleagues from management consultancies, industry specialists or internal MoD consultants who, themselves, had received training in this manner.

Without exception, the AS members from the EPCOT IPT felt that they were now better civil servants and airmen/women than before their training, somehow much more able to plan and track performance. Training had revealed to them that their jobs were concerned with management and the effective exploitation of resources, not explicitly support to aircraft (Interview: Black, 2007b).

The EPCOT team members who were part of the AS had found meaning and relevance in the language and constructs of a derived and learnt practice of management. This, for them, was somehow more relevant and significant than older, more traditional notions of military, public or civil service couched in a discourse of duty and personal commitment, even sacrifice, that historically had required no articulation beyond its own values and worth.
This sense of a different, better, way of doing things, mentored by industry through a managerial dialogue and set of processes and behaviours, is homed within smart acquisition’s explicit intent. For

The new ways of working described…require new and improved acquisition business tools…noting that the emphasis of smart acquisition is on a whole life approach, involving all key stakeholders, and closer working with industry. (MoD, 2002: 28)

It is a triumph of reform throughout public life, linking policy intent to day-to-day beliefs and activities. And the rationale, the objective, is merely sound and effective management. What could be more normal than this closed-loop logic? The exploitation by EPCOT IPT members of the opportunities offered by the AS, when viewed through this rationalist intent, is merely the consequence of sound, centralised resource planning and management, with the people themselves benefiting from being reformed and enabled to perform their new roles of manager. As one AS member said, ‘it’s just common sense; just good project management, there is nothing sinister going on here’ (Interview: Black, 2007b).

Rooted in the AS is the MoD’s Acquisition Leadership Development Scheme (ALDS). A member of the EPCOT IPT senior management team has been part of this scheme for a number of years as a ‘Core Member.’ She explained to me (Interview: Korn, 2006; Interview:
Korn, 2007) that the scheme is divided into three stages: Foundation, Core and Expert, the primary difference between the three being the competences which an individual is expected to possess along with the progress that they may have made against something called the ALDS development route-map. This route-map provides an aid to individuals and their managers in developing the types of job experience and competencies that they should have acquired and developed before entering the next, higher, stage of the scheme.

The aim of the ALDS is to develop existing and future leaders in acquisition. It provides an effective develop environment that will support civilian, military and industry acquisition staff who wish to develop a career in acquisition and who aspire to become or develop as a leader in this field. The scheme is open to MoD civilian and military personnel and industry representatives. (MoD, 2002: 38)

I asked the ALDS member within EPCOT’s management team for examples of job experiences, competency areas and appropriate developmental areas that would normally be associated with ALDS members. The key areas, I was told, revolved around ‘requirements sets’, ‘commercial toolkits and contracting’, ‘financial management and accountancy’, ‘engineering’, ‘project management and scheduling’, and ‘risk and opportunity management’ (Interview: Korn, 2007).
Yet the development clusters were far from the real benefit of the ALDS scheme I was informed. Rather, the best elements were the requirement to attend a residential leadership course where key lessons in effective management are passed down to new members by experienced scheme mentors who themselves are already successful acquisition leaders holding senior posts within MoD and industry. Moreover, supporting this residential course, a small group of ALDS members within a ‘learning set’ are required by the scheme’s rules to meet three times a year to ‘explore new thinking in management techniques’ (Interview: Korn, 2007).

There is a sense of overt, almost ceremonial, induction into management techniques and values through schemes such as the ALDS; somehow revealing to the military and civil servants methods and processes that have previously been hidden prior to the smart acquisition reforms. The notion, perhaps, that management is a set of competencies to be learnt, relationships to be built and values to be embraced that exist beyond previous public sector experiences. Pedler, Boydell and Burgoyne (1986) intellectualise this sense, by arguing that there are certain attributes and qualities possessed by successful managers that can be developed by the implementation of competency frameworks, allowing an organisation to reform and its people to align their own training and development to the stated needs of the business. As Drucker says
Development is always self-development. Nothing could be more absurd than for the enterprise to assume responsibility for the development of a person. The responsibility rests with individuals, their abilities, their efforts. (Drucker, 1955: 7)

It is just that, within EPCOT IPT, smart acquisition contextualises and frames those responses, so that individual efforts are pre-determined, organised, commoditised and managed; legitimised throughout by this common-sense managerial discourse and sense of benign organisational reform.

The Acquisition Stream and the Acquisition Leadership Development Scheme promotes, accredits and justifies industrial and commercial ideas of management, organisational design and refinement that resonates with notions of personal development and improvement. Learning is concerned with embracing given management models and explanations rather than exploring new understandings, perspective or critiques. It is a total-sum idea of personal knowledge; that is, if an individual rote-learns pre-identified management models and attends certain stated courses than she or he will possess a specific and measurable level of managerial expertise that can be badged with terms such as ‘core’ or ‘expert’. And as management is imbued with notions and concepts of ‘measurement’ and ‘test’, this total-sum concept itself appears rational and wholly legitimate. It is an idea that is certainly
embraced, perhaps unquestioned, within the EPCOT IPT (Interview: Korn, 2007).

I want now to turn to another strand of perceived development – an overtly personal, individualised one. The team leader explained at interview (Interview: Yossarian, 2006b) that his own personal development was of a much more academic flavour than that offered by either the AS or ALDS, although he did encourage his staff to engage with one or other of these schemes. Rather, the team leader was undertaking a two-year study in explication, as it related to his own internal knowledge. What he meant by this, he commented, was that explication as a practice promotes the prospect of deriving new, incremental, explicit knowledge through a holistic study of an individual’s implicit knowledge. Supported by an academic institute and structured study, the team leader concluded that the explication process offered significant opportunity for wider personal and management development.

I feel that it is important to explore this. Best and Kellner (1997) state that

The linguistic turn is an explicit realisation that the primary way human beings know and participate in their world is through language and different linguistic maps bring different senses of reality and claims to truth. The linguistic turn, therefore, is the eruption into human consciousness of

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the perspectival, contextual and contingent nature of all truth claims. Language does not represent reality, rather it shapes and constructs it. (Best and Kellner, 1997: 260)

The team leader’s linguistic turn, in this sense, is to see his development through this explication process within a definition as follows: ‘the process of explication is concerned with the creation of new meanings and additional knowledge’ (Franklin, 2006: 9). What this means is that the team leader has been able to review his own personal experiences from his working life, or ‘learning life’ as he describes it, to create his own sense of knowledge from an interaction between his experiences, intellect and imagination. From this learning process, mentored and enabled by an academic ‘partner’, the team leader has been able to conclude that for his development and that of his organisation, the EPCOT IPT, greater organisational processes, management tools and reporting techniques are required. These, in turn, are to be viewed as what he describes as ‘knowledge enablers’.

This journey of internalised exploration by the team leader has led to a self-realisation that more overt and robust management techniques for all is, somehow, the answer to the organisational challenges he faces. This may seem to some, perhaps, as quite an intellectual leap, but it is supported by a robust academic discourse and tradition (Chia, 2004; Denzin, 1994; Day, 2005). Indeed, such an approach has been seen as a significant intellectual achievement.
As the prime actors in our own development, we are prompted to focus on our own development needs and on our thirst to make contributions to knowledge which enable us to review and alter our contributions to the knowledge communities that we are part of, and to engage with knowledge communities too. Secondly, postmodernism gives us a licence to create our own localised knowledge and helps us to reveal the insidious implicit assumption, embedded in modernism, that the only knowledge worth having is out there provided by somebody else. Third, explication is a process which enables us to create our own knowledge...Finally, the fruits of explication tell it as it is! (Franklin, 2006: 10)

I am left with a sense that formal organisational development schemes, such as the AS and the ALDS, and personal, inward-looking development processes such as the team leader’s explication study has reinforced and supported dominant notions that managerial processes, constructs and ways of understanding are both common sense and intellectually legitimate. If there is uncertainty, a sense of organisational inefficiency, or if we can learn from somebody else – in the case of the EPCOT IPT, its industry partners – then the application of more and better management is the intuitive, entirely satisfactory, logically inevitable, even irresistible response. Given the above discourse, it could hardly be otherwise.
8.4 A Commonality of Purpose: Shared Ways of Thinking

There is a commitment, intellectual and derived, for more management, however formed, to replace outdated notions of public service that cannot be measured, monitored and, therefore, controlled (Interview: Michaela, 2006). This commitment has coagulated into a common way of working within the EPCOT IPT that has been borrowed exclusively from commercial organisations. It is these commonalities that will now be explored.

We will move the IPT’s main focus from aircraft to projects, whilst still delivering the daily support output (through industry). Projects will be the vehicle for changing how we do business.’ (MoD, 2006: 8)

It is clear from the EPCOT IPT’s business plan that the sort of managers they are to become is ‘project managers.’ There is logic to this. The management team from the IPT explained (Interview: Yossarian, 2006c) that they had seen that industry supports the military through various ‘projects’, therefore it was easy to make the case for, and see the benefit from, moving to a project stance. Also, by articulating the EPCOT IPT’s activities through the straight lines of schedules and resource management techniques associated with projects, the management team felt that there was also significant scope for future savings. I shall come on to address this shortly.
The guidance for the implementation of smart acquisition (MoD, 2002) is specific on the necessity of a single way of working, which is to take a professionalised project stance, whatever that means, by working closer with industry (MoD, 2002: 24). Indeed, the phrase used to brand this intent has already been introduced; namely ‘partnering’ or as an alternative ‘teaming’.

I explored with the EPCOT IPT (Interview: Yossarian, 2006c) its project lines of development. The Business Plan 2006 (MoD, 2006: 9) records that all activities are brigaded under five high-level projects. These five project lines were introduced in chapter 7, and are, ‘strategic enabling’, ‘partnering’, ‘people’, ‘organisational leaning’ and ‘transformation’ itself. Exploring these themes, it became clear that a highly complex and integrated set of project schedules, trade-off plans and shared data sets existed below these five sub-projects, with none of them really dealing with the business of maintaining aircraft. But then, it was explained, this is not the EPCOT IPT’s business any longer. It is now in the business of managing others to do the actual work (Interview: Yossarian, 2006c).

The toolboxes of management are different, of course, from the toolboxes of the maintenance hangar. For management, the EPCOT IPT requires a project planning and scheduling set, a performance management system, investment appraisal guidelines, cost forecasting, estimating and a risk management system (Interview: Korn, 2007). All of these things it has learnt, and can readily borrow
and insert, from industry (MoD, 2004). Indeed, in following the smart acquisition published advice

Management is greatly improved by managing progress in projects jointly with industry. Earned value management, for instance, is a tool which provides this. It creates a ‘no surprises’ culture and relationship whereby both MoD and industry are working towards the same goal. (MoD, 2004: 33)

The commonality of process, of ways of working, or thinking, is an industrial one. Reform is accepting industry practice as dominant and best. Or as a member of EPCOT IPT’s senior management team put it; ‘industry is just better than us. We’ve all their tricks to learn’ (Interview: Appleby, 2007).

8.5 EPCOT ‘Decider’ – Industry ‘Provider’: A Smaller Public Sector

The explicit dynamic and logic for the managerialist reform agenda represented by smart acquisition and demonstrated by the EPCOT IPT is the generation of a smaller public sector as industry reaches into the space traditionally occupied by its customer within the military. The EPCOT IPT senior management team explained that the project team will ‘going forward under transformation’ and
embrace the ‘decider role’ whilst industry will be the provider of services (Interview: Yossarian, 2008).

What this means is that industry will undertake the work traditionally performed by the project team under new long-term support contracts. The EPCOT IPT, in contrast, will undertake a ‘decider’ function whereby it monitors industry’s performance and activities and assures the operational commands within the UK military establishment that aircraft are being serviced and provided in accordance to stated operational and air worthiness standards. By changing its way of working in this manner, the project team will be able to reduce its headcount by about twenty five percent thereby meeting and exceeding MoD efficiency targets (Interview: Yossarian, 2008).

The idea of a smaller, more efficient public sector has been discussed and legitimised as discourse through the work of Tomlinson (1999), Friedman (2000) and Falk (1999) amongst many others. The predominant rationale is constructed around a macro-economic efficiency argument; namely that the dynamics of supply and demand ensure the inherent efficiency of the private sector which is able to offer, through partnering arrangements with the public sector, these rationalities and efficiencies to government, taking over public sector services and offering future provision at less cost to society. We have seen over the pages of this study that
smart acquisition is inculcated in this rationality and legitimising set of assumptions.

But there is another sense whereby these reforms are significant. Rose (1999: 103) suggests that the primary economic and social image offered to the modern citizen within industrial society is that of consumer rather than that of producer. For a person to be labelled as a producer is, somehow, to be old-society, unreformed, outmoded. By having a smaller EPCOT IPT reconstructed as a ‘decider’ or consumer of industry’s services, the management team are of the zeitgeist, legitimate and current (Interview: Yossarian, 2006b).

The EPCOT IPT management team also holds the view that commitment to the ‘decider role’ allows the project team the opportunity to combine with other military support teams in the future. As there is now no longer a technical or engineering set of activities for the EPCOT IPT to undertake, defence IPTs could combine, generating ever-increasing savings and efficiencies, thereby further reducing the size of the public sector footprint within defence support services (Interview: Yossarian, 2008). The sense from the senior management board was that this possibility was overtly desirable, aligned to the intent of higher military command and, by extension, government itself.
The single line of sight is the means by which we explicitly link individual objectives and the objectives of the EPCOT IPT to the achievement of the higher mission. It forms a hierarchy of vision and plans...our strategy is to transform logistics support. (MoD, 2006: 12)

The means of so doing, the calligraphy and folksongs of the EPCOT IPT, is this managerial discourse which is highly legitimate, profoundly rational and supported by a body of evidence and academic argument. As a senior IPT member states, afterall its ‘just good project management’ (Interview: Korn, 2007).

8.6 Conclusion: ‘It’s just good project management’

This chapter set out to present the EPCOT IPT as an exemplar of the rational and legitimate change programme, smart acquisition, that has embraced the UK defence environment during the early years of the 21st century – the key descriptor being ‘rational and legitimate’. The managerialist agenda and enveloping of industrial and commercial values, understanding and ways of working that comprise significant parts of smart acquisition have been demonstrated as logical, common sense, almost incremental reform, accepted and supported by people from across the EPCOT IPT. Indeed the tools of reform, the competency frameworks, training and development schemes and common processes have been
embedded as benign and constructive ingredients, leading to a much more effective, professional and flavoursome future.

It is a future, though, sharply seasoned by these industrial and commercial notions of management. What I have described as the commercialisation of the EPCOT IPT is perhaps the dominant flavour, but it is joined by a strong personal commitment from within the project team to become manager rather than public servant, the latter a concept which seems to have been summarily rejected. And as manager, to think, act and problem-solve in a unitary, highly systemic manner.

Somehow, all of these activities and events rationally direct and enable the EPCOT IPT’s management team to reduce numbers from within the project team, shrinking EPCOT into something conveniently, and managerially, labelled as ‘decider’, whilst industry willingly and for profit performs the public sector roles of yesterday.

Smart acquisition, therefore, in the language and analysis of transformation is a benign force recalibrating the EPCOT IPT into an effective and efficient management entity. The supposed joint learning and lessons from industry are now embedded to good effect across the EPCOT IPT. Surely, we all will benefit from the insertion of good management (Interview: Black, 2007b), for
A better relationship between MoD and industry is one of the key themes of smart acquisition. There is a lot to be gained in being more like our industry partners. (MoD: 2002, 24)

The antithesis of this perspective and sense of meaning is presented in the following chapter.
CHAPTER 9 – THE PROJECT TEAM AS ANALYTICS OF GOVERNMENTALITY

9.1 Introduction

Thus far, I have introduced the EPCOT IPT, a project team from the MoD’s DLO, and unpicked the values, beliefs and behaviours of the project team that predominantly view the smart acquisition reforms as a legitimate and necessary change management initiative. The management of the project team and the team members themselves have, at one level of explanation, embraced the notions and language of managerialism, especially the terms and forms associated with project control techniques and processes – indeed they no longer service aircraft, but manage projects – and, on the face of it, willingly commoditised and packaged their activities before transferring them to industry. The dynamic and legitimised rationale for this behaviour and intent is the efficiency and effectiveness of the procurement process and the generation of military force. Simply put, industry is seen as being better able to perform maintenance, rectification and supply functions than military or civil service practitioners.

This observable view resides within what Lukes (2005) describes as the first dimension of constructs of power. By observing what has occurred within the EPCOT IPT through stated preferences captured in management plans and emerging contracts with industry, it has been revealed in chapters 7 and 8 that the interests
of the smart acquisition management agenda prevails, both in public decision-making and in reforming the project team. So within the EPCOT IPT, through this pluralist, highly positivist lens, it is seen that the champions of smart acquisition exercise legitimate, benign power over colleagues within the project team through the dynamic of an observable change programme. People are not striving for outcomes or preferences that might constrain them or conceivably not be in their true interests as through this one-dimensional perspective all interests are aligned to what can be observed.

Smart acquisition has triumphed within the EPCOT IPT because its proponents have won an observable argument and their preferences were simply more rational in leading to perceived additional management efficiency and greater military effects. Indeed, this seems to be the kernel of the position adopted by a number of interviewees within the EPCOT IPT and certainly appears to capture Group Captain Yossarian, the team leader’s, perspective.

Throughout this chapter I challenge this perspective. Whilst the power and influence of smart acquisition can be viewed through the observable, this does not make its effects or impact a pluralist phenomenon. We know from the work of Bachrach and Baratz (1970), which I introduced in my fifth chapter, that power is also exercised through a second dimension (Lukes, 2005) whereby a group unconsciously create the conditions which prevent
discussion, challenge and conflicting perspective to a dominant, accepted discourse. This subliminal, concealed set of constructs, agendas, management initiatives and behaviours combine to form the only acceptable narrative within which any discussion can take place.

Critical for smart acquisition, of course, this narrative rejects any sense of challenge before it can form, as the language and activities of the day-to-day are flavoured with a techno-rational logic which precludes rejection or an alternative personal agency. As I say in chapter 5, organisation is the mobilisation of bias (Schattschneider, 1960) and this bias could be said to be the modes and constructs of the smart acquisition reforms, framed through a set of pre-determined, highly commercial values and rituals which define institutional policies, processes and individual behavioural responses.

Within this chapter I discuss this sense of bias and closed-loop logic as a power construct. I develop a typology of power within the EPCOT IPT that focuses on decisions and nondecisions to protect the subjective integrity of the smart acquisition theology. In doing this, I rely on the work of Bachrach and Baratz (1970). However, this analysis is built on the observable, where notions of power are derived by considering deliberate and selective choices, even at the level of a ‘nondecision’.
This is important and highly relevant. Through my unravelling of the EPCOT IPT, I intend also to consider the notion of systemic bias, created, mobilised and reinforced through the unconscious and the unobservable. It seems that the observable consensus, neoliberal and managerial, is where power is demonstrated within society, and that this power is imbued with a clear and unambiguous economic rationalism. The agents within the EPCOT IPT comply with this rationalism, but do so when the factors that drive this compliance are least visible or observable. In other words, my premise in this chapter is that power is demonstrated through the observable, but resides within the hidden, labouring through the very souls of those who feel and project its effects.

I then go on, influenced by this preceding discussion, to unpack the ‘shaping of the self’ within the EPCOT IPT, what I refer to as the subjectivisation of the individual and the alignment of her or his personal agency to expected norms of responses and behaviours. From this sense of learnt agency, I conceptualise power within the EPCOT IPT in Foucault’s terms (1980) as a multiplicity of mechanisms and functions beyond which no personality can exist or may even be formed in modern society.

Having laid out smart acquisition as, essentially, a power discourse rather than a change management toolset, I then consider the project team in terms of the three points of my smart acquisition triptych. I discuss how notions of modernisation within the EPCOT project...
team drive this discourse, and then consider the pervasive nature of the managerial as an agent of techno-rational dominance. I conclude by considering that the homogenisation of smart acquisition is not just associated with management processes, the stated values of management teams, or the toolsets and technologies provided under the banner of smart acquisition. Much more, it is about the homogenisation of the self, the pre-ordination of individual beliefs and responses that render them merely a function of the communal, so that the person becomes an automatised product of the external. I reveal the military person within the EPCOT IPT to be an economic agent, commoditised, packaged and traded like any other resource.

9.2 The EPCOT IPT – Observable, Conscious Reform – the First Dimension

The essence of Lukes’ first dimension of power, brought forward from my third chapter, is of a finite or constant-sum level of power distributed pluralistically through open, observable interactions (Lukes, 2005). This sense of power can be revealed by witnessing a set of behaviours, initially by observing certain outcomes and tracing them to the individuals or groups who have prevailed in public decision making. To paraphrase Dahl (1957), person ‘A’ exercises power over person ‘B’ by getting the latter to perform a certain act or behave in a certain manner he or she would not
normally choose. Watching ‘B’ conform to the will of ‘A’, we can deduce that ‘A’ exercises power over ‘B’ and that ‘B’s responses are a rational, causal response to that sense of power, as exercised by ‘A’.

At this level of understanding, it can be perceived that the EPCOT IPT team members have embraced the functional reforms of smart acquisition – the new organisations, processes and stated behaviours – because Group Captain Yossarian, the team leader, simply told them that this was the way they were to act and behave. It can be observed that this is so through the written word in the Business Plan.

The key objectives of [smart acquisition] transformation are to increase effectiveness, efficiency and flexibility…strong governance will underpin the transformation and its planning…we expect to gain many benefits…for ourselves. (MoD, 2006: 7)

I also get this sense from the views of the team members themselves.

Responses to the team leader’s business plan were initially discussed in a group session with team members in September 2006 (Interview: Aarfy, 2006) and followed-up in March 2007 (Interview: Aarfy, 2007). The dominant view offered from this collective was
that team members were embracing the construct of smart acquisition because, to do so, would, potentially, advance careers within the military and civil service, and also because the team leader required it of them and he exercised power over and within the project team. There is a sense here of the legitimate application of power being deployed by the team leader and embraced and replayed by team members through the transformation programme within the EPCOT IPT. As Michaela said

I have attended training courses and briefings, joined the Acquisition Stream and read management books because it is the only way to demonstrate that I should be promoted.

(Interview: Michaela, 2006)

Sociologists, at one level of functionality, distinguish between two notions of power: authority and coercion (Haralambos, 1980). Authority is that form of power which is accepted as legitimate, consensual, right and just and, therefore, obeyed and followed on that basis. Coercion, in contrast, is that form of power which is rejected by those subject to it and not regarded as legitimate. I tested this simple, competing construct or power with the project team (Interview: Aarfy, 2007) and to a person was advised that the team leader exercised legitimate power as authority

He is the most senior person in the team and has formal financial and air safety delegations from the Ministry of
Defence. Don’t forget, he also signs-off on all of our annual reports and aligns our management targets to [those in] the business plan. (Interview: Aarfy, 2007)

This sense of legitimate rational power-base is derived from a number of clear and visible concepts. Firstly, there is the team leader’s rank. As an RAF Group Captain the team leader was clearly recognised as the most senior person within the project team. Secondly, the team leader held a specific, formal delegation of authority and terms of reference from his commander within the DLO outlining his responsibilities and ‘span of control’ over his team and throughout the wider defence organisation. Thirdly, the team leader was the budget holder for the EPCOT IPT, personally responsible for all expenditure committed on the project team’s behalf.

I was told (Interview: Black, 2007b) that through these factors it was impossible to think of the team leader as exercise anything other than lawful legitimate authority

He’s the boss, no question. It’s simply ridiculous to have a conversation about whether his authority is legitimate and fair or not. The man’s a Group Captain, what else is there to say? (Interview: De Coverley, 2007)
Consequently, the smart acquisition change programme embraced by the EPCOT IPT’s transformation agenda must also, following this logic, be legitimate, benign and, ultimately unquestioned.

This discourse brings to mind the work of Talcott Parsons (1937; 1951; 1960). Parsons rejected the Weberian notion of power as zero-sum, being held by one group at the expense of another. Rather, he regards power as a resource possessed by the whole of society. It has a function to mobilise the intellect and processes of society for the attainment of collective, shared visions and goals to which a group commitment has been made. Power, therefore, can be realised and measured by the degree to which these collective goals have been realised (Parsons, 1937: 21). This view is sometimes referred to as the ‘variable sum’ concept of power since, in contrast to Weber’s view of power being fixed and exercised by one person or group over another, for Parsons it is variable in that power can increase or decrease, measured by goals attained.

Parsons’ view of power can be developed from his general theory of the nature of society (Parsons, 1951). His premise is that value consensus is essential for the survival of all social systems and that from these overt common values, collective goals shared by all members of a community can be derived. For the EPCOT IPT, these goals are the stated objectives of economic efficiency and effectiveness engendered by notions of transformation.
From a wider perspective, if materialism, for example, represents a major value of first-world industrial society, collective goals such as economic growth and expansion of the industrial base can be seen to stem from this value. Of course, smart acquisition is inculcated with this idea of transferring functionality from the public sector – the MoD and its project teams – to the private sector – the project teams’ industrial ‘partners’. For Parsons, the more able society is to realise economic goals such as these of growth and industrial expansion the greater the sense of power that resides within the social system. Additionally, it could be said that, in this way, industrial expansion indicates an increase in the total level of power within a community.

The key point of why and how Parsons’ theories resonate with the stated beliefs and values of the EPCOT IPT members is as follows. Since goals are shared by all members of a community or group, power is used by all to further these collective goals and ambitions, such as those associated with economic efficiency. As a result, all sides of a power relationship will gain from the application of power, with everybody gaining an economic benefit by the disposition of power in the manner articulated by Parsons. Moreover, cooperation in the dispersal and operation of power requires organisation and direction which necessitate positions of command and influence, exercised legitimately and benignly to direct others towards these shared common goals. ‘Thus, some are
granted authority for the benefit of all’ (Haralambos, 1980: 100), to pursue within the EPCOT IPT the stated objectives of ‘effectiveness, efficiency and flexibility’ gaining ‘may benefits…for ourselves’ (MoD, 2006).

The power to seize and implement the smart acquisition agenda throughout the EPCOT IPT is, under this analysis, common to all members from across the project team, openly shared and accepted. The EPCOT IPT staff occupying positions of authority do so legitimately in the eyes of wider team members, and are merely exercising power to brigade and align resources and processes to deliver identified, commonly-held, rational common goals. The consensual, deliberate reforms of smart acquisition, and the application of authority paraded under the lens of the first dimension of power (Lukes, 2005), conveniently provide a legitimising discourse of smart acquisition as it applies to the EPCOT IPT.

9.3 Power as Bias – the Second Dimension

The first dimension of power, within Lukes’ (2005) analysis, is pluralist, consensual and, in a self-referencing sense, benign. I now wish to turn my attention to the application of power through the second dimension, where there lurk hidden sets of structures, agendas and discourses that prevent an alternative understanding
or explanations of defence procurement from challenging the dominant narrative of smart acquisition within the EPCOT IPT. This is what Schattschneider (1960) paraphrases as organisations or communities possessing a bias in favour of a dominant, common understanding or narrative at the expense of or suppression of another. Organisation, by its nature, is the ‘mobilisation of bias’, with some issues organised in and other issues organised out (Schattschneider, 1960: 71).

At this level of meaning, the transformation agenda within the EPCOT IPT has framed notions of understanding defence procurement by the project team members through overtly stressing the values, beliefs, policies and processes of the team as captured and articulated within the Business Plan (MoD, 2006). The argument is that through the consistent, persuasive and systematic deployment of these procedures, smart acquisition is, somehow, an exercise in power of its sponsors and champions over the uninitiated members of the project team.

I discussed this with Michaela, a civil servant and senior project manager within the EPCOT IPT, during a set of conversations during 2006 and 2007. She informed me that, initially, she was ignorant of the smart acquisition agenda within MoD and undertook her job without reference to its values, language or processes. However, over time, she had embraced what she
described as the smart acquisition reforms as more senior people to her had championed their benefits and, significantly, the only way to frame problems and seek management intervention was through the perceptions and processes of smart acquisition.

Instead of writing memos in the usual way of the civil service, I started to write business cases and sought resources by describing risks to my project. I found myself talking about stakeholders and governance, probably out of context, but was never picked-up or challenged. It takes some getting used to, but that’s the game. (Interview: Michaela, 2007)

There is an interesting dynamic being revealed here. Michaela, prior to her awareness of smart acquisition, undertook her job through the traditional civil service practices of report writing, the so-called ‘staffing’ of crafted documents with recommendations through layers of bureaucratic management, and the development of ‘options’ and ‘cost-benefit analyses’. She no longer does this. In an exercise of bias she now frames her work through constructs of ‘projects’, ‘risk management’, ‘stakeholder engagements’, ‘governance’ and ‘partnering’.

This perspective intersects the work of Bachrach and Baratz (1970) and their derived typology of power relationships as decisions and nondecisions. The values and practices of what could possibly be described as the traditional UK civil service have been consigned to
history within the EPCOT IPT, through Michaela’s experience, by the dynamic, or rather, passive intervention of the nondecision. Smart acquisition is the only methodology for setting the context and exercise of management within the project team. Other practices, even those that are deeply historical in nature and traditionally embraced by the civil service, have been exorcised and moved beyond an active decision framework. Modes of action can only be formed and understood through the taxonomy of smart acquisition, with those actions, in turn, reinforcing and sustaining smart acquisition explanations and practices.

There is a sense through Lukes’ second dimension of power that smart acquisition has, somehow, taken-on in conflict and triumphed over other practices and regimes of explanation; somehow representing a rejection of a public sector ethos associated with the military and the civil service. For example, Wing Commander Appleby, the head of the transformation line of development within the EPCOT IPT, characterises smart acquisition in this manner. For him, smart acquisition represents the triumph of a rational, economically derived set of processes over inefficient and flabby, traditional public sector values and practices. In fact, ‘lean’ is the word he associates with smart acquisition.

We had to become leaner and more efficient through smart acquisition. Before, we were wasteful and bloated, and never
really had control of procurement. Now we’ve got some management over the process. (Interview: Appleby, 2007)

Power, accordingly, is exercised through smart acquisition constructs, as other regimes of practices and values – the civil service ethos or the military covenant – have been defeated. For the Wing Commander, smart acquisition wins on its merits, with these being economic and management rationalism.

This is a powerful narrative – in many senses. Smart acquisition, as a conceptualisation or expression of power within the EPCOT IPT, is revealed through the dynamic forces of replacing a service perspective – be it military or civil – with an economic or business critique. It is observable that traditional military doctrine has been trumped by the discourse of smart acquisition. Yet the most effective manifestation of power is that exercised over a group or individual by shaping and determining wants and desires. As Foucault described it, power is best perceived as both ‘repressing’ and ‘producing’ and that those subject to it are rendered susceptible to its effects through the subliminal, hidden and unobservable (Foucault, 1975).

Power ‘represses’ by prohibiting and constraining, by setting overt limits on what responses to situations are possible or acceptable. In the EPCOT IPT that limit could be said to be framed by project management constructs and processes. But power ‘produces’ as
well, it ‘traverses…induces…forms knowledge, produces discourse’ (Foucault, 1980: 119). In this way power forms subjects, normalising and forging character so that agency can be defined, pre-formed and ‘repressed’.

Foucault’s insight is that power is not just the observable or the measurable. It is internal, of the soul, constructing and defining personal mastery and agency, ‘determining…wants’ (Lukes, 2005: 27). This is the stuff of Lukes’ third dimension of power, through which the EPCOT IPT is now accessed.

9.4 Smart Acquisition and EPCOT: The Shaping of the Self – The Third Dimension

In chapter 5 I observed that the second dimension of power, within Lukes’ typology, is constrained in its outlook and diagnostic power as its focus is limited to behaviours, especially as these behaviours relate to choices which can be observed. A correlation to this is that observable choice is said to be made between competing interests and where no competition can be observed, consensus has been achieved and is not subject to an applicability of power.

Lukes’ (2005) third dimension of power, in contrast, attaches great significance to this very fabrication of consensus. He rejects the notion that power is not exercised where consensus is observed but
suggests rather that this very consensus is the tipping point of power’s manifestation within society. The discourse and practices associated with this consensus dictate an individual’s thinking, erects points of reference and perceived personal beliefs, and codifies responses (Lukes, 2005: 91).

I shall reflect on this for a moment. The interview conducted with Wing Commander Appley (Interview: Appleby, 2007) alluded to the reality that smart acquisition has taught the individual his or her responses to given situations

There are loads of issues, or rather risks, that could cause slippages which I need to manage if I wish to optimise outcomes and generate battle-winning military effects. If management needs to intervene, we will. (Interview: Appleby, 2007)

Appleby, in his work, captures issues in terms of expressing risks to a programme, whether that programme is one of a number of maintenance contacts and schedules for the servicing of aircraft by industry, or a programme of internal transformation. These risks are expressed in terms of impacts to the performance of a programme’s intended ‘effects’, expressed by Appleby in interview paradoxically as ‘certainties’ yet curiously undefined, cost growth to the programme, or time slippages. He mitigates these risks by
proposing project interventions; that is, more project management, more governance, or the application of more resource, and demonstrates his actions by reporting what he has done to a variety of stakeholders. As the EPCOT IPT Business Plan has it

Management of the expectations and engagement of all stakeholders can be key to success…the current level engagement of each is regularly assessed and recorded in a manner that assists the Stakeholder Management Process

(MoD, 2006:11)

Appleby states that, prior to smart acquisition, he would not have been able to think in this manner or respond so effectively. His management skills have been taught and subsequently fine-tuned by the smart acquisition initiative to the extent that his responses to problems and issues are now, almost, intuitive and automatic. For the Wing Commander, and he believes for his colleagues also, this is a desirable, organisationally beneficial and implicitly efficient state of affairs

You can’t underestimate what smart acquisition has done for us. Take me, I now have the confidence to laser-in on bad performance and can direct strong governance to where it is best needed. (Interview: Appleby, 2007)
It seems that smart acquisition, as manifestation of a governmentalist sense of power, has secured Appleby’s compliance by manufacturing his responses and training his beliefs. He is now an agent of the smart acquisition discourse to the extent that his personal agency and the managerial intent of smart acquisition are now one and the same. Appleby has been subliminally socialised and subjectivised into a role required of him by smart acquisition, a role that is both social and economic in flavour. I shall return to the theme of economic intent later in this chapter but for the moment I wish to focus on the social.

It is perhaps self-evident, but often forgotten, that organisations such as the EPCOT IPT are a social construct. We understand the impact of the notion of power better by reflecting that

Organisations are social entities that are goal-directed...comprised of people and groups...and is the prominent social institution of our time (Daft, 1995:11).

Accordingly, people trade and share notions of meaning and valuing through the social frameworks of networks and organisations. It is through this sense of human circuitry and social reticule or mesh that the capillary nature of power can be manifested within organisations. Both Foucault (1980) and Lukes (2005) view power as a complex, multi-dimensional social function,
or as Fraser (1989) describes it, a phenomenon grounded in a multiplicity of practices and functions that form relationships across groups in modern society. Throughout the EPCOT IPT these practices and functions are overtly and implicitly those of smart acquisition. I will take this idea of ‘practice’ and ‘function’ in turn.

Wing Commander Appleby describes the functions within the project team as the lines of development (Interview: Appleby, 2007). He echoes the statement within the business plan that these lines of development provide the functionality for focusing efforts on the delivery of what he perceives to be the key goals of the project team whilst, critically, meeting the needs of the IPT’s customers. The lines of development, to recall from chapter 7, are concerned with ‘strategic enabling’, ‘partnering and contracting’, ‘people’, and ‘leaning’, all of which contribute to the key development line of ‘transformation’, in turn delivering the intent of smart acquisition (MoD, 2006: 9).

The practices that team members undertake to deliver these functions are the practices of project management. The project team has management ‘schedules’ to deliver ‘continuous improvement’ to military capability. It practices the generation of work breakdown structures to align resources to tasks, and talks about ‘partnered solutions’ with industry and value for money contract (Interview: Korn, 2007). This language of management corralled across these practices and functions inculcates smart acquisition across
relationships within the project team so that the discourses and activities of the everyday equate to expressions and generations of power. As Foucault (1980) would have it, power is constructed through the socialisation of people but power also resides within the people themselves. It is transmitted through one to another as it colonises bodies and homogenises agency. Professional mastery within the project team, for Foucault, can be nothing but the absorption of the power construct.

These functions and practices form mechanisms of power, therefore, that ‘mould the soul’, in the phrase of Lukes (2005: 91), of each member of the EPCOT IPT. The boundary of what is normal and effective work – anything within smart acquisition – is clearly articulated and separated from characteristics of the abnormal and ineffective – the organisations and perceived practices that existing before smart acquisition, or any manner of thinking that challenges the rational, managerialist discourse of smart acquisition. There is a binary choice between the good and the bad, a choice framed by discourse. But of course this contrived visibility of choice means that there is no choice, for who would vote to be the fool?

Join the team, play the game and progress, or be left behind. You’re either for the transformation of the IPT, the lines of development, better management of our equipment, or you’re out. There’s no time for passengers. We’re doing this for a reason...We are at war! (Interview: Appleby, 2007)
Team members must embrace smart acquisition. Not to do so is to reject logic, reason and the techno-rational proof of economic society. Also, there is no alternative role for a team member to play other than that orchestrated by smart acquisition. A ‘rejective’ team member is a rejected team member, a person possessed of no economic or social utility. And this constructed reality becomes even more powerful when it unfolds against a backdrop of ever-present combat and military support operations.

In this sense, power within the EPCOT IPT is an interlocking, interdependent multiplicity of faculties and functions, mechanisms and nodes of understanding that shape personality and generate individual and collective meaning. The team member must reside within these multilayered assemblages of both purpose and purposefulness, operating and trapped within a social and managerial capillary of unified and unitary thought.

There are two powerful, underpinning strands of thought that collude to generate this effect of techno-rational accord within the project team. The first of these is the sense of observation and surveillance, systemic and pervasive, that face team members. The second is the internalisation by an individual of external fields and processes of domination, so that power is not an external phenomenon but an internal dominant set of automatised references.
Let me, initially, take this sense of observation and surveillance. The EPCOT IPT, at both team and individual levels, is observed through the reporting mechanisms and activities that the team has in place. The team must conform to a business plan and a set of indicators are generated against which performance is measured monthly. Behaviours and activities are formed to meet those indicators ensuring a collective congruence to the smart acquisition intent. As the team leader writes in the Business Plan

In order to gauge the levels of success against the delivery of [our business] task and the transformational task a business dashboard will be used. The dashboard will capture the performance in month using colour codes and the expected trend of performance using arrows (MoD, 2006: 11).

In addition, I was told by Michaela (Interview: Michaela, 2007) that the heads of branches and the owners of the lines of development have also generated their own ‘key performance indicators’ that feed into the business dashboard which, interestingly, the project team also refer to as a ‘scorecard’. From the plans developed by these team leaders, each are responsible for updating their own dashboard which will automatically generate the top level business dashboard.
We’re all obsessed by the scorecards – both generating them and trying to understand what they’re telling us. You can see them on noticeboards everywhere. We even have an interactive TV that tells the team how we’re performing in accordance with the dashboard. (Interview: Michaela, 2007)

Critically, the transformation team is tasked by the team leader to provide guidance, assurance and coherence for user guidance for the dashboard process. This process furnishes a weekly compliance meeting with all dashboards and minutes published on internal websites and placed on these noticeboards. Simply put, team members must conform to the smart acquisition discourse or their deviancy will be made highly public through regimes of visibility, with their deviancy subsequently addressed by senior management.

It is significant that the team members internalise the requirements of senior management in this manner. Bourdieu (1990) argues that power is projected from a multiple set of fields that are external to the individual but, thereafter, this sense of power is internalised and accepted as normal, manifested as responsible behaviour by the individual whose personal sense of agency aligns to the external dominion and intent of the power he or she has absorbed. The subtleties of things such as the business dashboard, team meetings and key performance indicators lead to this emotional, internal self-imposed alignment, flavoured with the compelling, self-validating hypotheses of knowledge and best practice. Consequently, the
technologies and explanations that form this knowledge provide a sound agent-socialisation and explication of power within the EPCOT IPT.

Wing Commander Appleby told me that

What I’ve learnt within the project team, I’ve learnt from smart acquisition. That’s true for most of us, but there are, I suppose, ink spots of hope and rebellion across the IPT who think differently (Interview: Appleby, 2007).

Yet technologies and explanations represent the manner in which objects of thought are constructed, validating self-legitimising regimes and articulations of knowledge. I shall come to those, the ‘ink spots’ or rebels who hold to different truths shortly, but it is clear that smart acquisition profoundly permeates the EPCOT IPT. It is the only way to think, perceive, respond and act. A single, all-embracing discourse permeating all those it touches – a capillaried extrapolation of power.

9.5 The EPCOT IPT’s Triptych

Derived from this governmentalist sense of power, the key technologies that manifest power into and across team members are badged in terms of notions of ‘modern’, ‘management’ and
‘homogenisation’. I introduced these themes under the banner of the smart acquisition triptych in chapter 6. Across the set of interviews and group sessions conducted within the EPCOT IPT these three elements were consistently raised as significant to the smart acquisition battle plan, but also perceived as important elements in their own rights. It is these three concepts I now wish to explore within the context of this smart acquisition project team.

It is clear from the EPCOT IPT’s Business Plan that transformation is being pursued because there is a sense that the processes, behaviours, organisations and even people prior to smart acquisition were somehow inefficient or inadequate. Rather, project teams need to modernise

The future of the project team focuses on delivery in a modern sense, with a clear line from industry to the front line commands…In order to make this work it is critical that we modernise and manage the partnerships to achieve our customer’s objectives (MoD, 2006: 5).

A significant driver for this within the EPCOT IPT, beyond this notion of somehow transforming a self-referencing organisation, is the drive to generate private money for public services (Shaoul, 2005). The project team has as its intent the stated objective of transferring functionality to industry so that future aircraft platforms will be serviced and maintained by its industry partner.
It believes that industry is better able to manage these sorts of services and that corporate money will be invested in front line services. The team leader told me that this was his ambition for industry and why he had embraced his industry partners – namely modern business competencies and the availability of industry’s money (Interview: Yossarian, 2007). Of course, I can find no evidence that industry has invested significantly in aircraft maintenance and services. Rather, the money has flowed the other way with the EPCOT IPT paying for a service from industry. Additionally, there is the sense that by partnering with industry, somehow the EPCOT IPT will be able to better manage the risks that it faces by tapping into core industrial and commercial competencies which are seen, explicitly, as somehow better than what exists within the public sector. These factors collude to provide an underpinning neoliberal discourse for the EPCOT IPT that corals its thinking and allows for a so-called transformation programme through the lens of modernisation.

Throughout earlier chapters I constructed the rationale that public sector teams sought to modernise their management, and that this self-referenced sense of management was formed through constructs of technological competencies and notions of best practice

Industry can do this better than us. The private sector has the background in management, is not bloated and inefficient…
Their behaviours and competencies are what we need within defence acquisition. (Interview: Nately, 2004)

The management reforms within the EPCOT IPT are presented as a techno-rationalist response to complexity, whereby the project team has learnt from industrial partners and, as a consequence, is committed to insert effective management practices to better meet the needs of consumers. To do this, the EPCOT IPT will build and empower teams that can generate their own performance indicators and management practices, provided they align to the templates and practices set out by smart acquisition. It is, managerially, the delegated power to comply, so that management technologies and practices will better manage this pre-stated sense of risk through the integration of industry within the project team.

The IPT will use documented governance throughout its business. Project, programme and commercial areas will conduct their business underpinned by clear statements of strategy, management planning, risk and opportunity management and stakeholder management. (MoD, 2006: 10)

Transforming the project team into this management construct is a core ambition of smart acquisition which utilises a common-sense, rational linear transformation model to instil change. Self-referencing certainly, but self-justifying also, and, as a consequence, enormously powerful.
Moreover, within the EPCOT IPT the stated management ‘lines of development’ of ‘strategic enabling’, ‘partnering and contracting’, ‘people’ and ‘leaning’ are all being enacted through a deliberately considered and engineered set of management processes brigaded around notions of project management. There is but one way of working that is legitimate and best practice, and people conform to these constructs as there is simply no alternative ways of working or perceiving problems. These processes, the core values and beliefs that give rise to them are derived from a taxonomy of language and practice from industry and commerce. The EPCOT IPT has become an economic entity possessed of business flavours and hues, modern, managerialist and homogenised in terms of thought and action. This is the intent and legacy of smart acquisition.

Also, in chapter 5 I discussed crafting an analysis of subjectivity and how the self can best be captured and understood within the context of smart acquisition. My assertion of the EPCOT IPT is that people have become homogenised to the extent that the individual and the group are interchangeable in terms of values and responses. There is an ontological perspective whereby the EPCOT IPT members are conscious agents comprised of thoughts and emotions. Secondly, there is an ethical perspective whereby a person is what they perceptively ought to be; that is virtuous, knowledgeable and useful. Thirdly, an epistemological perspective offers the view that the self is expressed through norms, knowledge and constructs of
normalcy to which individuality converges. Lastly, there is a technical strand through which project team members exercise practices and regimes of knowledge in order to improve or develop as a better project manager (Rose, 1999).

Through these four paradigms the individual has aligned him or herself to the power construct and transformational intent of smart acquisition. Because technologies and explanations represent the manner in which knowledge or critique are constructed, the only valuable knowledge worth possessing within the project team is that yielded and offered by smart acquisition. It has the status of self-evident truth, as the technologies and practices, within the narrative at least, are demonstrably effective in industry. The practices, the technologies and the people they inculcate and wrap, are formed within the EPCOT IPT as economic entities through a myriad of complex internal and external markets. This economic rationalism is what I now come to discuss.

9.6 The Military Team as Economic Phenomenon

Throughout this analysis one simple thought or concept has kept returning to my mind, namely, that the EPCOT IPT is first and foremost a military team and function or arm of the state. How is this reconciled with the economic, business rationalism of smart acquisition? Government within and of the state is a rational and
calculated set of activities undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities, of which the EPCOT IPT is but one, that work through a variety of techniques and modes of knowledge that intend to shape our conduct (Dean, 2007). Within this construct, governmentality, at one level, is merely the manner in which notions of government are considered and thought about and represents the different mentalities or attributes of government.

Yet it is more than just the manner in which government is objectivised and perceived. Foucault (1991: 102) specifically sees government as being for the populace as a whole whereby an element of government such as the EPCOT IPT is concerned with the well-being and safety of the whole of society, but through a very specific prism – the economy. Governmentality is, therefore, a set of relationships between government and forms of power and authority embracing permeating ideas of power and authority, directed through formal constructs of sovereignty, discipline and personal mastery. Moreover, there is a correlation between sovereignty, discipline and this sense of personal mastery within the bureaucratic apparatus of the state that is driven by and defines notions of economic effects and transformational efficiencies (Foucault, 1991: 106). Government, therefore, equates to these assemblages of power expressed specifically through the collusion of the individual, so that an entity such as the EPCOT IPT is merely a manifestation or representation of population as resources for economic ends.
This is fascinating in the context of a military team. Within chapter 5 I introduced a characteristic of governmentality (Foucault, 1991: 65) as one which contextualises this economic idea of population as resource, expressed within regimes of risk, reward and mitigation whereby security and military policies and practices are predominantly for the protection of the population as a whole and the economic interests it enables. It is a concept that places team members within EPCOT IPT as both subject of power and agent for the protection and management of the state and economy (Dean, 2007: 21). The values, beliefs, practices and doctrines of the EPCOT IPT are wrapped around this notion of economic effects and resource maximisation. And the risks that the project team seek to manage and mitigate -

The IPT will ensure that in running its business all areas will do so underpinned by risk and opportunity management, thereby ensuring best use of resources (MoD, 2006: 10)

- are economic risks. Indeed, the EPCOT IPT Risk and Opportunity Register (MoD, 2007) captures risks that are expressed in terms of time delays, expressed as ‘man days’ or costs; an economic not military taxonomy.

I discussed this sense of economic primacy with a senior commercial manager, Korn (Interview: Korn, 2007), from within the project team. She informed me that the mechanisms of supply and
demand, pricing and the ‘smart’ application of resource from both within the EPCOT IPT and the industry partners was what the project team was about. It was, therefore, not a surprise to have the project team characterised as ‘economic’ rather than ‘military’. Indeed, for Korn, smart acquisition was about efficiency and project effectiveness which are economic, not military phenomena.

This whole process, painful and challenging though it inevitably is, is about economic efficiency and getting the best products and services for our money. It’s probably right to say that we need more economic and less military skills.

(Interview: Korn, 2007)

In consequence, the EPCOT IPT serviceman, servicewoman or civil servant becomes an economic actor, for the project team is concerned with economic outcomes. The assemblages of power and constructs of knowledge that shape and define the agency of the individual within this project team are projected and formed for those economic ends. Society, as population, is there to resource this never-ending economic vortex. That is the role of the EPCOT IPT, a complex, multifaceted agent for economic effects.
9.7 Conclusion

Throughout this chapter I have rejected the logic and dynamic of the techno-rationalist explanation of the EPCOT IPT within smart acquisition and unpacked the project team through a managerialist power lens offered by the works of Foucault and Lukes, amongst others, that I introduced in chapter 5, enhanced by my Smart Acquisition Triptych brought forward from chapter 6. I discussed pluralist notions of power that underscore this rationalist set of explanations associated with a linear transformation model and derived understanding of smart acquisition, and introduced Lukes construct of the third dimension of power, whereby power is effective in shaping responses and agendas through a number of indirect and hidden regimes of practices as well as through an observable narrative. The self is subjectivised into the roles and behaviours required by smart acquisition so that agency becomes merely a reflection of that economic, managerialist intent. This finds expression within the project team through the technologies and explanations of effectiveness and project efficiencies with which the team frames its world.

I explored these themes through a constructed triptych of notions of ‘modern’, ‘managerial’ and ‘homogenisation’, dwelling specifically on how these assemblages of understanding collude to form a homogenised project member where individual agency is predictable, pre-programme and common. I reflected on the
significance of this occurrence and what this might mean for ideas associated with personality, free-will and justice. In this context I reflect that smart acquisition has generated an economic team and an economic team member, as neoliberal phenomena.

This represents a dark, bitter depiction of the meaning of smart acquisition, its priorities, functionalities and impacts on individuals within defence procurement teams. Yet there are also people encountered who reject the coercions and compulsions of smart acquisition and attempt to use the organisations and processes to pursue a different agenda, derived from a critique of this neoliberal discourse.

Wing Commander Appleby (Interview: Appleby, 2007), in a moment of self-critical reflection, rather dramatically referred to these individuals as the ‘ink spots of hope’, perhaps dripped across smart acquisition’s pre-written text. For me, any considered, deliberate singular way of thinking or behaving – often dressed in prescribed garments of ‘best practice’ – can be potentially despotic and harming. Ink spots though, when joined together, can narrate alternative ways of making sense and meaning. A disquieting stance; a human, personal challenge to the dominant; a different, private truth.
Part 4

In this final part of the thesis I pull together the threads of my analysis. I first outline the tragedy of the RAF Nimrod MR2 aircraft XV230 explosion over Afghanistan in 2006 and the subsequent Haddon-Cave report of October 2009 (Haddon-Cave, 2009) which heavily criticised the culture of the MoD, its industry suppliers and the flawed rejection of functional military values in favour of a taxonomy of business and constructs of change management, as represented by smart acquisition.

I go on to summarise my thesis, drawing together my overarching argument that smart acquisition represents a governmentalist explication of reform that ensnares behaviours, processes, structures and agency within a dominant, all-embracing narrative that is almost theocratic in its intensity and omnipotent power. I explain the nature of my contribution to this governmentalist body of knowledge and how my work has further unfolded meaning and understanding. I also reflect upon the limitations of my research and describe areas of follow-on enquiry that would attenuate any constraints or weaknesses.

In this manner, smart acquisition, as change agent, is revealed as a technology of power, co-opting docile bodies within its organisations to perpetuate its narrative – the embodiment of Auden’s ‘low dishonest decade’. 
CHAPTER 10 – CONCLUSIONS

10.1 Introduction

On 2 September 2006, an RAF Nimrod MR2 aircraft, XV230, was on a routine mission over Helmand province in Afghanistan in support of the NATO operation in that country. The aircraft was travelling at a height that would keep it safe from enemy small arms fire, so the mission was not perceived as dangerous or unusual for the competencies of the aircraft or its crew. At 11:17:39 local time the aircraft exploded following a brief on-board fire.


The resulting RAF Board of Inquiry concluded that the probable physical cause of the fire and explosion was a fuel leak ignited by a warm engineering duct. A further independent review was established in December 2007 by the MoD, as a consequence of this
finding, to examine the safe operation and airworthiness of the Nimrod fleet of aircraft.

The barrister appointed to conduct this review, Charles Haddon-Cave QC, delivered his report to the Secretary of State for Defence on 28th October 2009 (Haddon-Cave, 2009). Its subsequent publication coincided with my final efforts to conclude this work and represents a powerful justification for my research. If Haddon-Cave was to provide findings of fact – the what of UK defence procurement, my work provides findings of analysis – the why and the how of military acquisition. The critical importance of my research is profoundly validated by the Haddon-Cave report as I shall come to explain.

Haddon-Cave’s sub-title for his report was ‘A Failure of Leadership, Culture and Priorities’, and was perceived by commentators as an unprecedented rejection of UK MoD procurement and support processes

The Ministry of Defence and Britain’s largest defence company were officially blamed yesterday for the deaths of 14 servicemen who were killed when an RAF Nimrod surveillance aircraft burst into flames over Afghanistan…In one of the most damning reports published, the MoD was accused of sacrificing the safety of members of the Armed Forces to cut costs. The ministry was guilty of a systemic
breach of the military covenant between the nation and the men and women of the Forces, the report said. (The Times, 29th October 2009)

The transformation journey that defence in the UK had been embarked upon, from the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (MoD, 1998) that launched smart acquisition to the crash of the Nimrod aircraft in 2006, had changed the military and civil service from a force that embraced notions of safety, duty and obligation to one which spoke and acted through a business and managerialist taxonomy, leading to unnecessary sacrifice and loss. The 2009 Nimrod Report (Haddon-Cave, 2009) seemed to reflect WH Auden’s painful, yearning lament of a ‘low, dishonest decade’\textsuperscript{5}, which I introduced in the conclusion to chapter 2.

There is one specific paragraph in this report that makes especially disturbing reading for the advocates of smart acquisition

The MoD suffered a sustained period of deep organisational trauma between 1998 and 2006…Financial pressures and cuts drove a cascade of multifarious organisational changes, which led to a dilution of the airworthiness regime and culture within the MoD, and distraction from safety…There

\textsuperscript{5} WH Auden’s poem: September 1 1939, in E Mendelson (Ed) WH Auden Selected Poems (1984)
was a shift in culture and priorities in the MoD towards ‘business’ and financial targets, at the expense of functional (military) values such as safety and airworthiness. (Haddon-Cave, 2009: 12)

Airworthiness and equipment safety, in short, were the victims of the smart acquisition managerialist reform agenda. The aircraft was lost and the servicemen named above needlessly sacrificed as a consequence.

Haddon-Cave also made comment of a culture of selfishness, reward and self-referenced promotion for change

Officers who effect ‘change’ are more likely to be noticed and promoted...There was a realisation by ambitious officers that being seen to initiate and effect ‘change’ in post was good, or at least good for them. They would be perceived as ‘positive’, ‘energetic’, a ‘moderniser’, a ‘person with good ideas’, and ‘willing to try new things’. The agents and apparatchiks of change gained quicker promotion. (Haddon-Cave, 2009: 561)

The officers of the RAF had embraced the smart acquisition modernising agenda, aligning themselves to its ambition and intent, pursuing managerialist, homogenised change with the burning zeal
of the recently converted. An army of docile bodies, inculcated in
the wider narrative of smart acquisition reform, just as was
articulated and analysed through my review of the EPCOT IPT,
where an officer was either

for the transformation of the IPT [and]…better
management…or you’re out. (Interview: Appleby, 2007)

This chapter concludes my analysis of smart acquisition and pulls
together the argument around an assessment of the manner, extent
and purpose of smart acquisition’s reform of defence procurement.
I dwell on the perspectives and insights that have been gleaned in
relation to the exercise of constructs of power within the
procurement system and its pervasiveness. I especially consider
whether individuals can possibly exercise agency and self-reflective
authority in the smart acquisition organisations as formed.

In so doing I bring together the penetrations into smart acquisition
offered by the immanent critique that has emerged through
engagement with my informants, especially from within the EPCOT
IPT, that has evoked the spirit and form of smart acquisition
through the often repetitive voices of these respondents.

Section 10.2 addresses the nature, form and structure of my research
and summarises my approach to the thesis. Thereafter, section 10.3
discusses the binary nature of smart acquisition, concluding that it
can be presented concurrently as rational, linear change discourse, conceptualised and legitimised through a perceived body of knowledge, but also as a technology of governmentality, framing and deploying notions of power that ensnare all those within smart acquisition whilst profoundly remoulding the very ideas of agency that were previously discussed.

I consider the co-option and promotion of what I refer to as docile bodies within the smart acquisition organisations, as forces that cause smart acquisition to endure and evolve, expelling challenge and neutering criticism. The manner in which my interviewees become caught-up in this governmentalist wrap is discussed and critically assessed.

I return to the simplicity of my principal research question

In what ways and to what extent did the managerialist initiative of smart acquisition change UK defence procurement at the start of the 21st century?

I consider the imperatives for smart acquisition, the perceived rejection of the public sector in favour of business and commerce, and the manner in which the discourse was framed by a ‘risk management narrative’. I discuss the way smart acquisition has endured, its cultural impact, and reflect on the nature and shape of
power within defence procurement as principal artefact of this sense of cultural norm.

In section 10.4 I articulate the contribution to knowledge that this thesis has made, seeking to ground my work in the governmentalist critiques of Foucault, Dean and Rose. The nature, exposition and operation of power within a governmentalist frame is discussed and unpicked. I reflect upon the impact of my derived smart acquisition triptych as a method for unpacking the ‘new public management’ reform agenda (Boden, Gummett, Cox and Barker, 1998) that the initiative represents and perpetuates. This section is finished with a discussion reflecting the limitation of this thesis, and offers an overview of where and how future research can build from this work.

In section 10.5, almost by way of a postscript, I reflect upon the impact of this research on me, its transformative effect, and the meanings I have mined from this work for my own purposes and quest for peace of mind. From the jungles of West Africa, through deserts and storms, a part of my life has been conducted in smart acquisition’s grasp. In this section I come to perceive that the phenomenon no longer has any hold on me. Understanding smart acquisition through this work has allowed me to cynically embrace it or reject it as I see fit. I can choose, depending upon the circumstances in question, and I am not bound by my choice. And this very act of selection is a demonstration of agency beyond smart
acquisition’s pervasive, controlling eye. Through it, I recover my humanity and project the person over the things that would control me, echoing a simpler truth. Thereafter, in section 10.6, I offer a final thought on the work.

10.2 The Nature and Construct of the Research

Throughout this work I have, in many ways, been a central character in the story. My access to project team staff, and wider military and civil service personnel has allowed me to unpick smart acquisition through the language, perspectives and concerns of a variety of practitioners and commentators. It remains an enduring paradox, of course, that without smart acquisition’s commitment to notions of ‘partnering’ and ‘learning’ from industry and commerce, I would not have been able to work with the project teams first hand, or been in a position to capture the thoughts and perspectives of participants or to access their management plans. The auto/ethnographical nature of my work would simply have been impossible without the smart acquisition premise that the defence sector needed a range of supposed commercial, industrial and transformational skills and self-referenced competencies that somebody like me somehow possessed.

Framing the voices that I encountered in a governmentalist critical discourse, and placing this analysis aside the traditional rational
explanations of smart acquisition reform, has enabled a wide-ranging and detailed consideration of smart acquisition that is both significant to defence procurement, but also reveals the importance of managerialist initiatives across the public sector. This analysis took shape across ten chapters, with this, chapter 10, pulling together the threads of my argument.

In chapter 1 I introduced smart acquisition as the change programme that was perceived to be transforming for the better defence procurement in the UK. A number of advocates believed that the programme was profoundly making the acquisition process for military equipment a more economic and efficient set of activities which, in turn, was driving military and national security operations to be more effective. Smart acquisition itself was comprised of new public sector organisations, a centralised set of management processes, a refreshed managerial body of knowledge and required behaviours, aligned to professional practitioners from Britain’s military, its civil service and industrial base.

Chapter 2 unveiled my methodological approach by discussing what I described as the ‘autobiography of the method’. This outlined my auto/ethnographical engagement with the defence and security community and corresponding industrial apparatus. I described my intent to reveal smart acquisition through a range of structured interviews and informal conversations with practitioners from within the defence project teams and other informed contacts,
identifying smart acquisition as a set of narratives, beliefs, relationships and physical organisations through which power is both formed and exercised. It was viewed as both ‘oppressive’, in that it constrained actions and responses, but also ‘constructive’ in that it casts, forms and defines persons and personalities within clearly defined social and economic constructs and norms. My methodology elucidated the theoretical model of smart acquisition as a rational, highly sensible and self-legitimising, change management programme. Thereafter I was able to introduce, in comparison, a more profound set of explanations through my emerging governmentalist alternative critique.

In chapter 3 I placed smart acquisition in a time-bound context by distilling important themes from the history of UK military equipment procurement. I especially analysed the various imponderables through which equipment is sourced and procured, such as the nature of military alliances, the maturity of emerging technological advances, future threats and political will. The perceived failures of defence procurement prior to the early 1990s were introduced and a rationale established for the development of smart acquisition from these constructs of failure and inefficiency.

Throughout chapter 4 I introduced and analysed the main factors of smart acquisition, its organisations, contrived body of knowledge and the functional teams and networks that promoted its establishment and operation. This analysis generated an
understanding of the smart acquisition reforms as a rational change programme. I discussed the managerialist view of the procurement process, the tools and initiatives, and framed this within what I described as the rational transformation model.

Smart acquisition was presented in its own terms as a common-sense, practical, set of public sector management reforms, designed and delivered to generate greater efficiencies, economies and market-led effectiveness. I revealed through interviews that there were senior people from the military, civil service and industry championing and celebrating this self-referencing perspective.

As I said in chapter 4, it was understandable that so many practitioners presented smart acquisition as a benign process, the sole objective of which was this sense of efficiency. Through partnering with industry, defence was seen to benefit from the sound management practices that were to be found within the supply base to defence procurement and a myriad of professional advisors.

In chapter 5 I robustly rejected this rational-economic managerialist view of smart acquisition. Leaning on the work of Foucault, Dean, Lukes and Rose, amongst others, I presented an alternative view of smart acquisition as neoliberal technology of government control and socialisation. Through this chapter I provided an alternative and, I believe, richer rival analytics of government to the rational
managerial explanation, with analytics as a term used merely to represent the examination and fabrication of the condition and factors under and through which regimes of practices, behaviours and understandings came to be formed and framed.

I offered notions of ‘problematisation’, whereby practices were critiqued and potential alternatives or solutions offered. I articulated the premise that, in a sense, the problematisation of defence procurement prior to smart acquisition was that the process was wasteful, inefficient and ineffective, for which the cure was greater managerial control, homogenisation of project processes and behaviours and the modernisation of organisational structures, forms and practices.

Modes of ‘problematisation’ revolved around critiques of bureaucracy, discourses of practitioner incompetence and functional rigidity to which the response was the rigours of market rationality applied through institutional reform, free-market pricing mechanisms, competition and enterprise – what I came to discuss as the neoliberal agenda.

Within public regimes of practices, programmes such as smart acquisition through assemblages of knowledge, behaviours, notions of self-evident truths and technologies coagulate to provide meaning, self-regulation and external validation. People become ensnared in these regimes, because alternative meanings are
presented as heresies or ridiculed as inefficient or, somehow, not proper knowledge. In this way, smart acquisition is both a soft control of individuals who become aligned to its cadences as the music to a different song has become lost or tainted, but also an overt governmental control backed by legal forms and commercial notions of authority, obligation and sovereignty. A notion of government governing through constructs such as smart acquisition via a form of indigenous alliances between organisations, individuals and discourses, omnipotent in their force and effect.

In chapter 6 I went on to construct from this grounding in governmentality a revised explanatory model for smart acquisition. I introduced prevalent, recurring themes of modernisation, managerialism and homogenisation, and matured the discussion of the change programme as cultural phenomenon and neoliberal construct. I offered a revised analytical model for smart acquisition, postulated within these preceding notions of governmentality, as a critique of the simple linear change model.

I specifically unpacked what I described as the Smart Acquisition Triptych formed from these notions of modernisation, managerialism and homogenisation of process. I discussed, as a contextualisation, modernisation as a common theme across the public sector in the UK, and discriminated between forms of modernisation and modernity. I anchored my alternative discourse of managerialism through the critical lens of governmentality, and
the homogenisation of military procurement through enforced and learnt common aims and objectives, values and principles, and an inevitable core set of processes.

My early chapters, therefore, were designed to set the context of smart acquisition, its historical antecedence, organisational drivers and design intent. My work offered two competing frameworks for analysis and understanding, namely a rational linear change model and a complex theoretical critique matured from advanced notions of governmentality.

In chapter 7 I introduced a smart acquisition integrated project team, the EPCOT IPT, through which, as a fractal of the wider smart acquisition organisations, processes and people, I began to critically assess the impact on defence procurement of smart acquisition. I reported that between 2005 and 2007 I had the opportunity to work with and observe at close hand the efforts and behaviours of this integrated project team within the MoD. The team’s management offered access to their project documentation, staff and wider stakeholders, and contributed willingly to my research. Insights and emerging findings were shared with the project’s management as my work progressed, which, I hoped at the time, would help to influence and shape management’s critical thinking in relation to both its own schedule of work and people.
Using managerialist language prevalent throughout the project, I narrated what project team members described as the ‘transformation journey’ to the EPCOT IPT through smart acquisition, its strategy, business model, the perceived role of industry and its so-called project lines of development. I reflected upon this managerialism being championed in a military setting, and analysed the dominance of smart acquisition in forming and controlling the agenda for reform and project management.

In chapter 8 I ran the team through a more critical lens in projecting the EPCOT IPT as a totem of smart acquisition. I began by framing the project team as an agent of rational change, seeing the team through its own self-perceived reflection as embedding and promoting the values and principles of smart acquisition through the roll-out of its self-labelled body of knowledge. As part of this rationalism, I commented upon the EPCOT IPT’s strategy of partnering with industry to develop and deliver military equipment to the UK’s armed forces. I further discussed and analysed management’s intent to ‘lean the business’, which was the programme of reducing military and civil service staff from the project team replicating a number of traditional public sector functions within the industrial base. I emphasised that these initiatives and events were supported, justified, tested and evaluated, and, importantly, proven as sound management action through the dynamic of rational linear change.
An alternative discourse was then generated in chapter 9 to offer a contradictory, governmentalist understanding. I aligned the values, activities and stated objectives of the EPCOT IPT to a defined and critical sense of analytics of government. The dimensions of power associated with my critique of governmentality were overlaid onto the project team, peered through the critical lens of the Smart Acquisition Triptych. Power was revealed as possessing a profound connection with interlocking notions of management knowledge and senses of what was identified as ‘professional’ and perceived ‘best practice’.

These mechanisms of power were revealed as repressing contradictory, challenging behaviours and perspectives and producing practitioners socialised to smart acquisition’s values and norms. The EPCOT IPT’s application of the smart acquisition agenda was, thereafter, conceptualised as a multiplicity of functions and practices beyond which agency could not be effectively formed, exercised or valued. As a consequence, it was seen to generate and promote a neoliberal discourse beyond the benign understanding and self-referencing justifications and logic of the rational change agenda.

Central to this sense of pervasive neoliberal discourse and governmentalist understanding is the notion or risk management. There is an alignment and inculcating affinity between the neoliberal state, the technologies and rationalities of risk
management that can be applied to state activities such as defence 
procurement, and notions of programme randomness and 
uncertainty (Dean, 1999). In this sense, smart acquisition becomes 
an instrument or technology of the neoliberal state as it forms an 
organisational and procedural risk mitigation strategy to manage 
perceived, pre-reform failures.

Individuals across the smart acquisition organisations undertake 
their professional activities through a derived calculative risk 
rationality that legitimises responsive behaviours and pre-conceived 
competencies, guiding individual efforts but also securing self-
interested, homogenised concurrence. Agency is exercised through 
this pre-constructed risk management discourse which, logically, 
can suffer no challenge and frames absolute compliance.

Smart acquisition, consequently, represents a powerful force within 
the risk society (Beck, 1992). Such a society is one that is dominated 
by notions of risk and mitigation initiatives formed as rational 
service programmes to minimise or manage these very notions of 
risk. It is a closed-loop, self-referencing governmental dynamic 
enwrapping smart acquisition and other public sector reform 
programmes.

Through this analysis and structure I was able to achieve two 
distinct outcomes. Firstly, I came to perceive smart acquisition as 
existing within a binary state; that is as something which is both a
rational change management phenomenon, in a superficial form, and, at a more profound level of analysis, as a controlling, legitimising governmentalist force. I discuss, by way of conclusion, this binary nature shortly.

The second outcome is that I have come to profoundly feel and embrace the effects of the transformational nature of academic research, analysis and understanding, perhaps in part derived from the auto/ethnographical nature of my work. I come on to discuss this in sections 10.5 and 10.6.

10.3 The Binary Nature of Smart Acquisition

Researchers in quantum physics address themselves to something that they call the ‘central mystery’ of science (Gribbin, 2007). This, perhaps, can best be described in the summary form of an idealised experiment. Imagine a source of electrons, an electric gun, if you like, similar to the tube to be found in a typical television set. Add to this a simple screen with two subatomic sized holes in it, and an electron detector. Electrons are then fired through these two holes and the results captured by scientists.

Physicists report that what is observed is very strange (Kaku, 2005). Whenever an electron is detected by a researcher it behaves like a particle, but whenever the scientist is not physically monitoring the
experiment, at that moment the electron behaves like, and possesses the physicality of a wave. It seems to exist concurrently in both states, as physical matter and energy wave. This is remarkable and difficult to explain using science’s conventional analytical tools and constructs.

Likewise, smart acquisition exists in a duality, as both rational, legitimate discourse and change management dialectic, justifying and guiding perceived critical organisational change, but also at a deeper level as a force which exercises modes of power through the colonisation of bodies and the homogenisation of agency. Acceptance by individuals within the project teams of the smart acquisition reforms represents the absorption of a restraining, corralling, controlling power construct. As stated in chapter 9, smart acquisition is revealed as an interlocking, complex, interdependent multiplicity of functions, behaviours, beliefs and mechanisms that generate individual and group meaning and understanding, aligning agency to this dominant narrative.

A narrative, however, that is superficially benign, rational and expressed in the causal, linear terms of the management transformation model which, once deployed, will yield economic efficiencies and greater management effectiveness. It can hardly be otherwise, for smart acquisition measures the effects of these things through its own discourse and on its own terms. And when all is
said, what could be more normal, desirable or altruistic than the quest to capture and import good management?

So smart acquisition resides and can be explained in both states, that of the rational and that of the governmentalist discourse. The person within the smart acquisition organisation must exist and operate in these multilayered assemblages of purpose and purposefulness, enwrapped in what I have described as a social and managerial capillary of unified and unitary belief.

Understanding the manner in which smart acquisition was implicated in the process of change to defence procurement in the UK was the crux of this research. The short answer is that smart acquisition is the process of change, constructed of a powerful set of managerialist tools and explanations that capture individuals within the dominant discourse of smart acquisition, and use these individuals as exemplars to ensnare others, so that there is only one way of believing, understanding and acting. The long answer to the premise set is, of course, this thesis.

Smart acquisition is legitimising discourse and control mechanism as one, with this duality representing its profound importance to defence and the wider public sector. It is the cause of and companion to my ‘low dishonest decade’, or to Haddon-Cave’s ‘failure of leadership, culture and priorities’ (Haddon-Cave, 2009).
Its effect, in part, can be witnessed in the corteges of the returning dead.

10.4 The Contribution to Knowledge

This thesis has contributed to the knowledge of public management and the importance of a managerialist agenda viewed from the perspective of the beginning of the 21st century. I have built on a rich and important body of work that expresses the power and dynamism of this force of ‘governmentality’. Specifically, I have come to define this term as a set of notions and explanations around how we consider governing and ordering ourselves and others across a wide social and economic spectrum, and how these exercises in power, control and socialisation are presented through the regulation of the individual, group and team. Importantly, this definition also deals with and enwraps the processes, behaviours and beliefs that constitute and bind them. Government, in this way, is revealed as extending well beyond the notion of the state, a concept which is embraced by Dean’s form of ‘govern-mentality’ (2007).

Dean has, himself, built on the work of theorists such as Schattschneider (1960) and Bachrach and Baratz (1970) who have argued that power is exercised when an agenda overtly or unconsciously creates or perpetuates a barrier to the challenge of a
dominant discourse or perspective. I have demonstrated that this appears prevalent across the smart acquisition organisations, in that the dominant managerialist narrative is presented as immutable and exclusive.

This perspective is picked-up and expanded upon by Lukes (2005) who articulated a third dimension of power, supplementing that which is visible and that which is constrained by the protective, dominant nature of an agenda or belief-set. This third dimension is one where power resides in the very narratives and structures manifested in society which frame our lives and cause people to socialise, align and subliminally train their beliefs and responses to a dominant accord. These indirect and hidden manifestations ensure agent compliance, and the search for these explanatory tools and constructs is the nature of the emerging field of governmentalist study.

My thesis sits firmly in this tradition and represents a significant contribution to our understanding of the force and manifestations of the governmentalist wrap. I am not aware of a governmentalist critique being applied before to a society’s military or defence procurement process so, consequently, my work has enhanced our knowledge of this key public activity and is timely and profound given the UK’s current commitment to warfighting operations. I believe that the review of the EPCOT IPT represents a fractal study of wider smart acquisition, with smart acquisition, in turn,
providing a wider example of the forces and functions being applied to the broader public sector under the neoliberal banner.

This is significant, for governmentality does not try to address ‘what’ government is but rather applies itself to understanding ‘how’ government is (Rose, 1999), which brings in a sense of neoliberal perspective. Dean (1999) argued that this sense of neoliberalism is a dominant feature of modern constructs of government. Thatcherism and Blairism in the UK represent an important construct of this phenomenon whereby economic and social questions were engaged through a range of forces that marginalised the social-democratic consensus of a welfare state, coupled with a withdrawal from social-interventionist instincts and practices. The neoliberal consensus was promulgated through constructs of managing risks and change that led to wars of opportunity and national protection and the insertion of dominant managerialist practices.

For Foucault (1982; 1991), his theory of governmentality responded to this perceived withdrawal from the liberal state and represented a schematic of the history of social government and personal conduct through the ages. The monetarist economics of the time, however, the social and international conflicts, and consensual neoliberal politics of the late 20th century represent, for Foucault, the dialectical consequence of the genealogy of government. My work resides in this tradition, and contributes to this insight and
enhanced Foucauldian explanations of society and the self. It is an important addition.

My work, though, is constrained and limited by this governmentalist perspectives. I have offered a traditional, linear view of management and public sector reform, and critiqued this approach through the governmentalist paradigm and my Smart Acquisition Triptych of the ‘modern’, the ‘managerial’ and the ‘homogenised’. As such, I see smart acquisition as residing in a binary, dual state as I discussed in section 10.3. Other perspectives or approaches have not been considered or applied, which could be perceived as a constraint on or limitation of the work.

Also, I have only considered in detail the thoughts, behaviours and management plans of one defence project team, the EPCOT IPT. Important insights or views that may be contained in other project teams or agencies have not been captured or considered. I have sought to mitigate or attenuate this shortfall by including the comments and thoughts of a number of individuals who work in the defence market beyond the EPCOT IPT, but the predominant view remains that offered by this project team.

The insight offered by the EPCOT IPT is important knowledge, however. The manner in which smart acquisition has co-opted the docile bodies of the project team into its agenda and inculcated them with managerialist zeal is presented powerfully and
meaningfully through the project team’s own voice and language. The manner in which people become ensnared in such a dominant narrative is best revealed through the lens of auto/ethnography and is a powerful explication and analysis of the project team’s story.

There remains much work to be done. Taken my derived Foucauldian construct of governmentality from the reformist environment of defence procurement to other public sector initiatives is an obvious path to be followed by the lessons and critical framework offered by this work. Likewise, a greater, more detailed exploration of the individual as neoliberal subject and agent ensnared in a governmentalist wrap is important work to follow-up from this thesis. I also believe that unpicking the future, inevitable reform of the reform through my managerialist lens is an important additional baton to pass to tomorrow’s researcher. That person may even be me.

Whilst residing in a governmentalist epistemology, my work also has significance beyond the academic. The defence procurement process in the UK is deeply flawed and, when assessed on its own terms from the perspective of 2009, smart acquisition is increasingly being interpreted as a profoundly failing process (Haddon-Cave, 2009). My work could, and should, influence policy-makers and contribute to the debate around what comes next. Is this more managerialist reform – the reform of the reform, perhaps – or alternative approaches to securing society’s public services and
acquisitions? I make, deliberately so, no case for what an alternative procurement process should look like, but I make a strong case for an alternative.

10.5 The Transformative Effects of Research

I first put pen to paper in 2003 to outline, in broad terms, the path that this research would take, triggered by the sense that something troubling and unexplained was occurring in defence procurement and military support. I had served in the British armed forces, and subsequently worked in the shadows that hide the defence industry’s relationship with government, but felt that understanding military acquisition remained illusive and slippery. Having the knowledge and analytical skills to explain it to a third party was simply beyond me, or anyone that I knew or had read.

This thesis has helped me to find my voice and to speak of these matters with authority and sympathy towards the people ensnared within smart acquisition, but also with a clear and unambiguous simplicity. Smart acquisition as a phenomenon matters profoundly, because it enwraps people, their ambitions, behaviours and beliefs, within a singular, exclusive theology of understanding and taxonomy of expression, centred on a belief in the inalienable benefits of economic transaction, business efficiency and management orthodoxies, with these factors charged to somehow
deliver a country’s sovereign force. A person’s agency has been sacrificed to this omnipotent discourse as, of course, have been the very lives of young people who serve in Britain’s armed forces.

In these pages I have tolled the bell of remembrance and regret for lives extinguished. But it is also a chime of analysis and understanding, and this is probably the most profound effect that my work has had on me. Namely, that the knowledgeable voices of the past and present can bring meaning and revelation to the most complicated and inaccessible forces and forms. By understanding smart acquisition through the richer, more thorough, analysis of governmentality, the phenomenon loses its mystery and omnipotence, thereby rendering its power ill-fitting and contrived. I may wonder at the controlling, self-described, change initiatives such as smart acquisition and similar prevalent governmentalist initiatives throughout the traditional public sector, but I will no longer fear them.

Fear – in chapter 2 I shared how scared I was, being at war, at the mercy of factors beyond my control and, at that time, understanding. That fear has lived with me for many years since, clawing at me in the quiet hours, shaping my relationships and responses, a barrier to the many people I love and have wished to love.
I am no longer afraid. The dragons and dinosaurs have been revealed as shallow caricatures unworthy of fear; the wise men and generals of armies, fools; the explanations and chants of the priests of smart acquisition, follies and falsehoods. The transformational manner of research, for me, points to a powerful revelation. Fear crumbles and vanishes when touched by understanding, and communicating and sharing that understanding is an unbridled force for good. It is my sincerest hope that my work, from now, reaches this simple, transformative ideal.

Indeed, the test of research’s power to transform the person is the story of what happens next. My thesis suggests that I can write that story for myself, that I will not exclusively offer my soul to forces and factors seeking to shape and define me. Of course I live in the real world and, as all of us, must engage with these forces, occasionally trading agency for a livelihood. But I will make that choice for myself from a position of understanding and analytical perspective. And at the moments when I choose not to dance with the dinosaur, I will write, I will analyse, I will explain, critically assess and communicate.

Should others come to embrace the same choice that I make for myself, than I would have done my job well and written my own story. A small personal victory, perhaps hidden and unnoticed, but a triumph nonetheless.
10.6 A Final Thought

Explaining smart acquisition and understanding the binary nature of its existence has not reconciled me to the capillary effects of its roll-out and presence within defence procurement. The hidden-hand of its power is omnipotent and its managerialism an ever-present legitimisation of governmentalist forces that collude against demonstrations of initiative, judgement and insight – characteristics that in the past, on many occasions, appear to have well served the British military and people.

Unravelling and challenging smart acquisition matters, because human beings matter, soldiers on the front line, those others toiling in the smart acquisition organisations (and their future derivatives), you, me and our children. I have provided a framework and explanatory methodology for understanding smart acquisition, but what will its legacy be in the years that follow? Be sure, we shall all find out together, as one. It is a thought that chills me.
I have used pseudonyms sourced from Joseph Heller’s compelling work *Catch 22*. Mindful that sources could be, potentially, identified by offering exact dates of interviews and discussions, I have merely recorded the month and year. In this way I feel assured that subject anonymity is maintained, which is my obligation and intent.
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