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dc.contributor.authorCazeaux, Clive
dc.contributor.othercmet = Clive Cazeaux
dc.date.accessioned2016-01-11T16:13:59Z
dc.date.available2016-01-11T16:13:59Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.citationCazeaux, C. (2016) 'Epistemology and sensation' in Miller, H. (ed) Sage Encyclopaedia of Theory in Psychology. Sageen_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-1452256719
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10369/7441
dc.description.abstractSensation is recognized by epistemology as one of the sources of knowledge, alongside memory, testimony, reason, induction and introspection, but this has not always been the case. It is a defining feature of modern epistemology that the senses provide valuable information about the world that cannot be reached through reason alone. However, because the senses can have an intensity and uniqueness that is difficult to describe, it is sometimes not entirely clear what they offer as knowledge, or even whether epistemology has a secure and adequate grasp of them. This chapter explains some of the key theories of sensation in the history of epistemology, from ancient Greece to the present day, and shows how competing views of the relation between philosophy and science inform contemporary ideas about the senses.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.subjectSensationen_US
dc.subjectEpistemologyen_US
dc.subjectRationalismen_US
dc.subjectEmpiricismen_US
dc.subjectScienceen_US
dc.subjectMetaphysicsen_US
dc.titleEpistemology and sensationen_US
dc.typeOtheren_US
dc.date.dateAccepted2015-08-12


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